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The Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is a complex socio-technical system that 
ensures safe, efficient and cost-effective air traffic movements on the ground and in the 
air. The current ATM system is saturated as a result of an everlasting growth in air travel 
demand, leading to delays and potential negative safety impacts. In order to meet future 
demand, current ATM modernisation initiatives in the European Union and the USA are 
developing a new concept of operations based on strategic holistic system optimisation. 
On the airport surface, this is achieved by optimising operations not only during the take-
off, landing and taxiing phases, but also during the turnaround process on the apron. This 
requires the boundary of the ATM system to expand to include new elements, namely the 
apron. A key deficiency in current initiatives is that, while they focus on capacity, 
punctuality and cost-effectiveness of the apron, they do not address safety. This has 
potential negative impacts in terms of setting and prioritising safety targets.  
Unlike the rest of the aviation domain, which is aircraft-centric, the concept of apron 
safety is much wider and in addition to aircraft safety, it also includes occupational health 
and safety. Recent aviation safety statistics show that aircraft accidents attributed to 
ground handling operations are six times more frequent than those attributed to the 
ATM. Additionally, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) statistics show worse 
safety records on the apron when compared to the construction and agricultural 
industries. Considering the change in the ATM system boundary and the low aviation 
and occupational health and safety records, the airport apron has been identified in this 
thesis as a new safety-critical area of the future ATM system. Therefore, a key focus of 
this thesis is to address current deficiencies with respect to safety management on the 
apron, by developing a better understanding of the processes carried out on the apron 
and a new framework for safety assessment, as well as recommending enhancements to 
existing safety management practices. 
In contrast to existing safety management practices that are based on a dated 
understanding of safety (referred to as Safety-I), which is predominantly reactive, the 
framework proposed in this thesis, for the first time, adopts a state-of-the-art proactive 
and predictive understanding of safety (referred to as Safety-II) for the apron. The thesis 
demonstrates for the first time that the existing linear component-based models 
traditionally used for modelling apron safety do not account for the system complexity. 
Therefore, the proposed framework develops a state-of-the-art systemic functional Total 
Apron Safety Management (TASM) model and a corresponding taxonomy of factors that 




accounting for dependencies and dynamic interactions between different layers of the 
apron system (i.e. technological, human and organisational).  
The proposed functional model and taxonomy have been applied to three case studies in 
retrospective, prospective and system design analysis demonstrating the multi-purposive 
nature of the framework, particularly important under existing financial pressures. In 
retrospective analysis the proposed functional model and taxonomy have shown to 
identify systemic factors previously not found during the occurrence investigation. In 
prospective analysis, a new protocol for systemic and systematic hazard analysis in 
complex socio-technical systems (including the apron) was developed. Furthermore, a 
novel conceptual framework for a safety trend analysis based on the TASM framework 
was developed, offering a quick, simple, cost-effective analysis of large datasets. A key 
advantage of the TASM framework is that it is transferable to all ground handling 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION                                                       
The aim of this chapter is to present the background to the significant role of apron 
operations in assuring safety and efficiency of the overall Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
system and set the context of the research presented in this thesis. The chapter establishes 
the rationale, objectives and methodology for a new systemic framework for a holistic 
safety risk management of operations on the apron. Five research objectives are 
established to realise the framework. This is followed by a brief description of the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
The Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is a complex socio-technical system that 
ensures safe, efficient and cost-effective air traffic movements on the ground and in the 
air. To keep up with the continuous global air traffic growth of on average 1.8 percent 
annually (EUROCONTROL, 2013a), the ATM system needs to evolve. The leading 
regions, in terms of traffic volume, at present, Europe and the USA, are the main initiators 
of future ATM evolution, formulated in the global ATM Concept of Operations (ConOps). 
This ConOps is currently being implemented, and the required support technologies 
developed, coordinated by the SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) and 
NextGen (Next Generation Air Transportation System) research programmes in Europe 
and the USA respectively. In this new ConOps airports have been identified as a 
bottleneck in terms of capacity, environmental impact (SJU, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 
2008c, 2008b) and safety (Boeing, 2013). 
On the airport surface, this bottleneck is addressed by optimising operations not only 
during the take-off, landing and taxiing phases, but also during the turnaround process 
on the apron. To tackle inefficiencies, associated with turnarounds at airports, e.g. in 2006 
four out of five late departures attributed to the turnaround processes (EUROCONTROL, 
2007), the SESAR, NextGen and the European Commission proposed the following 
concepts and programmes: Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM), Departure 
Management (DMAN), Arrival Management (AMAN), Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS), Integrated Airport Apron Safety Fleet 
Management (AAS), Turnaround Integration in Trajectory and Network (TITAN) and 





programmes is expected to increase in efficiency, flexibility, predictability, punctuality 
and cost-effectiveness of the turnaround process on the apron whilst neglecting the safety 
aspect during turnaround. 
Statistics show high personal injury, aircraft, equipment and other property occurrence 
rates during ground handling operations. For instance, research conducted by the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom and the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
(BLS) in the U.S., identified that the Ground Handling (GH) workforce has higher 
accident rates than the workforce employed in the construction and the agricultural 
sectors (UK HSE, 2000a, BLS, 2013). Furthermore, in 2005 the Flight Safety Foundation 
(FSF) estimated: one ground handling occurrence resulting in property damage and nine 
personal injuries per 1000 flights (Lacagnina, 2007). In total, these occurrences on the 
apron have been estimated to cost the aviation industry over $10 billion annually in direct 
and indirect costs such as loss of reputation, impacts to schedules and passengers, hiring 
and retraining new staff to replace injured individuals, insurance costs for staff and 
operations, repairs, parts, and staff time to complete and test repairs (Flight International, 
2005). 
These unsatisfactory safety records can be associated with current reactive and piece-meal 
safety management practices on the apron underlined by the absence of the international 
legislative framework (ICAO, 2015, Studic et al., 2015). Consequently, the Ground Service 
Providers (GSPs) define their safety policy and objectives in a way that meets aircraft 
operator (i.e. Ground Operations Manual) and airport expectations (i.e. Airside safety 
requirements) in terms of safety and quality performance standards. Compounding this 
issue is the lack of a standardised terminology associated with the occurrence types, 
severity, reporting requirements, which creates data quality issues (Wilke, 2013, Wilke et 
al., 2014). Finally, in managing safety on the apron, the aviation industry focuses on 
reducing damage to the aircraft in isolation from other types of unwanted outcomes such 
as personal injuries of employees, equipment damage, infrastructure damage, operational 
disruptions or the environmental damage.  
On account of the above limitations, this thesis proposes a framework for a state-of-the-
art systemic functional Total Apron Safety Management (TASM) model and a 
corresponding taxonomy of factors that characterise different sources of variability of 
ground handling services. This is the first framework capable of accounting for 
dependencies and dynamic interactions between different layers of the apron system (i.e. 





observations, interviews, expert input and analysis of occurrence investigation reports 
across five airports worldwide. 
1.2 Aim and objectives  
Given the background above, the aim of this thesis is to develop a novel generic 
framework for a robust, systemic, systematic, retrospective, prospective and system 
design analysis to improve safety management and efficiency in apron operations. Five 
research objectives have been formulated to achieve this aim. 
1. Model the evolution in the ATM concept of operations. Develop a functional 
descriptive model of the ATM system that allows specification of its functional 
invariance and implementation variance. The model is used later to help identify the 
gap in the existing literature. 
2. Specify the apron system architecture by categorising and describing its components: 
physical architecture, operations, stakeholders and technology. This architecture is 
used later to inform the selection of an appropriate safety risk modelling approach 
for apron operations. 
3. Review the literature on the safety modelling paradigms. The identified strengths 
and limitations have the goal to inform the selection of the best theoretical match 
between the apron system characteristics and the required approach for its safety risk 
management. 
4. Develop a framework for a retrospective, prospective and system design analysis of 
apron operation. 
5. Demonstrate the application of the developed framework in retrospective, 
prospective and system design analysis of apron operation. 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
This thesis is organised in nine chapters as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides a systematic review of the ATM ConOps since its introduction in 
order to better understand its drivers, functions, and technologies. Each evolutionary 
transition in the ConOps is mapped with functional changes to derive a functionally 
invariant model of the ATM system. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that with the transition to the new ATM ConOps the apron 





critical area of the future ATM system, currently not addressed within the SESAR. 
Furthermore, in absence of standardised terminology, it proposes a set of apron specific 
occurrence definitions based on the best safety practices from the aviation, Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS), road traffic and punctuality literature. 
Based on the combination of literature, observations, interviews, structured and 
unstructured communication with the SMEs, Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of 
four aspects of apron operations: i) physical architecture, ii) ground handling services 
(operations), iii) participating stakeholders, and iv) the technology used on the apron.  
Chapter 5 caries out a comprehensive review of the two paradigms of safety science, 
which are then mapped to the principles and components of the Safety Management 
System (SMS). Established theoretical foundations about safety and its management are 
then mapped to apron operations to identify gaps in managing safety on the apron. 
On the basis of the i) safety literature, ii) observations across five airports worldwide, iii) 
interviews with 43 respondents working for the GSP, airlines and airports, and iv) SME 
input, Chapter 6 develops the Total Apron Safety Management (TASM) framework that 
includes a functional model and taxonomy of factors capable of capturing the complexity 
of apron operations.  
While Chapter 7 demonstrates the application of the TASM framework using three 
qualitative case studies, Chapter 8 discusses in turn the opportunities and requirements 
for the quantification of the TASM framework for all three applications and proposes a 
novel conceptual framework for a safety trend analysis, offering a quick, simple, cost-
effective analysis of large datasets. 
This thesis ends with Chapter 9 reviewing the contributions achieved throughout the 







Chapter 2 SPECIFICATION OF THE AIR TRAFFIC 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INVARIANCE 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the Air Traffic Management (ATM) concept of 
operations (ConOps) and its functional invariance. This is achieved in three ways. Firstly, 
by highlighting the most significant changes in its drivers, functions and supporting 
technology, a high-level evolution of the ATM system ConOps is presented. For each 
period in the ATM ConOps evolution, the key Operational, Functional, or Technological 
(OFT) elements that significantly affected safety in each period were discussed. Secondly, 
each evolutionary transition in the ConOps is mapped with functional changes to derive a 
functionally invariant model of the ATM system. Finally, the application of this functional 
model is demonstrated on a case study of the Part 2 of the SESAR ConOps. 
2.1 Air Traffic Management (ATM) Concept of Operations (ConOps) 
evolution 
The Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is a component of the much larger Air 
Transportation System that includes aircraft, airline operations, airport operations 
together with the operational environment in which these components exist and interact 
(Subotic et al., 2005). The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines ATM 
as an (ICAO, 2001b, p.21): 
“aggregation of the airborne functions and ground-based functions (air traffic services, 
airspace management and air traffic flow management) required to ensure the safe and 
efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of operations”.  
The main objective of the ATM system is to enable aircraft operators to meet their 
planned times of departure and arrival and adhere to their preferred flight profiles with 
minimum constraints and without compromising the required levels of safety (ICAO, 
2002b). 
In contrast to other modes of transport air transport has a greater flexibility in utilising its 
main medium – the airspace. Unfortunately, the processes currently used in managing air 
traffic still suffer from considerable inefficiencies, typically resulting in an under-





Historically, the ATM system has periodically approached its capacity limits. In order to 
minimise delays and increase capacity, changes to ATM have progressively been 
introduced in the form of new operational procedures (e.g. Reduced Vertical Separation 
Minima – RVSM), enabled amongst others by new technologies (e.g. Global Navigation 
Satellite System – GNSS). Since 2005 the aviation community, mainly in Europe and the 
United States, has been faced yet again with a significant capacity shortage. In Europe for 
instance, there is a danger that current capacity shortages will be accentuated with the 
expected air traffic increase of 1.8% per year, resulting in an expected 1.5 factor increase 
of the number of flights by 2035. The potential consequence of this is that up to 1.9 million 
flights, equivalent to 12% of the demand, could not be handled by the ATM system by 
2035 (EUROCONTROL, 2013a). 
The leading regions, in terms of traffic volume, at present, Europe and the USA, are 
expected to be the first to face the capacity shortages in the world and are therefore the 
main initiators of future ATM evolution. In order to address this capacity shortage and 
increase the efficiency of ATM without compromising safety, numerous research and 
development initiatives in Europe and the United States have led to the formulation of a 
new Concept of Operations (ConOps)1, founded on a trajectory-based instead of airspace-
based approach to air navigation. This ConOps is currently being implemented, and the 
required support technologies developed, coordinated by the SESAR (Single European 
Sky ATM Research) and NextGen (Next Generation Air Transportation System) research 
programmes in Europe and the USA respectively.  
ICAO developed the first written ConOps only in 2005: the Global Air Traffic Management 
Operational Concept for the future ATM system (ICAO, 2005b). Both to fill the gap prior to 
the year 2005 and to better understand the basis of the current and future ConOps, this 
chapter firstly provides a historical review of the evolution of the ConOps since the 
beginnings of aviation till the present time, on the basis of extensive literature reviews. 
The improved understanding of the ATM system ConOps evolution in this Section 
enables the derivation of the functionally invariant model of the ATM system. 
                                                      
1 The term ‘Concept of Operation’ (ConOps) of a system is defined as a user-oriented document that 
describes system characteristics of the to-be-delivered system from the user’s perspective. The 
document is used to communicate overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to the 
relevant stakeholders. It describes the user organisations, missions, and organisational objectives 







was the discovery of the commercial potential of flying. Flying machines were 
increasingly able to transport another passenger and/or goods in addition to the pilot. 
However, the importance of assuring safety of flight became apparent following the first 
fatal aircraft accident in 1908 (Whitehouse, 1965, Wiegmann and Shappell, 2012) caused 
by a failure of the propeller blade. As a response to this accident, the pilot and passenger 
were required to wear safety belts and crash helmets (Dille and Morris, 1966). 
Fortunately, this tragic event did not jeopardise the future growth of aviation and the 
production of flying machines, now widely known as aircraft, which started in France 
and was followed by Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the U.S. The number of aircraft 
and the people trained to manage them (pilots) started to rise gradually. This brought 
about a need for an operational change in the ConOps, namely the requirement for 
separation from other traffic to assure safety. During this period the responsibility for 
separation was fully the pilot’s, via visual means for separation, i.e. based upon ‘see and 
avoid’ techniques. 
2.1.2 During World War I (WWI) 
The ATM ConOps was revolutionised during World War I when aircraft started being 
used mainly for military purposes in Europe. In this period, the aircraft carrying a pilot 
and/or observer was flown according to its mission assigned by the military. 
Nevertheless, complete management of aircraft was in the hands of only one person: the 
military pilot, who was in charge of aircraft separation from the surrounding traffic, 
obstacles, terrain and meteorological conditions via visual means i.e. ‘see and avoid’. 
In addition to the flight management and basic communication function, military 
missions (reconnaissance, artillery observation, bombing, or air combat) required the 
development of more sophisticated Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) 
functions. Air-to-ground signalling techniques (including flags and flares, electric signal 
lamps, pyrotechnics, and rockets) were used for communication. Furthermore, visual 
markers on the ground supported navigation and the pilot performed the surveillance 
function.  
The total set of functions and their interactions, required for traffic management during 
World War I, is presented in Figure 2-2. To make the functional evolution description 
more transparent to the reader a convention is adopted. For each analysed period in 






separation assurance between aircraft and obstructions, as well as to expedite and 
maintain an orderly flow of air traffic. The FIS was responsible for providing advice and 
information relevant to the safe and efficient conduct of flights, whereas ARO was tasked 
with collecting ATS reports, including flight plans submitted prior to departure. 
The change of the ConOps following the introduction of ATS enabled pilots to fly in both 
Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) and Instrumental Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) during periods of reduced visibility. The navigation function evolved to enable 
pilots to rely on their instruments on-board the aircraft, in addition to visual navigation. 
This was underpinned by the development of ground-based radio navigation aids: the 
Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) and Non-Directional Beacon (NDB). 
Furthermore, the number of flights over Europe started to rise with the creation of the 
first commercial airlines, thereby increasing the risk of collision. To keep these risks under 
control, a Safety Assurance function of the newly created ATC was introduced to assure 
aircraft separation. However, it is interesting to note that the concept of safety within this 
period was considered to be fully in hands of the pilot. Accidents were explained as the 
absence of luck “if your number is up, that’s the way it goes” (Wiener and Nagel, 1988, p. 57). 
With the introduction of ATC, three parties managed commercial aircraft: pilots, Air 
Traffic Control Operators (ATCOs) and airline dispatchers. At the departure airport, the 
ATCO issued an aircraft with the permission to take off using a coloured flag or light 
guns. During the airborne phase of operation, a pilot communicated their position to the 
ATCO over predefined points, thereby transferring the role of surveillance under IMC 
from pilots to ATCOs. Based on these position reports, ATCOs gained situational 
awareness of all air traffic and estimated future aircraft positions along their routes. This 
enabled ATCOs to issue direction instructions to subsequent points on the route and 
simultaneously ensure the safe separation between the surrounding traffic during periods 
of IMC.  
Instructions issued by the ATCO were sent to the airline dispatcher who then transmitted 
them to the aircraft. Consequently, to support the ATC function, the communication 
function had to evolve to enable point-to-point radio communication between the airline 
flight dispatcher, the pilot and the ATCO. The introduction of ATC also changed the 
flight management function since pilots started to fly aircraft according to the instructions 







carry more passengers, had higher speeds and increased levels of comfort when 
compared to the pre-World War II era. 
Large numbers of fight crew and aircraft losses during the World War II highlighted the 
fact that aircraft had become too complex to be managed by flight crews. This prompted 
the development of dedicated military safety centres (Miller, 1965, Wiener and Nagel, 
1988) aimed at improving the safety of aircraft and their systems in 1950s. This marked 
the beginnings of research on human factors and ergonomics (Salvendy, 2012). 
In the post-World War II period, the ATM ConOps strongly resembled the ConOps from 
the ‘Golden age of aviation’. Although the ConOps did not change functionally (its 
functional representation equates to that shown in Figure 2-4), technological 
developments during the war led to changes in the implementation of four existing ATM 
functions: flight management, communication, navigation, surveillance and safety 
assurance. The function of flight management did not change and was still conducted by 
three parties: pilots, ATCOs and airline dispatchers. However, direct radio voice 
communication was established between the ATCO and the cockpit. Very High 
Frequency (VHF) Omnidirectional Range (VOR) improved the navigation function by 
overcoming some of the limitations of NDB. Implementation of the Primary Surveillance 
Radar (PSR) represented a major advance in the surveillance function of commercial 
aviation enabling a reduction in procedural separation standards, thereby increasing the 
capacity of the ATM system. In addition, improved accuracy of the radar enabled a 
reduction in the number of position reports. ATCOs monitored the movement of aircraft 
on their radar screens. These improvements in the CNS functions resulted in the 
augmented safety assurance of the ATM system when compared to the period between 
the Wars. 
2.1.6 Between 1960 and 1990 
In the 1960s the ConOps evolved again, triggered by the need to integrate air traffic 
services in Europe. This was initiated by the creation of the European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), founded by six Member States (Belgium, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (UK)). EUROCONTROL was aimed at improving the coordination of air traffic 
control by creating a collective air traffic control system (EUROCONTROL, 2011a). 
Initially the main role of EUROCONTROL was to provide control to both civil and 





The division of airspace was based on the most-frequented routes and traffic zones, rather 
than national frontiers (EUROCONTROL, 2010d).  
During the 1970s, as the cost of flying continued to decrease, the demand for air travel by 
the general public increased. This resulted in congestion and significant delays in the 
1980s. The long delays brought about the need to increase the efficiency of the ATM 
system, resulting in further changes to the ConOps. It was no longer sufficient to fly 
aircraft for commercial purposes between origin and destination in all meteorological 
conditions. An increase in the efficiency in handling these flights was required in order to 
reduce the growing delays associated with the ATM system. A solution was the 
development of the flow and airspace management function and improvements to the 
navigation function to enable landings in all weather conditions.  
Flow and airspace management was introduced in an attempt to protect national airspace 
initially from a surplus influx of aircraft: five regional Flow Management Units in Europe 
(i.e. Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Paris and Rome) were established (EUROCONTROL, 
2010d). Initially, due to the lack of information exchange between the regional units 
(associated with no direct data or voice links) traffic flows were only regulated at a local 
level, without consideration of the effect of this on the pan-European air traffic network.  
The navigation function evolved with the introduction of the Instrument Landing System 
(ILS), which enabled approaches and landings in all meteorological conditions. In 
addition to the ILS, in the en-route phase, legacy navigation technologies were 
complemented with the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). 
In regard to surveillance, although PSR provided information about aircraft position, a 
key deficiency was the lack of information it provided about the aircraft identity. This 
drawback was overcome with the implementation of the Secondary Surveillance Radar 
(SSR), which increasingly supplemented existing surveillance technologies. 
With regards to the functional changes, this period recorded a significant change when 
compared to the previously described periods. Three new functions were created: 
Regional Airspace Management, Regional Flow Management and Regional Information 
Management (see Figure 2-5). However, the uncoordinated regulation of flows and 
airspace configurations between states led to capacity imbalances between neighbouring 
states, and it became increasingly apparent that a European-wide solution for Flow and 






All the safety efforts incorporated into the functional, technological and operational 
changes during this period marked a significant 1500% reduction in aircraft accident2 
rates (Boeing, 2013). This improvement in safety can be partly attributed to the evolution 
in safety culture. While in the early days of the ConOps, the main contributing factors to 
accidents were mechanical failures. As shown in Figure 2-6, the aircraft accident rate 
gradually decreased in the period between 1970 and 1985. This decrease was mostly 
attributed to a reduction in mechanical defects on aircraft. In the 1980s and 1990s it 
became apparent that human factors and human errors played a significant role in system 
safety (Hollnagel, 2012b). Consequently accident analysis and investigation expanded to 
further include human aspects. This transition in safety thinking, from the age of 
technology to the age of human factors (Hale and Hovden, 1998, Hollnagel, 2014c), is 
revisited in 5.1.1.2. 
2.1.7 Between 1990 and 2005 
With high traffic growth, congestion and delays became critical between the years 1990 
and 2005. Additional capacity was needed, in the form of additional physical capacity (i.e. 
new airports) and/or by improving the efficiency of the existing ATM system, with 
associated changes to the ConOps for the latter. Improvements to the efficiency of the 
ATM system were achieved by both improving the ATM physical infrastructure as well 
as by increasing the levels of automation3 in the ATM system, which included a transfer 
of responsibilities from human operators to machines. 
Numerous initiatives (within EATCHIP, the European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation 
and Integration Programme) lead to the building of new en-route ATC centres, re-
equipping existing centres, installing new radar stations and improving the international 
ground-to-ground ATM communications infrastructure. The most significant change in 
the safety assurance function was the introduction of increased levels of automation 
through the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), for example the Traffic alert 
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) on-board aircraft. The introduction of 
automation also resulted in a key change to the flight management function, in that the 
responsibility for separation assurance between aircraft (in the en-route phase of flight) 
became distributed between the ATCO, pilot and automated systems. This improvement 
                                                      
2 Here the term accident is referring to ICAO definition further discussed in detail in Section 3.5. 
3 In this thesis automation according to Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens (2000, p. 287) is defined 
as “a device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully) a function that was previously, or conceivably 





in the implementation of the safety assurance and flight management functions, while 
surely prevented many mid-air collisions, it also created one of the most recent tragedies 
in aviation history: the Überlingen mid-air collision (BFU, 2004). This accident 
highlighted the importance of technical, organisational and political factors in assuring 
safety of the ATM system (Johnson, 2008).  
Increased automation was the main enabler for further improvements in the efficiency of 
the ATM system: it enabled the improved regulation of air traffic flow across Europe. 
This change in the ConOps was implemented through the creation of the Central Flow 
Management Unit (CFMU). Instead of Regional Flow Management centres operated by 
national administrations, air traffic flow management in the 36 European Member States 
was increasingly coordinated and controlled by the CFMU at a pan-European level, 
leading to increased efficiency, additional capacity and reduced delays 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010f). The Regional Flow Management function was replaced by a 
centralised Network Management function (see Figure 2-7) that regulated any overloads 
that could arise when the demand exceeded capacity, by applying adequate flow 
management measures.  
The lack of surveillance over oceanic and remote areas led to the requirement of 
procedural separation between aircraft, thereby restricting capacity in these areas. To 
solve this constraint, an initiative – Future Air Navigation System (FANS) – was 
developed, contributing to a significant increase in capacity over oceanic areas. The key 
developments were improvements in: the communication function – transition from voice 
to digital communication; the navigation function – transition from Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) to Satellite Navigation (GNSS); and the surveillance function – transition 
from voice reports to automated digital reports via Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Contract (ADS-C). 
Additionally, advancements in navigation capabilities enabled the introduction of area 
navigation (RNAV) over a network of ground-based radio navigation aids (VOR, DME, 
VOR/DME, DME/DME). This led to improvements in route efficiency, reliability and 
safety. Furthermore, the ConOps also evolved for the airspace above territorial Europe 
where the efficiency of the ATM system was increased by reducing the required Vertical 
Separation Minima (RVSM) between aircraft (ICAO, 2001a). In addition to RVSM, an 
increase in efficiency was achieved through closer coordination between civil and 
military air navigation, as a result of the Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) programme. The 
FUA resulted in improved airspace management, a significant reduction in airspace 






The main purpose of the new ICAO ConOps is to increase user flexibility and maximise 
the operating efficiencies, in order to increase system capacity, and improve safety levels 
for air traffic in the future. 
Having recognised that the existing definition of ATM as very static and that ignored the 
interactions between ATM components, the new ConOps proposed a new definition of 
ATM (ICAO, 2005b):  
“dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace (safely, economically and 
efficiently) through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration 
with all parties”.  
Additionally the ATM system is defined as:  
“a system that provides ATM through the collaborative integration of humans, 
information, technology, facilities and services, supported by air and ground- and/or 
space-based communications, navigation and surveillance”.  
These definitions also introduce new attributes of the future ATM system, highlighting 
dynamic and integrated management through the collaboration of all parties.  
Building upon functional ATM system descriptions derived in the previous Sections, a 
high level illustration of the future ATM system is presented in Figure 2-8. The ICAO 
ConOps introduced a paradigm shift from airspace-based to trajectory-based operations, 
implying that information on planned aircraft trajectories is used to adjust the airspace 
structures, rather than the other way around as was the case in the previous airspace-
based concept. The trajectory-based focus evolves around the concept of 4D trajectories 
that aims to improve the predictability of air traffic by making the 3D spatial position of 
aircraft and its temporal dimension available during any phase of the aircraft trajectory, 
both on the ground and in the air. By incorporating the spatial and temporal information 
of the ground segment in managing of air traffic, the scope of the flight management 
function required expansion. This led to the creation of a new function − trajectory 
management. In addition, to cater for the changing societal needs, two new functions 
were created: security assurance and environmental management. Finally, the ten 
functions in Figure 2-8 define the functionally invariant model of the ATM system that 






(SJU, 2014k). The implementation of the ten ATM model functions, illustrated in Figure 
2-8, is further elaborated in Appendix I for Step 2. 
2.2 Transferability of the derived functional ATM model in the 
intermodal transport of 2070 and beyond 
In parallel with the evolution of air transport and its management, other transport modes 
have evolved significantly in the 20th century. However, the ever-growing needs of 
travellers for better connectivity and reduction in travel times are putting pressure on the 
whole transport system. As a response, the European Commission 2050 vision imposed a 
very demanding requirement onto the future transport system, namely (European 
Commission, 2011b): “90% of travellers within Europe are able to complete their journey, door-
to-door within 4 hours”. 
The target seems to be impossible to reach in the current transport ConOps given that: 
• the average inter-European flight takes 1.5h; 
• the requirement to be at a departure airport at least 1h before departure; and 
• the time required to arrive to the origin airport and from the destination airport to 
the final destination. 
It becomes apparent that if this target is to be reached, the transport ConOps needs to 
change to integrate all transport modes and create a seamless transport experience for the 
travellers. Towards this goal, the EC initiated a research project Future Long-term ATM 
concept, Infrastructure, Technologies and operational Environment (FLITE) that looks 
into the long-term vision of integrated inter-modal transport. 
The ConOps of this inter-modal transport of the future significantly differs from the one 
in SESAR (ConOps between 2005 and 2025). Nonetheless, the functional description of the 
ATM system derived in 2.1.8 (Figure 2-8) was validated and implemented within the 
FLITE project (Schuster et al., 2014) for describing ATM in the context of the inter-modal 






Figure 2-9 FLITE High level ATM functions 
In addition to the ten functions, described in detail in Section 2.1.8, the model above is 
complemented by additional three functions: 
• Constraint management – While the SESAR ConOps’ objective is to create strategically 
deconflicted 4D trajectories, the inter-modal ConOps of 2070 will be tactical (i.e. 
Autonomous Aerial Systems (AAS) trajectories will be short-notice on-demand). To 
support this last-minute trajectory planning, the ATM ConOps of the future will need 
to develop a new functionality in the form of ad hoc constraint management that will 
be incorporated into management of the rest of the ATM system with minimal 
restrictions without compromising safety. 
• Automation management – When compared to the SESAR ConOps, this future ConOps 
environment will be fully automated where the human will only have a monitoring 
role. To assure safety in non-nominal operations (i.e. when automation fails), the new 
function of automation management will be needed for contingency planning.  
• Seamlessness assurance – The SESAR ConOps is unimodal traffic management solution 
aimed at optimising air traffic. However, the future inter-modal transport ConOps 
requires inter-modal traffic management solutions to satisfy the need for seamless 






Chapter 2 has provided, for the first time to the author’s knowledge, a systematic review 
of the ATM ConOps since its introduction in order to better understand its drivers, 
functions, and technologies. In addition, this chapter questioned whether the ATM 
system has undergone an evolution or a revolution over its 111-year-old history. A 
detailed description of the ATM system demonstrated that the number of basic ATM 
functions has evolved over the years, reaching its maturity in the 1990s and is expected to 
reach saturation in the period up to 2025 (corresponding to the SESAR ConOps). The 
identified functions along with their relationships were used to develop a high-level 
model of the ATM system applicable to any phase of ATM evolution. A case study of 
SESAR ConOps Step 2, was used to demonstrate that this high-level model could be used 
to depict the ATM system in the future. The conclusion from this analysis is that the 
functional description of the ATM system is invariant and that only the implementation 
of the functions has changed over time. This claim is further supported by the 
incorporation of the derived ATM model into the inter-modal ATM model of the more 
distant future.   
Building upon the invariant nature of the ATM system, Chapter 3 demonstrates that the 
physical boundary of the ATM system and the participating stakeholders have changed 





Chapter 3 AIRPORT APRON AS A NEW SAFETY-
CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE FUTURE CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
In the previous chapter, to illustrate the changes in the ATM system architecture 
boundaries, the most significant aspects in the evolution of the ATM ConOps were 
plotted onto the functionally invariant ATM system model. The objective of this chapter 
is to justify the identification of the airport apron as the new safety-critical area of the 
future ATM system. 
In this chapter, after demonstrating that ATM system boundary changes over time in 
Section 3.1, the importance of the turnaround process performed on the apron, on 4D 
trajectory management has been acknowledged in Section 3.2. This is then followed by a 
review of the initiatives (discussed in detail under Section 3.3), initiated by SESAR and 
the European Commission to address efficiency, flexibility, predictability, punctuality 
and cost-effectiveness of the turnaround process within the context of 4D trajectories. 
Consequently the apron is identified as an overlooked safety critical area of the ATM 
ConOps between 2005 and 2025 in Section 3.4. This is then followed by a critical review of 
the definitions and relationships between aircraft safety, ATM safety and apron safety in 
Section 3.5 whereas Section 3.6 concludes the chapter by providing its summary. 
3.1 Changes in the ATM system implementation 
The previous chapter indicated that there will be minimal change functionally to the 
ATM ConOps from 1990s (after establishment of the Central Flow Management Unit 
(CFMU)) to 2025. Therefore, if the ATM system is not expected to significantly change 
functionally in its anticipated evolution, the question is what will drive this evolution. 
The answer lies in the evolution in the implementation of these functions. The key 
changes are associated with the way ATM functions are implemented, e.g. a function that 
has been executed solely by an ATCO at one stage of the ATM ConOps, is being 
distributed between ATCO, the pilot and a system in another later stage. 
The variability in the ATM system function implementation is illustrated in the Figure 






• Example 3: p3 – represents the ATM system and its boundary following the 
implementation of aircraft systems such as Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) and Brake to Vacate (BTV). Prior to the implementation of TCAS, an ATCO 
and the flight crew executed the functions of conflict detection and resolution. 
Following implementation, execution of these functions is distributed between the 
ATCO, the flight crew and TCAS. Similarly, prior to the implementation of BTV, the 
function of runway management (which includes selection of the appropriate 
runway, stabilisation of approach, landing, braking and exit from a runway) was 
executed by the ATCO and the flight crew. However with BTV, the execution of these 
functions is distributed between the ATCO, the flight crew and BTV, where the 
majority of the tasks are executed automatically by the BTV. There is therefore a shift 
in the boundary of the ATM system to include certain aircraft systems. 
While the importance of these shifts in ATM system boundary needs to be considered in 
safety analyses of the ATM system as a whole, specifically the research presented in this 
thesis focuses on effects of this boundary shift at the airport level. This is because the 
airports have been identified as a bottleneck of the future ATM system in terms of three 
Key Performance Areas (KPAs): capacity, environmental impact and safety, as discussed 
below.  
Airport capacity (including terminal buildings, aprons, manoeuvring area and the 
Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA)) has been identified as a key constraint in the future 
ATM system evolution according to the SESAR (SJU, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008c, 
2008b). It is expected that a shortfall in airport capacity will result in a dramatic reduction 
in the punctuality of the ATM system and its inability to accommodate over 120 million 
passengers by 2035 (EUROCONTROL, 2013a). 
In addition, airport communities are under increasing pressure to reduce the negative 
impact of high traffic density, at and in the vicinity of the airports, on the local air quality 
and noise (SJU, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008c, 2008b). Air pollutants (such as nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbons (HC)) have been associated with 
‘early deaths’ of the residents in the neighbouring communities (Greater London 
Authority, 2012).  
Finally, when considering the historical distribution of aircraft accident2 per phase of 
flight, the probability of an accident occurring during airport operations is higher than 






touchdown to the gate and from the gate to take-off. During turnaround, the trajectory 
is in an idle state in all but the time dimension”.  
In the more recent SESAR documentation (SJU, 2012b, p.124, 2013, p.124) it has been 
stated that  
“the turnaround process is considered as a ‘black box’ for ATM. There is no 
requirement to be aware of what is occurring whilst the aircraft is on the stand. ATM 
only requires knowledge of certain milestones i.e. on and off block times, ready for 
start”.  
This approach is capable only of reacting to disruptions that happen during the 
turnaround process. However, the approach is considered to be inadequate and incapable 
of managing the operations that take place during an aircraft’s turnaround, which is 
essential for an effective ‘en-route to en-route’ ATM approach. 
As opposed to the SESAR’s ‘black box’ approach to the turnaround process, the European 
Commission (European Parliament & Council of the EU, 1996, p.3) highlights the 
importance of an integrated approach aimed  
“… to optimise and integrate all phases of a flight, from airport to airport, including 
ground handling services, with a view to enhancing performance in terms of delays, 
costs, environmental impact and safety”.  
In addition, in its vision for the future, the “key focus point” for EUROCONTROL 
(Brenner, 2013) will be “… the better integration of airports into network operations”. Not only 
does this vision depart from the ‘black box’ approach adopted by SESAR, but also it 
augments the European Commission’s approach to include management of the 
operations inside the airport terminals for the purpose of the total ATM system 
optimisation. This concept is known as Total Airport Management (TAM) concept and is 
further discussed in Section 3.3.7. 
Finally, following the arguments outlined above, it is evident that in the evolution in the 
ConOps from airspace- to trajectory-based operations (explained in depth in Section 
2.1.8), the ATM system changed functionally to include the turnaround process. This 
consequently gave rise to a transition from a flight management to a trajectory 
management function. 
Furthermore this change did not affect the shifting boundary of the ATM system only 
functionally but also physically. ICAO defines the ATM system according to the ConOps 






airports become fully integrated into the ATM network (with reference to the 
manoeuvring area and the apron). Consequently, the SESAR and the post-SESAR 
ConOps need to consider the impact of this boundary change on the ATM system KPAs. 
The outlined integration of airports into the ATM network is expected to deliver a holistic 
‘en-route to en-route’ approach that should enable safe and efficient air traffic growth in the 
future (SJU, 2006). To meet these requirements, the SESAR ConOps has proposed several 
concepts that are outlined in the Section 3.3 below. 
3.3 Conceptual improvement in the SESAR ConOps for the apron 
The inefficiencies in the ATM system can partly be attributed to the turnaround processes 
on the apron. In 2006 the Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA) statistics indicated 
that 79% of primary delays greater than 15 minutes were generated by turnarounds at 
airports (Cook, 2007), i.e. in 2006 four out of five late departures (EUROCONTROL, 2007). 
In the recent years, the situation improved and the turnaround process was at the origin 
of 52% delayed departures (EUROCONTROL, 2014e). There is therefore still room for 
improving the departure punctuality. 
To tackle these inefficiencies, the SESAR ConOps has proposed the following concepts: 
Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM), Departure Management (DMAN), 
Arrival Management (AMAN), Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control 
System (A-SMGCS). In parallel, the European Commission has initiated three research 
programs: Integrated Airport Apron Safety Fleet Management (AAS), Turnaround 
Integration in Trajectory and Network (TITAN) and Total Airport Management (TAM). 
The concepts and research programmes are explained in turn below.  
3.3.1 Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) 
Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) is a concept and a project, initiated in 
collaboration between the EUROCONTROL, Airports Council International (ACI) and 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), to optimise the network management 
function (see Appendix I) by improving the predictability of aircraft trajectories. This is to 
be achieved through better information sharing and resource optimisation between A-
CDM partners (ACI et al., 2012), which includes all the participants in the A-CDM process 
(as illustrated in Figure 3-4): airport operators, aircraft operators, ground handlers, Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), Network Management and support services 






Figure 3-4 A-CDM stakeholders and main objectives (ACI et al., 2012, p.2-5) 
 
 Figure 3-5 The A-CDM milestones (ACI et al., 2012, p.3-17) 
The main technological enabler for the A-CDM concept is the creation of an information 
platform able to connect all the A-CDM partners’ systems and their databases. This 





partner with the latest information available. Information in the A-CDM process is 
exchanged in discrete time intervals triggered by pre-defined events, known as milestones. 
Figure 3-5 illustrates the 16 milestones in the process. 
The A-CDM concept originated at Munich airport and was fully operational in 2007 (DFS, 
2013). At present, over 30 airports across Europe are in the process of A-CDM 
implementation due to the identified benefits in: fuel savings, emissions, better Air Traffic 
Flow Management (ATFM) slot and runway usage (ACI et al., 2014). The success of the A-
CDM concept achieved in Europe has contributed to its extension in North America, 
where it has been adapted to better reflect their ConOps and is called Surface 
Collaborative Decision Making (SCDM). For additional information, please refer to the 
(ACI, 2013). 
3.3.2 Departure management (DMAN) 
Building upon the information from the A-CDM information platform, it is possible 
optimise departure flows by taking into account multiple constraints and preferences 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010e). To address this, a planning system Departure MANagement 
(DMAN) was created. The departure sequence is calculated in reverse from the 
(non)constrained targeted take-off times, taking into consideration the location of the 
gate, departure runway, departure separation requirements and other operational 
constraints (i.e. crossing runways). Furthermore, the DMAN system enables the ATCO to 
use probing (i.e. what if scenarios) so that different planning strategies can be compared 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010e). 
The trials and results of DMAN at Malmo have demonstrated significant benefits in terms 
of (Böhme, 2005) reduction in: i) the taxi out time and consequent fuel consumption; ii) 
the ATCO workload due to an improvement in predictability and reliability of 
operations. 
Further enhancements in the DMAN system are achieved by integrating it with the A-
SMGCS system, which provides continuous surveillance information and creates a more 
reliable DMAN departure sequence. 
3.3.3 Arrival Management (AMAN) 
Similarly to the DMAN concept, Arrival Management (AMAN) system sequences and 





on the environment (EUROCONTROL, 2010a). In creating the arrival sequence, AMAN 
considers flight plan data, aircraft performance and weather. The output of the AMAN 
system are advisories to the flight crews to lose (Time to Lose (TTL)) or gain (Time to 
Gain (TTG)) time, adjust speed or turn radius instructions (EUROCONTROL, 2010a). 
The benefits of increasing the number of arrivals per hour have been demonstrated in 
Helmke et al. (2009). However, their approach focused on optimising arrival flows in a 
piecemeal manner. Additional increases in arrival rates, as well as increases in departure 
predictability, punctuality and efficiency can be achieved by integrating the AMAN with 
the DMAN systems (Bohme et al., 2007) to create an integrated arrival/departure 
sequence. Furthermore, AMAN/DMAN integration can be additionally improved by 
combining it with Surface Management (SMAN), which creates surface traffic sequences, 
based on the actual surveillance information (i.e. A-SMGCS) of the surrounding traffic. 
Finally, the AMAN/DMAN/SMAN integration can provide for a holistic approach to 
traffic flows management at airports (Kjenstad et al., 2013). 
3.3.4 Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) 
Although modern aircraft have the functional capability to take-off and land during the 
periods of low visibility, inadequate surveillance of particularly ground vehicles 
operating on the manoeuvring area used to bring airport operations to a halt.  To address 
these issues Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) was 
developed with the objective of providing routing, guidance and surveillance for the 
control of aircraft and vehicles, under all weather conditions – without compromising 
safety (ICAO, 2004). 
A-SMGCS implementation is planned in four stages (SJU, 2013). A-SMGCS level 1 will 
enhance the safety and efficiency of ground surface operations through the introduction 
of a surveillance service. The identification and position of aircraft and vehicles within the 
manoeuvring area for vehicles and movement area for aircraft will be known 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010g). Additionally, A-SMGCS level 2 will complement the 
surveillance service with a control service (to the ATCO only) which will provide ATCOs 
with appropriate alerts following a detection of potential conflicts on runways, and 
intrusions into restricted areas. A guidance service (i.e. airport static map) may also be 
provided to vehicle drivers (EUROCONTROL, 2010h) for operations on the manoeuvring 
area. In addition, A-SMGCS level 3 will provide detection of all aircraft conflicts that 
occur on the movement area and improved guidance and planning for use by controllers, 





and automatic guidance for the pilots as well as the controllers (EUROCONTROL, 2010b). 
Vehicle drivers operating on the manoeuvring area in levels 3 and 4 will be equipped 
with dynamic guidance (i.e. airport dynamic map) and route planning. 
On the manoeuvring area, aircraft and vehicles need to be in direct communication with 
the ATC. With the assistance of the surveillance information displayed by the A-SMGCS, 
ATCOs provide routing and guidance information to the flight crews and vehicle drivers 
directly, thus ensuring safety on the manoeuvring area. The situation on the apron is 
however different, and will be discussed in detail in Section 4.3, because:  
• the ATCO is not responsible for providing the separation service on the apron; 
• the vehicles operating on the apron only are not equipped with transponders 
(making identification impossible); and  
• there is no means of direct communication between the entity responsible for the 
apron (i.e. apron management) and the vehicle driver. 
Consequently, A-SMGCS is expected to have a more significant contribution to safety on 
the manoeuvring area than on the apron. As a solution to this, the European Commission 
tasked the Integrated Airport Apron Safety Fleet Management (AAS) project that 
explored ways to improve safety on the apron by using the available surveillance 
infrastructure and is discussed in the following Section. 
3.3.5 Integrated Airport Apron Safety Fleet Management (AAS) 
Integrated Airport Apron Safety Fleet Management (AAS) is a project founded by the 
European Commission's (EC) Directorate General for Mobility and Transport (DG 
MOVE) under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7) with the objective to improve safety, efficiency and environmental 






Figure 3-6 Dynamic geofencing (GlobeGround Berlin, 2011, p.12) 
The project addressed three research questions (GlobeGround Berlin, 2011). Firstly, it 
designed real-time resource allocation software that produces optimal solutions for the 
integrated allocation of staff and ground support equipment (GSE) in a turnaround 
process. This solution, by reducing the number of movements, reduces the probability of 
collision and also improves the operational efficiency (i.e. time and fuel consumption) by 
decreasing the total distance driven on the airport surface. Secondly, the project 
contributes to apron safety by applying the ‘dynamic geofencing method' to advice staff 
operating GSE not to enter a restricted area on the apron (i.e. a gate when an aircraft 
engines are still running). An example of a dynamic geofencing Human Machine 
Interface (HMI), located in the GSE cabin, which denotes restricted areas of the apron in 
red, is illustrated in Figure 3-6. Finally, a GSE access control measure improves both 
safety and security on the apron by ensuring that only qualified staff have access to the 
equipment they operate.  
While contributing to safety improvements, the outlined three solutions of the AAS 
project manage safety in a more reactive way. For instance, in the case of damage found 
on the apron (i.e. aircraft engine damage), the AAS system enables the responsible party 
to be traced by specifying the approximate time when and place where the damage 





3.3.6 Turnaround Integration in Trajectory and Network (TITAN) 
Concerned with the delays caused by the turnaround process, the European Commission 
launched another project under its Seventh Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development (FP7) − The Turnaround Integration in Trajectory and 
Network (TITAN). 
The TITAN project builds upon the A-CDM concept by including the processes that take 
place inside of the terminal building (known as landside operations) into the trajectory 
management process. While the A-CDM milestone principle remains the same, the 
TITAN concept introduces an additional ten milestones for monitoring and improving 
the predictability of the turnaround process progress (TITAN Consortium, 2012b). As one 
of its main objectives, the TITAN project delivered a decision support tool (similar to A-
CDM but of a higher granularity) with the aim of making the turnaround process more 
predictable, efficient, flexible and cost-effective (TITAN Consortium, 2012a). 
3.3.7 Total Airport Management (TAM) 
While the concepts of: A-CDM, DMAN, AMAN and A-SMGCS can independently bring 
about certain improvements in the ATM sub-processes, their integration is even more 
beneficial for the overall ATM system performance. This idea forms the basis for the new 
Total Airport Management (TAM) concept.  
 






The proposed A-CDM, DMAN, AMAN and A-SMGCS concepts only enable the planning 
and execution of 4D trajectories based on Network Management and airport surface 
operations (manoeuvring are and the apron) information. However the operations within 
an airport terminal (airport landside such as check-in, security check etc.) have a direct 
influence on airside operations (Günther et al., 2006, TAMS Partners, 2012). Therefore, 
TAM extends the scope of 4D trajectory management by incorporating passenger and 
baggage flows from the terminal building.  
Information from various systems at the airport and network level is fed into the Airport 
Operations Centre (APOC) to create an Airport Operations Plan (AOP). An AOP is a 
subset of the total Network Operations Plan (NOP) and is similarly dynamically updated 
from a strategic, pre-tactical to tactical phase of operations. All the stakeholders at an 
airport communicate and co-ordinate to achieve an optimal network-wide solution. In 
doing so, TAM is supported by tools for real-time analysis and monitoring, planning and 
simulation (Günther et al., 2006) to aid Collaborative Airport Planning (CAP) and the 
management of landside and airside airport processes (TAMS Partners, 2012). The TAM 
process is illustrated in Figure 3-7. 
3.3.8 Summary 
In conclusion, all the concepts and projects discussed under Section 3.3 above have 
focused on improving cost-effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility, predictability and 
punctuality of the turnaround process on the apron (see Table 3-1). As safety does not 
seem to be an area of concern of the recent initiatives, the following Section explores the 
safety on the apron. 
Table 3-1 Summary of the SESAR conceptual improvements for the apron 
 Conceptual improvement in the SESAR ConOps for the apron 
KPA A-CDM DMAN AMAN A-SMGCS AAS TITAN TAM 
Cost-
effectiveness ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Efficiency ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Flexibility ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Predictability ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ 
Punctuality ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ 





3.4 Apron safety in SESAR ConOps 
Interestingly, none of the initiatives discussed in Section 3.3 (apart from the AAS project 
partially), focused on the actual safety on the apron. To further investigate why safety on 
the apron is not considered within the scope of SESAR, a personal enquiry with safety 
officials from EUROCONTROL and the European Aviation Safety Agency5 (EASA) was 
instigated. Structured Communication (2014a) with EUROCONTROL unveiled that this 
was because apron is not considered as a component of the ATM system. Structured 
Communication (2013a) with EASA justified this by a statement that apron safety falls 
outside the remit of the EASA Basic Regulation (European Commission, 2008b). In 
contrast to these claims, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 critically reviewed and provided strong 
arguments in favour of apron incorporation into ATM.  The changes in the ATM ConOps 
coupled with the temporal change in the ATM system boundary clearly demonstrate that 
the apron should become a part of ATM in SESAR. 
Therefore, this Section firstly introduces the concept of apron safety within the context of 
aircraft safety and ATM system safety. It then discusses the safety impact of the change in 
the expanded ATM system boundary, which should include the apron in the SESAR 
ConOps, on the total risk attributed to the ATM system. 
3.5 Apron safety in the context of aircraft safety and ATM system safety 
Whilst Chapter 5 discusses safety in detail, this Section outlines in brief the main aspects 
of safety in relation to the apron. The commonly accepted definition of aviation safety 
referred to in the ICAO Safety Management System (SMS) Manuals (ICAO, 2009, 2013e) is 
“the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and 
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification 
and safety risk management”. This definition entails introduction of another three terms: 
hazard, risk and acceptable level of safety. 
ICAO (2013e, p. 2-24) defines hazard “as a condition or an object with the potential to cause 
death, injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of 
the ability to perform a prescribed function”. Different types of hazards are present in our 
daily lives, but they require certain conditions to be met to become harmful. While 
                                                      
5 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the European Union aviation regulatory body 
tasked with the mission to “promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental 





hazards cannot be eliminated, they can be identified and managed. Fortunately not all 
hazards have equally damaging potential. Therefore, the damaging potential of each 
hazard, expressed as safety risk, needs to be assessed. ICAO (2013e, p. xii) also defines 
safety risk as “the predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a 
hazard”. Following the process of hazard identification and risk assessment, safety risks 
need to be managed to an acceptable level. This term introduces an element of subjectivity 
in the definition of safety, since what is ‘acceptable’ may vary across different industries, 
countries, even organisations. In aviation safety, in order to do this each ICAO member 
state is required to define the Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP) through safety 
performance targets (i.e. 1 accident in 10 million flight hours) and safety performance 
indicators, and manage safety accordingly (ICAO, 2013e). 
Safety (performance) indicators can be divided into (Hale, 2009, Hopkins, 2009, ICAO, 
2013e) the leading (low consequence, proactive or predictive) and lagging (high-
consequence or reactive). Leading safety indicators have the objective to 
predict/anticipate unwanted outcomes. Through the monitoring of deviations during 
normal (everyday) performances, leading indicators tend to measure temporal change in 
risk levels with the objective of capturing minor events leading to an unwanted outcome. 
However, the definition and measurement of these indicators has proven to be very 
challenging (Øien et al., 2011a, 2011b). It is typically based on audits or other defined 
performance-based process monitoring metric. Lagging safety indicators have the 
objective of preventing future unwanted outcomes by learning from such outcomes in the 
past. They are typically expressed as the number of unwanted outcomes, defined in 
aviation as accidents, incidents and nearmisses. These terms are discussed further. 
While the definitions of these concepts are mostly domain-specific (Hollnagel, 2004, 
Dupuy, 2012, Nascimento, 2014), the ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO, 2010c) definitions in 
aviation are very strict and harmonized worldwide. These definitions are used 
throughout this chapter as follows: 
• Accident: “An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the 
case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft 
with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or 
in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready 
to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to rest at the end of the 
flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which: 





— being in the aircraft, or 
— direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become 
detached from the aircraft, or 
— direct exposure to jet blast, 
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other 
persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally 
available to the passengers and crew; or 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure […];  
c) or the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. 
• Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operation. 
• Occurrence: A term used by ICAO to denote either an accident or incident. 
Accidents and incidents differ only in the degree of injury sustained by persons involved 
or in damage sustained to the aircraft (CICTT, 2011, p. 1). 
The temporal applicability of these definitions is restricted to the term ‘operation of an 
aircraft’. However, this term is not explicitly defined in the ICAO Annexes. Structured 
communication (2014b) with a Subject Matter Expert (SME), linked to the ICAO, 
explained that the “ICAO only defines terms that have a specific meaning in the context in 
which they are used. Otherwise they revert to the plain language meaning as defined in the 
dictionary applicable to the language being used.” However IATA (2013, p. 9) provides a 
definition of the term ‘aircraft operations’ as “all activities associated with the operation of an 
aircraft on the ground and in the air.“ Furthermore, according to the same source (IATA, 
2013, p. 71) the term ‘operations’ is defined as “activities carried out under the discipline of 
flight operations, operational control, engineering and maintenance, cabin operations, ground 
handling, cargo operations and operational security”. It follows from this that the ICAO 
implied meaning of the term ‘operation of an aircraft’ can only be a subset of a much wider 
term ‘aircraft operation’ defined by IATA − limited only to the set activities that take place 
either while i) the persons with the intention of flight are onboard the aircraft, or ii) the 
aircraft engine is running in case of an unmanned flight. Consequently the ICAO (2010c, 
p. 1-1) accident definition fails to address the entire turnaround process. If, for example, 






for aviation safety data, known as CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomies, aimed at 
(Stephens et al., 2008):  
• harmonising safety investigation, reporting, and post-accident analysis practices 
worldwide; 
• data sharing;  
• focused, data-driven, coordinated safety actions; 
• common investigation, reporting, and post-accident analysis; and 
• shifting from reactive to proactive safety assessments. 
Currently, this taxonomy is considered to be a global reference for taxonomies and 
definitions of (CICTT, 2014): i) Aircraft Make/Model/Series; ii) Engine Make/Model; iii) 
Human Factors; iv) Occurrence Categories; v) Phases of Flight; vi) Positive Taxonomy; 
vii) System/Component Failure or Malfunction (powerplant); viii) System/Component 
Failure or Malfunction (non-powerplant). These definitions are used by all major aviation 
safety databases, i.e. Boeing, Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
in the U.S., and the European Coordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting 
Systems (ECCAIRS) in Europe. 
As a step towards the understanding of the ATM system’s boundary change impact on 
the aircraft accident risk attributed to the ATM system, it is necessary to introduce some 
of the existing occurrence definitions found in CICTT (2011). For this purpose, the 
classification scheme will be reviewed first.  
This occurrence classification scheme suffers from a limitation common to many other 
occurrence classifications across numerous industries. Namely, “phenotypes 
(manifestations) with genotypes (‘causes’)” (Hollnagel, 1993b, Hollnagel et al., 2007) of an 
occurrence are mixed in the classification of an occurrence description. The phenotype is 
considered to be an observable outcome of an occurrence whereas the genotype accounts 
for all the factors that contributed to the manifestation of an occurrence (phenotype) and 
are not observable directly. Consequently, “a genotype identifies deeper characteristics that 
many superficially different phenotypes have in common” (Hollnagel et al., 2007, p. 198).  
For instance, the CICTT classification uses genotypes in the description of the ATM/CNS, 
Aerodrome, and Bird categories. In contrast, it uses phenotypes in the description of the 





definitions of the ATM/CNS and RAMP categories, which are relevant for the following 
discussion. For definitions of other occurrences refer to CICTT (2011). 
Table 3-2 CICTT occurrence definitions (CICTT, 2011, p. 4 and 11) 
Occurrence type Definition 
ATM/CNS 
(ATM) 
Occurrences involving Air traffic management (ATM) or communications, 
navigation, or surveillance (CNS) service issues. 
Usage Notes: 
• Includes ATC facility/personnel failure/degradation, CNS service 
failure/degradation, procedures, policies, and standards. 
• Examples include, NAVAID outage, NAVAID service error, controller 
error, Supervisor error, ATC computer failure, Radar failure, and 
navigation satellite failure. 
• Occurrences do not necessarily involve an aircraft. 
NOTE: ATM includes all of the facilities, equipment, personnel, and 
procedures involved in the provision of State approved Air Traffic Services. 
Ground handling 
(RAMP) 
Occurrences during (or as a result of) ground handling operations. 
Usage Notes: 
• Includes collisions that occur while servicing, boarding, loading, and 
deplaning the aircraft also during boarding and disembarking while 
helicopter is hovering. 
• Includes injuries to people from propeller/main rotor/tail rotor/fan 
blade strikes. 
• Includes pushback/powerback/towing events. 
• Includes Jet Blast and Prop/rotor down wash ground handling 
occurrences. 
• Includes aircraft external pre-flight configuration errors (examples: 
improper loading and improperly secured doors and latches) that lead 
to subsequent events. 
• Includes all parking areas (ramp, gate, tiedowns). 
• Except for powerback events, which are coded here, if a collision occurs 
while the aircraft is moving under its own power in the gate, ramp, or 
tiedown area, code it as a ground collision (GCOL). 
• Includes operations at aerodromes, heliports, helidecks, and unprepared 
operating sites. 
• If external loads involved, also code as EXTL. 
It can be seen in that categories ATM and RAMP are mutually exclusive, acknowledging 
the fact that RAMP occurrences in the existing ConOps are not considered to be the 





of the change in the ATM system boundary, to include ground handling operations on 
the apron, would affect the risk attributed to the ATM system. 
Consequences of the lack of standardisation in occurrence reporting on the apron are 
evident from a survey performed by ACRP (2011) on a sample of 18 airports in the U.S. 
The results of identified that 45% airports do not have standards for occurrence reporting 
in place. Additionally, respondents were unable to distinct between the meaning of terms 
accident and incident. The author of the thesis confirmed these results during the field 
observations described in Chapter 6. Respondents had significantly different views about 
the definition of the terms. To address this gap in the literature and practice, the research 
proposes definitions of occurrence categories specific to apron operations in Section 3.5.3. 
3.5.1 Estimating aircraft accident risk attributed to ground handling 
operations on the apron 
To evaluate the impact of the changes introduced in the new ATM ConOps (discussed in 
2.1.8), EUROCONTROL developed the Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) methodology. The 
methodology (EUROCONTROL, 2006c) is capable of modelling the impact of the ConOps 
changes on aircraft accident risks with ATM contributions (i.e. everything ATM supplies 
to the pilot). 
The IRP considered the following five types of aircraft accident to have an ATM 
contribution (EUROCONTROL, 2006c): i) Mid-air collision, ii) Runway collision, iii) 
Taxiway collision, iv) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and v) Wake turbulence 
accident. For detailed definitions of these accident categories refer to EUROCONTROL 
(2006c). 
While the theory behind safety modelling techniques is discussed in Chapter 5, only a 
high-level summary of the IRP model (illustrated in Figure 3-9) is provided in this 
Section. Each of the five types of accidents is modelled separately, with a fault tree 
analysis (FTA) technique, by establishing causal links between technical and human 
factors. In addition to these direct factors that combine in a linear fashion to lead to an 
aircraft accident, each of the factors is further modelled using numerous influences, such 
as variability in the operating environment, safety management, human performance and 
safety equipment, as illustrated in the bottom of the pyramid in Figure 3-9. Finally, 
aircraft accident frequencies are quantified using the combination of historical accident 






Figure 3-9 Overall ATM Risk Model Structure (EUROCONTROL, 2006c, p. 8) 
Once again, as seen in the IRP model, accident risk of ground handling operations on the 
airport apron has been omitted from the future ConOps. Therefore, the following attempt 
was made in this Section to estimate this risk based on historical data. 
In the first step, the absolute number of accidents and accident rates, defined according to 
the ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO, 2010c), for the European region were evaluated using official 
data from the ICAO website (ICAO, 2013a). Results are shown in Figure 3-10 and Figure 
3-11. 
Average accident rates of four accidents per million flights for the period of seven years 
(2005 to 2011) was assumed in the assessment below.  
However this value represents the aircraft accident risk of the whole air transport system, 
of which ATM is only one component. The proportion of the overall air transport risk that 
can be attributed to the ATM system was evaluated on the basis of statistics from the 
Annual Safety Review for 2011 (EASA, 2012). 
The report indicates that ATM was a contributing factor to seven accidents in the last 
decade (2002-2011). Since on average 10x106 aircraft take off over the European airspace 
(EUROCONTROL, 2011d, EASA, 2012) every year, the average accident rate of the ATM 
system is 7x10-­‐8 per flight. When compared with average ICAO accident rate for Europe 
of four accidents per million flights, the accident risk attributed to ATM accounts for 
around 2 per cent of the total accident risk. This is in line with EUROCONTROL (2001) 







An aircraft may sustain damage during the turnaround process, which in the worst-case 
scenario may deem it unairworthy. Research conducted by the National Airspace 
Laboratory (NLR) indicated a very high aircraft occurrence rate for operations taking 
place during ground handling on the apron. More precisely one aircraft ground handling 
occurrence (referring to incidents and accidents), with resulting aircraft damage, takes 
place per 5000 flights (Balk, 2008). As an example, consider an occurrence on 4 June 2014, 
when a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 jet rolled backwards making contact with a building at 
Rome Ciampino Airport (Figure 3-12). Fortunately, there were no injuries but the aircraft 
sustained substantial damage in excess of £200,000 (Roma Repubblica, 2014). 
  
Figure 3-12 Aircraft damage during turnaround Rome 2014 (Source: Roma Repubblica (2014)) 
In contrast, damage made to an aircraft that occurs during the process of turnaround can 
easily go unnoticed or unreported (Interstate Aviation Committee, 2013). Balk (2008) 
estimated that over 30 per cent of occurrences during aircraft turnaround belong in this 
category. These occurrences pose the highest risk to flight safety. For instance, on 2 April 
2012, an ATR72 aircraft operated by UTair on a domestic flight in Russia crashed shortly 
after take off (Figure 3-13). Following the omission in de/anti-icing, the aircraft stalled 
due to accumulated ice on the aircraft surface (Interstate Aviation Committee, 2013). Four 
crewmembers and 29 passengers were killed in the accident while other 10 passengers 
sustained serious injuries. 
  






As outlined in this Section, the probability of an aircraft-related occurrence during 
turnaround is considered to be very high when compared to the ATM system. However, 
these figures do not provide the complete safety risk picture for the apron since aircraft 
accident risk is not the only safety risk present on the apron as will be discussed in the 
following Section. 
3.5.2 Airport apron – The complete safety risk picture 
As previously discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.5.1, the objective of aircraft safety is to 
protect lives of human beings (i.e. passengers, flight crew, the public) and avoid/reduce 
property damage (i.e. aircraft or infrastructural damage) that could arise as a consequence 
of an aircraft accident.  
Nevertheless, the concept of safety on the apron is much wider than the existing 
understanding of aircraft safety. More specifically, as illustrated in Figure 3-14, apron 
safety is the combination of aircraft safety, and the Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS). 
 
Figure 3-14 Components of safety on the apron 
Jointly, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) Committees on Occupational Health developed a globally accepted definition of 
occupational health and safety as follows (Benjamin, 2001): 
“Occupational health should aim at: the promotion and maintenance of the highest 
degree of physical, mental and social well-being of workers in all occupations; the 
prevention amongst workers of departures from health caused by their working 
conditions; the protection of workers in their employment from risks resulting from 
factors adverse to health; the placing and maintenance of the worker in an occupational 
environment adapted to his physiological and psychological capabilities; and, to 





OHS performance is assessed through occupational accidents and incidents, defined 
according to ILO (2001) as:  
• Occupational accident: an occurrence arising out of, or in the course of, work which 
results in: 
o fatal occupational injury; or 
o non-fatal occupational injury. 
• Occupational incident: an unsafe occurrence arising out of or in the course of work 
where no personal injury is caused, or where personal injury requires only first-aid 
treatment. 
During the process of aircraft turnaround, employees or Ground Service Agents (GSA), 
are exposed to numerous hazards summarised in Table 3-3 by UK HSE (2000a). 
Table 3-3 Hazards during aircraft turnaround (adapted from UK HSE (2000a)) 
Hazard Possible sources 
Manual 
handling 
Handling cargo and baggage, but also equipment such as vacuum 
cleaners and catering trolleys 
Falls from 
heights 




Vehicles driving up to and away from the aircraft, vehicles passing close 




Refuelling of aircraft  
Hazardous 
substances 
Exposure to body fluids and sanitary waste, injuries from discarded 
hypodermic needles (needle stick injuries) during aircraft cleaning, skin 
exposure to aircraft fuels, fumes from aircraft and vehicle engines 
Noise Aircraft auxiliary power units and engines, ground power units and 
vehicle engines  
Electricity Ground power units and cables  
Machinery Moving parts of machinery (e.g. conveyor belts) 






Research conducted by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom 
and the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) in the U.S., identified that the Ground Handling 
(GH) workforce has higher accident rates than the workforce employed in the 
construction and the agricultural sectors (UK HSE, 2000a, BLS, 2013).  
Furthermore, in 2005 the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) developed a detailed ground 
handling damage data-driven cost model that applies to 90 percent of the world’s airlines. 
The model has estimated: one ground handling occurrence resulting in property damage 
and 9 personal injuries per 1000 flights (Lacagnina, 2007). In total, these occurrences on 
the apron have been estimated to cost the aviation industry over $10 billion annually in 
direct and indirect costs such as loss of reputation, impacts to schedules and passengers, 
hiring and retraining new staff to replace injured individuals, insurance costs for staff and 
operations, repairs, parts, and staff time to complete and test repairs (Flight International, 
2005). A recent analysis by the researcher carried out for ICAO (2015), on data from a 
major Ground Service Provider (GSP) with worldwide operations for the years 2012 and 
2013, produces results that are in line with the above figures. 
IATA’s decade old estimates attributed a $4 billion direct cost to ground damages. 
Indirect cost is, however, estimated to be between four and ten times the direct cost 
(IATA, 2014a), in line with the FSF estimate. 
3.5.3 Apron occurrence definitions 
Following the identification of the high personal injury, aircraft, equipment and other 
property occurrence rates and the high cost they induce to aviation, the research 
presented in this thesis deems it is necessary to move away from an aircraft-centric to a 
more holistic approach to apron safety management. The first step towards this aim was 
to provide definitions of safety occurrences specific to apron operations that will account 
for all unwanted outcomes in both aircraft safety and occupational health and safety. 
Building upon the previously outlined limitations of apron occurrence definitions in 
terms of their: i) applicability to apron operations, ii) inconsistency in the use of 
phenotypes and genotypes in occurrence classification, and iii) the absence of standard 
apron occurrence definition, the following text proposes a set of definitions with the 
objective of establishing a global reference. The proposed definitions were derived from 
the ICAO Annex 13 (ICAO, 2010c) and other literature sources including aviation safety 
(ACI, 2005, European Commission, 2010b, European Commission, 2010a, ICAO, 2010d, 





road traffic safety (ANSI, 2007) and punctuality literature (University of Westminster, 
2004, Janić, 2015). 
To ensure consistency, the definitions below are derived from phenotypes (outcomes) of 
events. In addition, the definitions consider all unwanted outcomes of an occurrence 
during operations on an apron: a) personal injury, b) aircraft damage, c) infrastructural 
damage, d) Ground Service Equipment (GSE) damage, e) impact on the environment, and 
f) operational disruptions. Occurrences are divided into three categories: i) accidents, ii) 
incidents, and iii) nearmisses. The difference between i) and ii) is in the severity of 
unwanted outcome. In the case of iii), unwanted outcome is avoided but could have 
occurred while its actual severity remains unknown. 
The following definitions are therefore proposed for use in the Ground-Handling sector 
of aviation but, through correspondence to ICAO Annex 13, correspond to their 
similarly–titled counterparts in other aviation sectors. 
Accident: An occurrence during (or as a result of) ground handling operations on the 
apron, in which: 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured, where injuries are defined as: 
• fatal injury: an injury resulting in death within thirty days of the date of 
the accident; 
• serious injury: an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and 
which: 
o requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 
seven days from the date the injury was received; or 
o results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes 
or nose); or 
o involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or 
tendon damage; or 
o involves injury to any internal organ; or 
o involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 
5 per cent of the body surface; or 
o involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious 
radiation; or 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
• adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight 





• would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected 
component; 
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a single engine, 
(including its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, 
vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the 
aircraft skin (such as small dents or puncture holes), or for minor damages to main 
rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird 
strike (including holes in the radome); 
c) the airport apron infrastructure sustains damage or adverse condition which 
limits or prevents the use of a: 
• fixed aircraft handling facility or requires repairs; or 
• a structure or building or which requires repair; 
for the period of 5h or longer. 
Incident: An occurrence during (or as a result of) ground handling operations on the 
apron, in which: 
a) a person sustains a moderate or minor injury, where injuries are defined as: 
• moderate injury: an injury requiring a first aid treatment; 
• minor injury: an injury that does not require first aid treatment; or 
b) an aircraft sustains minor damage: where an aircraft can be rendered airworthy by 
simple repairs or replacement; 
c) a ground service equipment sustains damage (GSE), defined as: 
• disabling damage: damage which precludes departure of the equipment 
from the scene of the incident in its usual operating manner by daylight 
after simple repairs; or 
• functional damage: damage, other than disabling damage, which affects 
operation of the equipment or its parts; or 
• minor damage: damage which does not affect the operation of or disable 
the GSE in their operations; or 
d) the airport apron infrastructure sustains damage or adverse condition which 
prevent the use of the airport infrastructure for less than 5h; 
e) a substance causing an environmental hazard is released. For aviation fuel spills, 
the release can be classified as below. For other hazardous substances, similar 





• uncontained: any amount of uncontained environmental hazard requiring 
third-party response; 
• major contained: over 1006 litres of contained environmental hazard; 
• minor contained: below 1006 litres of contained environmental hazard; 
f) an operational disruption: 
• cancellation or aircraft departure delay longer than 1207	  minutes; or 
• long delay: aircraft departure delay longer than 658	  minutes; or 
• short delay: aircraft departure delay longer than 158 minutes. 
Nearmiss describes outcomes of an occurrence in which an apron accident or incident 
nearly occurred but was avoided by i) safety barrier(s), or ii) providence. 
So far the definitions above have been validated by the Head of Safety Regulations at 
EUROCONTROL (retired) and an Airport Safety Expert at a doctoral level. Additionally 
the author approached the EASA (Structured Communication, 2013a) and the UK CAA 
(Personal Communication, 2014) for further calibration and validation. Negotiations on 
the workshop format were in progress during the course of writing of this PhD thesis. 
However since these definitions are not yet recognised within the aviation sector, the 
remainder of the thesis will use a generic term ‘occurrence’ when referring to accidents, 
incidents or nearmisses on the apron. 
3.6 Summary 
In contrast to the common understanding of the ATM system structure, this chapter 
demonstrated that with the transition to the en-route-to-en-route concept in the new ATM 
ConOps the apron should become a part of ATM in SESAR. Furthermore, the apron was 
identified as the new safety-critical area of the future ATM system, with aircraft accident 
rates six times higher than the ones induced by the ATM. However, apron safety is 
currently not addressed within the SESAR. 
                                                      
6 The figure is based on the HSE study (UK HSE, 2000b) which identified, through an exhaustive 
literature search, that fuel spills of 100 litres or more are often referred to as ‘major’ worldwide. It 
is assumed that this quantity is the maximum a spill kit on a vehicle can mop up without any 
external assistance. 
7 The figure is based on the Janić (2015) estimate that the cost of a flight cancellation is equivalent 
to 2h or more of aircraft departure delay. 





Despite the high cost and frequency of the occurrences in ground handling, the apron is 
considered as a ‘grey area’ in the aviation safety. For instance existing ICAO aircraft 
occurrence definitions do not account for occurrences resulting in unwanted outcomes 
(i.e. personal injuries, aircraft, GSE, infrastructural damage, environmental impact or 
operational disruptions) that take place during the turnaround when the aircraft is not 
manned. Since no standardised terminology exists to describe different types of 
occurrences on the apron, a set of definitions based on the best safety practices from the 
aviation, OHS, road traffic and punctuality literature was proposed. 
Chapter 4 depicts the apron system architecture whereas Chapter 5 carries out a critical 
review of safety analysis methods, to derive requirements for the Total Apron Safety 





Chapter 4 THE APRON SYSTEM 
A precondition for the Total Apron Safety Management (TASM) modelling is a detailed 
understanding of the system in which the ground handling (turnaround) process takes 
place. The apron system belongs to the category of socio-technical systems where the 
‘objects of system design’ (Goode and Machol, 1957) are founded on interaction of technical, 
human and institutional system components (Ottens et al., 2005). Therefore, this chapter 
takes a multi-layered approach to apron system description based on: 
• the literature;  
• observations and interviews (the methodology of which is further described in 
Sections 6.3 to 6.5); and 
• structured communication with SMEs. 
The first part describes the physical architecture where ground handling operations takes 
place. A high-level description of tasks performed during the ground handling operations 
are introduced in the second part. This is followed by the definition of the actors and the 
technology required to perform the turnaround in parts three and four respectively.  
4.1 Physical architecture 
The terms manoeuvring area and apron were defined in Section 3.2 and their distinction 
was illustrated in Figure 3-3. In this Section, these two terms are linked with the 
remainder of the wider airport system to describe the interdependencies between 
different airport components.  
4.1.1 Airport airside and landside 
The most common approach to the classification of airport components is their division 
into two categories: the airside and the landside (Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994, Wells, 
1996, Wilke, 2013). This division aims at separating the management of passengers from 






runways, taxiways, aircraft parking areas (stands), navigation aids, lighting systems, 
signage and markings and ATC tower. 
Although landside operations have an impact on the airside operations (e.g. check-in, 
security checks, delayed boarding due late passenger, etc.) and vice versa, this research 
only focuses on airside operations and their relation to safety. 
Furthermore, the airside can be divided into the manoeuvring area and the apron. Since 
the manoeuvring area is out of scope of this research, please refer to Wilke (2013) for 
more information on safety of the manoeuvring area.  
Aprons can be classified according to the type of aircraft stands10 they hold (De Neufville 
and Odoni, 2003, ICAO, 2005a) as follows: 
• Passenger building apron is an area designed for aircraft manoeuvring and parking 
that is adjacent or readily accessible to passenger terminal facility. 
• Cargo building apron is a separate cargo terminal apron adjacent to a cargo terminal 
building dedicated to aircraft that carry only freight and mail. 
• Remote (long-term) parking apron is a separate parking apron where aircraft can 
park for extended periods. 
• Service apron is an uncovered area adjacent to an aircraft hangar on which aircraft 
maintenance can be performed. 
• Hangar apron is an area on which aircraft move into and out of a storage hangar.  
• General aviation aprons are dedicated to general aviation aircraft and as such are 
used for business and personal flying. 
This research is focused on passenger and remote parking aprons. Aircraft maintenance 
takes place on the service and hangar apron and along with cargo building aprons and 
general aviation aprons are out of scope of the research. The operational processes that 
occur on the apron are described in Section 4.2. 
                                                      
10 Aircraft stand is according to ICAO (2005a) defined as “A designated area on an apron intended to be 





Furthermore, the passenger building stands can be subdivided into contact and remote, 
depending on their location relative to the buildings. Both types of stands are considered 
in this research. 
Aprons, whether contact or remote have some common infrastructural elements, 
including: 
• passenger and cargo terminal aprons; 
• apron taxiway; 
• aircraft stand taxilane; 
• apron signage; 
• apron markings; 
• service roads; and 
• de-icing/anti-icing facilities. 
The infrastructural elements of aprons are detailed in Sections 4.1.2 to 4.1.6 below.   
4.1.2 Passenger terminal apron 
The passenger terminal apron is defined as an “area designed for aircraft manoeuvring and 
parking that is adjacent or readily accessible to passenger/cargo terminal facility” (ICAO, 2005a, 
p. 3-1). While different configurations exist of such aprons, each configuration is required 
to satisfy certain design requirements (ICAO, 2005a) in terms of: 
• Safety – safety clearances and procedures; 
• Security – aircraft must be protected of unauthorised personnel; 
• Efficiency – taxi distances should be minimised but also the configuration of an apron 
(stand arrangement) should be laid out so that it minimises delay; 
• Geometry – of an apron is determined by: the shape and size of available parcels of 
land, aircraft size, clearances, parking method, geometric arrangement of aircraft 





• Flexibility – includes accounting for different aircraft sizes and land extension; 
• Aircraft traffic volumes; 
• Planned passenger loading – this includes aircraft loading bridges (stationary loading 
bridge and apron drive loading bridge), movable steps, passenger transporters (buses 
or specially designed passenger transporter vehicles that are driven between the 
terminal building and a remote aircraft stand), aircraft-contained steps (steps on 
board an aircraft). 
Typical design configurations are explained and illustrated below according to the ICAO 
(2005a) classification. 
Simple concept – this is well suited to airports with low demand for air travel (i.e. annual 
passenger volume below 1,000,000 according to European Commission (2005)). Low 
demand for air travel enables the angled parking of aircraft, which has a benefit in that 
aircraft can taxi in, and taxi out with their own power. L'Espérance Airport (SFG), on the 
French side of the Caribbean island of Saint Martin, is an example of this concept. This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2 Simple concept (Source: ICAO (2005a)) 
Linear concept – this is designed for bigger air travel demand (i.e. annual passenger 
volume between 1 million and 5 million according to European Commission (2005)), 
enabling a much better utilisation of the parking (stand) space than the simple concept. 
Aircraft can only taxi in with their own power into the stand, but on the push-out, a 
towing tractor is required and consequently aircraft cannot use their own power. 
Belgrade International Airport (BEG) is an example of this concept. This concept is 






Figure 4-3 Linear concept and its variations (Source: ICAO (2005a)) 
Pier (finger) concept – this can vary according to the shape of the pier. This concept 
enables even better utilisation of the space when compared to the simple and linear 
concepts, in terms of the number of stands but it also has certain limitations. These are 
apparent in those cases where two piers face each other, when the process of pushing out 
one aircraft from one pier puts a restriction on the operations of all other aircraft in order 
to avoid conflicts between aircraft entering and leaving the stand. A solution to this 
problem is to increase the space between the piers. London Heathrow International 
Airport (LHR) is an example of this concept. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 Pier (finger) concept (Source: ICAO (2005a)) 
Satellite concept – this is named after a satellite-like building surrounded by aircraft 
stands, separated from the terminal building. Passengers are transported from the 
terminal buildings to the stands either by underground or elevated corridors, or on the 
surface. This type of configuration has certain disadvantages: unfavourable turns when 
taxiing to certain aircraft positions, traffic congestion of the ground service equipment 
around the satellite. Orlando International Airport (MCO) is an example of the satellite 
concept. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4-5 under (a). 
Transporter (open) apron concept11 has an advantage in that it is located close to the 
runway. This in turn facilitates a reduction in taxi distances and self-manoeuvring. 
However, when compared to other concepts it requires longer transport distances for 
transporting passengers, baggage and cargo from the terminal to a remote location. 
                                                      
11 Aircraft stands located at remote areas from the terminals are often referred to as remote aprons 





Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) is an example of this concept. This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 4-5 under (b). 
   (a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4-5 Satellite concept under (a) and Transporter (open) apron concept under (b) and 
Hybrid concept under (c) (Source: ICAO (2005a)) 
Hybrid concept – this is the prevalent apron concept. It represents a combination of 
previously introduced concepts i.e. combination of a transporter with any other concept. 
Frankfurt International Airport (FRA) is an example of this concept. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure 4-5 under (c). 
4.1.3 Service roads 
In addition to aircraft, a large number of ground vehicles circulate on the apron for the 
purpose of servicing aircraft, or infrastructure or in emergency situations. Consequently, 
there is a need for the segregation of air and ground traffic in order to minimise the 
probability of aircraft and ground vehicle collision. This is achieved through service roads 
dedicated to the ground vehicles. Service roads are usually located either: i) adjacent and 
parallel to the terminal building, or ii) on the airside of the aircraft stand parallel to the 
aircraft stand taxilane (ICAO, 2005). For instance, service roads at London Heathrow 
International airport (LHR) are located in front and behind the aircraft stands, whereas at 
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) the service roads are predominantly located 
only behind the aircraft stands. 
4.1.4 Apron taxiway and aircraft stand taxilane 
The aircraft stand taxilane and the apron taxiway serve to link an aircraft parked at a 
stand on the apron with a runway, through other parts of a taxiway system located in the 





Taxiways located on the apron are divided into two types according to ICAO (2005a): 
• Apron taxiway:  “A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended either to 
provide a through taxi route across the apron or to gain access to an aircraft stand taxilane”; 
and.  
• Aircraft stand taxilane: “A portion of an apron designated as a taxiway and intended to 
provide access to aircraft stands only”. 
 
Figure 4-6 Apron taxiway, aircraft stand taxilane and lead-in lines (Source: ICAO (2005a)) 
 
Another type of line, which exists on the apron, is the aircraft stand lead-in lines. These 
lines branch off from the aircraft stand taxilanes to the parking positions and are not 
considered to be a part of the aircraft stand taxilanes (ICAO, 2005a). Apron taxiways, 





4.1.5 Apron marking and signage 
Paint marking segregate i) aircraft from ground traffic, ii) aircraft from other aircraft 
traffic, iii) ground from other ground traffic, with the objective being to assure the safe 
manoeuvring on the airport surface area. This is achieved through both navigational 
guidance, and the precise positioning of flight crews and vehicle drivers. 
Since ICAO Annex 14 has no standards for the colours of apron markings except that 
taxilane markings and aircraft stand markings shall be yellow, ACI (2007) has developed 
a handbook with recommendations for apron markings and signs. Table 4-1 summarises 
the recommended colour coding convention. 
Table 4-1 ACI (2007) recommendations for colour coding on the apron 
Colour Meaning 
 Taxiway/taxilane centreline markings and aircraft stand markings 
 Apron markings for vehicle traffic 
 Area not to be crossed while an aircraft in the vicinity has its engines on 
 Multiple used taxiways or taxilanes 
 Multiple used taxiways or taxilanes 
A set of recommended apron markings and signage for aircraft and vehicles is illustrated 
in Figure 4-7. For detailed explanations of the recommendations refer to Apron markings & 
signs handbook (ACI, 2007). 
In addition to the signage and marking, for night time and low visibility conditions, 
flood-lighting on the apron area and pavement centre light lighting is required according 






Stand identification Aircraft stop line 
  No parking area Fuel hydrant 
  
Service road Taxiway and taxilane crossing 




Figure 4-7 Examples of markings and signage on the apron (adapted from ACI (2007))  
4.1.6 De/anti-icing facilities 
The de-icing and anti-icing process consists of spraying special fluids (or hot pressurised 
air) over the aircraft with the aim of removing snow/ice and preventing its formation 
prior to take-off. The reduction in lift, as a consequence of the negative impact on 
aerodynamics, due to accumulated ice on aircraft surfaces, significantly increases the 
aircraft accident risk, as previously discussed in Section 3.5.1. Therefore, during periods 
of snow and ice, each aircraft needs to be de-iced and/or anti-iced to inhibit formation of 





Facilities for de-icing and anti-icing can be placed on an apron, at or adjacent to the gate 
(centralised), or remote (off-gate) on a manoeuvring area, along a taxiway (ICAO, 2005a). 
When positioned at or adjacent to the gate, aircraft tend to occupy stands for longer 
periods of time thus reducing stand utilisation. In addition, the distance from the stand to 
the runway needs to be accounted for in the selection of the fluid type. This was taken in 
consideration as an operational aspect in the TASM framework development, outlined in 
Chapter 6. In contrast, a remote de-icing facility enables better stand utilisation and 
ensures better protection against ice formation due to shorter taxi times when compared 
to de/anti-icing at the stand. This approach also has a limitation in terms of the potential 
for creating de/anti-icing queues that can negatively impact departure flow rates. 
4.2 Ground handling services 
The notion of the term ground handling has already been introduced in Section 3.2. Due 
to lack of standardisation of this term, this Section starts by critically reviewing the 
existing definitions and re-defines the term that will be used throughout this thesis. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 6 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation defines ground handling as (ICAO, 2010a, p. 1-6, IATA, 2013, 
p. 45): “services necessary for an aircraft’s arrival at, and departure from, an airport, other than 
air traffic services”. This definition is very generic and does not explicitly specify the 
services included in ground handling. In addition this definition is not widely accepted in 
the ground handling community who is more inclined to use the IATA definitions (Balk, 
2008) outlined below. 
There have been numerous attempts to re-define the ICAO ground handling definition. 
The most commonly accepted definition can be found in the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) Airport Handling Manual (AHM) whereby ground handling is 
defined as a (IATA, 2008a): “complex series of processes required to separate an aircraft from its 
load (passengers, baggage, cargo and mail) on arrival and combine it with its load prior to 
departure.” This definition, although more specific than that of ICAO, excludes services 
such as fuelling and de/anti-icing.  
Furthermore, the European Commission (EC) has proposed the most complete definition 






“all ground-based aviation-related activities carried out for individual airlines at 
airports and are a key function in the aviation chain” […] Ground handling services 
include the following 11 categories of services: “1) ground administration and 
supervision; 2) passenger handling; 3) baggage handling; 4) freight and mail handling; 
5) ramp handling; 6) aircraft services; 7) fuel and oil handling; 8) aircraft 
maintenance; 9) flight operations and  crew administration; 10) surface transport; 11) 
catering services.”  
As a consequence of the variety of definitions for ground handling services (GHS), a 
certain level of confusion exists amongst the ground handling community. Enforcing a 
common reference would help standardise these activities. 
Despite the problems of the existing definitions’ incompleteness and lack of 
standardisation, none of them specifically address the scope of the apron system studied 
in this research. Therefore it is deemed necessary to explicitly define services in 
accordance with the research objectives. The definition of ground handling services was 
derived from the ICAO (2010a) and the European Parliament & Council of the EU (1996) 
definitions, as follows: 
Ground handling services (or short ground handling (GH)) comprises services necessary 
for an aircraft’s arrival at, and departure from, an airport, other than air traffic services, 
including: 
1. Arrival/departure services: 
• Towing/pushback comprises of the moving of the aircraft at arrival and 
departure, as well as the provision and operation of suitable devices; 
• Marshalling the aircraft on the ground at arrival and departure; 
• Assistance for aircraft parking and provision of suitable devices. 
2. Passenger/crew services that comprise of passenger/crew embarking/disembarking. 
3. Baggage, cargo and mail services that comprise the loading and unloading of 
baggage, cargo and mail. 
4. Aircraft services: 






• Water and lavatory services; 
• Cooling and heating of the aircraft cabin; 
• De/anti-icing of aircraft; 
• Provision and operation of appropriate units for starting the engines; 
• Aircraft cabin cleaning; 
• Replenishing supplies in the aircraft cabin; 
• Catering which comprises of the loading and unloading of food and beverages to 
and from the aircraft. 
5. Surface transport comprises execution of the crew, passenger, baggage, freight and 
mail transport between any two points within the perimeter of an apron. 
Whilst focusing on ground handling services, as defined above, this research also takes 
into consideration: 
1. Flight operations: 
• moving the aircraft in/out of the apron; 
• preparation of the flight at the departure airport or at any other point; 
• post-flight activities. 
2. Apron management: 
• Stand allocation; 
• Coordination of aircraft entry and exit from an apron; 






Numerous stakeholders impact operations on the apron either directly or indirectly. 
Direct influence is linked to the stakeholders that have a direct effect on ground handling 
services on the apron:  
• airport operator;  
• aircraft operators;  
• apron control; and  
• ground service providers (GSP).  
These stakeholders will be referred to as front-line stakeholders. Furthermore, operations 
of these front-line stakeholders are influenced by indirect stakeholders: i) regulatory 
bodies, ii) representative bodies (i.e. IATA, ACI), iii) national OHS system, iv) aircraft 
manufacturers and maintenance, v) GSE manufactures and maintenance, and vi) 
international standardisation bodies (i.e. International Organization for Standardisation 
(ISO)). 
Each stakeholder along with the relationships with the other stakeholders is considered in 
turn below. 
4.3.1 Direct stakeholders 
The airport operator (or airport authority) is the entity that owns, operates and manages 
an airport. On the apron, the airport authority is responsible for ensuring a “safe 
environment for airport users, staff and aircraft” (ACI, 2010, p. 8). The main functions 
performed by the airport operator are related to i) the development and maintenance of 
airport infrastructure (i.e. apron surface, paint markings, lighting); ii) the control of 
airside access through the granting of airside security passes (i.e. airside security); iii) the 
development and enforcement of airside procedures and processes (i.e. the wearing of 
personal protective equipment (PPE), airside driving, apron cleanliness (i.e. foreign object 
debris (FOD), ice, snow); iv) the collection, investigation, analysis and promotion of the 
lessons learned from the occurrences that took place on the airside (i.e. safety reporting, 
inspections). 
Aircraft operator (or airline or airport user) is a person or organisation certified by the 





(ICAO, 2010a). During the turnaround process, an aircraft operator performs the 
following: i) operation of aircraft on arrival/departure and post-arrival/pre-departure 
procedures, performed by the flight crews; ii) passenger disembarking and embarking, 
performed by the cabin crews; iii) aircraft maintenance; iv) aircraft loading and securing 
of load; v) aircraft security checks; and vi) ground handling services.  
Whilst aircraft maintenance is out of the scope of this research, it has a significant impact 
on ground handling operations as illustrated on a case study of an aircraft incident in 
Section 7.1. Airlines have the right to sub-contract some aspects of their operations (i.e. 
maintenance, ground handling services).  
Apron management (or control) is an entity at an airport responsible for regulating the 
activities and the movement of aircraft and vehicles on the apron (ICAO, 2013b). An ATS 
unit, airport operator, aircraft operator or their combination can perform the role of apron 
management (ACRP, 2012b). Characterisation of a stand type facility at a terminal in 
terms of facility lease type and operations as: exclusive, preferential or common use 
(Hamzawi, 1986), partly determines the stakeholder responsible for apron management. 
As implied by its name, exclusive stands grant usage exclusivity to certain typically large 
aircraft operator. Common use stands do not discriminate between aircraft operators 
whereas preferential use stands cater for aircraft operator preferences when operationally 
feasible. For instance, due to the fact that stands at European airports are predominantly 
either preferential or common-use, airport authorities or ATC typically performs apron 
management. In the US, dominated by the exclusive-use stands − tenant aircraft operators 
or GSPs perform the function, whereas the airport authority provides the service for the 
preferential and common-use stands (i.e. JFK, MCO). Apron management may be located 
within the airport control tower (i.e. at Munich airport) or can be situated anywhere else 
with the airport (i.e. at London City the service is located within the terminal building).  
Apron controllers typically work in team of two that includes an apron controller and an 
assistant. Depending on the configuration of the airport, there is typically one team per 
terminal. The apron control closely interacts with the ATC ground control in the tower 
through dedicated apron control frequency. On arrival, as the aircraft is about to enter the 
apron from the manoeuvring area, the pilot is required to transfer to the apron frequency, 
at which the apron controller guides the aircraft to the assigned stand. The process is 
performed in reverse order for the departure of an aircraft. Apron controllers typically do 
not provide an active control over GSE, resting the responsibility of safe and efficient 





Ground service provider (GSP) is an entity responsible for provision of ground handling 
services, defined in Section 4.2, but also for some additional services that are out of scope 
of this research. These services may include: i) ticketing; ii) passenger check-in and 
boarding; iii) airport lounge management; iv) sorting baggage, cargo and mail; v) 
provision of information services; and vi) maintenance of ground service equipment 
(GSE). 
The airports, airlines and/or independent ground handling companies can provide 
ground handling services (European Parliament & Council of the EU, 1996, ARC, 2009). 
For instance the majority of airports in Europe have their dedicated ground handling 
company (i.e. Munich airport). In the US, on the other hand, the majority of large aircraft 
operators provide the ground handling services themselves. If an aircraft operator is 
providing its own ground handling, this type of service is known as a self-handling service. 
However, if an aircraft operator provides services to another airline – the service is called 
third party handling. 
Traditionally, ground handling in Europe was monopolised by the airport’s own ground 
handling services. With the intention to liberalise the ground handling market, the 
European Parliament & Council of the EU (1996) adopted the Directive 96/67/EC on 
access to the ground handling market. A study performed, on a sample of the 23 
European airports, by the Airport Research Center (ARC, 2009) found that following the 
introduction of the Directive, competition increased, followed by a reduction in handling 
prices. The results of study however remained inconclusive about the impact of the 
Directive on the quality of service. 
Liberalisation of the ground handling market increased the number of organisations 
operating on the apron. Consequently the ground handling services required during an 
aircraft’s turnaround was no longer performed by a single organisation. Instead in 
today’s market, sub-contracted ground handling services are typically performed by three 
or more GSPs. For instance one GSP may be specialised in fuelling operations, second in 
passenger, baggage, cargo and mail and aircraft servicing below wing12 (i.e. lavatory and 
water service), and the third in aircraft servicing above wing12 (i.e. aircraft cabin cleaning). 
                                                      
12 Colloquially, ground handling services are divided into ‘above wing’ or ‘below wing’ respective to 
the aircraft wings. I.e. services such as: fuelling; baggage, cargo and mail loading/offloading are 
considered to be below wing services whereas: cabin cleaning; catering; passenger 





Ground handling services on an aircraft are performed by teams from a single, or more 
likely, several GSPs. The team size may significantly vary as a function of the i) number of 
teams, ii) the service(s) the team is providing, iii) aircraft type, iv) length of the 
turnaround, v) operational disruption, vi) experience of the team members, vii) type and 
the condition of GSE used. 
GHS front-line teams typically have three organisational levels of hierarchy ranging from 
a Ground Service Agent (GSA), the lead agent (or just the lead) to the supervisor. GSAs 
are at the bottom of the hierarchy. They perform the task assigned by the lead, who is 
responsible for forming each team empirically (based on the criteria listed in the 
paragraph above) and the task assignment for each GSA. While GSAs tend to be 
specialised in a particular task execution, the lead and the supervisor are required to 
know how to perform all the GHS tasks. During the turnaround, the lead assists GSAs in 
their task execution, particularly the aspects of the operations that are lagging behind the 
schedule. The supervisor, who is on the top of the pyramid, has the role of a manager of 
the front-line GHS. He closely follows operations of several teams and intervenes in case 
of any disruption (i.e. simultaneous aircraft arrivals, malfunction of GSE).  
4.3.2 Indirect stakeholders 
Regulatory bodies can be divided into international (ICAO), regional (i.e. European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)), and national 
(i.e. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)).  
Following to the Chicago convention, the ICAO has been tasked to establish the 
minimum international aviation Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs), 
contained in 19 Annexes. A total of 191 ICAO member states (ICAO, 2013d) are required 
to conform to these SARPs. As illustrated in Figure 4-8, there are no SARPs that establish 
the direct link between the ICAO and GSPs. This link is instead indirect - through aircraft 
and airport operators. SARPs contained in Annexes 6, 8 and 13 deem the aircraft operator 
responsible for GHS, whereas Annex 14 provides guidance on the design, operations and 






The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is a Regulatory Authority of the European 
Union established by the Regulation (EC) No 216/200813 (European Commission, 2008b). 
EASA’s remit today includes (European Commission, 2008b, 2009b): i) airworthiness, ii) 
environmental certification of aeronautical products, iii) aerodromes, iv) air traffic 
management, and v) air navigation services. According to the Regulation, GHS are 
accounted for but only indirectly through air and airport operator provisions (as 
explained in the paragraph above). Consequently, GSPs are not considered liable for the 
GHS. This gap has been identified (EASA, 2014b, p. 12) as a “weak link in the chain of safety 
regulation in Europe” and is likely going to be addressed in the future amendments to the 
Regulation.  
Similarly the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), EASA’s counterpart in the US, does 
not have the remit to impose safety requirements on GSPs directly but through the Air 
Operating Certificate (AOC) and the airport operations certificate (FAA, 2011, 2014b). 
Finally, each state has a national regulatory body, known as the National or Civil 
Aviation Authority (NAA or CAA). The NAA is responsible for development, 
implementation and oversight of national standards and recommendations that are 
typically either equal or more stringent than the international and regional regulatory 
body. For instance the UK CAA (2006) has developed a CAP 642 as an advice and 
guidance on safe airside operations. 
Stakeholder representative bodies. Aviation stakeholders typically have associations 
that support, represent and lobby for their interest, in addition to participating in the 
development of standards and recommendations. The two associations relevant in the 
ground handling domain are: i) International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
representing air carriers; and ii) Airport Council International (ACI) representing airports. 
IATA has developed a set of commercial products that aim to enhance and standardise 
GHS, the main products being the Airport Handling Manual (AHM) and the IATA 
Ground Operations Manual (IGOM). AHM comprises of standards and recommended 
practices for airport ground operations (IATA, 2008b), whereas the IGOM comprises of 
detailed procedures for frontline  ground handling staff (IATA, 2014b). Additional IATA 
products dedicated to safety management in ground handling are further discussed in 
Section 5.2.3. The ACI has developed material aimed at: i) standardising apron marking 
and signs (ACI, 2007), and ii) enhancing overall apron safety (ACI, 2010). 
                                                      





National OHS system. The objective of OHS is to protect the life and health of employees 
by preventing personal injuries at work. Levels of OHS performance vary across 
countries, sectors and the size of organisations (ILO, 2006). The ILO adopts Conventions 
and Recommendations that define the OHS standards and codes of practice of Member 
States, are transposed into a national OHS system. According to Convention No. 187 
(ILO, 2006), national OHS systems are required to establish: i) a national OHS Policy, ii) a 
national OHS system, and iii) a national OHS programme. From the national OHS 
system, through legislation and regulations, these standards and codes of practice are 
imposed on organisations. Management of an organisation needs to ensure a safe and 
healthy working environment, and promote safety and health at work. Finally, the 
employees are required to cooperate with the organisation’s management in the continual 
process of OHS improvement. 
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is an example of a national OHS system. 
Today, the UK HSE is responsible for regulating and enforcing workplace OHS standards 
and recommendations in 58 industries (UK HSE, 2014), including air transport. In the 
ground handling domain the UK HSE has developed numerous guidance material aimed 
at improving safety (UK HSE, 2000a, 2011, Lewis, 2012) and has closely collaborated with 
the UK CAA on the development on CAP 642 (UK CAA, 2006) 
Manufacturers and maintenance.  The design and maintenance of aircraft and GSE has 
been identified (see Section 6.6.2) as a factor impacting both the safety and efficiency of 
ground handling operations. Hence aircraft and GSE manufactures have developed 
dedicated groups devoted to identifying improvements in design that would enhance the 
aircraft turnaround process by reducing service time, increasing reliability and safety. For 
instance the leading European aircraft manufacturer − Airbus has established a dedicated 
Ground Operations department with the objective of fostering collaboration with airports 
and ground handling companies (Glover, 2012). Similarly, innovation remains at the 
forefront of the major GSE manufacturers (Mallaghan, 2014). 
International standardisation bodies. International standard-setting body, the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), has established a classification of 
standards for Ground service and maintenance equipment under field of activity 49 of the 
Level 1 of the ICS (International Classification for Standards) classification (ISO, 2014b). 
In the absence of the NAA requirements, GSE manufacturers apply these ISO standards 





A new ISO 45001 standard Occupational Health and Safety Management Standard 
applicable for OHS management in ground handling is under development and is 
expected to be published in 2016 (ISO, 2014a) 
Furthermore, the European Commission introduced the European Machinery Directive 
(European Commission, 2006) that assigned GSE manufacturers with the legal 
responsibility to assure equipment’s conformity to health and safety requirements at all 
European airports. 
4.3.3 Relationships between stakeholders 
Additionally, an extensive literature review (UK HSE, 2000a, European Commission, 
2006, UK CAA, 2006, IATA, 2008b, ISO, 2009, ICAO, 2010a, ICAO, 2010b, UK CAA, 2011, 
UK CAA, 2012, ICAO, 2013b, ICAO, 2013e, UK CAA, 2013, UK HSE, 2013, ISO, 2014b, UK 
Government, 2014, OSHA, 2015) was carried out to derive relationships between all the 
stakeholders on the apron illustrated in Figure 4-8. 
The direct and indirect stakeholders, described in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, belong to 
different levels of a hierarchal control structure that regulates the GHS. The hierarchical 
control diagram in Figure 4-8 was constructed using the Leveson (2012) methodology, 
reviewed in detail in Section 6.2.1.2. The diagram accounts for the apron system: i) 
development (i.e. by aircraft manufacturers, GSE manufactures), ii) operations (i.e. by 
GSP, aircraft operator and airport authority), iii) maintenance (i.e. by aircraft, airport 
maintenance and GSE maintenance), and iv) their interface. 
Relationships between different levels of the control structure are described through a 
downward control and upward feedback communication channels. At the top of the 
hierarchy are the international, regional and national regulatory bodies, followed by: i) 
national/regional aviation and OHS regulatory authorities, and ii) industry associations 
(i.e. IATA, ISO). At the next level GSPs are controlled by safety requirements and 
feedbacks (i.e. safety records, audits) imposed onto: i) aircraft manufacturers and 
maintenance, ii) airport authority and maintenance, iii) GSE manufacturers and 






The identified relationships were validated by four SMEs: i) the GSP OHS Manager, ii) the 
Head of Safety Regulations at EUROCONTROL (retired), and iii) Head of Aerodrome and 
Air Traffic Standards at the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
4.4 Technology 
Multiple interactions between human operators and the technology take place during the 
execution of GHS on the apron. These interactions range from those that are very manual, 
such as baggage loading/offloading, to those that are highly automated3, such as fuelling. 
The characteristic of a task coupled with the technology used to perform it, has an impact on 
the type of hazards that could be encountered in the execution of a particular ground 
handling service. 
While the functional modelling of ground handling services is explained in Chapter 6, this 
Section explains the technologies used to perform the functions on the apron. The available 
technologies are explained with regard to the function they perform out of the complete set 
of the ATM functions illustrated in Figure 2-8. 
Prior to the discussion about technologies, it must be highlighted that apron operations are 
heterogeneous and vary significantly between airports. These differences further referred to 
as factors that affect variability of apron operation, were derived through a template 
analysis, which combined literature review, observations and interviews at five airports in 
Europe and the US. The approach used in selection of these airports is detailed in Section 
6.4, the methodology for derivation of the differences is explained in Section 6.6 whereas for 
the complete list of differences (factors that affect variability of apron operations) can be 
found in Appendix VII. 
Communication. Operations on the apron require communication and coordination 
between all direct stakeholders (see 4.3.1). This is achieved by the combination of three 
communication means: i) written (i.e. fixed computer-based communication), ii) verbal (i.e. 
direct voice, mobile-based communication via telephone or VHF), iii) visual (i.e. hand 
signals, uniforms). The type of communication used is the function of the levels in the 
organisations between which the communication takes place and the level of urgency. 
Typically, stakeholders at a higher level of hierarchy communicate in the written form (i.e. 







In addition to markings and signage (previously discussed in 4.1.5) due to the proximity of 
obstacles, in the phase of aircraft parking (known as docking), before coming to a complete 
stop, flight crew require assistance in navigating aircraft. This assistance may take a form of 
a GSA’s guidance, known as marshalling, or it may be automated. In case of an automated 
guidance, a Visual Docking and Guidance System (VDGS) is used to provide aircraft lateral 
position guidance (which is a function of the aircraft type) during the docking phase (UK 
CAA, 2007). More current editions of the VDGS (i.e. at Munich, and Heathrow airports) can 
count down the remaining turnaround time from the moment the aircraft comes to a 
complete stop. This practice has been implemented at the majority of the A-CDM airports. 
Vehicles driving on the apron today are not assisted with a routing guidance system. 
Instead, vehicle drivers themselves, following the airside driving training provided by the 
airport operator, perform this function. The training is a part of the Airside Driving Permit 
(ADP) scheme that aims to assure the safety of airside operation. In the UK, CAP 790 defines 
the requirements for the ADP scheme, e.g. of the three types of permits (‘A’, ‘M’ and ‘C’), 
vehicle drivers are required to obtain permit ‘A’ (UK CAA, 2012). In the future, vehicle 
drivers, on the apron, will be supported by GNSS capabilities already discussed as a part of 
the AAS project in Section 3.3.5. 
Surveillance. When compared to the surveillance capabilities in the rest of the ATM system, 
discussed in Appendix I, surveillance on the apron is very primitive. Apron management 
performs the function of surveillance on the apron through the feed of cameras (the number 
and location of which is the function of the apron configuration) positioned at stands. Since 
there is no direct communication between the apron controller and the vehicles, and the 
vehicles are non-cooperative (i.e. not equipped with transponders), there is therefore no 
means for apron controllers to establish a control-feedback loop (Leveson, 2012) with the 
ground vehicles. Consequently, the surveillance function is not used to manage safety 
proactively on the apron. Instead, the output from these cameras is used to i) gain an 
overview of the progress of the turnaround process, ii) identify operational problems (i.e. 
FOD), iii) analyse past occurrences, and iv) assign responsibility for departure delays to 
stakeholders. 
Trajectory management. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, during an aircraft 
turnaround the aircraft trajectory is only evolving in its time dimension, which is managed 
through the A-CDM concept (see Section 3.3.1). 
Airspace and network management. A parallel between the airspace and the airports has 
already been made by SJU (2007a, p.47) where “the airport can be considered as another, rather 






outcome (i.e. a GSA exposure to noise by wearing headphones, or minimise the impact 
between a GSE and an aircraft). 
Functional (active or dynamic) barriers, prevent a task/function from being undertaken unless 
certain logical or temporal pre-conditions are met (Trost and Nertney, 1985, Leveson and 
Diaz-Herrera, 1995, Hollnagel, 2004). Examples of functional barriers include interlocks and 
sensors installed on GSEs. Interlocks installed on fuelling hydrant vehicles are connected to 
their brakes. They prevent the vehicle from moving unless, for instance (UK HSE, 2000b), i) 
the fuelling platform is in the lowered position, and ii) the fuel hoses are correctly stowed. 
Another example of a functional barrier is a sensor ensuring the correct, optimal distance 
between the nozzle on the de/anti-icing vehicle and an aircraft during de/anti-icing 
(Vestergaard, 2013).	  
Symbolic barriers communicate visual, audio or tactile information, the interpretation of 
which should prevent an unwanted occurrence, if adhered to (Hollnagel, 2004). The 
examples of symbolic barriers include for instance signs (i.e. ‘no smoking’ or ‘no mobile 
phone’), colour coding of fuel and audio signals (i.e. by vehicles backing up, or horns on 
vehicles). 
The final type of barrier – incorporeal (Trost and Nertney, 1985, Hollnagel, 2004), is not of a 
physical nature but is highly dependant on the knowledge of the user in preventing 
unwanted occurrences. Examples of incorporeal barriers include policies, procedures and 
training. This type of barrier is out of scope of this Section but will be revisited in Section 
5.1.1.2. 
Security assurance. SARPs to assure security, by preventing acts of unlawful interference14, 
of civil aviation and air transport are described in the ICAO Annex 17 (ICAO, 2006). 
According to Annex 17, aircraft and airport operators are expected to establish measures to 
prevent acts of unlawful interference. These measures include: i) access control of persons 
and vehicles to the airside (i.e. background checks, identification validation, screening); ii) 
protection against unlawful interference and aircraft security checks/searches; iii) protection 
against unlawful interference and screening of hold baggage, cargo and mail.  
In addition to these, other measures were identified during the airport visits. They include 
ad hoc security inspections performed on the airside. As a part of the airport and GSP 
policies, employees are also required to challenge anyone working on the airside who does 
                                                      
14 ICAO Annex 17 (ICAO, 2006, p. 1-1) defines Acts of Unlawful Interferences as: “acts or attempted acts 





not have a visible identification. Furthermore in the future, security on the apron may be 
enhanced if the measures proposed by the AAS project (see Section 3.3.5) on GSE access 
control get widely accepted. 
4.5 Summary 
Based on the combination of literature, observations, interviews, structured and 
unstructured communication with the SMEs, this chapter has provided a detailed 
description of four aspects of apron operations: i) physical architecture, ii) ground handling 
services (operations), iii) participating stakeholders, and iv) the technology used on the 
apron.  
For the first time a hierarchical control diagram of all direct and indirect stakeholders on the 
apron was developed to identify the control and feedback loops (Leveson, 2012) associated 
with the design, operations and maintenance of the apron system. Furthermore, the 
relevance of this diagram for apron safety management is demonstrated in Section 5.2.3 
Additionally, after highlighting the importance of communication in assuring safety and 
efficiency of apron operations, this Chapter provided a diagram of communication flows 
and their means between the stakeholders on the apron. 
This Chapter has provided a multi-faceted description of the apron system necessary for the 
identification of the best safety approach to be applied in the TASM framework 
development in Chapter 6. Therefore, the next chapter introduces the concept of safety and 






Chapter 5 ELICITATION OF THE APPROACH SUITED 
FOR TASM FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter 4 provided a detailed multi-layered description of the apron system including its 
infrastructure, services provided, participating stakeholders and present technologies. 
Following the characterisation of the apron system, it is necessary to identify a 
methodology, the best suited for the Total Apron Safety Management (TASM) safety 
framework in Chapter 6. Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the evolution in 
safety thinking and its management with the objective of eliciting the state of the art 
methodology for this.  
The most widely accepted definition of aviation safety was introduced in Section 3.5. 
However, such traditional definitions have recently been challenged leading to a paradigm 
shift in the very definition of safety itself. This is discussed in 5.1 through a review of the 
evolution of safety thinking aetiology, phenomenology and ontology in the past century. 
Subsequently, Section 5.2 introduces a generic safety management concept through Safety 
Management Systems (SMS). This is followed by a critical review of the existing safety 
management approach on the apron and its future prospects. Building upon the apron 
system description and the existing approach to safety management, a need for a change in 
the safety risk management component of the SMS on the apron is highlighted. A review of 
the existing approaches for apron safety modelling and their limitations is presented. 
5.1 Paradigms in safety thinking 
The word safety, originating from the Latin word salvus meaning “uninjured, healthy or safe”, 
has a long history dating from the Roman period (Hollnagel, 2014c). Safety became 
increasingly important following the industrial revolutions (Hollnagel, 2013) and the 
thinking about safety has evolved ever since. Currently, safety is even considered to be a 
scientific discipline. 
In his seminal paper, Hollnagel (2014b) questioned whether safety, as defined at present, 
actually can be a subject of science. He argued that each scientific discipline had to have an 
object (phenomenon) of study and questioned what the object of safety science was. An 





of safety vary across domains, they all have certain properties in common illustrated in a 
generic definition of safety (Hollnagel, 2014c, p. 1): 
“Safety is the system property or quality that is necessary and sufficient to ensure that 
the number of events that could be harmful to workers, the public, or the environment is 
acceptably low”. 
It follows from the definition above that the object of safety science is to eliminate/avoid 
unwanted outcomes. Contrary to this widely accepted thinking, Hollnagel (2013, 2014b) 
argues that this approach is geared towards studying the lack of safety rather than safety 
itself. He continues by pointing out that prevention of unwanted outcomes is instead object 
of another science – accidentology. 
Consequently, Hollnagel (2013, 2014b, 2014c) and EUROCONTROL (2013c) introduced a 
paradigm in safety thinking where safety as a science is focused on studying safe operation 
and how operations succeed under varying conditions. This paradigm is labelled as  “Safety-
II”, as opposed to the existing “Safety-I” school of thought (2013, 2014b, 2014c). 
When analysing the safety of a system, the purpose of the analysis may be twofold 
(Hollnagel, 2012b): i) retrospective, and ii) prospective. The starting point of any 
retrospective analysis is the (unwanted) event that has happened, from where it is necessary 
to reason backwards to understand what may have caused the event. In contrast, 
prospective analysis begins by analysing different combinations of circumstances (i.e. 
scenarios), and uses forward reasoning to anticipate the impact these circumstances may 
have on the safety of the system in question. Regardless of the purpose, safety analysis must 
be based on certain theoretical assumptions, as discussed in the following Sections.  
The two paradigms of safety thinking are further developed and compared in Sections 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2. They are described in terms of three dimensions of safety (Hollnagel, 2004, 2014c): 
• Phenomenology refers to an observable outcome of an event/occurrence being studied. It 
answers the question ‘what happened?’ 
• Aetiology refers to the causes of an observable event/occurrence. It answers the question 
‘why/how event/occurrence happened?’ 







focusing on accidents, the phenomenology of Safety-I also extends to near-accidents 
(incidents) due to an accepted assumption (‘myth’) of linearity (Besnard and Hollnagel, 2012, 
Hollnagel, 2014c) further discussed in 5.1.1.3. 
5.1.1.2 Aetiology 
The aetiology of safety describes both i) the factors, and ii) the mechanism that bring about 
an event, which is either an accident or incident in Safety-I, with an unwanted15 outcome 
(Hollnagel, 2014c). 
The factors describe conditions that “came together or aligned at a specific time” (Hollnagel, 
2004, p. 29) just before an unwanted outcome occurred but they do not answer the question 
as to why it occurred. Historically, safety thinking has evolved in terms of the typology of 
factors that explain unwanted outcomes. Hale and Hovden (1998) distinguished between 
three periods in this evolution:  
1. The age of technology – this started during the industrial revolution when technology, 
characterised by high failure rates, was believed to have contributed to an increasing 
number of industrial accidents/incidents. People realised that certain accidents could 
have been prevented by the rectification of technology, which prompted the research on 
reliability engineering. Indeed, it was until nearly the middle of the 20th century, the 
safety community considered technological malfunctions as the main factor 
contributing to industrial accidents/incidents.  
2. The age of human factors. Following the end of WWII, while the reliability of technology 
improved significantly, events resulting in unwanted outcomes continued to rise in 
both frequency and severity. However, it became apparent that human limitations 
created vulnerability in system safety. This acknowledgement triggered research in 
early ergonomics16 (human factors) with the objective being to improve human 
productivity and reliability. Initially this was achieved by developing automation to 
compensate for human limitations. However, following the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
                                                      
15 The world unwanted is highlighted in this Section only because these outcomes were the focus of 
Safety-I thinking. 
16 International Ergonomics Association (IEA) defines ergonomics (or human factors) (IEA, 2015) as: 
“the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of 
a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize 
human well-being and overall system performance. Ergonomists contribute to the design and evaluation of 
tasks, jobs, products, environments and systems in order to make them compatible with the needs, abilities and 





nuclear disaster in 1979, this approach has proven to be ineffective. This accident gave 
rise to the famous concept of ‘human error’ that dominated human factors and 
ergonomics literature until the beginning of the 21st	  century. Accordingly, the humans 
were treated as yet another technical component and system safety was managed by 
improving the reliability of the human component. 
3. The age of organisation. During the human factor era only the human operators at the 
sharp end (Reason, 1990b, Cook and Woods, 1994), i.e. the people performing the tasks 
when and where the accident occurred, were accounted for. Despite the early warning 
signs, it was only in 1986 following the Challenger and Chernobyl accidents, in the 
space and nuclear industry respectively, that it became apparent that human and 
technological factors are insufficient for explaining accidents. Suddenly it became 
increasingly important to address the people at the blunt end (Reason, 1990b, Cook and 
Woods, 1994), people whose actions affected the sharp end prior to the event (i.e. 
designers, planners, management, maintenance). This gave rise to a new class of factors 
– organisational factors that focused on quality assurance, self-regulation and safety 
culture (Kjellén and Hovden, 1993, DeJoy et al., 2004, Underwood, 2013), and are 
currently in use.  
The changes described above in considering the factors that affect safety were only 
evolutionary in nature. The identification of a new class of factors did not imply replacing 
the existing factors but rather in complementing them. In addition, safety analysis always 
needs to account for changes in the operating environment of a system over time (Leveson, 
2015). Operating environment refers to organisational factors but also included physical 
environment in which system functions (i.e. force major) that need to be accounted for. 
However, since the control of these factors lies with the organisation, they are often referred 
to as organisational factors.  
At present, in the so-called “third age of safety”, the safety community acknowledges, 
although not all are accorded equal the importance of all three classes of factors (Hollnagel, 
2014c), and takes a structured Safety Management System (SMS) approach in managing 
them. Consequently, the third age is also known as ‘the age of safety management’ (Hale and 
Hovden, 1998). The SMS fundamentals and its application on the apron are discussed 






prospective analyses. The criteria, outlined in the definitions above and summarised in 
Table 5-1, can be used as a decision aids in the selection of the appropriate safety analysis 
method. For instance, two extreme categories in terms of system tractability may be 
considered: i) a production line in a factory − as a completely tractable system, in contrast to 
ii) an emergency room at a hospital − as a completely intractable system. Simple and 
complex linear models are considered to be appropriate (Hollnagel et al., 2007, Hollnagel, 
2008, 2012b, 2014c) for safety analyses of tractable systems, whereas systemic models are 
deemed necessary to model intractable systems. 
Simple and complex linear models, characteristic for more tractable systems are typical for 
the Safety-I paradigm. They are explained in turn below. In contrast, the systemic accident 
models are more closely related to intractable systems that call for the adoption of the 
Safety-II paradigm and are discussed in 5.1.2.2. 
Table 5-1 System tractability (adapted from Hollnagel (2014c, p. 119)) 
 Tractable system Intractable system 
Number of details Descriptions are simple with few details Descriptions are elaborate with many details 
Comprehensibility Principles of functioning are known Principles of functioning are partly 
unknown 
Stability System does not change while being 
described 
System changes before description is 
completed 
Simple linear safety analysis mechanisms (models). This term is used to address both accident 
analysis and risk assessment models that assume a sequential and deterministic propagation 
of events based on the cause-effect links to/from and unwanted outcome/initiating event 
(Hollnagel, 2004, 2007). The initiating event in the accident sequence is considered to be an 
unsafe act of a human, mechanical or physical (i.e. working environment) nature (Heinrich 
et al., 1980). To illustrate the simple linear model, Heinrich et al. (1980) proposed the domino 
theory analogy (see Figure 5-3) where each domino represents an  event or factor that 
contributed/may contribute to an unwanted outcome. Removing a domino or preventing it 






Figure 5-3 The domino theory by Heinrich et al. (1980) cited in Hollnagel (2004, p. 49)) 
Two of the most common models used in retrospective and prospective safety analyses are 
fault trees (FTA) and event trees (ETA) respectively. Fault trees (Vesely et al., 1981, NASA, 
2002) use a binary tree representation to denote the propagation of events from normal 
operations to unwanted outcome, in a single or multiple linear sequences (chains), following 
an introduction of a system disturbance. Even trees (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1975, Leveson and Diaz-Herrera, 1995) which are based on the same assumptions and visual 
representation, but require reasoning from an initiating event to the unwanted outcome. 
The popularity of the tree-like analogy can be explained by the following (Hollnagel, 2004, 
Dupuy, 2012): i) reasoning simplicity, and ii) manageability in a graphical illustration to 
explain mechanisms of unwanted outcomes. However, simple linear models were initially 
developed only with the intention of describing mechanisms by which technological factors, 
the focus of the first era of safety thinking, align and combine to bring about a negative 
outcome. While these models were initially only capable of modelling purely technical 
systems, they were adapted to account for the rising need to modelling human operator 
behaviour (i.e. Human Reliability Analysis Event Tree (HRAET)), a characteristic for the age 
of human factors. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 20th century these approaches have 
proven to be ineffective in explaining unwanted outcomes arising from the systems of 
higher complexity. This led consequently to the development of the complex linear models. 
Complex linear safety analysis mechanisms (models). This cluster of models has been developed 
as a response to the Three Mile Island disaster. The complex linear models refer to the 
symbolism found in epidemiology17 and are therefore also known as ‘epidemiological accident 
models’. Accordingly, for an unwanted occurrence to take place, interactions between three 
types of factors must happen, that of the host (i.e. ground service agent), agent (i.e. physical 
                                                      
17 According to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2014) epidemiology is “the study of the 
distribution and determinants of health-related states or events (including disease), and the application of this 





fatigue) and environment (i.e. apron). These interactions are much more complex and 
multifaceted than the causal chains, found in the simple linear models, and are referred to a 
causal networks (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
Figure 5-4 Predecessor of the Swiss cheese model (source: Reason (1990a, p. 479)) 
The epidemiological approach to safety thinking augmented the existing linear mechanism 
by accounting for the following novel features (Hollnagel, 2004, p. 55): i) latent conditions, 
and ii) safety barriers. In contrast to simple linear models, which assume that the unwanted 
outcomes are caused by ‘active failures’ associated with front line operators, complex linear 
models introduce the concept of ‘latent failures’ attributed to unobservable and dormant 
conditions (i.e. factors such as design, management decisions, rules and regulations) that 
exist in a system long before the unwanted outcome occurs (Reason, 1990a). Latent 
conditions, “emerging from the interaction between technical and social aspects of the 
system”(Reason, 1990a, p. 476), established the instrument for explaining a new class of 
factors characteristic for the third age of safety, the organisational factors. As a means to 
control the propagation of the factors leading to an unwanted outcome, the epidemiological 
approach introduced the concept of barriers (see Section 4.4). Barriers, depending on the 
classification, have the function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an unwanted 
event. Safety in the complex linear models is managed by (Reason, 1990a, Hollnagel, 2004): i) 
the minimisation of performance deviations due to active failures and latent conditions, and 
ii) the reinforcement of the safety barriers. Reason (1990a) was the first to identify the 
importance of understanding the ‘health’ of a system (components) before considering its 
‘pathology’ (i.e. failures). This hypothesis served as a building foundation for the systemic 





As an application of the complex linear safety thinking, James Reason (1990a) developed a 
complex linear model, today known as the Swiss cheese model. This model, capable to 
account for systems complexity better than simple linear models, is currently the most 
widely accepted model amongst the safety community. Therefore an isolated failure (of its 
component) can rarely produce an accident on its own. But instead, an active failure 
combined with latent failures in the organisational structure or defences create an 
opportunity for an accident to happen. Only when active and latent failures, illustrated as 
planes in Figure 5-4, align in a particular fashion, a ‘trajectory of opportunity’ for an unwanted 
outcome is conceived. This model establishing the link between active and latent failures, as 
planes in accident causation was later complemented by holes, corresponding to weaknesses 
in barriers, and attached a ‘Swiss cheese’ label by “Rob Lee, then Director of the Bureau of Air 
Safety Investigation (BASI) in Canberra” (EUROCONTROL, 2006d, p. 4). In addition to the 
Swiss cheese model, epidemiological theory has also been elaborated through other well 
known models such as Tripod (Energy Institute, 2014, Hollnagel, 2014c) and AcciMap 
(Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000, Hollnagel, 2014c). 
5.1.1.3 Ontology 
The third dimension of safety, ontology, depicts the basic assumptions upon which the 
phenomenology and aetiology are based and closely linked to. Besnard and Hollnagel 
(2012), Besnard and Hollnagel (2014), and Hollnagel (2014c) identified six main assumptions 
that are the foundations of the Safety-I thinking: 
• Causality. The most basic assumption in Safety-I thinking is based on the principle of 
causality or the “causality credo” as proposed by Hollnagel (2014c). The assumption 
implies that successes and failures happen for completely different reasons, i.e. in other 
words they have different causes. In addition, these causes have very different 
mechanisms in the cases of successful as opposed to unwanted outcomes. This in turn, 
permits the safety community to focus their limited resources on the causes and 
mechanisms that only lead to unwanted outcomes. Finally, upon determining the 
causes and underlying mechanisms it is possible to completely eliminate unwanted 
outcomes (i.e. “Vision Zero” of road traffic accident in Sweden). The assumption also 
implies a “symmetry between the past and the future” (Hollnagel, 2014c, p. 64). This 
symmetry enables the safety community to assume: i) factors that existed at the time of 
an accident can always be found in retrospective analysis, ii) factors that were present in 
an accident in the past will be present in the future as well, iii) the mechanisms used in 





• Systems are decomposable. Provision of a system description is the starting point in 
retrospective and prospective safety analysis. While a system may be defined 
differently, for illustrative purposes the Oxford dictionary (2014a) defines a system as “a 
set of connected things or parts forming a complex whole”. Deriving a system description, as 
the sum of its parts, is used as a basis for system design and development. This 
approach was also extended to safety analyses, dating back to the first age of safety 
when technology was the focus of safety science. Retrospective analysis even goes a step 
further by assuming that it is perfectly acceptable to decompose technological systems 
into components in the search for factors that contributed to unwanted outcomes 
(Hollnagel, 2014c). The assumption remained valid in the second and the third age of 
safety thinking when human and organisational factors came into the spotlight. This 
was achieved by decomposing human operations in terms of task and organisations 
into the business units. Consequently, safety analyses are performed by analysing one 
component/factor at a time while assuming the “ceteris paribus” principle (Hollnagel, 
2014c) that implies that all the other dependant components/factors remain unchanged. 
• Bimodality. Building upon the decomposition assumption, in the Safety-I system 
constituents are one by one undergoing a binary analysis process in both retrospective 
and prospective analyses. This assumption oversimplifies the actual processes 
characteristic for complex systems, based on interaction of social and technological 
elements, which are often concurrent, multi-state and non-linear. 
• Linearity. The assumption on linearity dates back to Heinrich (1931). As the “father of 
industrial safety”, he performed a study based on 50,000 accidents to identify the 
frequencies of industrial accidents. The results of the study indicated a ratio 1:29:330 
between major injury, minor injuries and other occurrences respectively. The safety 
community however took these ratios for granted and translated them into the ratio 
between the types of events, instead of their severity, the original intention of Heinrich 
(Hollnagel, 2014c). Following his death, the ratio was complemented by a graphical 
illustration in the form of a pyramid, which fundamentally affected the safety 
community’s reasoning on the linearity of accidents causes. The underlying idea is the 
more unwanted outcomes of lower severity that occur, the more the unwanted 





• Context. Until 1990, the era known as the first generation of Human Reliability 
Analysis18 (HRA), the impact of the context in which an operation takes place was 
completely ignored (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). The on going second generation of human 
reliability analysis accounts for the context but in a very simplistic manner – by 
adjusting the reliability of a component/task failure. However, to date, the benefits of 
the second over the first generation of HRA techniques are inconclusive (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009, Kyriakidis, 2011, 2013) 
• Predictability. The predictability of (unwanted) outcomes follows from the previous 
assumptions. Oversimplification of the system description by assuming that systems are 
decomposable, bimodal, non-concurring and linear, grants the generation of over 
simplified rules (i.e. Boolean logic) again for predicting future unwanted outcomes. 
This completes the description of all three dimension of Safety-I thinking, which are all re-
considered within the context of Safety-II approach. 
5.1.2 Safety-II 
5.1.2.1 Phenomenology 
While the phenomenology of Safety-I focuses on the left-hand side of the task outcome 
distribution tail illustrated in Figure 5-1, this approach completely neglects the need to study 
‘normal’ and ‘successful’ (exceptionally good) outcomes. The reason for this has already been 
explained within the ontology of Safety-I, where it was assumed that the wanted and 
unwanted outcomes stem from completely different causes and underlying mechanisms. 
However, the ontology of Safety-II, as detailed in 5.1.2.3, starts from the point that these 
mechanisms are the same for wanted and unwanted outcomes. Therefore, the object of 
Safety-II is the whole range of outcomes from Figure 5-1.  
This analysis focuses on (EUROCONTROL, 2013c, Hollnagel, 2013, 2014b, 2014c) the active 
understanding and management of ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ outcomes and instead of focusing 
on minimising the failures, it tries to maximise the number of completed outcomes (normal 
and successes). 
                                                      
18 Swain and Guttmann (1983b) and Boring (2005) define HRA as “the use of systems engineering and 
behavioural science methods in order to render a complete description of the human contribution to risk and to 






The notion of system (in)tractability has already been introduced in Section 5.1.1.2. Due to 
underlying ontology of Safety-II, described later in 5.1.2.3, it can been concluded that 
intractable systems cannot be effectively modelled using linear mechanisms, widely used in 
Safety-I thinking. Due to the criteria outlined in Table 5-1, intractable systems can never be 
completely specified (in terms of the number of details and comprehensibility) and are 
highly unstable due to the high variability of the social components and the environment 
(Hollnagel, 2014c).  
In contrast to the simple and complex linear models whose aetiology is based on a piece-
meal analysis of system components and tasks, systemic models take a holistic approach to 
system performance analysis. Systemic models depict systems functionally while 
emphasising the importance of performance variability due to the dynamic interactions, 
dependencies and conditions within the system (Hollnagel, 2004, Leveson, 2004).  
Performance variability has already been mentioned within the epidemiological models but 
in a negative context of a deviation. In line with the Safety-I thinking, these models 
considered performance deviations as unwanted and bad (Hollnagel, 2004). Consequently 
the approach in managing them in the epidemiological fashion was to constrain 
performance deviations. 
Systemic models on the other hand accept performance variability as a normal characteristic 
in the functioning of any intractable systems. This thinking stems from Perrow (1984) who 
believed that we, as human beings, are incapable of predicting the behaviour of intractable 
systems even though we are fully aware of the components that comprise the systems. Thus 
system behaviour is considered to be emergent and impossible to predict from the system 
components, in contrast to the resultant behaviour for which this is feasible (Hollnagel, 
2004). Accordingly, as framed in his Normal Accident Theory (NAT), unwanted outcomes (i.e. 
accidents) should be considered as normal system behaviour. 
For modelling systemic behaviour it is necessary to anticipate performance variability and 
its effect on system performances. This has proven to be increasingly difficult particularly 
for highly intractable systems due to the large number of influences between elements of the 
analysis. The following methods dominated the systemic safety modelling in the past 
decade, namely the: 
• Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) for the use in both retrospective and 





• System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) for retrospective analysis 
and System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) for prospective analysis by Leveson 
(2012, 2013). 
FRAM, STAMP and STPA are critically reviewed in Section 6.2.1. 
5.1.2.3 Ontology 
The assumptions in the Safety-II paradigm differ considerably from those of Safety-I 
(Hollnagel, 2014c): 
• Emergence. As stated earlier, linear models are founded on the causality assumption, 
where an unwanted outcome results from a combination of factors that can be found 
using the principles of reversed causality in retrospective, and forward causality in 
prospective analysis that follows a deterministic linear path. In contrast, as a 
consequence of variability in the system, its environment and their interaction, 
unwanted outcomes are thought to emerge in systemic models. Crick (1995, p. 11) 
describes emergent behaviour as the one where “…the whole may not be the simple sum of 
its separate parts, its behaviour can, at least in principle, be understood from the nature and 
behaviour of its parts plus the knowledge of how all these parts interact”. Hollnagel (2004) uses 
the analogy with the Brownian motion model, of random particle movements resulting 
from a collision with the surrounding particles in a fluid, to explain the principle of 
emergence. Assumption of emergence can further be illustrated with the example of the 
Lorenz’s butterfly effect (Lorenz, 2000, Hollnagel, 2004) that explains how a tornado 
could emerge from a butterfly flapping its wings several weeks before the event. 
• Functional interdependence. Structural decomposition characteristic for Safety-I has been 
substituted by modelling of a functional (i.e. functions, constrains) interdependency 
coupled with performance variability (i.e. internal, external variability/disturbances) in 
Safety-II. In addition to the identification of the functions, a holistic approach to safety 
modelling is highly dependant on the determination of dynamic, non-linear 
dependencies between system functions. 
• Performance variability. Over the years systems have undergone increasing automation, 
yet the human operator is relied upon to perform all the tasks that cannot be automated 
(Bainbridge, 1983). This need for human ‘intervention’ makes systems additionally 
intractable and further increases performance variability thereby making the bimodality 





• Non-linearity. Unlike simple and complex linear models that assume linearity between 
factors (causes) and unwanted outcomes (consequences) a basic assumption in systemic 
models is that of non-linear mechanisms. This implies that outcome severity is not 
necessarily proportional to the contributing factors but that seemingly small (irrelevant) 
factors can bring about severe consequences (i.e. the Butterfly effect). Furthermore, 
outcomes of different severity can be attributed to different factors (one or their 
combination) and underlying mechanisms, requiring each type of outcome to be 
individually modelled (Hollnagel, 2014c). The hypothesis on different factors associated 
with outcomes of different severities has been confirmed by Nascimento et al. (2013), 
questioning the validity of the Heinrich pyramid. 
• Context. The ontology of Safety-II emphasises the importance of context on the shaping 
of system performances. Furthermore, systemic methods (i.e. FRAM, STAMP) typically 
used to describe intractable systems are capable of accounting for contextual factors but 
only in a qualitative manner (i.e. though internal and external variability). 
• Predictability. While Safety-II abandons the assumptions of decomposition, linearity, 
bimodality and non-concurrence, the prediction of unwanted outcomes is still feasible 
but in a more systemic way achieved by identification and control of regular and 
recurrent conditions that emerge from performance variability (Hollnagel, 2014c). 
5.1.3 Summary of the safety paradigms 
Section 5.1 provided a theoretical overview of the concept of safety and its modelling, 
summarised in Figure 5-5. In order to provide a satisfactory explanation of the past and 
anticipate the future unwanted outcomes, safety thinking evolved in: 
• Phenomenology. Until the end of the 20th century, the safety community focused on 
learning from unwanted outcomes and used gained knowledge to anticipate how they 
could reoccur in the future. Certainly, by introducing barriers this approach did reduce 
the events of a certain types but nonetheless new previously unanticipated (‘unknown’) 
events started to occur. This prompted the safety community not only to consider the 
events that have actually resulted in an unwanted outcome but also the events that 
could have. As safety evolved, particularly in safety-critical industries, the frequency of 
unwanted outcomes significantly dropped. However in terms of severity, the events 
that do happen typically result in a disastrous outcome (i.e. Fukushima). Yet the 






Assuming the entirely different resulting nature of unwanted versus desired outcomes, the 
Safety-I school of thought attempts to eliminate unwanted outcomes by identifying and 
managing their specific underlying factors and mechanisms. By focusing on unwanted 
outcomes, Safety-I is managed through the following steps (Johnson, 2003, Leveson, 2012, 
Hollnagel, 2014c): 
i) reporting systems for recording and collecting information on unwanted outcomes of 
different severity; 
ii) trend monitoring, investigation, causal analysis and explanation; 
iii) recommendations followed by actions aimed at rectifying the factors causing (associated 
with) the unwanted outcome to an acceptable safety level; 
iv) evaluation of the effectiveness of the actions; 
v) safety learning and improvement.  
Furthermore, the Safety-I approach to safety management, often referred to as “find and fix” 
(Hollnagel, 2014c, p. 48), is considered to be reactive due to its focus on learning from 
historical unwanted outcomes. In retrospective analysis, occurrences that resulted in the 
unwanted outcomes are studied in depth to understand the factors and the mechanisms that 
caused them. However, lessons learned from the past-unwanted outcomes are very limited 
due to their inability to identify the types of occurrences and their underlying mechanisms 
that have yet to occur (Hollnagel, 2014c). Similarly, despite the need to predict future 
unwanted outcomes, prospective Safety-I analysis is considered to be more reactive than 
proactive since it (Hollnagel, 2014c): i) anticipates unwanted outcomes from historically 
identified risk, ii) is typically performed only once - in the system design phase. Unwanted 
outcomes are explained through failures in technology, human operator or the organisation 
and are consequently managed through the introduction of barriers (i.e. physical, functional, 
symbolic or incorporeal previously discussed in Section 4.4). 
In contrast to Safety-I, Safety-II Management focuses on the understanding of the factors 
and mechanisms that drive the desired outcomes. The more desired outcomes a system 
achieves through a proactive safety management – the safer it is (Hollnagel, 2014c). Instead 
of investing resources exclusively to correct circumstances/conditions that led to unwanted 
outcomes in the past, Safety-II Management aims to anticipate and prevent an occurrence 
that may bring to an unwanted outcome in the future. This is achieved through (Hollnagel, 
2013, 2014c) an understanding of the behavioural patterns that emerge due to couplings 





Furthermore, while Safety-I Management aims to identify what went wrong and to attribute 
to certain failure category (typically single and linear), Safety-II Management acknowledges 
the notion of performance variability and attempts to identify the types and reasons for 
performance adjustments that were made in a particular scenario. 
Table 5-2 Comparison between Safety-I and –II Management practices (adapted from 
EUROCONTROL (2013c, p. 21) and Hollnagel (2014c, p. 147)) 
 Safety-I Safety-II 
Definition of 
safety 




Reactive, respond when something happens 
or is categorised as an unacceptable risk. 
Proactive, continuously trying to anticipate 
occurrence developments and 
control/enhance its variability. 
View of the 
human factor in 
safety 
management 
Humans are predominantly seen as a liability 
or hazard. 
Humans are seen as a resource necessary for 




Harmful, should be prevented as far as 
possible. 
Inevitable but also useful. Should be 
monitored and managed. 
Accident 
investigation 
Accidents are caused by failures and 
malfunctions. The purpose of an 
investigation is to identify the causes. 
Things basically happen in the same way, 
regardless of the outcome. The purpose of an 
investigation is to understand how things 
usually go right as a basis for explaining how 
things occasionally go wrong. 
Risk 
assessment 
Accidents are caused by failures and 
malfunctions. The purpose of an 
investigation is to identify causes and 
contributory factors. 
To understand the conditions where 
performance variability can become difficult 
or impossible to monitor and control. 
5.2.2 Safety Management System 
The aetiology of safety evolved in the past century and at present it synthesises technical, 
human and organisational factors, characteristic for the Third age of safety. Management of 
these classes of factors and their interactions is achieved through formalised “safety control 
structures” (Leveson, 2012) often referred to as the Safety Management System (SMS). 
Although based on the same concept, the elements, structure, level of sophistication and 
maturity of a SMS varies across industries and organisations (Johnson, 2003, Dupuy, 2012, 
Leveson, 2012, ICAO, 2013e). 
In the aviation domain, ICAO has recognised the importance of the SMS concept, defined as 
(ICAO, 2013e, p. xii): 
“A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational 





, and its principles in managing aviation safety. This led to the development of a dedicated 
ICAO SMS Manual with the main objectives being to provide guidance to aviation service 
providers on the standardised (ICAO, 2013e): i) development, implementation and oversight 
of a State Safety Programme (SSP) in line with the ICAO SARPs, and ii) development, 
implementation and maintenance of SMSs. At present, the scope of the Manual’s SMS 
provision extends only to the following service providers (ICAO, 2013e, p. 1-1): “approved 
training organisations …, aircraft operators, approved maintenance organisations, organisations 
responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft, air traffic service providers and certified 
aerodromes.” Using the framework outlined in the ICAO SMS Manual as guidance, the ICAO 
Member States are required to ensure SMS implementation for all service providers listed 
above through their SSPs. While Dupuy (2012) and Wilke (2013) provided an in depth 
review of the ICAO SMS framework, this Section only introduces the basic components of 
an SMS to support the discussion about the SMS on the apron in Section 5.2.3. 
 
Figure 5-6 ICAO SMS framework (source: Wilke (2013, p. 124)) 
The generic framework of a SMS outlined by ICAO prescribes four components: i) safety 
policy and objectives, ii) safety risk management, iii) safety assurance, and iv) safety 
promotion; that are further broken down into a total of twelve elements as illustrated in 
Figure 5-6. It is worth highlighting that a certain level of variability exists even within the 
aviation sector in terms of the SMS framework. For instance, while the FAA SMS framework 
(FAA, 2014c) is fully aligned with the one from ICAO, the EUROCONTROL SMS 
framework (EUROCONTROL, 2000) is still based on four components but organised into 





concept referred to in this thesis is the one contained in the ICAO SMS Manual given its 
widespread use in aviation globally. The remainder of this Section expands on the generic 
ICAO SMS components according to ICAO (2013e). 
Safety policy and objectives. The highest level of a service provider’s hierarchy is 
responsible for outlining the organisation’s attitude towards safety. To achieve this, senior 
management first needs to demonstrate their commitment by setting and enforcing safety 
policies and objectives. Safety accountabilities along with the safety personnel then need to 
be strictly defined for all levels of an organisational to avoid the reoccurrence of events such 
as the US Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System (ICBM), associated with the lack of safety 
leadership (Leveson, 2012). Furthermore, to ensure seamless transition from normal to 
emergency operations and a safe return to normal operations, service providers are 
responsible for developing an Emergency Response Plan (ERP). Finally, the records of all 
safety policies and objectives need to be documented and continuously maintained to 
ensure SMS traceability. 
Safety risk management. Service providers are expected to account for all risks within their 
organisation in order to meet the set safety objectives. This component includes both 
retrospective and prospective safety analysis. The safety risk management process begins 
with the identification of hazards (i.e. technological, human, organisational or contextual) 
associated with the operations of a service provider. Selection of methods used in hazard 
identification is left to the service provider but needs to incorporate reactive, proactive and 
predictive safety data collection. Following the identification of hazards, the probability and 
severity of unwanted outcomes resulting from each hazard is assessed to determine safety 
risk. The service provider is required to develop a safety risk assessment matrix capable of 
classifying unwanted hazard outcomes in terms of risk tolerability. Intolerable risks must 
therefore be mitigated in line with the Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoS) principle. 
Safety risks are typically managed in three ways, by: i) avoiding risks (i.e. by eliminating 
certain tasks), ii) reducing risks (i.e. improving reliability of a component to reduce the 
failure probability), iii) segregating exposure (i.e. adding a barrier capable of containing an 
explosion). In the selection of an appropriate safety risk mitigation approach, each solution 
needs to be considered in terms of its effectiveness, cost, feasibility and unintended 
consequences. 
Safety assurance. The effectiveness of safety risk management measures is monitored 
through the process of safety assurance. For an effective monitoring of a system’s safety 





Section 3.5). The indicators are derived through the data collected by the service provider’s 
reporting systems that can be either:  
• mandatory – typically based on regulatory requirements to collect information on 
occurrences that resulted in unwanted outcomes of high severity; or 
• voluntary – typically loosely regulated but with the objective being to collect 
information on occurrences that resulted/or could result in unwanted outcomes of 
lower severity or operational hazards.  
In addition to reporting systems, data collected through internal and external audits are 
used to assess the safety performance of a service provider. Raw data, collected through the 
reporting systems and audits, converted into safety performance indicators are analysed 
periodically to benchmark the achieved safety performance with the previously defined 
safety objectives, from which the follow-up action is defined. This process is continuously 
repeated to improve safety performance in an organisation. 
Safety promotion. The pre-requisite to achieving an effective safety management 
framework is an operational environment that promotes commitment, justness, trust and the 
open sharing of safety information. Safety is promoted by means of: i) training and 
education for each employee proportionate to its role in safety management, and ii) the 
establishment of a formal means of communication between all levels of an organisation’s 
hierarchy.  
This is only possible in organisations with a developed safety culture and safety climate 
(also referred to as organisational culture). Due to their multi-faceted nature, numerous 
definitions of these concepts exist in the literature (Zohar, 1980, Pidgeon, 1998, Flin et al., 
2000, Guldenmund, 2000, Glendon et al., 2006). While the concepts of safety climate and 
culture are often used interchangeably, according to Correll and Andrewartha (2000, p. 12) 
safety culture typically refers to “something an organisation is (the beliefs, attitudes and values of 
its members regarding the pursuit of safety)” whereas safety climate refers to “something an 
organisation has (the structures, policies, practices controls and policies designed to enhance safety).” 
The two concepts do not exist in isolation but are tightly coupled – changes in the 
organisational climate affect organisational culture and vice versa (ICAO, 2013e, Mearns et 
al., 2013). 
Safety culture and climate reflect “the value of, priority of, and commitment to” safety in an 
organisation (EUROCONTROL, 2008c). Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that the 





organisations across numerous industries (Clarke, 2006, Christian et al., 2009, Mearns et al., 
2013). However, measurement of these concepts has proved to be challenging. Intangible 
dimensions of safety culture and climate are typically measured using questionnaire-based 
and checklist-based surveys (i.e. audits). Johnson (2003) questions the reliability of such 
surveys since the data collected is: i) highly subjective, ii) a function of the combination of 
social, professional, organisational and national cultures (ICAO, 2013e), iii) a function of 
time period when it was performed. Furthermore, occurrence reporting system metrics are 
the most widely accepted measure of a positive safety culture and climate (Johnson, 2003), 
although their results should be interpreted with caution. For instance, a rise in occurrence 
reports may indicate an improvement in the reporting culture that could have been 
associated with the positive safety culture/climate, or it may indicate the deterioration of 
operational safety within an organisation. 
In conclusion, within the above outlined ICAO SMS framework, each organisation has a 
duty to establish its own activities, methodologies and processes to ensure their compliance. 
The ICAO SMS manual only intends to support an objective regulatory framework, and 
emphasises more on “what to do” rather than “how to do it”. 
5.2.3 Apron safety management 
Operations that take place on the apron depend on the interactions of numerous direct and 
indirect stakeholders previously described in Section 4.3. Accordingly apron safety 
management needs to account for these interactions. This Section, therefore, focuses 
predominantly on the existing safety management practices of the direct apron stakeholders, 
highlighted in blue in Figure 5-7, and provides recommendations on enhancing these 
practices in the future. 
As previously discussed in Section 5.2.2, aircraft operators (airlines), airport operators, and 
apron management19 are all required by ICAO SARPs (ICAO, 2013e, 2013c) to have a SMS in 
place for the systematic safety management of their own operations and also to account for 
interaction with other stakeholders present on the apron. However for the ICAO global 
aviation regulatory framework to be in force, the Member States are required to implement 
the SARPs through national laws. 
                                                      






Opinion20 01/2013 (European Commission, 2013) by EASA, the European Commission has 
developed a Regulation on Aerodromes (European Commission, 2014) that has come into force 
in the first quarter of 2014 and requires full compliance by the airport authorities prior to the 
end of year 2017. In the U.S., the FAA is in the process of incorporating the ICAO SARPs on 
airport operator SMS into the Federal airport certification regulation 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), Part 139 (FAA, 2014d). Towards the U.S.-wide SMS implementation, the 
FAA has developed guidance to support airport operators (ACRP, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2013, 
2014). However, following the process of public consultation on the Safety Management 
System for Certificated Airports Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the FAA issued 
second round of public consultation in the form of a Supplemental Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (SNPRM) before issuing the formal SMS implementation requirement for 
airports across the U.S. most likely in 2015 (FAA, 2012b). 
The provision for SMS implementation contained in the ICAO Safety Management Manual 
(SMM) (ICAO, 2013e) and the ICAO Annex 19 (ICAO, 2013c) does not apply to Ground 
service providers (GSPs). In the absence of GH regulations, aircraft operators, airport 
operators and GSPs, over the years, developed their own individual safety practices and 
recommendations, typically using the ICAO SMS Framework (ICAO, 2013e) and national 
regulations as a reference. These are variable across GSPs, regions, aircraft operators, airline 
operators, aircraft and GSE types. A survey based on 19 NAAs outside of the U.S. on apron 
safety management practices, carried out by ACRP (2012b), identified for instance that 
Denmark and Greece require GSPs to develop and integrate their SMS with the operating 
airport’s SMS. In contrast GSPs in Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland are 
not required to develop and implement a SMS. Consequently, this dichotomy ensures a high 
level of variability in GH safety management practices worldwide that makes harmonisation 
difficult without regulatory enforcement.  
The existing approach to safety management in GH is summarised in terms of the four 
elements of the ICAO SMS Framework, previously reviewed in Section 5.2.2: 
• Safety policy and objectives. Since no specific GSP international and national 
requirements are established, GSPs define their safety policy and objectives in a way 
that meets aircraft operator (i.e. Ground Operations Manual) and airport expectations 
(i.e. Airside safety requirements) in terms of safety and quality performance standards. 
                                                      
20 Opinions are documents prepared by EASA to assist the European Commission in preparation of 





The safety policy and objectives component of the SMS Framework includes the 
development of a safety reporting system and underlying procedures. However, 
without standardised guidance, on which events need to be reported, each GSP has the 
liberty to decide upon the data type to collect. Consequently, data quality reporting 
varies across GSPs. 
Furthermore, aircraft operator safety reporting requirements do not explicitly specify 
the occurrence reporting procedures for GSPs. For instance EU OPS 1 European 
standard (European Commission, 2008a), in the Section on Occurrence Reporting, 
specifies reporting procedures - aligned with ICAO Annex 13 - only for crew members. 
Consequently, data from the GSPs are not captured in the aircraft operator’s occurrence 
reports. Similarly, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) voluntary system - 
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) - does not explicitly invite GSPs to report 
occurrences during an aircraft turnaround (FAA, 1997). However, UK CAP382 (UK 
CAA, 2011), for instance, does mandate the reporting of ground handling occurrences 
from GSPs. 
• Safety risk management. On the basis of the occurrences that a GSP needs to collect 
within its policies and objectives, safety hazards are identified and reported. However, 
in addition to the differences in the type of occurrences that need to be reported, GSPs 
adopt different definitions of severity categories in the process of risk management 
within the organisation. Furthermore, GSPs vary in the approach to reporting culture 
based on the organisational safety culture that is specific to each GSP.  
Consequently, the above-mentioned variance in data quality makes safety risk 
identification, assessment and management feasible only at the level of a single GSP 
(and airport/base). This burden questions the representative nature of attempts to 
aggregate ground handling safety data worldwide (i.e. IATA Ground Damage Database 
(GDDB)). 
• Safety assurance. The purpose of safety assurance in safety management is to assure 
that predefined safety performance criteria are met through the effective monitoring of 
safety risk controls.  
While aircraft-specific safety indicators are clearly defined, no international 
standardised safety performance measures have been developed to capture GSA 
injuries, GSE damage, infrastructure damage or the environmental damage. This 
consequently led to development of internal safety indicators across GSPs, which are a 





All the findings and corrective actions, uncovered during this safety monitoring 
process, are therefore at the level of a single GSP and are therefore potentially variable 
between GSPs. 
Furthermore, continued improvements in GSP operations are achieved through the 
combination of internal and external audits. Internal audits are typically performed on 
an annual or bi-annual-basis within each GSP department. However, on a daily-basis, 
safety is assured through inspections enforced by the GSP’s management and 
supervisory roles. In addition to the numerous airline audits, two of the most common 
external audit programs are the Ramp Line Operations Safety Audit (R-LOSA) program 
(Ma and Rankin, 2012) and the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) 
program (IATA, 2014c). R-LOSA aims to identify safety risks on the apron through 
observations of normal operations. ISAGO, on the other hand, takes a different 
approach to improving safety on the apron, by introducing a standardised way of 
auditing GSPs. However, participation in the R-LOSA and ISAGO programmes is on a 
voluntary basis only. 
• Safety promotion. Safety in ground handling is promoted through:  
o internal company channels that foster GSP communication and safety information 
sharing (e.g. safety bulletins and posters); 
o national channels that aim to mitigate the safety risks from ground handling based 
on the trend analysis data aggregated across various GSPs (i.e. Ground Handling 
Operations Safety Team (GHOST)); 
o international channels that aim to share the best GH safety practices across the globe. 
This is achieved through audit programmes such as ISAGO, working groups (e.g. the 
European Commercial Aviation Safety Team – ECAST), GH conferences, and GH 
safety journals. 
Following the positive results of the SMS concept implementation in the aviation domain, 
the research outlined in this thesis calls for the extension of the ICAO SMS provision to 
GSPs. While the idea for mandating SMS was present for many years in the GH community, 
the rest of the aviation sector was apprehensive often justifying it with the increase in 
operating costs for GSPs who already operate currently at very low profit margins. This 
assumption was challenged in a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), carried out by the researcher 
for ICAO (2015), that demonstrated, from the perspective of a GSP, that the benefits of SMS 





maintenance. Details of the methodology, technical background information, supporting 
documentation and recommendations have been brought to the attention of ICAO through a 
Discussion Paper (ICAO, 2015). 
To illustrate the change in the existing organisational control structure, previously 
introduced in Section 4.3 and Figure 4-8, red arrows and accompanied text in Figure 5-8 
indicate the change in the control process if SMS implementation for GSPs were to be 
mandated by the ICAO. 
Following a critical review of the state of the art safety management practices on the apron, 
discussed in Section 5.2.3, GSPs have been identified as the poorly developed stakeholder 
when compared to aircraft and airport operators. Furthermore, out of the four SMS 
components, enhancements in the safety risk management component would grant the most 
substantial safety improvement potential in a GSP’s operations globally. For these reasons, 
the remainder of this thesis concentrates on the GSP’s safety risk management whilst 
accounting for the interactions with: i) other GSP SMS components, ii) aircraft operations, 








Chapter 5 carried out a comprehensive review of the two paradigms of safety science and 
their associated objectives. It then reviewed all the assumptions and modelling approaches 
associated with each paradigm. These paradigms were then mapped to the principles and 
components of the Safety Management System (SMS). 
Established theoretical foundations about safety and its management were then mapped 
with apron operations and a gap analysis was conducted to highlight the absence of safety 
regulations and the lack of standardisation in managing safety on the apron. 
Towards developing regulations and standardisation in apron operations, changes in the 
safety risk management component of a SMS in ground handling are judged to grant the 
most substantial safety improvement potential in a GSP’s operations globally and were 






Chapter 6 DEVELOPMENT OF THE TASM 
FRAMEWORK 
Building upon the fragmented and static theoretical description of the apron as a complex 
socio-technical system (in Chapter 4), and after introducing the multi-dimensional nature of 
the safety paradigms and their management (in Chapter 5), Chapter 6 provides a detailed 
description of the methodology used for derivation and validation of the systemic Total 
Aprons Safety Management (TASM) framework, including its functional model, taxonomy 
of variability and the storyline.  
6.1 Methodology 
The remainder of this chapter describes the methodology for the development of the TASM 
framework, followed by its derivation and validation. The methodology is described in 
seven segments (Sections 6.2 to 6.8), illustrated in Figure 6-1. It begins by deriving the best 
theoretical match between the apron system characteristics and the required approach for its 
safety risk management (aetiology) including a critical review of the two most common 
systemic safety models to select the best approach for this research in Section 6.2. 
Preparatory work and airport selection an access are described in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 
respectively. Next, Sections 6.5 and 6.6 presents the data collection and analysis 
methodology, while the following two Sections depict the framework validation (Section 
6.7) and the final derivation (Section 6.8, Appendix VII and VIII). Discussion about the final 






To account for both the theoretical and operational aspect of the apron system description, 
the validation exercise included SMEs from both academia and the industry. The exercise 
was carried out longitudinally in three phases to account for the gradual increment in the 
researcher’s knowledge. Therefore the first phase tested the validity of researcher’s 
preconceptions based on the literature that later informed data collection during the 
fieldwork across the five airports. Similarly, operational knowledge validity was tested in 
the first phase based on the knowledge gained from the literature whereas the second phase 
aimed at validating the results from the fieldwork (descried in Section 6.5). Finally, the third 
phase of the exercise aimed at increasing the validity even further by accounting for a 
deficiency in the SME sampling strategy explained further. 
SMEs were selected based on their experience in both academia and GSP operations. To 
maximise the feedback from the experts, group sessions were carried out in the first two 
validation phases. Although the researcher targeted the groups with solid experience in both 
theoretical and operational domains, the control over the individual compositions of these 
groups (i.e. FRAM workshop, safety steering committee meeting) was determined in all 
cases by a third party. Consequently, certain SMEs participated in both of the first two 
phases of the validation exercise. To account for the possibility of the confirmatory bias, 
another two external SMEs with relevant experience were invited to the third phase of 
validation that was carried out in two separate individual sessions. All six group and 
individual validation sessions, that integrated SME views from both academia and the 
industry, are explained in more detail next.  
The first two group sessions aimed to elicitate the apron system tractability at the: i) FRAM 
workshop held in Munich in September 2013, and ii) a major GSPs annual safety conference 
held in Orlando in March 2014. The following two group sessions aimed at validating the 
knowledge elicitation exercise and included the combination of new participants and the 
participants who already participated in the first exercise at the: i) FRAM workshop held in 
Gothenburg in September 2014, and ii) safety steering committee meeting of the same major 
GSP held in London in July 2014. To account for the possible bias induced by the overlap of 
participants being included in both − the knowledge elicitation and validation exercises, two 
additional individual sessions with external experts, with at least 5 year of experience in 
safety of socio-technical systems in safety modelling, were used for validation. 
The same exercise (Studic, 2013, 2014), comprising of three parts, was used in all six sessions. 
Part I aimed to establish common ground for each participant regardless their background 
and experience by: i) a description of the apron system and its characteristics, followed by ii) 






Although considered obsolete due to its oversimplification in safety modelling, simple linear 
models are still present in the literature. Assuming the linearity underlying the analysis of 
Heinrich (1931) and based on historical safety data at Zurich airport for a two year period, 
Rieder (2011) demonstrated an approach to deriving the Target Level Safety (TLS) and has 
calibrated the famous Heinrich’s pyramid for apron operations. 
Similar to other safety-critical industries, complex linear models are widely used in the 
modelling of ground handling operations. Balk and Bossenbroek (2010) performed a survey-
based study into human factors and safety culture in ground handling. The Ramp Error 
Decision Aid (REDA) model was used to formulate the human factors portion of the survey. 
A retrospective tool for safety analysis – REDA, was developed by Boeing (2004) to support 
occurrence investigation processes in ground handling. REDA is a typical linear modelling 
(i.e. with the belief that “addressing the contributing factors to lower level events helps prevent 
more serious events” (Boeing, 2004, p. 8)) Safety-I tool orientated towards identifying factors 
that contribute to failures in the apron system (technological, human performances or 
organisational) so that unwanted outcomes can be reduced or eliminated (typically by 
introducing additional barriers into the system).  
Complex linear thinking is also widespread in the safety risk management and assurance 
processes, i.e. Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA21). Ma and Rankin (2012) developed 
guidelines that enable the extension of the flight-deck LOSA concept (Ma et al., 2011) into 
maintenance (M-LOSA) and ramp (R-LOSA) operations. The LOSA concept is based on 
structured observations of normal aviation operations focused on the identification of 
deviations from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Observers are trained according to 
the Threat and Error Management (TEM) framework (Helmreich et al., 1999, Klinect et al., 
1999) to identify threats (i.e. equivalent of hazards), errors (i.e. deviations from SOPs) and 
record how frontline operators manage these situations (Ma and Rankin, 2012). While 
highlighting the ‘human error’ as factor that leads to unwanted outcomes, TEM framework 
also acknowledges the frontline operator as the last line of defence in stopping the 
propagation of a threat, via human error to an unwanted event. De Boer et al. (2011) have 
calibrated the RAMP LOSA framework to fit specifically KLM Ground Services at Schiphol 
airport. The TEM framework is highly promoted within the ground handling community by 
IATA (2014d, 2014a) and EASA (NLR, 2012) for training purposes. In addition to the TEM, 
variations of the Reason’s Swiss Cheese model have been found in safety risk management 
of GSPs as evidenced during the international ground handling conferences (i.e. Ground 
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Damage Stakeholders Meeting held in Barcelona in September 2013). Complex linear models 
are also widely used in safety modelling airport operations (i.e. London Heathrow Airport). 
To the author’s best knowledge there have not been many attempts to apply system 
thinking on apron safety. De Boer and de Jong (2014) carried out a study based on the 
STAMP methodology to demonstrate the relationship between GSP’s safety management 
measures and safety performances. The STAMP model was derived from the two semi-
structured interviews. The objective of the study was to perform a longitudinal study that 
compared the safety performances before and after the establishment of a new safety and 
quality department. Control theory, that underlies STAMP methodology, was used to 
qualitatively demonstrate the effectiveness of the organisational change on ground handling 
safety performance. Finally the study demonstrated viability of the systemic safety 
modelling of ground handling operations.  
Tasked with the development of a TASM framework, this Section concludes by deriving the 
best theoretical match between the apron system characteristics and the required approach 
for its safety risk management – i.e. systemic risk management. Interestingly, the systemic 
approach to safety has not been practiced in the ground handling domain and for the first 
time, the researcher adopted the combination of the FRAM and STAMP methodologies in 
the safety risk modelling of apron operations. The following Section critically reviews the 
two most common systemic safety models to select the best approach for this research. 
6.2.1 Review of the systemic safety models 
During the past decade two methods have led the field of systemic safety management for 
complex socio-technical systems: the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) and 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). Both aim at ensuring system 
resilience, which refers to “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning before, during 
or after changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions”(Hollnagel, 2011, p. xxxvi). The main requirement for ensuring system 
safety is to maintain control over its processes at all times. To maintain the control, the 
system is required to have four qualities (Hollnagel et al., 2007, Hollnagel, 2009, 2011): i) 
responding – the ability to manage actual regular and irregular operations of a system, ii) 
monitoring – the ability to identify critical changes in the system operations that could 
jeopardise safety, iii) anticipation – the ability to anticipate the future threats and 
opportunities, iv) learning – the ability to learn from the past both successes, failure and 






Step 2:  Describe the functional model of the system. The objective of this functional 
description is to represent the system’s actual operations to achieve its objective (‘work as 
done’) as opposed to its expected operation according to the system design (‘work as 
imagined’). Each function represents an activity (or a set of activities) that need(s) to be 
performed to produce an outcome. Depending on the entity performing it, every function is 
classified as technological, human or organisational. A function is graphically represented 
using a hexagon (as illustrated in Figure 6-4) and is described with up to 6 aspects (see Table 
6-1): Input (I), Output (O), Precondition (P), Resource (R), Time (T) and Control (C).  
 
Figure 6-4 Visual representation of a FRAM function 
Table 6-1 The six aspects of a FRAM function 
Aspect Aspect definition 
Input (I) what the function processes or transforms or what starts the function 
Output (O) the result of the function, either an entity or a state change 
Precondition (P) a condition that must exist before a function can be carried out 
Resource (R) what is needed by the function when it is carried out or what it consumes to 
produce the Output 
Time (T) the temporal constraints affecting the function (with regard to starting time, end 
time or duration) 
Control (C) how the function is monitored or controlled 
After identifying all the functions that a system requires to meet its operational objectives on 
a daily basis, each is depicted in terms of the six aspects listed above. Although it is not a 
requirement to describe all aspects, the completeness rule must be fulfilled at all times. This 
rule states that “no aspect should occur for one function only” (Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 60). Finally, 
once the system is depicted in the tabular form, it can be visualised using the recently 
developed FRAM Model Building and Visualisation (FMV) software (Hollnagel and Hill, 
2014). 
Step 3: Analyse the developed model. The analysis starts by identifying the scenarios 





purpose, e.g. in case of a retrospective analysis scenario will correspond to the occurrence in 
question. However, selection of the scenarios becomes much more complicated in the case of 
prospective and design analysis where there is an indefinite combination of variable 
conditions that need to be considered. In its current form, FRAM is not supported by a tool 
that would ensure a higher degree of completeness in safety risk analysis. To address this 
gap in the method, the researcher has proposed complementing Step 3 of FRAM with a 
rigorous procedure for hazard analysis, adapted from Thomas (2013), as detailed in Section 
6.2.1.5. 
Step 4: The variability of the Output from functions is analysed. Every function in FRAM 
may experience three sources of variability: internal (endogenous), external (exogenous) and 
coupling between the functions. Internal variability is attributed to the nature of the function 
and its internal functioning (i.e. fatigue or cognition capabilities – in case of human 
functions). External variability, in contrast, is attributed to the external conditions in which 
the function is performed (i.e. maintenance cycles – in case of technological functions). In 
addition to external and internal variability, the analysis considers the propagation of 
variability through couplings (influences) between the system functions, referred to as 
‘upstream-downstream’ coupling.  
Step 5: Solutions are proposed to monitor and dampen performance variability through the 
development of leading indicators, design of modifications to prevent or contain an 
unwanted outcome, the introduction of changes to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
and/or training. 
6.2.1.2 STAMP 
The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) method creates foundations for 
system retrospective, prospective and design safety modelling where safety is seen as a 
control problem. In control and systems theory, every system can be represented through a 
series of hierarchical and functional control loops. Safety is then seen as an emergent system 
property and is explained as the state of dynamic equilibrium between system components 
achieved by control and feedback loops. Similarly, unwanted outcomes result from the 
inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related constraints on the development, design 






Figure 6-5 A standard controlled loop (Leveson, 2012, p. 66) 
The STAMP methodology applied to accident and incident investigation is referred to as 
Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST), whereas when applied to hazard identification 
and analysis it is referred to as System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The initial steps 
in CAST and STPA, are the same summarised by Leveson (2012) as follows. The baseline of 
the analysis is the development of the functional control diagram based on system design 
information and the identification of system-level hazards. The basic element of a control 
diagram is a control loop illustrated in Figure 6-5. A process is controlled by a controller 
(human or machine) based on the input from a higher control structure (i.e. line 
management) and the feedback from the controlled process through measurable variables - 
detected by sensors. In addition, a controller’s behaviour is determined by i) the control 
algorithms (i.e. procedures and training), ii) the process model (i.e. mental model of a 
human operator or software). The availability, appropriateness and effectiveness of feedback 
from the controlled process coupled with the input from the higher control structure, 
controller’s algorithms and process model determine the control action produced by the 
controller. Finally, control over a process can only be achieved if the control action is 
implemented through actuators (Figure 6-5). 
Following the development of the functional control diagrams and identification of system-
level hazards, constraints and controls, CAST or STPA steps are explained in turn below. 
The CAST analysis is performed using the following five steps: 
Step 1: Identify the ‘proximate’ events that occurred just before the unwanted outcome. 
Step 2: Analyse the physical system structure to determine which physical controls leading 
to the unwanted outcome were ineffective and the reasons for this. Figure 6-6 should be 





Step 3: Analyse the system’s safety control structure to determine which safety controls 
leading to the unwanted outcome were ineffective together with the reasons for this. Figure 
6-6 should be used to aid the analysis. 
Step 4: Analyse the system communication and coordination flows to determine whether 
and to which extent, they could have contributed to the unwanted outcome. 
Step 5: Analyse the impact of the changes in the physical and safety control structure of the 
system over time on the unwanted outcome. 
Step 6: Propose recommendations. 
The STPA analysis is divided into the following two main steps: 
Step 1: For each control structure, identify control actions that could lead the system into 
one or more of the identified hazardous states. This is followed by probing each control 
action using STAMP guidewords, which may lead to hazardous states as a result of 
inadequate control: 
• a control action is not provided or not followed; 
• an unsafe control action is provided; 
• a potentially safe control action is provided at the wrong time or in the wrong sequence; 
• a control action is stopped too soon or applied for too long a duration. 
Step 2: Once the set of hazardous control actions has been identified, for each control loop 
the identified hazardous actions/or their absence are analysed in detail. The objective of this 
analysis is to determine the potential causes and underlying scenarios that could lead to 
system-level hazards. The control loop and the associated causal factors presented in Figure 
6-6 can be used to guide and facilitate the analysis. Once identified, the available solutions 
are considered to address these causal factors and consequently manage, contain or 
eliminate hazards from system design and operations. 
However, the described 2012 edition of STPA did not contain a structure that ensured 
completeness in hazard analysis (described in Step 1). This limitation was overcome by 






method and FRAM in retrospective analysis of an aircraft accident. The results of their study 
demonstrated that FRAM offered a greater insight about the systemic factors and their 
dynamic interactions that created the foundation for the accident to take place. Starting from 
a retrospective analysis of an aircraft accident in Brazil, De Carvalho (2011) shed light on the 
deficiencies in the normal operation of the Brazilian ATM system using FRAM. Performance 
variability and its impact on safety performance using FRAM has been studied in the 
railway sector (Belmonte et al., 2011), where the results of the analysis pointed towards 
improving the Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) system interface to reduce the variability. 
The application of FRAM in prospective analysis by Woltjer and Hollnagel (2008) 
demonstrated that functional dependencies, modelled with FRAM, much more closely 
depict ATC operation than conventional sequential methods. Macchi et al. (2009) 
demonstrated the capability of FRAM to anticipate safety risks during normal operations 
due to performance variability. In the financial sector, Sundstorm and Hollnagel (2008, 2010) 
demonstrated the capability of FRAM to anticipate financial risks through functional 
dependency modelling. 
STAMP: When comparing the Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology (SOAM) and 
STAMP in the ATM domain, Arnold (2009) demonstrated the main benefit of STAMP over 
SOAM in terms of capturing the system’s emergent behaviour and nonlinear interactions. 
Nelson’s (2008) and Stringfellow’s (2010) application of CAST in aircraft accident 
investigations of the Comair 5191 flight and Predator-B unmanned aircraft respectively 
demonstrated the capability of CAST to unearth additional factors and recommendations 
capable of preventing future similar losses when compared to the results of investigations 
based on linear methods. Ishimatsu et al.’s (2010, 2014) comparison between STPA and the 
traditional National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) approach to hazard 
analysis in the domain of unmanned spacecraft demonstrated that the STPA approach has 
identified additional risks that are either missed or neglected by the existing NASA 
methods. Another application of STPA in the chemical engineering domain performed by 
Hardy and Guarnieri (2011) recognised the systemic advantage of the STPA to model a 
complete system instead of focusing on technological components exclusively. Thornberry 
(2014) augmented the STPA approach with principles from psychology and cognition to 
derive additional categories of human factors necessary for safety control mechanisms in 
ATC. 
Despite the clear benefits of the outlined systemic models, they both have certain limitations 
that restrict their wider applications. Underwood (2013) performed a survey with 42 safety 





practice communities when it comes to the application of systemic models. The results of the 
study captured numerous factors that contribute to this gap:  
• inadequate knowledge about the systemic models amongst the practitioners − this was 
explained by the fear of increased workload for already over-worked safety 
practitioners induced by learning about new methods. Additionally, practitioners 
experienced difficulties accessing knowledge from the scientific sources; 
• lack of initiative for the adoption of systemic models amongst the practitioners − their 
complexity and the limited empirical validity when compared of the traditional tested 
methods, inhibits the use of systemic models in practice. Furthermore, the existing legal 
frameworks are often not underpinned by systemic models but rather the punitive 
culture which drives blame apportionment; 
• usage requirements − systemic models require significant amount of human resources, 
which can only be justified for higher-severity unwanted outcomes. In addition these 
models must be underpinned by data, which quite often is not even collected in 
practice. 
A comparative analysis of FRAM and STAMP  (including CAST and STPA) is illustrated in 
Table 6-2. The characteristics used for the comparative analysis of the two methods are 
based on a well-established scientific and operational literature (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 
1992, NLR, 2013, Underwood and Waterson, 2013) whereas the descriptors for each 






Table 6-2 Comparative analysis of FRAM and STAMP methods 
Characteristics FRAM STAMP 
1. Theoretical 
construct 
• Stochastic resonance (Benzi et al., 1981) 
• Resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2007) 
• Control theory and System theory (Ashby, 1956) 
• Resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2007) 
2. Approach to 
safety modelling 
Systemic – containing key elements of a systemic approach to 
safety namely the ‘component interactions’ and ‘analysing the 
whole system’ (Underwood and Waterson, 2013) 
Systemic – containing key elements of a systemic approach to safety 
namely the ‘component interactions’ and ‘analysing the whole 
system’ (Underwood and Waterson, 2013) 
3. Domain • Mainly applied in the following industries: 
o Aviation industry (Hollnagel et al., 2008, Woltjer and 
Hollnagel, 2008, 2009, Macchi et al., 2009, De Carvalho, 
2011) 
o Financial systems (Sundström and Hollnagel, 2008, 2010) 
o Medical industry (Hollnagel et al., 2014) 
o Nuclear industry (Lundblad et al., 2008) 
o Oil and gas industry (Shirali and Ebrahipour, 2014) 
o Organisational science (Hollnagel, 2012a) 
o Railway industry (Belmonte et al., 2011) 
• Originated and is predominantly applied in Europe  
• Mainly applied in the following industries: 
o Airspace industry (Owens et al., 2008, Ishimatsu et al., 2010, 
2014) 
o Aviation industry (Nelson, 2008, Arnold, 2009, Stringfellow, 
2010, Leveson et al., 2012, Fleming et al., 2013, Thornberry, 
2014) 
o Automotive industry (Stringfellow et al., 2010, Hommes, 
2012) 
o Defence industry (Pereira et al., 2006) 
o Medical industry (Antoine, 2013, Helferich, 2013) 
o Chemical industry (Hardy and Guarnieri, 2011) 
o Railway industry (Ouyang et al., 2010, Dong, 2012) 
• Originated and is predominantly applied in North America 
4. Application - Hardware 
- Human behaviour 
- Organisational behaviour 
- Hardware 
- Software 
- Human behaviour 
- Organisational behaviour 
5. Focus of 
analysis 
• In retroactive analysis, the starting point is the development of 
understanding of the ‘work as done’ with the focus on 
‘normal’ everyday operations 
• In prospective and design analysis, the starting point is the 
development of understanding of the ‘work as imagined’ 
• In retroactive analysis, the starting point is the development of 
understanding of the ‘work as imagined’ while looking at 
‘normal’ everyday operations and its failures 
• In prospective analysis and design, the starting point is the 
development of understanding of the ‘work as imagined’ 
6. Basic element of 
analysis 
Function Functional control loop 
7. Parallels 
between aspects of 
the basic element 
of analysis  
Input Higher control inputs, Controlled variables 
Output Process outputs, Measurable variables 
Precondition Not explicitly defined 
Resource Actuators, Sensors 





Control Control algorithm, Process model, Disturbances 
8. Maturity in 
usage 
Lower level of maturity and empirical validation than other 
comparable methods for hazard identification (i.e. Hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP) 
Lower level of maturity and empirical validation than other 
comparable methods for hazard identification (i.e. Hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP)). 
9. Demonstrated 
ability to add 
value 
Demonstrated ability to account for dynamic, complex system 
behaviour may contribute to an unwanted event (Woltjer and 
Hollnagel, 2008, Hollnagel, 2012a, Underwood and Waterson, 
2013) 
Demonstrated ability to account for dynamic, complex system 
behaviour may contribute to an unwanted event (Leveson et al., 
2012, Underwood and Waterson, 2013, Ishimatsu et al., 2014) 
10. Rigour in 
hazard 
identification 
FRAM’s weaknesses in terms of rigour are: i) the lack of rigor in 
selection of scenarios (instantiations) for analysis (Studic, 2014); ii) 
the lack of structure and completeness in analysis of scenarios 
(Studic, 2014); iii) focus on normal ‘everyday operations’ whilst 
ignoring extraordinary successes and failures in the system 
operations (Thomas, 2013, Studic, 2014). 
STPA has been characterised as being “ad-hoc with no rigorous 
procedures or model-based design tools to guide the analysis” (Thomas, 




The existing applications of FRAM are typically capable of 
describing a system through approximately 20 functions. 
Although the method is theoretically capable of ‘higher resolution’ 
descriptions, it soon becomes unmanageable due to the large 
amount of dependencies between the system functions. 
The existing applications of STPA have demonstrated its capability 
of modelling a system at a ‘higher resolution’ however capturing 
complex systems interactions imposes a multi-layered dynamic 
analysis whose laboriousness and manageability rises exponentially 
with the system size and complexity. 
12. Reliability Subjective qualitative nature, influenced by the assessor’s background and experience (Underwood and Waterson, 2013), is common to 
both methods thus making the results of an analysis difficult to reproduce, i.e. unreliable. 
13. Level of effort 
required for 
analysis 
Level of effort required for both methods includes but is not limited to: a series of interviews to understand an operation (in the case of 
FRAM), supporting documentation on a system’s design specifications, procedures, historical data on the system performance, but also a 
high number of man-hours of experienced highly-qualified individuals to describe the system functionally, its potential for 




- Static with a potential to add system dynamics 
- Capable of representing functional dependencies 
- Need for automation since the model may become 
incomprehensive due to large number of couplings 
(interdependencies) between the functions  
- Available 
- Static 
- Capable of representing system dependencies in a hierarchical 
way 
- Further development of graphical rendering is needed (Leveson, 





Following the detailed comparative analysis outlined in Table 6-2 it can be concluded 
that FRAM and STAMP are similar in terms of their characteristics. The main 
difference between the two lies in the theoretical construct, the basic element of the 
analysis and graphical rendering. In the development of the TASM framework, the 
main requirement was to develop a framework: i) that is systemic and based on 
Safety-II paradigm, ii) capable of performing retrospective, prospective and system 
design analysis, iii) able to cater for graphical illustration, iv) ensure rigor and 
completeness in analysis. Both FRAM and STAMP cater for this requirement i) and 
ii). Requirement iii) works in favour of FRAM since STAMP has been criticised for its 
graphical description (Leveson, 2013). Requirement iv) is particularly important for 
prospective and system analysis but is absent from both methods. Therefore, due to 
its advantage in a graphical description and the fact that it has not previously been 
applied in the domain, FRAM was chosen for the systemic modelling of apron safety. 
Furthermore, to compensate for the absence of the requirement iv) in prospective 
analysis, FRAM is augmented with the adaptation of the Thomas (2013) approach to 
ensure rigour hazard identification and analysis in Section 6.2.1.5. 
In addition to the functional model in the TASM framework, it is paramount to 
understand the factors that may affect variability/control of the model’s functions. 
Interestingly, since neither FRAM nor STAMP “provide a detailed taxonomy of 
contributory factors” (Underwood, 2013, p. 142) the research in this thesis develops a 
detailed taxonomy of factor that effect variability of the functional model, as a part of 
the TASM framework. 
6.2.1.4 Extension of prospective analysis based on FRAM 
Theoretical foundations of the FRAM method have been summarised in Section 
6.2.1.1. While the method offers a framework for an ad hoc prospective analysis, it is 
not supported by a protocol for systematic22 identification of hazardous scenarios 
that may lead to system resonance (i.e. occurrence). Therefore this Section develops a 
new approach to augment FRAM by providing a protocol that would guide a hazard 
analysis23 process in complex socio-technical system. 
                                                      
22 Any process is considered systematic if it is “logical, thorough and robust” (Hughes et al., 
2015, p. 251) 
23 Hazard analysis process enables identification and analysis of hazards in a system. As a 





Section 6.2.1.4.1 starts by reviewing literature in a search for existing protocols for 
systematic hazard analysis for systemic safety methods (i.e. FRAM and STAMP). 
Building upon the limitations of existing approaches, a new hazard analysis protocol 
is introduced in Section 6.2.1.5. Furthermore a simple illustrative example of the 
application of the protocol, followed by a discussion on the proposed protocol is 
given in Section 7.2. 
6.2.1.4.1 Review of the FRAM and STAMP augmentation in hazard analysis 
Since the original FRAM and STPA were introduced, several new approaches have 
been developed to complement and augment these original methods. Three key 
methods, described in the following subsections, have been proposed (two to 
augment FRAM and one to augment STPA). The augmentations are used as the basis 
for the derivation of the new approach in Section 6.2.1.5. 
6.2.1.4.2 Augmentation of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
for prospective analysis 
The inability to predict ‘complex interconnections that can arise under dynamic operating 
conditions’ using the existing Hazard Identification (HAZID) techniques that assume 
linear causality and independence (Leveson and Diaz-Herrera, 1995, Hollnagel, 
2012b), prompted Frost and Mo (2014) to complement HAZID with FRAM. This 
hybrid application of FRAM and HAZID has been applied to hazard analysis arising 
from structural and process changes to the operational control centre of an 
international airline. 
Frost and Mo (2014) adopted the first two steps of the original approach to FRAM in 
prospective analysis (described in Section 6.2.1.1). The derivation of 
scenarios/instantiations, in the third step, is based on the results of a HAZID 
workshop performed with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Due to limitations related 
to access to SMEs, the analysis was based on three scenarios/instantiations. The 
analysis of variability, in the fourth step, was based on a guideword process. Two 
sets of guidewords were used to analyse the performance variability of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Inductive analysis (known as hazard identification) mainly focuses on identifying hazards 
without considering causal mechanism (Ericson, 2005) whereas deductive analysis starts from 
pre-identified hazards and works backwards to identify “scenarios that can lead to losses” 





functional model. The first set used guidewords to capture the effect of variability in 
precision and timing of the five aspects (input, precondition, resource, control and 
time) on the output of a function. This set of guidewords captured the propagation of 
variability due to ‘upstream-downstream’ coupling. The second set of guidewords 
aimed to capture the impact of internal and external variability of the functions by 
using some of the following probes: Information certainty/sufficiency; Procedures and 
authorisations; Circadian and stress factors; Organisational influences and support.  
According to Frost and Mo (2014, p. 12), the hybrid approach to hazard identification 
was successful in identifying “specific system performance factors and hazards arising 
under defined scenarios and conditions that would not have been identified using traditional 
risk analysis techniques alone”. However, the method still has the limitations inherent 
to the other hazard identification techniques in terms of a lack of completeness 
associated with ad-hoc hazard identification. 
Building upon the work of Frost and Mo (2014) and Studic (2013, 2014), Slater (2014) 
proposed an approach to hazard identification based on the combination of FRAM 
and Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP). The author claims to have augmented 
the FRAM approach to hazard identification by imposing “demonstrable rigour and 
valuable (reproducible/standard) structure and auditability of the HAZOP” (Slater, 2014, p. 
1). 
 
Figure 6-7 Protocol for augmenting FRAM for prospective analysis based on Slater (2014) 
Where: 
n – guidewords (more, less, none, as well as, other than, too early, too late, not at all, 
out of sequence); 
m – aspects (input, precondition, resource, control and time); 





To achieve this, Slater proposes a protocol, which adopts the first three steps of the 
FRAM for prospective analysis (see Section 6.2.1.1). However, similar to the original 
FRAM application (Hollnagel, 2012b), Slater does not propose any criteria for the 
derivation of the scenarios/instantiations whose variability is to be analysed in step 
four. The fourth step, on the other hand, is augmented compared to the original step 
(see Section 6.2.1.1). Slater proposes the use of HAZOP guidewords (more, less, none 
etc.) to probe the five aspects (Input, Precondition, Resource, Time and Control) of 
the functions to systematically capture the effects of varying these aspects for the 
function of interest. The protocol to achieve this is presented in Figure 6-7. 
6.2.1.4.3 Augmentation of the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
Thomas (2013) highlighted that due to a lack of rigor, STPA has only been applied in 
an ad-hoc manner without a rigorous procedure for hazard analysis. He identified 
this as a factor that hinders the mathematical formalisation of STPA. 
To overcome this STPA limitation, a set of procedures was proposed for the 
identification of hazardous control actions. These procedures are summarised below 
(Leveson, 2013, Thomas, 2013). 
The process starts by identifying system-level hazards. In contrast to the hazard 
definition introduced in Section 3.5, in the STAMP application a hazard is defined as 
“A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case 
environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss)” (Leveson, 2012, p. 184) whereas 
an accident is defined as “An undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss 
(including loss of human life or injury, property damage, environmental pollution, and so 
on)”(Leveson, 2012, p. 467). For instance if an accident is defined as person being 
injured while crossing the road, then one of the system-level hazard would be a person 
crossing the road when traffic lights are inoperable. Step 1 of STPA identifies control 
actions/inactions that may lead to the defined hazard. The notion of the control 
actions, as explained in Section 6.2.1.2, is a command sent by a controller to control 
some process. For instance – cross the road. 
However, the ability to classify a control action as safe or unsafe is highly dependent 
on the context in which that action takes place.  For instance, a cross the road control 
action can be considered as safe if it is performed while the traffic light is indicates 
green, and as unsafe if the road is crossed while the traffic light indicates red. 





action. While the control actions can be identified with ease, identification of 
hazardous contexts is much more challenging. Thomas (2013) proposed a structure 
of decomposition of the context into variables and values (i.e. building on the 
example above, variable is the traffic light indication whereas values are green, amber 
or red). 
A hierarchical control diagram and potential control actions, context variables and 
values are defined first (see Figure 6-6). The procedure then continues by analysing 
their combinations such that hazardous control actions can be identified. 













Hazardous	  control	  action?	  
If	  provided	  
any	  time	  in	  
this	  context	  
If	  provided	  
too	  early	  in	  
this	  context	  
If	  provided	  
too	  late	  in	  
this	  context	  
Cross 
the road Green Normal Bad Low No Yes Yes 
Cross 
the road Green Normal Normal Low No Yes Yes 
Cross 
the road Green Normal Normal Normal No Yes Yes 
Cross 
the road Red Bad Bad Low Yes No No 
Cross 
the road Red Bad Normal Low Yes No No 
Cross 
the road Red Bad Normal Normal Yes No No 
 
The analysis is performed in a tabular form where the rows list the control actions 
(i.e. cross the road) whereas columns represent the process variable (i.e. traffic light 
indication, road surface conditions, weather conditions, alertness of a pedestrian). Different 
combinations of the values (i.e. for traffic light indication can be defined as green, amber 
or red; for road surface conditions values can be normal or bad; for weather conditions 
values can be normal or bad; for alertness of a pedestrian can be normal or low) of process 
variables form the context of a control action. After describing the process variables, 
the subsequent three columns probe the time aspect by questioning the effect of a 
                                                      
24 Although in theory, a traffic light can have four states: green, amber, red and no indication, 
in this illustrative example, only two states are considered – including the transition from 





control action if it happened at any time in the particular context, too early or too late. 
The results for each context are recorded in these columns. Table 6-3 above provides 
an example of a ‘cross the road’ control action. Similarly, the second part of the 
analysis considers the effect of inactions, i.e. potential contexts in which the lack of a 
control action are hazardous. 
In summary, the highlighted protocol enables the systematic identification of all the 
actions and inactions under varying contexts that could bring the controlled sub-
/process into a hazardous state. The identification of the hazardous control actions is 
followed by the STPA Step 2 analysis and continues (as described in Section 6.2.1.2) 
to identify approaches to manage the hazardous states. 
6.2.1.5 A new protocol for systematic hazard analysis based on FRAM 
The three augmenting approaches outlined in the previous Section have managed to 
overcome some of the limitations in hazard analysis using FRAM and STPA. 
However, certain limitations (summarised in Table 6-2) remain. Firstly, while the 
approaches by Frost and Mo (2014) and Slater (2014) are both based on 
brainstorming and thus able to capture ‘unimaginable hazards’ (De Jong, 2004), they 
suffer from a lack of structure and rigour in hazard analysis. Secondly, the 
approaches use the guidewords for probing function aspects in an isolated manner, 
and fail to consider the effects due to the concurrent variability of multiple function 
aspects. Thirdly, while Frost and Mo (2014)  consider the impact of internal/external 
variability to a certain extent, this has been omitted in the work of Slater (2014) which 
only considers the effects of performance variability caused by ‘upstream-downstream’ 
coupling. 
While Thomas (2013) provides a rigorous protocol for systemic hazard analysis, its 
tabular form does not facilitate the graphical display of different combinations of 
contexts during the execution of a control action. 
To overcome the limitations highlighted above, the research presented in this Section 
proposes a novel approach to hazard analysis in complex socio-technical systems by 
integrating the best practices of FRAM and STPA. This integration is achieved by 
combining the strengths of the theoretical foundation and graphical system 
representation of FRAM with the analytical rigour of the Thomas (2013) protocol for 
hazard analysis. The new protocol is described using the steps of the FRAM outlined 





Step 1: Remains unchanged (Section 6.2.1.1). 
Step 2: Depict the FRAM model of a system to capture all the potential and actual 
couplings according to Hollnagel’s (2012) guidelines. However, while the original 
approach to functional system description, based on FRAM, aims to describe typical 
(‘normal’ or ‘everyday’) operations, in the proposed new approach this step is 
modified by extending its description to additionally capture ‘failures’ and ‘successes’, 
as illustrated in Figure 5-1. This approach ensures consistency with the ‘Safety-II’ 
paradigm (EUROCONTROL, 2013c, Hollnagel, 2014b). Furthermore, it overcomes 
the inability of FRAM to model component failures (Thomas, 2013). 
This modification of Step 2 of FRAM induces a change in the description of the 
Outputs of a function. It is no longer sufficient to describe an Output of a function 
with a single (‘typical’ or ‘normal’) value since it also needs to capture the ‘successes’ 
and ‘failures’. To tackle this, although Outputs of functions typically have continuous 
values, for the sake of simplification and manageability of the analysis that follows, it 
is necessary to discretise these values. Each function needs to be described with at 
least three Outputs values so that at least one value belongs to each of the three 
categories illustrated in Figure 5-1. Following the definition of the whole set of 
discretised Outputs, and based on the knowledge of system operation (including 
‘normal’, ‘emergency’ and ‘productivity’), the couplings with the other system functions 
are established. 
Step 3 and 4: The order of Steps 3 and 4 depends on the type of hazard analysis, i.e. 
whether it is deductive or inductive. Since the term hazard is not explicitly defined in 
the context of FRAM, the following definition is proposed within the context of the 
new protocol “hazard is an unwanted state of a single or multiple function internal, 
external and/or upstream/downstream variability that if not managed would lead to system 
resonance”. Furthermore system resonance is defined as an accident, incident, or 
operational disruption depending on the purpose, scope and resources available for 
the analysis. 
With this hazard definition, if FRAM is used for deductive hazard analysis, the 
system variability analysis will start with a pre-defined hazard (Step 3) followed by 
the analysis of variability (Step 4) that may lead to the emergence of the hazard. 
Using the previous example for illustration, resonance would be pedestrian injury, 
and a hazard could be defined as cross the road when the traffic light indicates red at low 
visibility. The protocol would then be applied to the Cross the road function, the 





would lead to resonance. The function whose output variability resulted in system 
resonance is used only as a starting point of the analysis from where Step 4 of 
analysis of variability should be continued for all the coupled functions. 
If FRAM is used for inductive hazard analysis, i.e. to examine the impact of 
propagation of introduced variability through system couplings, Step 4 will precede 
Step 3. This is because the idea behind this new approach is to capture the ‘whole set’ 
of performance variability and its impact on couplings between all the functions 
before performing simulations for different scenarios. 
To derive the ‘whole set’ of scenarios for every function, a protocol adapted from 
Thomas (2013) (outlined in Section 6.2.1.4.3) was developed. However, the protocol 
is theoretically based on the assumption of the FRAM model (Hollnagel, 2012b). 
Therefore instead of referring to the ‘context’ of a hazardous action used in Thomas 
(2013), the protocol is referring to the variability of a function the results from the 
combination of internal and external variability as well as ‘upstream-downstream’ 
coupling (Hollnagel, 2012b). 
Similar to reasoning by Thomas (2013) to capture different contexts that affect the 
success/failure of a control action, the proposed approach assumes that the Output 
of a function greatly depends on its context, further defined by:  
a) internal variability – factors within a function itself causing variability in its 
Output – e.g. fatigue, workload etc. 
b) external variability – factors external to the function that affects its Output – e.g. 
weather conditions. 
c) ‘upstream – downstream’ coupling. While considered in the previous attempts 
to augment FRAM (Frost and Mo, 2014, Slater, 2014), these approaches analyse 
the couplings in an isolated ‘one-by-one’ fashion thus missing the opportunity to 
capture hazards that emerge due to the co-existence of these couplings. This 
limitation has been overcome in the proposed approach as illustrated below. 
By translating the Thomas (2013) approach into FRAM application, the new modified 
protocol can be as follows (Table 6-4): 
• The rows list all the functions of a FRAM model; 





! list all the functions that the function of interest (listed in the row) is coupled 
to – based on the FRAM model.  
! two columns that capture i) internal, and ii) external variability. For the 
purpose of simplification of the analysis, they would have three values: ‘+’ for 
positive variability; ‘-‘ for negative variability; or ‘0’ for neutral variability.  
! three columns, similar to the Thomas’ approach, where the effect of time is 
considered for each context. Since the outputs of each function are pre-
defined as discrete events, for each function, context and time effect should be 
assigned one of these discrete values. This assignment will be based on SME 
expertise and complemented with data, where available.  
In the approach by Thomas (2013), the objective was only to identify whether the 
control action execution (or the lack of it), within a certain context, and time 
condition can create a hazardous control action as binary values (Yes or No). The 
proposed approach extends this by assigning a discrete value of the function 
Output. This has been deemed necessary to establish influences (couplings) 
between the functions to enable simulations in Step 3. 
It should also be noted that while the effect of time is considered within the 
original FRAM guidelines (Hollnagel, 2012b), variability in time is considered 
for each coupling relative to the function of interest. However, this approach 
would introduce even more complexity in tabular description and therefore, the 
Thomas approach was taken. In this approach, the context is considered as 
‘static’ and relative to this, the effect of time on a function execution is analysed 
(any time, too early, or too late relative to the context). 
The proposed protocol establishes the links between every function execution 
context and a discrete value of the function Output. Upon completion of the analysis, 
these couplings create a complex network of potential influences between the 
functions. Furthermore, these influences can be mathematically described and 
programmed to augment the existing static FMV software. This software could then 
be used to model different scenarios by activating different aspects and their 
variability and observing their propagation through the model and thus overcome 
one of the limitations of the STPA hazard analysis. Once this complex network is 
established it can be used for deductive and inductive hazard analysis or modelling 






This then leads to Step 5 where the possible mitigation strategies are considered. 
Step 5: Remains unchanged (Section 6.2.1.1). 
The remainder of this chapter provides a description of the methodology based on 






Table 6-4: A simplified table illustrating the proposed approach to hazard identification based on integration FRAM and STPA best practices 
Function 
Coupled 
Function b (Fb) 
… 
Coupled 






If provided any time 
in this context 
If provided too early 
in this context 
If provided too late 
in this context 
Fa O1Fb … O1Fn + + O1Fa … … 
Fa O2Fb … O2Fn - - O2Fa … … 
Fa O3Fb … O3Fn 0 0 O3Fa … … 
… … … … … … … … … 
Fb blank … O1Fn + + blank … … 
… … … … … … … … … 
Fn OXFn … blank + + OXFn … … 
Legend: 
• Fa, ..., Fb, …, Fn – all the functions of the FRAM model 
• O1Fa, O2Fa, ..., OXFn– the outputs of coupled functions (i.e. number of outputs range from 1 to X) 
• ‘blank’ – the analysis only considers, for each function, the function it is coupled to. Since a function is only coupled to itself if there is a 
feedback loop, in this example it is noted as ‘blank’. 





6.3 Preparation for the field work 
The objective of a FRAM model is to represent how an activity is typically performed (c.f. 
normal or everyday operations in Figure 5-1). Practical experience in using FRAM, 
evidenced in Hollnagel et al. (2014) recommends using the combination of interviews, field 
observations and literature review to obtain the information necessary for modelling the 
work as done. 
Due to the fact that the researcher did not have any practical experience in the domain, it 
was deemed necessary to prepare for the field observations and interviews by familiarising 
with the work as imagined first. This was performed in three steps: 
• Literature review to understand the context of apron operations within the ATM system 
(ICAO, 2001b, 2002b, 2004, 2005b, Modrego et al., 2009, TITAN Consortium, 2010, 2012b, 
2012a, DFS, 2013, ACI et al., 2014), and the airports (Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994, 
Wells, 1996, De Neufville and Odoni, 2003, ICAO, 2005a, 2013b, Wilke, 2013, TRIP, 
2014), as well as apron safety (UK CAA, 2006, 2011, Balk, 2008, Balk and Bossenbroek, 
2010, ACRP, 2011, 2012b, ICAO, 2013e, 2013c); 
• Preliminary task analysis based on operations manuals (Boeing, 2005, IATA, 2008b, 
Norvegian, 2013, Swissport, 2013) and existing task analyses (Balk, 2008, Ramp LOSA, 
2011, Ma and Rankin, 2012, TITAN Consortium, 2012b) to become familiarised with the 
tasks of stakeholders on the apron; 
• Successful completion of initial theoretical online GSA safety training course of a major 
GSP. 
6.4 Airport selection and access 
Following an extensive literature review on airport characteristics, Wilke (2013) identified 
that while generic airports functions, components and actors exist at all airports, the way 
that these are implemented varies at each airport. Furthermore, the literature review in 
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated differences in characteristics of apron operations related to the: 
i) physical architecture, ii) services provided, iii) stakeholders and their interactions, iv) 
present technology, v) regulations, and vi) safety management practices. Airport uniqueness 
has also been widely acknowledged across the aviation industry, e.g. the UK CAA (2006, p. 





alike and that no assumptions can be made based on the solutions used at another location”. 
Subsequently, it can be argued that these differences, due to the uniqueness of every airport, 
make the definition of an ideal representative airport sample for modelling of ‘everyday’ 
operations impossible, given the available time and monetary restrictions.  
Additionally, airport uniqueness influences the selection of the level of granularity of the 
TASM framework. Two alternatives were considered therefore: the development of either a 
microscopic or macroscopic framework. A microscopic framework would be calibrated to 
the exact specifications of a particular airport, for which the data collection is based upon, 
and would be capable of depicting these operations to a high level of granularity. In 
contrast, a macroscopic framework could be developed on the basis of the data gathered 
from a larger number of airports, and due to uniqueness of each airport, the subsequent 
analysis would be at a lower level of granularity. Both approaches have their pros and cons 
in terms of the transferability of the results and required resources. However, as the primary 
goal of this thesis is to develop a generic systemic safety framework of the apron system 
capable of capturing performance variability, the macroscopic approach was selected. While 
acknowledging the limitations of the proposed macroscopic approach in terms of its 
transferability due to the sample limitations, it is believed that the TASM framework is able 
to capture the majority of aspects that contribute to variability in apron operations. Finally, 
the completeness of the framework is put to test by internal and external validations. 
An important consideration for the selection of airports was whether to include one or more 
GSPs in this study. ACRP (2011, 2012b) and Wilke (2013) have already studied and 
identified the differences between GSPs in terms of safety management, previously 
discussed in Chapter 5. To augment the literature, the approach taken in this research, in 
line with the above requirement for a macroscopic airport study, was to survey the safety 
management of a single GSP across several airports.  
In accordance with Chapter 4 and Wilke (2013), the criteria for selection of the GSP needed 
to fulfil the following requirements: i) large operations that would ensure considerable 
performance variability exposure, ii) geographical diversity in terms of infrastructure, 
meteorological conditions, organisational characteristics, culture and regulations, iii) 
provision of all services listed in Section 4.2, iv) airline and aircraft fleet diversity, v) 
diversity in the GSE fleet, and vi) a good safety culture. 
A major international GSP, Aircraft Service International Group (ASIG), voluntarily 
proposed to participate in this research, conditional to a Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA). 
The suitability of the GSP for the TASM development was assessed by matching the pre-





Table 6-5, evidences the GSP’s suitability and subsequently ASIG was adopted for the future 
TASM development.  
Table 6-5 GSP requirements 
GSP requirements Selected GSE characteristics 
Operations size Ranked in the top 10 by revenue (CAPA, 2014) 
Geographical diversity Over 80 airports mainly in the U.S. and Europe (ASIG, 2015) 
GHS provision diversity All GHS excluding catering (ASIG, 2015) 
Aircraft operator and fleet diversity ASIG services over 350 airlines that operate aircraft ranging in size from a Bombardier (DH8) to the Airbus A380 
GSE diversity 
Pushback tugs, baggage tugs, beltloaders, high-lift box trucks, 
lavatory trucks, water trucks, towbarless tractors, deicing 
trucks, fuel trucks (bowsers in Europe), fuel hydrant trucks, 
fuel hydrant carts, pickup trucks and jetways 
Positive safety culture 
• ISAGO registration 
• Positive internal safety culture assessment results 
• In the process of SMS implementation 
• Participation in IATA’s Airside Safety Group 
• Sharing data and collaborating with Imperial College 
Finally, to maximise exposure to airport and GSP performance variability, a set of criteria 
were defined in order to select a representative sample of airports among the 84 airports 
serviced by ASIG globally. The following criteria were considered:  
• the air traffic mix should account for: i) airports of different size in terms of the number 
of aircraft movements, ii) seasonality of operations, and iii) the day vs. night shift 
patterns;  
• geographical distribution of airports should account for: i) GSP operations in varying 
weather conditions, and ii) regional cultural differences;  
• GSP should account for all ground handling services (defined in Section 4.2); 
• a positive assessment of local safety culture.  
While objective factual information was available for the majority of criteria listed above 
(The Port Authority of NY & NJ, 2014, ASIG, 2015, LAX, 2015, LHR, 2015, MCO, 2015, TPA, 
2015), this was not the case with cultural differences. To account for these differences, two 
SMEs working at a senior positions at the GSP: i) the Senior Director, Security and Health, 
Safety, and Environment (HS&E) and ii) the Director of the HS&E Training, were consulted. 





London Heathrow Airport (LHR25), John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK25), Orlando 
International Airport (MCO25), Tampa International Airport (TPA25) and Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX25). The summary of airport characteristics is presented in Table 
6-6 below. 
Table 6-6 Characteristics of selected airports 




469,552 406,181 291,662 191,315 614,917 
Seasonality No No Yes Yes No 
Day/night 
shift Day Day and night Day and night Day and night Day and night 
Weather Oceanic Continental Tropical Subtropical Subtropical 
Regional 
culture UK New York Florida Florida California 








culture Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6.5 Apron observations and interviews 
After gaining the knowledge on the ‘work as imagined’ in Section 6.3, interviews and 
observations of everyday operations were conducted at the selected ASIG airport bases, 
described in the previous Section. Data were collected within 20 working days, between 
September to November 2013. Five working days were spent at each of LHR, JFK and LAX 
airports, three working days at MCO and two working days at TPA as a function of the size 
of GSP operations. The data collection process from observations and interviews is 
explained in the remainder of this Section. 
Observation is a qualitative data collection technique that aims to directly and systematically 
capture the behaviour of a study’s object(s) (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992, Drury, 1995). 
                                                      





When studying human behaviour, observation allows the person performing observations, 
i.e. the observer, to capture human behaviours and interactions in a natural physical setting 
as they occur. Furthermore observation enables the observer to capture “everyday behaviour 
that otherwise might be taken for granted, expected or go unnoticed”(Cohen et al., 2011, p. 456). 
The observations performed in this research were of an exploratory nature (i.e. unstructured 
observations) with the aim of becoming familiar with the turnaround process and 
identifying the potential factors that may contribute to performance variability during the 
process in a natural setting. At each airport, observations were conducted in three stages, 
accompanied at all times by a senior safety manager due to security reasons. Firstly, upon 
arrival at the airport the researcher/observer was taken onto a tour around the airport 
apron. Secondly, at each airport a minimum of three turnaround processes of different 
aircraft types were observed, ranging from 30 to 90 minutes. However, the decision to stop 
observations at each location was based upon the point of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Adler and 
Adler, 1994), reached when the observer judged that no new data would be gained by 
increasing the number of observations. Thirdly, apron management operations were 
observed at three (JFK, MCO and LAX) out of five airports, for at least 15 minutes due to the 
inability of the observer to access apron management at LHR and TPA. Due to restricted 
access, it was not possible to perform observations on the flight crews. To overcome this 
limitation, data on flight crew performance variability was collected during interviews, as 
will be explained later.  
During observation, the observer was in the role of an ‘observer as participant’ (Gold, 1958). 
Thus, while not overtly taking part in the turnaround process, the observer instead 
unobtrusively and attentively observed and took notes of the process. Additionally, for the 
purpose of clarification of specific operational aspects, participants were questioned upon 
the completion of a particular task. In the post-processing and reflection phase, the notes 
were, on the same day, converted into hypotheses on the factors that may affect 
performance variability and were then used during the interviews. This approach enhances 
the validity of the results by compensating for any bias or subjectivity that could have 
emerged during observations. Following the completion of observations at each airport, the 
data collection process continued through interviews. 
Interviews are used to collect data based on direct verbal communication between two types 
of participants: i) interviewers, and ii) interviewees. In research interviews, the information 
of the research interest is transferred from the interviewee(s) to the interviewer with the aim 
of “obtaining systematic description, prediction, or explanation” (Cohen et al., 2011, p. 411). 





levels of flexibility in questioning/probing (Tuckman, 1972) and were therefore considered 
more appropriate for the knowledge acquisition process on performance variability required 
for the derivation of the TASM framework. 
To ensure representativeness and transferability of the TASM framework, before data 
collection, the sample had to be clearly defined. Two approaches were considered, 
probability and non-probability sampling. The former ensures that each member of the 
population has an equal probability of being included into the sample. On the other hand, 
the latter allows the researcher to deliberatively focus on particular characteristics of the 
population in the sample selection (Cohen et al., 2011). The following criteria were 
considered in the sampling strategy selection, as follows: 
• fitness for purpose – the objective of data collection was to come up with a qualitative 
description of ‘work as done’ on apron; 
• sample strata – the interviewees had to meet all the following requirements: i) capture 
all direct stakeholders participating in apron operations (previously described in 
Section 4.3.1), ii) speak the English language, and iii) volunteer to participate in the 
survey; 
• sample size – the main requirement set for the number of interviewees was to reach the 
level of theoretical saturation (Adler and Adler, 1994);  
• sample access – selection of the interviewees was restricted to the pre-determined 
airport (selected in Section 6.4).  
Following the outlined data requirements, it was decided to carry out a non-probabilistic 
sampling strategy, a characteristic for qualitative research (Cohen et al., 2011). However, due 
to the exploratory nature of research, in parallel with the stratified sampling, enabling all 
direct stakeholders to be captured, a theoretical sampling approach was taken. Theoretical 
sampling, a characteristic of Grounded Theory (described further in Section 6.6.1), allows for 
flexibility in data collection in an iterative process thus enabling the generation of the theory 
under investigation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In line with the flexible nature of theoretical 
sampling, the interview sample was continuously reassessed during the data collection 
process. The changing sample requirements were communicated to the persons of contact at 
each airport to select the next interviewee, whilst still meeting the sample strata criteria 
outlined above (knowledge of English and the consent to voluntarily participate in the 





saturation was reached. The interviewee characteristics are summarised in Table 6-7 and 
Table 6-8 below. 
Table 6-7 Sample characteristics per airport 
 Airport  
 LHR JFK MCO TPA LAX Total 
Number of interviews 6 6 6 5 18 41 
Mean experience [years] 17 10 14 20 11 13 
Mean interview time [minutes] 41 62 33 38 41 43 
 











































Number of interviews 8 7 7 7 3 4 5 2 
Mean experience [years] 7 9 17 19 12 22 10 16 
Mean interview time [minutes] 39 43 42 50 13 76 28 79 
 
While a rich literature exists on the classification of interviews (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 
Oppenheim, 1992, LeCompte et al., 1993, Bogdan and Biklen, 1998), a classification by Patton 
(1980) based on different levels of structure incorporated into the data retrieval process was 
adopted in this thesis. Accordingly interviews can be classified into the following four 
categories (Patton, 1980): 
• Informal conversational interview – this is a characteristic for exploratory research 
where specifics of the study are yet to be established. Through informal and non-
structured conversation, research questions are not predetermined and gradually 
emerge. 
• Interview guide approach – this is a characteristic for an already established research 
question but is still in its early phase of development. While generic open questions are 
predetermined, the interviewer has a complete freedom to manipulate their sequence as 
a function of the conversational flow. 
• Standardised open-ended interviews – these are a characteristic for an even later phase 
in research where the research question is precisely defined. The interviews have a firm 
but open-ended question structure and are being repeated in the exactly same manner 





• Close quantitative interviews – this is a characteristic for a type of research where 
hypothesis have already been established and are in the test phase. Unlike other 
interview classes, this category enables quantification given a predetermined set of 
questions and answers. 
The level of structure required for the TASM development was derived from the 
characteristics of the FRAM method. Standardised open-ended interviews were selected for 
the following reasons: i) FRAM’s objective of describing ‘everyday’ operations can only be 
effectively captured through open-ended questions, however ii) a certain structure must be 
incorporated into the interviews to enable characterisation of functions, their aspects and 
variability. To assure the required structure, interview forms with questions were structured 
in a format enabling the variability of all direct stakeholders to be captured. 
Interview questions were formulated in line with the Arksey and Knight (1999) and Patton 
(1980) recommendations on data collection quality, accounting for: i) use of a clear, simple 
and unambiguous vocabulary, and ii) avoiding bias and prejudice. To increase the interview 
reliability and validity, a pilot study was performed before administering interviews to test 
the draft question formulation, their organisation and structure. Three final year PhD 
students with experience in qualitative safety research participated in the pilot study. They 
were asked to critically review and comment on the formulation and the structure. Their 
feedback led to a revision of draft questions (i.e. adding a Section on recommendations, 
rephrasing and grammar) and led to the final version provided in Appendix II. 
The researcher exclusively performed the role of the interviewer. Furthermore, interviews 
were always carried out on an ‘one to one’ basis in an isolated environment (i.e. a room with 
closed doors) and were recorded audibly with the consent of interviewees. Every interview 
was organised in six parts, starting by i) introducing the aims, objective and background of 
the research. Interviewees were then explained guarantees of confidentiality and asked 
whether they wished to proceed with the interview. After giving their consent, the 
interviewee was asked ii) basic demographical information. This was followed by an open-
ended question requiring the interviewee to iii) describe their everyday work from their 
own point of view. Probing was performed in following section of the interview where the 
iv) impact of performance variability on operations (i.e. functions) was investigated using 
‘what if’ scenarios that varied according to the different aspects of a function being discussed 
(i.e. input, precondition, resource, control or time) to asses their impact on operations. 
Finally, the last section of the interviews was orientated towards v) eliciting possibilities for 
improvement in apron operations. The interview concluded by allowing the interviewee an 





participation. Interviewee was left with the contact details of the interviewer in case of any 
future questions or the desire to withdraw from the study. 
The responses were given in a unstructured mode (Cohen et al., 2011) giving the interviewee 
the complete liberty in their response provision. The lack of structure however makes 
coding of data increasingly laborious as explained in Section 6.6.1.1. In addition to audio 
recordings, the interviewer made textual notes and graphical illustrations when deemed 
necessary. 
6.6 Qualitative data analysis 
To enable further qualitative analysis, raw data gathered through observations and 
interviews was converted into a structured textual format. Interviews, recorded with the iOS 
Voice Record software, that has demonstrated reliability and validity in pilot interviews, 
were transcribed using free Express Scribe Transcription software. Interview transcripts 
were then integrated with notes derived from observation and interviews. On average, one 
full day was required to transcribe a 60 minutes interview. 
Two methods widely used in the field of qualitative data analysis were considered in this 
research (Cassell and Symon, 2004, King et al., 2004, Cohen et al., 2011): i) Grounded Theory, 
and ii) Template Analysis. In essence, both methods systematise the collected data through 
data coding with the objective of generating a story description/explanation of the research 
question (Cohen et al., 2011). The main difference between the two techniques lies in the 
approach towards data coding. While Grounded Theory starts with a tabula rasa, Template 
Analysis starts with pre-defined categories of codes, known as a template, which are later 
refined through an iterative process of narrative analysis.  
Therefore, in line with the main research objective, i.e. to describe the functions and 
variability of apron operations ‘… as done,’ and since there has been no attempt to do so 
before, Grounded Theory was used to develop the initial theory, of apron operations 
variability, ‘that is grounded in the data systematically gathered and analysed’(Strauss and Corbin, 
1990, p. 23). To assure completeness and exhaustiveness of the factors that could affect the 
variability of the apron operations, the template derived from Grounded Theory was used 
as a basis for a subsequent Template Analysis that compared the initial template with the 
existing performance shaping factors (PSFs) from the human factors and ergonomics 
literature. The foundations of Grounded Theory and Template Analysis, along with their 





6.6.1 Grounded Theory and its application in TASM framework development 
Grounded Theory takes a systematic, emergent, inductive and implicit approach towards 
theory generation on the research problem (Cohen et al., 2011). Its founders – Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) developed Grounded Theory to understand and account for the complexity of 
world which they certainly did not consider to be linear but instead highly complex and 
interconnected. Furthermore, the main assumptions on non-linearity, emergence and 
complexity that underlie Grounded Theory fully complement systemic Safety-II approach 
adopted in this research. 
From its origins, Grounded Theory evolved resulting in the creation of two dominant yet 
opposed schools of thoughts. The main disagreement is founded in the differences linked to 
the scientific inquiry that precedes data collection. Glaser and Strauss (1967) promote a 
‘tabula rasa’ view of enquiry which entails performing the literature review only after the 
sample has been selected and initial categories derived (Charmaz, 1990). In contrast, 
Charmaz (1990, p. 1163) firmly opposes “delaying the literature review” since this impacts the 
direction, scope and initial sample of the research. Following the strong theoretical 
arguments, the Charmaz viewpoint was adopted in this research. The consequence of this 
choice affected the approach towards the literature review and sampling strategy explained 
in Section 6.4. 
The remainder of the Section starts by explaining the theory of the analytical process 
Grounded Theory is founded upon, followed by its adaptation and application for the 
purpose of the TASM framework development. 
6.6.1.1 Grounded Theory procedures for data coding and analysis 
The data analysis process in Grounded Theory requires the combination of (Cohen et al., 
2011): i) coding, and ii) constant comparison.  
The process of coding summarises, categorises and organises data from the narratives 
enabling the theory gradually to emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2006). A combination of 
three types of coding processes is applied in Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967): 
open, axial and selective coding. 
Open coding is defined by Corbin and Strauss (1998, p. 101) as the “analytic process through 
which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data”. In this 





to their category. Following the definition of categories and sub-categories, 
interrelationships between them are analysed during the process of axial coding. 
Axial coding is defined by Corbin and Strauss (1998, p. 123) as “the process of relating 
categories to their subcategories, termed ‘axial’ because coding occurs around the axis of a category, 
linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions”. After establishing basic categories of 
codes, narratives are examined to explain the “when, where, why, who, how, and with what 
consequences” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 125). These explanations are used to create 
provisional hypothesis on relationships between categories and subcategories that are 
challenged with every consideration of a new unit of analysis (i.e. sentence, paragraph, 
event) and/or code (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
Selective coding, defined by Corbin and Strauss (1998, p. 143) as “the process of integrating and 
refining the theory”, is the final data coding process in Grounded Theory. At this stage, after 
establishing the relationships between categories, an explanation of the question “what is this 
research all about” emerges in the form of a central or core category (Corbin and Strauss, 1998, 
p. 146). This is followed by a textual and often diagrammatical description of the theory that 
emerged during the extensive coding process, which concludes the Grounded Theory 
coding and analysis procedure. 
In common to open, axial and selective coding is the application of the method of constant 
comparison (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The constant comparison of “data with data and then 
data with codes” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 50) guards against researcher bias and increases 
consistency in the definition of categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In this method, every 
unit of analysis is examined whether it belongs to a previously defined category or calls for 
the creation of a new category. In this iterative process categories are grouped, re-grouped, 
new ones are created, existing ones are deleted or amended (Nascimento, 2009). 
6.6.1.2 Adaptation and application of Grounded Theory 
The process of generating the theory on everyday operations on the apron started with an 
understanding of the ‘work as imagined’ (previously described in Section 6.3). This informed 
the initial theoretical sample and structured the form of the interviews (see Appendix II). In 
contrast to conventional sampling and data collection techniques, theoretical sampling, a 
characteristic of Grounded Theory, requires that the researcher performs analysis in parallel 
with data collection. The initial analysis is then used to inform the following data collection 





To meet the research objective in the process of interview transcript coding, two criteria 
were established: i) derive functions required to perform everyday operations on the apron 
and the relationships between them, and ii) derive factors that affect variability of the 
functions. These criteria in turn call for a slight adaptation of the generic Grounded Theory 
coding method (Corbin and Strauss, 1998) explained below. 
Open coding process was performed line-by-line to enable the identification and extraction 
of statements, which depict the functions performed on the apron and their variability. 
While Glaser (1978) defined line-by-line coding as assigning codes to every line of the 
transcript, the rule was not followed strictly. Instead meaningful statements of different 
lengths were extracted ranging from several words to a paragraph. This was justified with 
focus of this research on identifying the functions and the factors that affect variability of 
apron operations. During the process, provisional codes were defined following the 
Charmaz (2006, p. 57) recommendations to keep the codes “short, simple, active and analytic”. 
Furthermore, to increase the reliability of the coding process two conventions were 
established. 
Interestingly, while Hollnagel (2012b) recommends considering all three types of 
performance variability, practitioners tend to focus on variability due to function coupling 
while completely neglecting factors that contribute to their internal and external variability, 
as evidenced through the FRAM workshops (FRAMily Meeting, 2012, 2013, 2014). To 
address this gap in the literature and practice, a convention was proposed to distinguish 
between two types of codes: i) codes that depict an activity (i.e. a function), ii) codes that 
depict a state or condition present during the execution of a function (internal and external 
variability). The former codes are defined as functions and morphologically depicted as 
activities, consistent with Glaser’s (1978) and Charmaz’s (2006) guidelines, whereas the latter 
are defined as internal or external factors that affect function variability and are 
morphologically depicted as nouns. For instance, a function is labelled as ‘Maintain and test 
GSE’ and its Output as ‘GSE are maintained and tested’. In contrast, variability of this function 
may be affected by a factor labelled as  ‘GSE characteristics’ (for definitions of these, please 
refer to Appendix III and Appendix IV). 
The second convention aims to ensure consistency in the level of granularity during the 
coding process. The adopted macroscopic approach to TASM development, defined in 
Section 6.4, should capture the variability of apron operations during a generic turnaround 
process. This is in line with the “breadth before depth” principle recommended by Hollnagel et 
al. (2014, p. 46) for FRAM modelling. The principles suggest that framework development 





primarily only the functions absolutely necessary for a process to take place, guards against 
becoming trapped in the details. To maintain manageability, Wilke (2013) restrained her 
model of airport surface operations from accounting for differences in: i) aircraft type, ii) 
stakeholder procedures and iii) individual direct stakeholder’s task. In addition to Wilke’s 
modelling restraints, TASM development did not account for: iv) GSE differences, nor for v) 
airport infrastructural differences. The five outlined restraints about the framework 
resolution define the second convention adopted for the high-level TASM development. 
However, depending on the purpose of the analysis, certain functions of the functional 
model can be developed to a higher resolution as will be illustrated on a case study in 
Section 7.1.  
While these restraints were applied to create a generic high-level TASM functional model of 
apron operation applicable to every turnaround, the internal and external factors that affect 
variability of the model were developed to complement the model with the specifics of 
every airport, GSP, airline etc. Therefore, before applying the TASM functional model in 
retrospective, prospective or system analysis, specifics of a particular turnaround process 
need to be identified using the taxonomy of factors as guidance. The analysis of the TASM 
functional model should then proceed by accounting for all factors that may affect its 
variability. The final taxonomy of factors is presented in Appendix VI and Appendix VII. 
To support the constant comparison method in the process of open coding, a mind map was 
created using FreeMind software. Each statement was compared to the previously identified 
categories to assess its fit. In case the existing codes could not adequately depict the 
statement, a new code was created. During this iterative process, categories were merged or 
amended to derive a total of 40 categories that depict functions and 47 categories that depict 
factors that affect functions during operations on the apron.  
Open codes were then analysed at a higher conceptual level and organised into axial codes. 
More specifically, open codes depicting activities were clustered under a unique function. In 
the context of FRAM, open coded activities were considered to be outputs of functions 
characterised as axial codes. This process derived in total 3026 categories of higher order 
(functions). Similar to coding for activities, factors that affect function variability were 
clustered into 12 higher-order categories. To reflect the FRAM methodology (Hollnagel, 
2012b) these 12 categories were organised into two levels: i) human and ii) organisational, 
                                                      
26 In addition to the derived 30 categories, following the validity checks, another function was found 
“walk across the apron”. Consequently the final TASM functional model, described in Appendices IV 





each of which was further divided into a) internal, and b) external variability, illustrated in 
Figure 6-8. Since the scope of this research did not consider functions performed by 
technology, but instead predominantly focused on human and organisational functions, 
technological factors were not developed further within this thesis. However its importance 
should not be neglected and future research, mainly focusing on GSE design and 
maintenance, should develop this aspect further. 
 
Figure 6-8: Organisation of internal and external factors 
The rationale underlying open and axial coding in the derivation of functions and their 
variability is explained in Appendix III and Appendix IV. Furthermore, each code is 
illustrated by an example. 
The processes of open and axial coding was subjected to consistency, completeness, 
reliability and validity checks, described in 6.7 and Appendix IX, and resulted in the final 
code classification presented in Appendix VII and Appendix VIII. 
While the process of open and axial coding yielded a hierarchical relationship between a 
function and its outputs, diagrams were used throughout the coding process to account for 
relationships between a function’s outputs to the function itself (in case of a closed loop) and 
other functions (through Input, Precondition, Resource, Time or Control aspects). The 
relationships were used to build and visualise the FRAM model using the FRAM Model 
Building and Visualisation (FMV) software (Hollnagel and Hill, 2014). However, upon 
completion of the coding process certain open codes (function Outputs) did not feed into 
any function. This violated the completeness rule of FRAM that states: “no aspect should occur 
for one function only” (Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 60). To account for incompleteness in the 





The Goals-Means Task Analysis (GMTA) method (Hollnagel, 1993a) is used to derive the 
required tasks and their organisation that leads to accomplishment of an end goal (i.e. 
complete the turnaround safely and on time). To reach the end goal, certain sub-goals need 
(i.e. fuelling process is completed) to be achieved by the means of execution of a number of 
tasks (i.e. establish the interface with the aircraft) whilst meeting certain preconditions (i.e. 
procedures). In this iterative process, goals and means (tasks) are refined to establish a 
goals-means relationship (Hollnagel, 1993a). The results of the GMTA analysis specify the 
sub-goals, tasks and preconditions that are required to achieve the end goal. These were 
used to inform the definitions of functions and their aspects in the FRAM method (Woltjer et 
al., 2008, Woltjer, 2009) thus augmenting the completeness of the TASM functional model 
(see 6.7.2 on completeness) based on FRAM. An example of GMTA is given in Section 7.1.2. 
After defining the open and axial codes, the last stage of Grounded Theory, selective coding 
needed to be applied. In this process, the central category was chosen according to Strauss 
(1987) criteria that required all axial codes to relate to it in some way. Consequently, the 
variability of apron operations emerged as a core category. Finally, the storyline (textual 
description) of the core category and the underlying FRAM model is provided in Section 6.8. 
6.6.2 Template Analysis and its application in TASM framework development 
The initial template (list) of factors that affect the variability of apron operations (presented 
in Appendix IV) was based on the data from the interviews and observations of front line 
employees. This approach only reflected the operational perspective on ground handling 
variability without any input from the scientific literature. To account for this, in line with 
the principles of Grounded Theory, the literature was revisited only after the derivation of 
the initial template “to enhance, rather than constrain, theory development”(Corbin and Strauss, 
1998, p. 49). 
Apron operations are no different to the rest of aviation sector where the majority of 
unwanted outcomes are attributed to the human (Boeing, 2004, Johnson and Holloway, 
2004, Balk and Bossenbroek, 2010) either at the ‘front end’ or ‘blunt end’ (Reason, 1990b). 
Therefore, it is important to understand the factors that shape human performances (at 
different organisational levels) causing its variability. Over the years, with the development 
of new methods, different terminology has been used to describe these factors (Kyriakidis, 
2013): Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), Contextual Conditions (CCs), Error 
Producing Conditions (EPCs), Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs), Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSFs) and performance variability. Regardless of the terms used, they all tend to 





and physiological resources” (Johnson, 2003, p. 65). In the remainder of this thesis, in line with 
the FRAM method, these factors will be referred to as (factors that affect) the internal or 
external variability of technological27, human or organisational functions. 
The objective of this literature review was therefore to identify factors that may lead to 
human and organisational performance variability across numerous safety-critical 
industries, including the ground handling sector, and use those to augment the list of factors 
outlined in Appendix IV.  
In doing so, the Template Analysis method by King (1998) for the thematic analysis of 
qualitative data was applied. In contrast to Grounded Theory, Template Analysis starts with 
a list of a priori codes, known as the initial template. Next, similar to the process of Open 
and Axial coding in Grounded theory, the units of analysis (i.e. factors that affect variability 
of human performance) are compared to the codes in the initial template. If the unit of 
analysis can fit into the pre-defined code, it is assigned to it. Otherwise, the taxonomy is 
refined either by creating a new code, or by amending/deleting the existing code(s). During 
the process of coding, relationships between categories are organised hierarchically. The 
process is iteratively repeated until the whole set of data is assigned to the corresponding 
codes – when the final template is created. Lastly, similar to selective coding in Grounded 
Theory, the final template is used to develop, interpret and summarise the findings of the 
study. 
In this research, Template Analysis was applied on the factors that affect the variability of 
human or organisational performances extracted from the literature. Section 6.6.2.1 starts by 
reviewing the factors specific to apron operations. To ensure an even higher completeness of 
possible factors that could affect human performance variability, a cross-industry literature 
review was considered in Section 6.6.2.2, to develop the most exhaustive list (taxonomy) of 
factors affecting the variability of operations on the apron summarised in Section 6.6.2.3. 
Understanding this variability is necessary for the: i) transferability of the functional TASM 
model, and ii) systemic prospective, retrospective and performance analysis of apron 
operations. 
                                                      
27 Although technological functions are excluded from the scope of this thesis as previously explained 





6.6.2.1 Review of factors that affect human performance variability specific to apron 
operations  
The literature review starts by extracting factors, which have been identified to affect 
variability of apron operations from the existing safety analysis methods. In total, eight 
methods were reviewed, resulting in the extraction of over 1101 factors. Each method along 
with the extracted higher-order factors is explained below. 
The Ramp Error Decision Aid (REDA) is a tool designed by Boeing (2004) for retrospective 
analysis of unwanted outcomes on the apron. In REDA, an unwanted outcome occurs “when 
one or more of the system’s component’s performance is degraded to a point where the entire apron 
system cannot meet its requirements” (Boeing, 2004, p. 3). REDA belongs to the category of 
Safety-I complex linear safety methods, introduced by Reason (1990b), for retrospective 
analysis. It focuses on “human performance failures” due to “errors, violations or inability to 
complete tasks in required time” (Boeing, 2004). In contrast to Reason’s generic types of human 
performance failures, REDA provides failure descriptions that are very specific to the apron 
environment (i.e. failure to see FOD on the ramp). In addition to human failures REDA 
accounts for other types of system failures (i.e. equipment breakdown, lack of equipment). 
Of interest in this Section are factors that have been identified to contribute to human or 
other types of failures, referred to as ‘contributing factors’. REDA proposes a classification 
based on 91 lower-order categories grouped into ten higher-order categories of factors: i) 
information, ii) equipment, tools, and safety equipment, iii) aircraft design, configuration, 
and parts, iv) job or task, v) technical knowledge and skills, vi) individual factors, vii) 
environment/facility/ramp, viii) organisational factors, ix) leadership and supervision, x) 
communication. This taxonomy of factors suffers from the mixing of phenotypes with 
genotypes – a limitation inherent to many of the existing taxonomies. For instance, while the 
majority of sub-categories related to equipment and tools under ii) represent genotypes (i.e. 
equipment is unreliable), several factors depict phenotypes (i.e. equipment driven too fast). 
The contributing factors identified by REDA have been used with minor adaptations, as a 
basis for a survey on human factors in ground handling performed by Balk and Bossenbroek 
(2010). While the higher-order categories remained the same (apart from re-labelling the 
category ‘individual factors’ with ‘personal factors’), at the lower level some of the categories 
based on the SME input were deleted, re-labelled or added – resulting in a total of 105 
factors. For instance, the category ‘mis-calibrated’ was re-labelled with ‘bad maintenance’, and 





The Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) is a predecessor of the REDA tool, also 
developed by Boeing (2001), for the retrospective analysis of unwanted outcomes in aviation 
maintenance. The same theoretical foundations and limitations explained above for REDA 
apply for MEDA. Likewise, MEDA has the identical higher-order structure of categories 
with a slight variation at the lower level (i.e. equipment ‘past expiration date’), containing a 
total of 98 lower-order factors. Today, MEDA is a widely accepted tool in the aviation 
maintenance domain and since the early 2000s it has been implemented in over 60 
organisations (Rankin et al., 2000). 
The IATA Ground Damage DataBase (GDDB) is the only global centralised database that 
aggregates voluntarily provided information on ground damage occurrences from airlines, 
GSPs and airports that provide ground handling services (IATA, 2015b). The collected data 
is de-identified and fed into a centralised system allowing the participating stakeholders to 
benchmark their individual safety performances against the other participants. Data 
collection requirements include eight higher-order categories related to environmental 
conditions (IATA, 2015c): i) weather, ii) surface conditions, iii) phase of day, and causal 
factors related to: iv) behaviour, v) equipment, vi) organisations, vii) physical circumstances, 
viii) regulations/SOP’s not followed. At the lower-level, GDDB captures in total 61 
categories. Factors in the GDDB taxonomy also cluster together genotypes (i.e. ‘unattended 
vehicle left running’) with genotypes (i.e. ‘distraction’). 
The Ramp Line Operations Safety Audit (R-LOSA) is a proactive and predictive tool for 
monitoring, modelling and managing human performance during normal operations with 
respect to their compliance with prescribed procedural practices on the apron (Ramp LOSA, 
2011, Ma and Rankin, 2012). Ramp LOSA is founded on the principles of Line Operations 
Safety Audit (LOSA) originally developed for monitoring the performance of flight crews 
(ICAO, 2002a) but later transferred to the aircraft maintenance and apron operations (Ma 
and Rankin, 2012). Non-compliance to the procedures is interpreted as unwanted ‘human 
error’ corresponding to the bi-modal approach to human performance modelling in Safety-I. 
The Ramp LOSA (and LOSA) methodology is based on the Threat and Error Management 
(TEM) model, previously discussed in Section 6.2, that belongs to the category of complex 
linear models. TEM models the relationships between threats that lead to errors committed 
by human operators (i.e. flight crew, GSAs) and the actions to correct/contain these errors 
and the potential consequences (Klinect et al., 1999). 
Ramp LOSA identified a set of ‘threats’ that may contribute to human error, organised in 
nine higher-order categories: i) aircraft, ii) ground equipment, iii) communication/ 





leadership and commitment, ix) environmental threats. Every higher-order category is 
populated with a set of lower-order categories making a total of 202 categories at the lowest 
level. Ramp LOSA threats also tend to mix phenotypes and genotypes, e.g. for instance in the 
case of category i) ‘aircraft’, characteristics of the aircraft design/stage of repair (genotype) 
are included in the same category as  ‘aircraft positioning’ at a wrong stand (phenotype). 
Following the success of LOSA across major international airlines, Ramp LOSA has been 
applied at KLM Ground Services where it has proven to be an effective tool for monitoring 
unwanted variability in apron operations (de Boer et al., 2011). 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Airport Operations Safety Panel’s study 
on “Reducing accident and improving safety on the ramp” (NTSB, 2004) based on the elicitation 
of SME knowledge identified in total 11 categories that affect safety on the apron: i) human 
error, ii) failure to follow established procedures, iii) poor inadequate training, iv) ramp 
congestion, v) substandard equipment maintenance, vi) lack of standardisation, vii) 
equipment error and malfunction, viii) inadequate supervision, ix) high employee turnover, 
x) financial pressures, xi) pressure to reduce turnaround times. This list of factors also mixes 
genotypes (phenotype categories i) and ii)) with genotypes (categories iii) to xi)). 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary occurrence aviation reporting 
system in the USA run by NASA (Skybrary, 2015). Amongst other data, the ASRS database 
contains a taxonomy on contributing factors that affect safety classified into 16 categories 
(ASRS, 2015a): i) aircraft, ii) airport, iii) airspace structure, iv) ATC equipment/navigation 
facility, buildings, v) chart or publication, vi) company policy, vii) equipment/tooling, viii) 
environment – non weather related, ix) human factors, x) incorrect/ not installed/ 
unavailable part, xi) logbook entry, xii) manuals, xiii) Minimum Equipment List (MEL), xiv) 
procedure, xv) staffing and xvi) weather. Due to the fact that ASRS taxonomy refers to the 
complete ATM system, it is very generic and certain factors are not applicable to the apron 
operations (i.e. factors under iii) and xi)). 
NASA’s study on the “Airport ramp safety and crew performances issues” (Chamberlin et 
al., 1995) performed an analysis on a sample of 182 reports from the ASRS database. All the 
occurrences analysed resulted in property damage (aircraft or GSE) or personal injury on the 
apron and involved the flight crew directly. Based on the narratives from the reports, the 
analysis has identified the following five major contributing factors to be associated with the 
unwanted outcomes contained in the reports: i) improper guidance, taxi or parking 
instructions, ii) improper positioning of ground equipment, iii) flight crew performance 
issues, iv) communication issues, v) procedural issues. Again, this analysis provides more 





outcomes. This can be explained by the data used to derive this information, namely free 
subjective voluntary text occurrence reports. 
The Taxonomy of Causal Factors Underlying Airport Surface Safety Occurrences developed 
by Wilke et al. (2012) is the most detailed taxonomy of ‘critical factors’ that underlie safety 
occurrences on the manoeuvring area. The taxonomy is organised into five higher-order 
categories: i) aircraft operations, ii) ATC, iii) airport operations, iv) environment, and v) 
regulatory system. At the lowest level, this taxonomy captures a total of 512 factors. 
Although developed primarily for the airport manoeuvring area, certain elements of this 
taxonomy are applicable to ground handling. However, due to its objectives and the 
underlying methodology, this taxonomy primarily focuses on phenotypes of safety 
occurrences (i.e. ‘Operator started ground handling while engines still running’) and it does not 
account for the organisational factors. In addition within the context of apron safety, Wilke 
(2013) calls for development of an integrated taxonomy for apron operations. Therefore, 
aspects of Wilke’s taxonomy that correspond to genotypes and are linked/transferable to 
apron operations were considered in the development of factors that contributes to 
variability of apron operations. 
6.6.2.2 Cross-industry review of factors that affect human performance variability 
As a way of assuring an even higher level of completeness about the factors that may affect 
variability of apron operations, cross-industry factors were reviewed. To avoid repetition, a 
recent literature review by Kyriakidis (2013) is referred to in this thesis. Kyriakidis’ review 
encompassed 16 methods from the railway, nuclear, transportation and oil and gas 
industries. From every method, he extracted human performance variability taxonomies 
that included 248 factors to develop a unique Railway Performance Shaping Factors (R-
PSFs) taxonomy. Kyriakidis’ review while not exhaustive, due to the repetitiveness of the 
factors across different taxonomies, has managed to capture the majority of factor that affect 
variability of human performances (Kyriakidis, 2013). The higher-order factors of the 16 
taxonomies are summarised in Table 6-9 whereas for the complete list of 248 factors please 







Table 6-9: Cross-industry review of factors that affect human performance variability (adapted 
fromKyriakidis (2013)) 
Taxonomy Reference Method/Industry Higher-order factors (incomplete list) 
SLIM • Embrey (1983) 




(SLIM) was developed 
to model human 
performances in the 
nuclear industry. 
• Training and experience 
• Procedures and administrative controls 
• Availability and clarity of 
instrumentation 
• Time available and time required to 
complete the task 
• Complexity of the required diagnosis and 
response 
• Workload, time pressure and stress 
• Team dynamics and characteristics 
• Staffing 
• Quality of the human-system interface 
• Environmental factors 
• Accessibility and operability of the 
equipment to be manipulated 
• Need for special tools 
• Communication within organisation and 
special fitness needs 
THERP • Swain and 
Guttmann (1983a) 
Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) is a 
taxonomy of factors 
develop to analyse 
factors that affect 
human operator 
performance 
variability in the 
nuclear industry. 
• Situational characteristics 
• Work and task instructions 
• Task and equipment characteristics 
• Organismic factors 
• Psychological stressors 
• Physiological stressors 
HEART • Williams (1986) Human Error 
Assessment and 
Reduction Technique 
(HEART) is a method 
applied in the nuclear, 
chemical and 
petrochemical 
industries to assess the 
negative impact of 
certain factors on 
human performances. 
• Unfamiliarity 
• Shortage of time 
• Low signal-noise ratio 
• Means of information suppression 
• Means of information assimilation 
• Mismatch between designed and 
operated model 
• Reversibility of unintended actions 
• Channel capacity overload 
• Technique unlearning 
• Transfer of knowledge 
• Performance standard ambiguity 
• Mismatch between perceived and real 
risk 
• Feedback inadequacy, incompleteness or 
ambiguity 
• Operator inexperience 
ATHEANA • Cooper et al. 
(1996) 
A Technique for 
Human Error Analysis 
(ATHEANA) is a 
method for modelling 
human performances 
developed for the 
nuclear industry. 
• Training and experience 
• Procedures 
• Availability and clarity of 
instrumentation 
• Time pressure 
• Workload and stress; 
• Complexity of required actions and 
familiarity with the situation; 







• Quality and human-machine interface 
• Communication 
• Environmental and working conditions 
• Personal fitness level 
HRMS • Kirwan (1997) Human Reliability 
Management System 
(HRMS) is a taxonomy 
developed for 
modelling human 




• Quality of information and interface 
• Training / expertise / experience / 
competence 
• Task organization 
• Task complexity 
CREAM • Hollnagel (1998) Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) is a 
generic method 
capable of assessing 
the impact of the 
negative impact of 
human performances 
applicable to any 
industry. 
• Adequacy of organisation 
• Working conditions 
• Adequacy of Man-Machine Interface 
(MMI) and operational support 
• Availability of procedures/plans 
• Number of simultaneous goals 
• Available time 
• Time of day (circadian rhythm) 
• Adequacy of training and preparation 
• Crew collaboration 
TRACEr-
Rail 
• Rail Safety and 
Standards Board 
(2004) 
• Shorrock and 
Kirwan (2002) 
Technique for the 
Retrospective Analysis 
of Cognitive Errors 
(TRACEr) Rail is 
adaptation of the 
TRACEr taxonomy, 
developed to model 
factors contribution to 
ATC errors, in the 
railway domain. 
• Infrastructure and traffic 
• Communication 
• Procedures and documentation 
• Information 
• Training, knowledge and experience 
• Workplace design, HMI 
• In-cab environment 
• Personal 





Human Error in Air 
Traffic Management 
(HERA-JANUS) is a 
method developed for 
analysis of the 
negative aspect of 
human performances 
variability in the ATM 
domain. 
• Pilot-controller communications 
• Pilot actions 
• Traffic and airspace 
• Weather 
• Documentation and procedures 
• Training and experience 
• Workplace design an HMI 
• Environment 
• Personal factors 
• Team factors 
• Organisational factors 
HERMES • Cacciabue (2004) Human Error Risk 
Management for 
Engineering Systems 
(HERMES) is an 
adaptation of the 
THERP method, 
developed for the 
nuclear industry, 
applied in the railway 
domain. 
• Communication within organisation 
• Communication means 
• Technological interfaces  
• Comfort of work context 
• Roster/shifts planning 
• Regulations/rules 
• Training methods and simulators 
SPAR-H • Gertman et al. 
(2004) 
Simplified Plant 
Analysis Risk Human 
Reliability Assessment 
(SPAR-H) is a method 
for modelling human 
performances in the 
nuclear industry. 
• Available time 
• Stress and stressors 
• Training and experience 
• Task complexity 
• Ergonomics (HMI) 
• Procedures 





• Work processes 
HEPI • Khan et al. (2006) Human Error 
Probability Index 
(HEPI) is a method 
developed for 
modelling negative 
aspects of human 
performances in the oil 









• Environmental factors 
HFACS-RR • Reinach and Viale 
(2006) 





(HFACS-RR) is the 
adaptation HFACS 
method, developed to 
analyse human factors 
in aviation, in the 
railway domain. 
• Conditions of operators  
• Personal factors  
• Organisational factors 
• Environmental factors  




Analysis (HERA) is a 
taxonomy developed 
for the analysis of 
human performances 
in the nuclear 
industry. 
• Available time 
• Stress and stressors 
• Experience and training 
• Complexity 
• Procedures and reference documents 
• Ergonomics and HMI 
• Work processes 
• Fitness for duty/fatigue 
• Environment 
• Team dynamics/characteristics 
• Communication 




(CARA) is an 
adaptation of the 
HEART method, 
developed to assess 
the negative impact of 
certain factors on 
human performances 
in the ATM domain. 
• Technique unlearning 
• Unfamiliarity 
• Time pressure 
• Traffic complexity 
• Shift/position handover difficulties 
• Coordination difficulties 
• Workplace characteristics 
• Weather 
• On-the job training 
• Cognitive overload 
• Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched system 
feedback 
• Procedure quality shortfall 
• Low vigilance and fatigue 
• Controller reactive mode 
• Risk taking 
• Stress or ill health 
• Low workforce morale 
• Communication quality 
• Over/under-trust in automation 








• Hammerl and 
Vanderhaegen 
(2009) 
Human Factors in the 
Railway System Safety 
Analysis Process is 
another adaptation of 
the THERP and the 
TRACEr-Rail methods 





RARA • Gibson et al. (2013) 





(RARA) taxonomy was 
developed to assess 
the impact of factors 
that affect 
performance 
variability of train 
drivers.  
• Task design 
• Interface design 




6.6.2.3 Results of the final taxonomy of factors that affect internal and external 
variability of function on the apron 
The organisation of categories and subcategories in the process of developing the final 
template of factors that affect variability of human and organisational functions in the TASM 
model, theoretically corresponds to the FRAM method (Hollnagel, 2012b). An illustration of 
the first two levels of the taxonomy can be found in Figure 6-9. 
 
Figure 6-9 First two levels of the taxonomy of the TASM functional model variability 
This structure was then used as a basis for the Template Analysis, which integrated the 
initial template derived from the interviews (see Appendix IV), with the factors extracted 
from the total of 24 apron and cross-industry taxonomies (see 6.6.2.1 and 6.6.2.2). During the 
process of template analysis, the following rules were applied to consolidate the factors from 
the sources outlined above: 
• In line with the objective of the final taxonomy to capture genotypes only, any factor 
that had a phenotype nature was excluded. Furthermore, the phenotype factors 
typically overlapped with the functions (or their outputs) in the TASM functional model 
and were therefore excluded; 
• Factors for specific industries that cannot be transferred to apron operations were also 
excluded; 
• The remaining factors were either kept under their existing labels or were renamed to 





instances the factors with a negative connotations (i.e. loss of situational awareness) 
from the reviewed taxonomies were neutralised (i.e. situational awareness); 
• Finally, new factors were added. The list of higher-order factors was fairly consistent 
across the reviewed taxonomies and therefore only factors characteristic to the scope of 
the research were added. In contrast, significantly more factors were added at a lower-
order due to the specific nature of apron variability. 
A more detailed mapping between the reviewed taxonomies and the final taxonomy on the 
TASM variability, along with the examples, is given in Appendix V. 
This process led to the derivation of the draft final template, which was then subjected to 
internal and external validation, described in 6.7.4. Through the validation process, the draft 
of the final template was refined in order to create the final taxonomy of factors that affect 
the variability of apron operations (see Figure 6-10). For practicality, the definitions for the 
first four levels of taxonomy are given in the Appendix VI, whereas the complete list of 440 
factors (beyond the fourth level where applicable) is given in the Appendix VII. 
 
Figure 6-10 Methodology for development of the final taxonomy variability of the TASM 
framework 
6.7 Reliability, consistency, completeness and validity checks 
To ensure that the TASM functional model and its variability are exhaustive, unbiased and 






6.7.1 Consistency check 
Within the context of FRAM, the TASM functional model is primarily based upon, 
consistency refers to the agreement in labelling functions and their aspects in the model. In 
particular, this refers to the requirement that “aspects that refer to the same state” are 
identically labelled (Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 60). Following testing in the FRAM Model Building 
and Visualisation (FMV) software (Hollnagel and Hill, 2014), the above defined consistency 
requirements were met in the TASM functional model.  
6.7.2 Completeness check 
The consistency check needs to be performed before the completeness check. Within the 
context of FRAM, completeness refers to the exhaustiveness in the couplings between the 
aspects of the function. This rule states that “no aspect should occur for one function only” 
(Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 60), an Output of one function has to be coupled with at least another 
function (including itself). The completeness test was performed in the FRAM FMV software 
(Hollnagel and Hill, 2014), the result of which was consistent with the requirement above. 
6.7.3 Reliability checks 
Within the context of this research, reliability refers to the ability to reproduce the results of 
research (Cohen et al., 2011) by independent third party raters, also known as inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen, 1960). 
Inter-rater reliability assesses whether another rater(s) would have interpreted the data 
collected in the same way as the researcher. To measure inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s 
Kappa test was selected due to its wide applicability in the aviation domain (Wilke, 2013, 
Moriarty and Jarvis, 2014, Nascimento, 2014). In particular, Cohen’s Kappa (κ) coefficient 
measures the level of agreement between two raters, whilst accounting for the possibility of 
agreements occurring by chance, and is calculated as (Cohen, 1960): 
 κ = 𝑝 − 𝑝!1 − 𝑝!  6.1 
where p is defined a proportion of instances where agreement is reached and pe a proportion 
of instances where the agreements is expected to be reached by chance. Values of Cohen’s 
Kappa range from 0, when no agreement is reached, to 1, when the complete agreement is 





this corresponds to the criteria outlined by Fleiss et al. (2013) in which the level of agreement 
between two raters is characterised as ‘excellent’.  
Two independent raters were selected based on their experience in aviation safety (i.e. both 
raters hold a doctoral degree in aviation safety). Cohen’s Kappa was calculated at two levels: 
axial codes and open codes, as previously applied by Nascimento (2009, 2014). At the level 
of axial codes, Kappa was calculated for the total of 42 codes (30 for functions and 12 for 
factors of the TASM framework) based on a sample of 100 randomly selected statements 
(Nascimento, 2009, Wilke, 2013) distributed to each rater.  
In contrast to axial codes, Cohen’s Kappa calculation at the open code level was not as 
straight forward. This was due to the fact that some of the axial codes were sparsely 
populated and had only one open code category, thereby reducing the credibility of the 
Kappa coefficient. Therefore it was decided to cluster the open codes when computing 
Kappa by adapting the rules proposed by Nascimento (2009, 2012, 2014), as follows: 
• Cohen’s Kappa was computed independently for every axial code that contained 
three or more open codes; 
• for axial codes that had less than three open codes, axial codes were clustered 
together so that at least three open codes were available as alternatives before 
Cohen’s Kappa was computed; 
• a sample of 30 statements was used to compute Cohen’s Kappa where the total 
number of statements in the axial code or a cluster of axial codes category exceeded 
30; 
• where the number of statements in the axial code or a cluster of axial codes category 
was below 30, the complete set of statements within the category was tested for 
Cohen’s Kappa. 
Preliminary results of the Cohen’s Kappa test demonstrated that two clusters of codes 
(categories A and T in Appendix IX) had a score below the pre-defined criteria of .75. This 
prompted semi-structured discussions with the raters, which resulted in improvements in 
the definitions of axial and open codes (see Appendix III and IV). Following the 
modification of the definitions, the two categories were tested again, at which time 
satisfactory scores were reached. The final results of Cohen’s Kappa tests for both axial and 
open codes, summarised in Appendix IX, demonstrated an ‘excellent’ level of inter-rater 





6.7.4 Validity checks 
The credibility and representativeness of the TASM functional model and taxonomy must be 
tested through validity checks. Within the context of Grounded Theory, applied to analyse 
the collected data, as a way of testing validity Corbin and Strauss (1998, p. 159) recommend 
the following as a means of testing validity: 
“… tell the story to respondents or ask them to read it and then request that they 
comment on how well it seems to fit their cases. Naturally, it will not fit every aspect of 
each case because the theory is a reduction of data, but in the larger sense, participants 
should be able to recognise themselves in the story that is being told. They should be able 
to perceive it as a reasonable explanation of what is going on even if not every detail quite 
fits their cases.” 
To further increase validity of the TASM functional model and taxonomy, the above criteria 
was applied to two types of validity checks: internal and external validity (Cohen et al., 
2011). 
Internal validity was aimed at demonstrating the consistency, neutrality and dependability 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007) of the TASM framework judged by the participants of the 
research. Therefore LHR, as one of the five airports (but the only one in Europe) that 
participated in the study was revisited to test internal validity. During a two-day airport 
visit, the researcher completed a total of six semi-structured interviews with employees from 
the GSP and the airport operator. The duration of the interviews ranged from 15 minutes to 
3 hours, during the course of which notes were taken. Each respondent had over a decade of 
operational experience and was therefore a Subject Matter Experts (SME) in the apron safety 
domain, numbered as SMEs i) to vi). The SMEs performed the following job functions: i) 
safety manager, ii) ramp and operations manager, iii) operations coordinator, iv) supervisor, 
v) lead, and vi) airside safety manager. The SME number i) had an extensive experience (37 
year) in both operations and human factors. Therefore he was asked to comment on the 
TASM functional model and the factors that affect its variability. The SME was talked-
through the whole functional model in the FMV software, and the complete list of factors 
that affect variability presented in a mindmap format, and asked to comment. The feedback 
was positive with few corrections regarding the a) semantics (i.e. use the word ‘onload’ 
instead of ‘upload’ in the functional model), b) revision and identifications of new factors (i.e. 
‘cognition’ as a factor was present in two places in the taxonomy, ‘day of the week’ was 
identified as an additional factor that affects the operations). SMEs ii) to vi), due to their 
mainly operational expertise were presented only with the graphical illustration of the 





They were asked to comment on the definition of the functions and their interfaces during 
the discussion. All comments received were positive and the SMEs judged the functional 
model capable of capturing the complexity of the turnaround well, at a high level of 
granularity. No corrections were therefore needed to the TASM functional model and 
taxonomy. 
External validity aimed to test the transferability (Cohen et al., 2011) of the TASM functional 
model and the factors that affect its variability. In line with the Grounded Theory principles 
above, the storyline (see 6.8) along with the final TASM functional model (Appendix III and 
Appendix VIII) and taxonomy of factors (Appendix VI and Appendix VII) was sent by email 
to three SMEs who did not have an input in the model and factors development. The SMEs 
were selected based on their experience in the aviation safety domain and knowledge of the 
apron safety operations. These SMEs were: 
• the Senior Director, Security and HS&E of a major GSP; 
• the Head of Safety Regulations at EUROCONTROL (retired); and 
• the Airport Safety Expert at a doctoral level. 
All three SMEs provided positive feedback. The comments were predominantly related to 
the semantics. However, one of the SMEs suggested an additional function to be added to 
the TASM functional model ‘Walk across the apron’ to allow the model to capture GSAs and 
other individuals walking across the apron in-between their tasks (defined by other TASM 
functions). The researcher incorporated their comments in the final version of the storyline 
(see Section 6.8), TASM fuctional model (see Appendix III and Appendix VIII) and 
taxonomy of variability (see Appendix VI and Appendix VII). 
6.8 Story development 
Following the emergence of the core category, the variability of apron operation (see 6.6.1.2), a 
storyline (textual description) integrating all axial codes into the core category is provided in 
this Section. The storyline aims to answer the question about “what seems to be going on” 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1998, p. 148) during operations on the apron. 
In the en-route or approach phase of flight, the flight crew receives information about the 
allocated stand from ATC. Gates are typically planned for and assigned by the apron 
management at the beginning of each working day, with adjustments being made to reflect 
the actual traffic situation. Disruptions in the operations, including the present and future 





process, apron management considers the following: i) type of flight (i.e. international or 
domestic), ii) already occupied stands, iii) airline preferences, iv) aircraft type, v) Scheduled 
Time of Arrival (STA), and vi) Scheduled Time of Departure (STD). Up-to-date information 
on the stand assignment by apron management is made available to ground control and the 
tower who communicate with the flight crews in the approach, landing and taxi phase of a 
flight. This information is also provided to the airline operations centre and dispatch service 
of a GSP. 
Airline operations have the most up-to-date information about the ground service 
requirements for each aircraft. Any special requests (i.e. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
malfunction) are communicated to the Ground Service Provider’s (GSP) dispatch. To 
accommodate these requests, the GSP’s dispatch considers the availability of the Ground 
Service Agents (GSAs), Ground Service Equipment (GSE) and replenishing supplies (i.e. 
fuel, de/anti-icing fluids, cleaning supplies).  
The availability of GSAs is a function of the number of GSAs at each base and on their 
rosters. The number of GSAs employed at each base depends on the size of operation and 
the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with the airline. Typically the number of GSAs 
increases during a peak season, as a function of the airport location. However, the number 
of GSAs employed can display considerable fluctuations, e.g. the collective resignation from 
one GSP and their transfer to a competing GSP, which offers GSAs better working 
conditions (e.g. salary).  
The number of GSA at each base provides the basis for the design of rosters, which are 
usually designed around the scheduled flight information and provide hardly any buffer to 
accommodate disruptions. Consequently, early or late arrivals may put a strain on GSA 
resources. A GSP manages disruptions in the flight schedules in several ways. Firstly, it 
relies on experienced leads and supervisors, normally working in coordination and 
oversight positions, to help out GSAs by carrying out operational tasks. Secondly, especially 
at larger bases, the GSAs are trained to perform different tasks enabling cross-utilisation. 
Finally, since the number of GSAs is constant throughout a shift, the supervisors or 
management stretch the available resources by offering the GSAs opportunities to work 
overtime. GSAs on low-income salaries are prompted to accept overtime work due to the 
higher hourly payment rate it offered in comparison to the normal working payment rate. If 
uncontrolled by the GSP management at a base, GSAs may work 16-18 hours shifts, reaching 
up to 32 hours in extreme cases (Personal Communication, 2013d).  
Furthermore, the existing regulations regarding overtime, both in Europe and in the USA, 





regulated by EU Directive 2003/88/EC (European Parliament & Council of the EU, 2003). 
For instance, this EU Directive is implemented in the UK legal framework through the UK 
Work Time Regulation. Although mandatory, a worker has the option to voluntary opt out 
from the Directive, though four categories of employees including those employed by the 
airlines and the road transport industry cannot opt out from the UK Work Time Regulation. 
This restriction however does not apply to the GSP employees. In the USA, regulations 
about work hours are somewhat different. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
“employees must receive at least the minimum wage and may not be employed for more than 40 hours 
in a week without receiving at least one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for the overtime 
hours”(US Department of Labor, 2014). In addition, the act specifies no limit “on the number of 
hours employees aged 16 and older may work in any workweek”. 
The availability of GSE is a function of a GSP’s resource management and maintenance 
strategies. When acquiring new GSE, a GSP  management considers: i) the models available 
on the market; ii) the cost of different models; and iii) matter of preference (Personal 
Communication, 2013c). Due to frequent corporate changes and restructuring in the GSP 
business, GSE fleets tend to be heterogeneous in terms of their age and the models. For 
instance, “the average age of ground support equipment is about 10 years, although some of the 
equipment can last more than 30 years with periodic engine replacement” (GAO, 2003, p.39). High 
utilisation, coupled with the aging of GSE, makes its maintenance a demanding task. 
Compounding this, there are an insufficient number of GSE mechanics on the market while 
GSE model diversity imposes lengthy on-the-job training to those that are available. GSE 
mechanics are supported in their maintenance tasks by GSAs who are required to inspect 
their GSEs at the beginning of each shift and report to the mechanics any discrepancies. 
However, due to production and time pressure, GSAs often skip the GSE inspections. 
After obtaining their assignment, GSAs drive or are driven to the stand according to the 
rules specified and enforced by the Airport Operator. However, the driving of GSE can be 
influenced by the driving culture within the GSP and the airport in general. GSAs are 
expected to arrive at the stand before the aircraft to perform a stand inspection, though due 
to disruptions it is often the case that the assigned gate changes with very little prior notice 
(i.e. 10 minutes prior to scheduled arrival). Such last minute changes in gate assignment 
create difficulties for the ramp agents since they have to move all the GSE from one gate to 
another, thus increasing workload and adding time and often peer pressure (Personal 
Communication, 2013e). To counteract this problem, rosters can be designed based on the 
stands rather than on the aircraft and therefore GSA teams may be assigned to a particular 





Depending on the characteristics of the stand and the aircraft type, aircraft either power-in 
or are towed-into the stand. As an aid to the visual cues, during the process of positioning 
on the stand, flight crews are supported either by automated systems for positioning (i.e. 
VDGS) or guidance by a team of marshallers and (typically) two wingwalkers (GSAs 
positioned at the ends of the wing tips responsible for assuring clearance between aircraft 
and obstacles). In this phase of the turnaround it is crucial that the stand is free from any 
obstacles and that effective communication takes place between all the parties involved. 
Upon arriving at the stand, the aircraft is secured against jetblast (turning the engines off), 
movement of aircraft (aircraft brake, chokes) and GSE (cones). Before the permission is 
granted for the GSE to approach, aircraft are inspected to protect the GSP against potential 
liability in case damage was inflicted to the aircraft prior its arrival at the destination. 
Aircraft damage found on arrival accounts for one third of the total number of occurrences 
resulting in aircraft damage (Balk, 2008), seriously jeopardising flight safety. 
Upon aircraft arrival, the priority is to offload passengers and their baggage. To do so, 
aircraft doors need to be opened first. However the design and opening mechanisms of 
doors vary across aircraft types, which induces variability in the door opening function. For 
instance, if the door latch is positioned in the middle of the aircraft cargo doors, the GSA 
needs to use the ladder to release the latch first and then move the ladder to the side to 
operate the door panel. In contrast, this process is much safer and more efficient on aircraft 
that have the latch located close to or within the door panel. Other sources of variability 
during the opening of aircraft doors can be linked with i) aircraft maintenance, ii) the way 
baggage is loaded/secured and iii) the training of GSAs. 
After the opening of aircraft doors, the GSE is positioned respective to the aircraft. During 
this process, typically a guide person standing just in front of the vehicle (or in some cases a 
cone) guides the GSA operating the vehicle. However, as the vehicle approaches the aircraft 
the guide person needs to step sideways, at which point, it becomes difficult for the GSE 
driver to simultaneously operate the vehicle and follow the instructions given by the guide 
person’s hand signals. In addition, hand signals and their dynamics make the guidance 
fairly subjective and open to interpretation. Other factors that greatly influence the 
variability of GSE positioning are i) aircraft type, ii) airline positioning procedures (i.e. 
clockwise vs. anti-clockwise), iii) congestion, iv) coactivity (i.e. GSAs or GSE operating tasks 
in the close proximity at the same time), and v) communication between the driver and the 
guide person. In some instances, GSE maintenance plays a role. Positioned equipment (and 
its load if applicable) is secured against movement and in such cases cognition (i.e. 





variability. However, interlock systems on vehicles can be used to remind the GSA to secure 
the vehicle. 
Once the GSE is positioned, passengers (and flight crew) disembark the aircraft typically 
through a jet bridge (or portable stairs). During the disembarkment, the bridge adjusts its 
height relative to the aircraft (i.e. auto leveller). However in some instances i) the jet bridge 
maintenance, ii) the disengagement of the auto leveller function or iii) the aircraft 
movement, may lead to aircraft and jet bridge damage. 
In parallel, the offload process is initiated, requiring teamwork between GSAs: i) operating 
the equipment, ii) physically offloading units (in the aircraft and on the ground), iii) 
managing load and control and iv) where applicable GSA operating aircraft systems (i.e. 
aircraft loading system). In these situations, effective communication and coordination 
between GSAs is essential. In addition, variability during the offload is often related to i) the 
aircraft characteristics and its maintenance, and ii) the condition of the load unit (container, 
pallet), and iii) the way the load unit is built (i.e. stacking technique not applied, ropes not 
properly secured). 
Certain aircraft services (i.e. fuelling, portable water, lavatory service) require the 
establishment of a direct interface between the aircraft and the GSE (or infrastructure). These 
services are typically undertaken by a single GSA who is required to both operate and 
monitor aircraft and the GSE Human Machine Interface (HMI). Variability in these services 
is often associated with i) the type of service, ii) coactivity, iii) characteristics of the tasks (i.e. 
duration, repetitiveness), iv) aircraft, v) GSE and vi) airport maintenance. 
Effective communication and coordination between all stakeholders is pivotal for a safe and 
efficient turnaround. It is however, subject to a high level of variability as a function of i) 
airport operations, ii) airline operations, iii) GSP operations, iv) means of communication 
available and v) phraseology/signology used. Over the years, airports, airlines and GSP 
have adopted different technologies and processes used for communication, some more 
efficient and effective than others, e.g.: 
• At certain airport locations, due to unreliable means of communications between 
aircraft operators and the GSP, the GSP’s supervisors visit airline operations for 
information about flight updates on an hourly basis. 
• At some GSP bases, only supervisors carry radio devices for communication whereas at 
others the leads are also equipped with radios. While standard phraseology/signology 






• In contrast, no standardised phraseology/signology has been developed to aid the 
communication and coordination between GSAs on the apron. This gave rise to the 
development of micro GSA communication protocols (i.e. a GSA would touch their nose 
to indicate to the colleague GSA to move to the nose of the aircraft) at each GSP base. 
The process of turnaround requires orchestration between all the stakeholders involved. 
Historically this position used to be managed by airlines, in particular, the airline dispatcher. 
Following the trend of cutting costs, airlines have physically moved the function of a 
dispatcher from managing flights on a particular airport, while physically being located at 
the airport, to centralised Operational Control. Consequently, the airlines had to compensate 
for the lack of the physical presence of a dispatcher by delegating this task to the GSP. 
Therefore a new position was created: a ‘handling agent’ or ‘turnaround coordinator’. The 
person working in this position manages the whole turnaround process and coordinates 
with supervisors who control various parts of the turnaround process. While it is 
recommended to have an individual in this position, there is no regulation that enforces this 
recommendation (HSE, 2000). Consequently, this may induce a great level of variability 
affecting safety and efficiency of the process. 
For a successful assurance of safety and quality of operations during the turnaround, it is 
vital that all stakeholders (airport, airlines and GSP) work towards achieving the same 
objectives, i.e. safe, timely and efficient turnaround. As a starting point, they should start by 
understanding the gap between the operations prescribed by the procedures (‘work as 
imagined’) and the actual performances (‘work as done’). At some bases, due to poor 
specification and the inefficiency of generic Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), GSP 
managers assist their GSAs in finding an equally safe but more efficient solution. Similar 
examples can be found with airlines, where the local airline management at a base is 
satisfied by the performances of a GSP but, due to the variations specified in the SLA, the 
GSP often gets penalised during the external audits. Therefore standardisation and local 
enforcement of procedures could contribute to the safety and efficiency improvements for 
all stakeholders.  
To avoid repetition, the storyline only described the functions and variability during the 
offload segment of the turnaround. During the onload segment, all the mentioned services 
(functions) are affected by the similar type of variability but are carried out in a reverse 
order. 
While the process is outlined above relates to the context of the most typical factors that may 
affect the variability of each service, a multitude of other factors along with their 





• Weather conditions coupled with poor visibility, can increase the variability during the 
turnaround. Disruptions in the flight schedules, particularly if affected by severe 
weather conditions, may lead to the bunching of inbound and outbound flights. These 
extreme disruptions put a strain on all stakeholders at an airport. Fortunately, they do 
not happen frequently. 
• There are situations where a team of GSAs needs to service three aircraft 
simultaneously, thereby significantly increasing the individual GSA workload. In 
extreme cases, an aircraft type, which according to a SLA requires a minimum of six 
GSA for servicing (under the wing), may be performed by only three (i.e. a single GSA 
will alternately be positioning and operating a beltloader and (off)loading baggage 
from/to the aircraft). 
• The complexity of this scenario may change as a function of the i) the distribution of the 
aircraft that needs servicing by the same GSA team, ii) distance between the bag room 
and each stand, iii) size of the airport and iii) traffic (air and road) on the airport surface. 
• Airport design and maintenance may also increase the variability of operations on the 
apron, particularly at older hub airports with a limited size of the land parcel. 
• In addition, all the services conducted by human operators are subject to their current 
internal (physiological and psychological) characteristics and external pressures (time 
and peer pressure).  
• Nevertheless, ingenuity of GSAs to carry out their tasks under the most unfavourable 
conditions (i.e. insufficient resources, under-specified procedures, aircraft/equipment 
malfunction, lack of training) has to be emphasised. In these conditions GSA always 
works towards finding a solution to ‘get the job done’. Line managers are often aware of 
those unapproved GSA practices. However when these practices are associated with 
negative outcomes punitive actions may be taken against GSAs. 
• Factors affecting variability are also associated with the safety maturity of all the 
organisations performing services on the apron (i.e. poor safety practices of one 
organisation may negatively influence the better performing ones). 
• Furthermore, airline and GSP safety managers respond to occurrences by i) adding new 
or frequent modification of the existing procedures following an occurrence, or ii) 
suspending or dismissing the GSA involved in the occurrence, both of which are often 
considered counterproductive. However, good safety culture at other bases may use 
unwanted occurrences i) as a tool for safety learning, and ii) to promote initiatives that 
reward a GSA for safety-conscious behaviour and reporting nearmisses. Even between 





improvements (i.e. at times teamwork between GSPs can be used to stretch resources 
during the periods of high demand/lack of resources). 
• Finally, national and international regulatory frameworks coupled with the economic 
situation (local and global) and the strength of the trade unions can affect variability of 
apron operations. 
To complement this storyline, the final versions of the TASM functional model and the 
taxonomy are presented in the Appendices VIII and VII respectively. 
6.9 Discussion about the TASM framework 
In this era of an adverse economic climate and of a competitive environment, squeezing the 
profit margins of GSPs, airlines and airports to achieve a high level of safety can be seen as a 
burden. This often leads to an imbalance between safety and productivity, in favour of 
productivity, and this may lead to detrimental consequences on the services provided by an 
organisation, be it a GSP, an airline or an airport (ICAO, 2013e). 
In contrast to the existing approaches that make a sharp distinction between the methods 
used for productivity against those used for safety modelling, FRAM offers an all-
encompassing approach simply by modelling everyday performance in line with Safety-II 
thinking, where investments in safety are seen as being proportional to the investments in 
productivity (Hollnagel, 2014c). Consequently, by investing resources into TASM, it will 
also be feasible to use the framework to achieve improvements in productivity as 
demonstrated in Section 5.2.1. Nevertheless, the TASM framework can also be used for 
retrospective and prospective analysis, as demonstrated and discussed in Sections 7.1 and 
7.2 respectively. 
The TASM functional model has been designed to be a generic tool for modelling everyday 
operations on the apron. However, a large number of internal and external factors may 
introduce variability into this generic model. Therefore, to the author’s best knowledge, this 
research has been the first application of the FRAM method to consider these factors in 
depth, as detailed in Section 6.6. This aspect of research is particularly important for the 
following reasons: 
• it provides the most exhaustive list of factors (440 at the lowest level) that affect human 
and organisational performance variability on the apron, based on a review of factors 





• while focused on GSP operations, it accounts for the dependencies with all other direct 
(and indirect to an extent) stakeholders; 
• it is the first taxonomy based purely on genotypes, thus overcoming the limitations of 
existing methods as evidenced by Hollnagel et al. (2007) and the review outlined in 6.6.2 
and Appendix V; 
• it is the first neutral taxonomy capable of capturing both positive and negative 
performance variability, offering a much needed tool to help promote Safety-II thinking 
(Hollnagel, 2012b, 2014c); 
• the application of this taxonomy is serves numerous purposes. Firstly, it allows for 
transferability of the TASM framework, where each base would need to map the 
characteristics of their everyday operations with the factors in the taxonomy and 
subsequently apply those factors on the generic TASM functional model in prospective 
analysis. Secondly, it can be used a tool in occurrence investigation in retrospective 
analysis, where it would provide an investigator guidance as to which factors can be 
identified in an investigation. Thirdly, it could complement some of the existing training 
on human factors, i.e. NLR (2012). Fourthly, the taxonomy offers guidance for the 
development the first occurrence reporting system that would account for all 
stakeholders, aircraft, equipment at the sharp- and the blunt-end. This application will 
be particularly significant once the SMS requirements under Annex 19 (ICAO, 2013c) 
are extended to GSPs. 
Despite these numerous advantages, the described TASM functional model and its 
accompanying taxonomy of variability can be improved as follows: 
• due to the defined scope, this research did not address in any depth the maintenance of 
aircraft, airport infrastructure nor GSE. The criticality of these factors has been 
identified during the interviews and is further discussed in the Chapter 7; 
• Personal Communication (2013a) with the top safety management of the GSP found the 
taxonomy’s level of detail overly cumbersome and too complicated to be used as a part 
of their internal data reporting system. However, the taxonomy offers different levels of 
hierarchy and it is not necessary to base the data-reporting system on the factors at the 
lowest-level. It is recognised that without a regulatory initiative, GSPs will be highly 
reluctant to adapt and improve the reporting systems they already have in place. 
Therefore, in parallel with this research, studies are performed by the researcher 
towards justifying the extension of the ICAO SMS requirements to ground handling 





• the TASM functional model offers a high-level generic description of the apron 
operations in line with the “breath before depth” principle recommended by Hollnagel et 
al. (2014, p. 46) for FRAM modelling. This approach does not limit the application of the 
model, which can developed to a much higher-level of granularity subject to the 
objectives of the study in question. 
6.10 Summary 
After carrying out a critical review of the FRAM and STAMP methods, FRAM was selected 
for the application in the TASM framework due to the graphical description it offers, 
which is desirable in safety modelling. Additionally due to the exploratory nature of this 
research, FRAM was selected as favourable since it has not previously been applied in the 
apron safety domain. Furthermore, after identifying certain limitations associated with the 
FRAM method they were addressed in turn as follows: 
• lack of rigour in the hazard analysis – this was addressed by developing a novel protocol to 
hazard analysis in complex socio-technical systems by integrating FRAM and STPA best 
practices; 
• absence of a detailed guidance for developing a FRAM model – this was achieved by 
developing for the first time a detailed methodology based on the combination of 
Grounded Theory, Template Analysis, GMTA and expert judgement; 
• absence of detailed taxonomy of factors that affect variability of functions on the apron – this 
was addressed by developing the most exhaustive list yet of factors (440 at the lowest 
level) that affect human and organisational performance variability on the apron, based 
on: i) observations across five airports worldwide, ii) interviews with 43 respondents 
working for the GSP, airlines and airports, and iii) a review of factors from 24 methods. 
In addition the taxonomy is the first neutral taxonomy in ground handling safety based 
on genotypes. 
In addition to augmenting the FRAM method and promoting Safety-II thinking, the 
applied methodology has derived a comprehensive TASM functional model and taxonomy 
capable of capturing the intractability of apron operations, which is applicable to 





Chapter 7 APPLICATION OF THE TASM FRAMEWORK 
ON THREE CASE STUDIES 
Following the derivation of the TASM functional model and the taxonomy of genotypes that 
may affect its variability in Chapter 6, this chapter demonstrates the application of the 
TASM framework using three case studies. These case studies were selected to illustrate the 
wide range of applications of the TASM framework. Typically in the safety risk 
management component of an SMS, discussed in Section 5.2.2, different types of methods 
and models are used for occurrence investigation, risk assessment and change management 
respectively. In contrast, the TASM framework, founded on the FRAM method, can be 
applied in retrospective, prospective and system analysis. This trait makes the framework 
very attractive since it allows for a reduction in costs associated with GSP employees 
developing, training and applying different methods in the safety risk management 
function. 
Section 7.1 starts by demonstrating the application of the TASM framework on the analysis 
of a safety occurrence that resulted in an unwanted outcome. This is followed by an 
application of a novel tool for identification and analysis of hazards in complex socio-
technical systems, while not restricted to the apron operations in Section 7.2. Lastly, Section 
7.3 sketched conceptually how the TASM framework can be used for modelling 
performance improvements on the apron.  
7.1 TASM framework application in retrospective analysis 
According to ICAO (2013e), data on past occurrences of higher severity (i.e. accident and 
serious incidents), collected by means of a safety reporting system, must be investigated. 
The aim of an investigation process is to identify the root causes that led to “failures within 
the aviation system” (ICAO, 2013e, p. 2-17) and subsequently to use the lessons learned to 
improve aviation safety. Such a safety management approach to investigation clearly 
supports ICAO’s attitude towards Safety-I thinking. Nevertheless, ICAO recognizes that “a 
mature safety management environment may provide for the investigation of lower-consequence 
events as well” (ICAO, 2013e, p. 2-18). In light of the latter recommendation, the TASM 
functional model and taxonomy on a low-severity occurrence is applied in this Section to 





The occurrence chosen for this analysis was selected primarily due to the fact that the 
researcher was present when it took place, ensuring both that first hand information and the 
evidence on the occurrence was available to the researcher. After outlining the extract from 
the data reporting system containing the description of the occurrence and the corrective 
actions, the functional TASM model from Appendix VIII was adapted to reflect the 
functions necessary for description of the occurrence. 
7.1.1 Occurrence description 
For reasons of confidentiality, the information regarding the name of the GSA involved in 
the occurrence, the airport location and the airline, which operated the aircraft, were de-
identified from the extract (Structured Communication, 2014c): 
“At approximately 1710 EST28, November 5, 2013, three (GSP) employees were pushing 
a pallet into the forward cargo compartment, including (GSA name). According to (GSA 
name) his foot slipped backward into an opening inside the aircraft cargo hold as he was 
pushing the pallet forward. His foot made contact with the water pipe and dislodged the 
clamp that connects two pipes together. Employee had to push the containers due to the 
aircraft load system being inoperable. Airline management and (apron management) 
were notified about the incident”. 
As a result of this occurrence, water started leaking from the aircraft. The airline’s engineers 
promptly responded to call for repairs. While the scale of the damage was being assessed, 
passengers had to disembark the aircraft. The engineers repaired the clamp (see Figure 7-1), 
and after a two-hour delay, passengers boarded the aircraft for the second time and 
departed safely. 
Interestingly, upon inquiry the following day it was found that the airline did not report the 
occurrence in its own safety reporting system. Instead, the two-hour delay was assigned the 
IATA delay code 93 (IATA, 2008b), signifying that the aircraft arrived late from the previous 
flight. Furthermore, a GSP typically has the right to object to a delay code if it is considered 
incorrect. However in this case, since the airline did not assign the blame to the GSP but 
instead concealed the occurrence with assigning it a reactionary delay, the GSP did not 
object to the assigned delay code. 
                                                      







a) Before repair b) After repair 
Figure 7-1 Damaged water pipe in the aircraft fuselage 
The occurrence was reported in the GSP’s reporting system as outlined above. In addition to 
the report, the safety manager of the GSP was given the responsibility of identifying a root 
cause of the occurrence and for proposing a remedial action. The identified root cause was a 
“broken seal on water pipe inside forward  hold  compartment”  and  the  remedial  action  was  to 
“brief employees to be aware of work area” (Structured Communication, 2014c). The results of 




7.1.2   TASM framework applied on the occurrence investigation 
 
The scope of the occurrence (described in 7.1.1) is limited to the loading of a container into 
the aircraft. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider all the functions and factors from the 
functional TASM model and taxonomy but  rather  to  concentrate  the  investigation  related 
only to the function(s) and factor(s) that are of relevance to the occurrence. However, since 
the TASM functional model, illustrated in Appendix VIII, is of a low resolution certain 
functions may need to be described in more detail in order to represent the specifics of the 
occurrence  better. 
 
The identification of the functions necessary to describe the occurrence was carried out by 
applying GMTA on the ultimate goal of the loading function, which is ‘The aircraft is loaded’. 
From there tasks, pre-conditions and intermediate goals are defined according to Hollnagel 
(1993a) as follows: 
 
Goal: The aircraft is loaded 
Task: Load the aircraft 








Goal: Load unit is in the correct position 
Task: Manage load and control 
Pre-condition: (Aircraft loaded according to the loading instruction) AND 
(Procedures are enforced) 
Goal: Aircraft loaded according to the loading instruction 
Task: Development of GSP, airport and airlines procedures 
Goal: Procedures are enforced 
Task: Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
Task: Position a load unit 
Pre-condition: (Aircraft loading system is operable) OR (Load units are handled 
manually) 
Goal: Aircraft loading system is operable 
Task: Aircraft is maintained and tested 
Goal: Load units are handled manually 
Task: Handle load unit manually 
Pre-condition: (GSE is maintained and tested) AND (Optimal number of 
qualified GSA for each task) AND (GSP employees are trained) AND 
(Aircraft is approved for manual handling) 
Goal: GSE is maintained and tested 
Task: Maintain and test GSE 
Goal: Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Task: Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Goal: GSP employees are trained 
Task: Provide training to GSP employees 
Goal: Aircraft is approved for manual handling 
Task: Approve aircraft for manual handling 
Pre-condition: (Airline procedures) AND (GSP procedures) AND 
(International/national recommendations and standards) 
Goal: Airline procedures 
Task: Develop procedural guidance 
Goal: GSP procedures 
Task: Develop procedural guidance 
Goal: International/national recommendations and standards 
Task: Develop procedural guidance 
Goal: Load units are secured 





Pre-condition: (GSE is maintained and tested) AND (Aircraft is maintained and 
tested) AND (Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task) AND (GSP employees 
are trained) AND (Procedures are enforced) 
Goal: GSE is maintained and tested 
Task: Maintain and test GSE 
Goal: Aircraft is maintained and tested  
Task: Maintain and test aircraft 
Goal: Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Task: Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Goal: GSP employees are trained 
Task: Provide training to GSP employees 
Goal: Procedures are enforced  
Task: Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
The outlined GMTA was used to construct a section of the TASM functional model based 
upon the FRAM principles summarised in Section 6.2.1.1. Twelve functions were deemed 
necessary to describe the everyday operations of the loading process. Eight functions 
correspond to the original TASM functional model (see Appendix VIII), and four new 
functions were added in this investigation using FRAM methodology: 
• ‘Load the aircraft’ function was given a higher resolution through two additional 
functions ‘Position a load unit’ and ‘Secure/stack load units’ to describe the tasks that were 
performed during the occurrence more precisely; 
• ‘Approve aircraft for manual handling’ function was added purely to highlight the 
underspecified aspect of the generic ‘Develop procedural guidance’ function; 
• ‘Develop international/national recommendations and standards’ function was created again 
to highlight the importance of the regulatory framework in the development of 
‘Procedural guidance’ for apron operations. 
The following Section uses the graphical illustration of the occurrence to explain the 
functions and the factors that contributed to the variability of this section of the TASM 





7.1.3 Discussion on TASM variability and its management within the context of 
the occurrence instantiation 
Just before the occurrence emerged, a GSA was carrying out his everyday function of 
loading an aircraft. Variability in the internal human or organisational factors may have as 
well contributed to the occurrence but were not mentioned in the reporting system 
following the occurrence. At the time there were certain observable external factors that 
increased the variability of the loading function: i) low temperature, ii) darkness, and the 
most importantly iii) the aircraft model, this case the Boeing 767-300. 
This particular aircraft model is unusual when it comes to the design of the cargo 
compartment in the lower cargo hold. Figure 7-1 under a) illustrates that the compartment 
does not have a solid floor, thereby creating slip/trip/fall hazard. However the aircraft has 
an automated cargo loading system that a GSA should be using for positioning load units. 
Therefore the aircraft manufacturer (Boeing) never intended to expose GSAs to the hazards 
of physically pushing the load units, but instead the floor design was aimed at reducing fuel 
consumption through the aircraft’s weight reduction. 
The fact that the cargo loading system was inoperable significantly increased the variability 
of the ‘Position a load unit’ function. This meant that GSAs had to use their own body 
strength to push the containers into the correct position. Furthermore, this was not the first 
case of the cargo loading system inoperability. Upon further inquiry, it was found that the 
system had been already faulty for a number of years prior to the occurrence. In addition, a 
similar type of occurrence resulting in a GSA slip/trip/fall during loading/offloading, had 
happened several times on that particular aircraft model operated by the same airline. 
This then led the researcher to query the GSP, airline and regulatory practices in the case of 
a faulty aircraft loading system on that particular aircraft type.  
The GSP did not have any special practice for servicing this aircraft, i.e. it was aware of the 
hazard and simply briefed their GSAs about it. However, the GSAs were still required to 
undertake (off)onloading and were unable to decline the task despite the hazardous 
environment.  
The operation of the aircraft with a fault has to be compliant to a Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL). Before every flight, the airworthiness of the aircraft is checked by comparing the 
status of aircraft systems operability with the requirements established in the MEL. ICAO 
(2010a, p. 1-7) defines the MEL as: “A list which provides for the operation of aircraft, subject to 





with, or more restrictive than, the MMEL established for the aircraft type.” In contrast to the MEL, 
developed by the airline specifically for their operations, Master Minimum Equipment List 
or MMEL (ICAO, 2010a) is a more generic document of a particular aircraft model 
developed by the aircraft manufacturer and approved by the regulatory authorities (i.e. 
EASA, FAA). MMEL sets the minimum requirement for MEL. 
 
Figure 7-2 Extract from a MEL for a B767-300 (source LAN Argentina (2012, p. 266)) 
The researcher, in conducting this investigation, proceeded by reviewing the MEL 
requirements for the B767-300. The MEL issued by the airline who operated the aircraft at 
the time of the occurrence could not be accessed. However for illustration, a portion of the 
MEL from a different airline was extracted in Figure 7-2. The figure shows that one Cargo 
Loading System is installed on the aircraft, while the aircraft can be dispatched even if it is 
inoperable. The field Remarks and exceptions typically contains a recommendation about the 
timeframe within which a certain fault should be repaired (i.e. may be inoperative provided 
the repairs are made within a certain period). No such requirement was defined for the 
Cargo Loading System on a B 767-300 aircraft, see Figure 7-2. These findings were also in 
line with the MMEL requirements for the same aircraft model (FAA, 2012c).  
Regulatory requirements for operation of a faulty aircraft are specified in a MMEL. This 
regulatory framework focused on aircraft airworthiness, making the B767-300 safe to fly 
with its Cargo Loading System inoperable. However, there is a possibility that a component 
of an aircraft system positioned under the lower cargo deck could be damaged by a GSA or 
the load unit but this does not get reported. If unnoticed and not reported, damage of the 
aircraft system may potentially affect aircraft airworthiness in flight. In the case of the 
investigated occurrence, the aircraft’s water system was damaged and the leaking water 
made the damage transparent and impossible to conceal. Apart from this implied flight 
safety hazard, which is unaccounted for, the MMEL, also does not consider the 
consequences of personal safety of GSAs carrying out aircraft services in the hazardous 




representative of the regulatory authorities the hazards associated with the B767-300 during 
an audit a year before this occurrence, but never got any response. 
The variability of the functions and their outputs combined with the factors that increased 
this variability is illustrated in Figure 7-3 in red, while for a detailed description of functions 
and their couplings see Appendix X. This instantiation of the TASM functional model 
replicated the conditions that were present when the investigated occurrence took place. 
Although this occurrence resulted in a low outcome severity (i.e. broken seal on a water pipe 
and a two hours departure delay), should the variability be coupled in a different way (as 
discussed in the paragraph above), flight safety could have been jeopardised. 
 
Figure 7-3 Instantiation of the occurrence 
Compared to the investigation results performed by the GSP in which a phenotype 
described as a “broken seal on water pipe inside forward hold compartment” (Structured 
Communication, 2014c) was considered to be the root cause of the accident, the investigation 
based on the TASM framework provided a much deeper understanding and has identified 
systemic blunt end genotypes that led to the occurrence. Furthermore, the benefits of the 
recommendations based on the TASM framework significantly outweigh those 
recommendations based on the initial GSP investigations in preventing repletion of the 
Sources of variability:





occurrence. While the GSP’s recommendation was to “Brief employees to be aware of work area” 
(Structured Communication, 2014c), recommendations based on the application of the 
TASM framework clearly demonstrate that the only way to prevent this type of occurrence 
in the future is to amend the MMEL and MEL requirements. Without any regulatory 
initiative, the airline is not required to repair the Cargo Loading System and is unlikely to do 
so.  
The investigation carried out in this Section clearly demonstrated the suitability of the 
TASM framework, based on the FRAM method, for occurrence analysis and prevention. It is 
worth noting that application of a different method may have led to the similar results. 
Conclusive claims about the uniqueness of the findings gained from the application of the 
TASM framework when compared to the other safety analysis methodologies cannot be 
made due to the number of biases underlying occurrence investigation, some of which are 
listed below (Svenson et al., 1999, Johnson, 2003, Lundberg et al., 2009, 2010):  
• professional bias – when an organisation considers and prioritises certain categories 
of factors (i.e. technological, human, organisational at a sharp or/and blunt end); 
• recognition bias – associated with the investigator’s knowledge (i.e. education, 
training) and competence to carry out a complex investigation; 
• confirmation bias –  drives the investigation to look for evidence that confirms the 
pre-conceived hypotheses on occurrence causation; 
• frequency bias – a tendency to associate historically frequently observed factors to 
the occurrence investigations, regardless of whether they have had a contribution or 
not; 
• political bias – the impact of advocating a hypothesis on accident causation by an 
influential member of an organisation; 
•  sponsor bias – the impact an investigation results may have on the organisation the 
investigator is employed with; 
• resource availability – timeframe, technology and human resources (internal and 
external) available to carry out an investigation. 
7.2 New protocol for systematic hazard analysis in practice 
Instead of performing a prospective analysis based on the TASM functional model and 
taxonomy, the objective of this Section is to augment the FRAM method for prospective 
analysis so that it can be applicable not only to the apron operation but also for any other 





To illustrate this new protocol to hazard analysis (described in Section 6.2.1.5) reference is 
made to the example used in Section 6.2.1.4.3. In this example, for simplicity, the process of 
crossing the road is explained through three functions: Cross the road, Provide traffic light 
indication, and Maintain road surface. Furthermore, two factors have been identified to affect 
the variability of the Cross the road function. Internal variability is affected by the Alertness of 
the pedestrian whereas external variability is affected by the Weather conditions. In this 
example, the protocol is applied to the Cross the road function only. However, it can be 
reproduced in using the same approach for any function in a FRAM model.  
The scope of the analysis using FRAM, i.e. hazard identification, and the development of the 
FRAM model of the process (illustrated in Figure 7-4, Table 7-1, Table 7-2 and Table 7-3) and 
its variability were addressed in Steps 1 and 2. This was then followed by the protocol in 
Step 4 - illustrated in Table 7-4 below. 
 
Figure 7-4: Graphical illustration of the FRAM model for the process of crossing the road 
The importance of concurrent variability of multiple function aspects is illustrated in Figure 
7-5 where the existing approach (Hollnagel, 2012b, Frost and Mo, 2014, Slater, 2014) shown 
on the left-hand side under a) is compared to the new proposed protocol on the right-hand 
side under b). Step lines in different colours represent the Outputs of coupled functions and 
the variability (internal or external) of the function in question. Three steps are defined by 
the types of Outputs ranging from success, via normal operations to failures (see Figure 5-1). 
As discussed earlier, although each function needs to be described with a minimum of three 
Outputs, a higher number of Outputs is equally possible. This would imply: i) an increase in 
the number of steps in Figure 7-5, ii) improvement in the sensitivity in hazard analysis, and 






Table 7-1 Aspects of the ‘Cross the road’ function 
Name of function Cross the road 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Traffic light indication provided accurately 
Traffic light indication provided but inaccurate 
Traffic light indication missing 
Output The road is crossed safely 
The road is crossed but resulted in a nearmiss 
The road has not been crossed but resulted in an injury 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control Road surface well maintained 
Road surface adequately maintained while some debris can be found on the 
road 
Road surface ill maintained 
Time  
 
Table 7-2 Aspects of the ‘Provide traffic light indication’ function 
Name of function Provide traffic light indication 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Traffic light indication provided accurately 
Traffic light indication provided but inaccurate 











Table 7-3 Aspects of the ‘Maintain road surface’ function 
Name of function Maintain road surface 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Road surface well maintained 
Road surface adequately maintained while some debris can be found on the 
road 





For instance, based on the example above, Figure 7-5 (a), illustrates the existing approach 
(Hollnagel, 2012b, Frost and Mo, 2014, Slater, 2014) where the impact of Outputs variability 
on the function in question (i.e. Cross the road) is analysed one at the time (i.e. Maintain road 
surface illustrated by the blue step line in the Figure 7-5 (a)). Once the analysis for this one 
function is complete, a similar approach would be repeated for the function Provide traffic 
light information and for internal/external variability (i.e. Alertness of the pedestrian, Weather 
conditions). 
 
Figure 7-5: Comparison of approaches to the analysis of variability: a) based on (Hollnagel, 
2012b, Frost and Mo, 2014, Slater, 2014), b) proposed hybrid approach 
The proposed hybrid approach (illustrated in Figure 7-5 (b)) demonstrates that each discrete 
timeframe is characterised by a certain set of conditions defined by the combination of 
Outputs of the coupled functions and the internal/external variability of the function in 
question. To achieve higher level of exhaustiveness in hazard identification, it is necessary to 
consider all the combinations of states of coupled functions and the variability as illustrated 





Additionally, the number of ad-hoc instantiations of individual functions that the original 
FRAM and its augmentations (Hollnagel, 2012b, Frost and Mo, 2014, Slater, 2014) are 
capable of identifying is highly subjective and a function of the hazard analysis analyst’s 
experience and resource availability. Therefore, the number of analysed instantiations is ad 
hoc and can only be considered to be a subset of the ‘whole set’ of instantiations the proposed 
new protocol is capable of capturing. 
Finally, upon completion of the tabular description (i.e. Table 7-4), theoretically the ‘whole 
set’ of hazards are identified for every function. Since all the functions in a system are 
connected by their Outputs, it is possible to programme these influences into software, 
which can be used to analyse the scenarios in Step 3. Each scenario ‘activates’ certain 
Outputs and variability within the system. This allows to track the propagation of variability 
within the system. For instance, in the case of a very simple process of crossing the road 
(equivalent to the function highlighted in red in Figure 7-6), a scenario (instantiation) would 
include activation of the two Outputs from the coupled functions (Maintain road surface and 
Provide traffic light information) highlighted in red (see Figure 7-6). 
 
Figure 7-6: An example of a simple scenario (instantiation) 
Advantages and limitations of the proposed protocol are discussed next. 
Despite the listed benefits, the proposed method has a number of limitations. Firstly, since it 
provides a higher level of completeness compared to other methods, it requires a 
correspondingly greater amount of resources to perform. Furthermore, the new protocol 
relies on SME expertise to assess the Outcome of a function within a certain context. While 
this approach of using SMEs has its drawbacks relating to subjectivity bias, it does enable 
the analyst to ‘go through’ a large number of scenarios (under condition that the FRAM 
model is built completely and correctly). Finally, while the proposed approach creates 





rigour in the criteria for the selection of system-wide scenarios for inductive hazard analysis 
to identify unimaginable hazards. 
While FRAM is able to capture the couplings and propagation of Outcomes (‘phenotypes’ 
(Hollnagel, 1998)), future research will consider the development of influence models of 
internal and external variability. Due to the complexity of the proposed table format, these 
additional influence models will not be included in the hazard analysis process but would 
be used at the later stage to analyse and control the hazards identified with the proposed 
protocol. 
Finally, the implications of this hybrid approach are significant not only for a SMS in apron 
operations but in all other complex socio-technical systems. It has already been noted that 
such systems have grown in both number and complexity in recent years. The task of hazard 
analysis in such a system has the potential to become one of the major barriers to effective 
safety mitigation. Therefore, for the SMS in complex sociotechnical systems to be effective, it 






















































































































































































7.3 TASM framework application in system analysis 
The third application of the TASM framework is concerned with the possible application of 
the TASM functional model and variability for system level analysis. The previously 
discussed concept of A-CDM (see Section 3.3.1) was selected for this case study to 
demonstrate application of TASM, based on the FRAM method, in a change management 
process due to introduction of A-CDM. Through an improved and timely information 
sharing between all airport stakeholders A-CDM has already contributed to a reduction in 
gaseous emissions, fuel savings, reduction in taxi times, improved runway utilisation and 
increased punctuality (EUROCONTROL, 2015). This case study explores the capability of A-
CDM to achieve even further benefits through better resource management and allocation 
strategies within GSP operations. 
According to its ConOps document (EUROCONTROL, 2006a, p. 22) A-CDM should “enable 
ground handlers to position their resources more efficiently, using their precise knowledge of the order 
and time flights will require them”. However, ground handling resources have been identified 
as one of the major factors that create difficulty in predicting accurate departure times 
(EUROCONTROL, 2005) within the A-CDM context.  
In addition to the literature, GSP resource allocation issues have also been captured during 
the observations and interviews with the flight crews and GSAs, outlined in Section 6.5. The 
interviewed flight crews regard GSP resources as a hindrance to aircraft on-time departures. 
For instance, in circumstances where aircraft departure was delayed for any reason and 
therefore the aircraft was not ready to pushback, the pushback operators would not wait but 
instead move to pushback the next aircraft that is on time. Consequently, this places the 
delayed aircraft at the back of the queue for pushback. Interviews with the GSAs identified 
that the issue of concern to them is when multiple non-scheduled aircraft arrive for servicing 
at the same time. This may place a significant strain on the team of e.g. five GSA agents 
assigned to service three flights. In one particular case, two GSAs rather than the usual five 
serviced one aircraft. 
The relationships between A-CDM and GSP resource management are modelled using the 
TASM functional model and taxonomy. Similar to the analysis of the occurrence scenario in 
Section 7.1.2, this case study does not require the complete set of functions and factors to be 
considered, but only the function(s) and factor(s) that are of relevance to the case study. 
Four functions were deemed necessary to describe this case study. The granularity of these 




The four relevant functions and associated aspects are illustrated in Figure 7-7 and 
explained below. A tabular description of the aspects of the functions relevant to the A-
CDM case study can be found in Appendix XI.  
 
Figure 7-7 Graphical illustration of the A-CDM case study
Up-to-date flight information controls the Communication and coordination of every task 
execution during an aircraft turnaround. At A-CDM airports, defined outputs of this 
function i.e. milestones, are fed into the Provide and update flight information function. As a 
result of this feedback, Flight information is updated and this updated flight information is 
then passed to Dispatch GSAs and GSE function, which is expected to adjust its resource 
allocation in light of the updated flight information. At this stage however, the output of the 
GSP dispatch function is highly dependant on the resources available at the time. The 
resources available to dispatch in terms of rosters, qualified GSAs, required GSE and 
quantity of replenishing supplies are determined by the Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing 
supplies function.  Interestingly these resources are planned strategically (i.e. up to 24 hours 
in advance) based on the scheduled flight information. Consequently, on the day of 
operation in case of a disruption, resources based on scheduled information will not 
correspond to resources required by the up-to-date flight information. 
Furthermore, operational management of resources is determined by internal variability at 
the organisational level (see Appendix VI and Appendix VII) in i) Human resources that 
includes GSP employee selection, training methods, staffing, salary, insurance, job 
satisfaction and turnover rate, ii) GSE/facility resource related to acquisition and management 
of the equipment (i.e. type, condition and quantity of units), and iii) GSP budget. The 
mismatch between GSA and GSE can also be associated with GSP policies i.e hiring and 
firing, overtime, maintenance policies. External organisational factors such as Commercial 





Requirements for airside compliance for GSE and employees, Global economy (i.e. recession), 
Regulations (i.e. Directive 96/67/EC) also contribute to the mismatch. 
The results of this case study identified a limitation in the A-CDM concept, which could be 
overcome by a better integration of the GSP resource management at the operational and 
organisational level with the actual traffic demand. This integration could potentially further 
enhance A-CDM benefits by increasing airport operations flexibility, punctuality and 
capacity by providing resources (i.e. GSAs, GSE and replenishing supplies) when and where 
needed. These benefits could potentially also be transferred into a reduction in the number 
of safety occurrences on the apron where the time pressure or insufficient resources played a 
role. 
In conclusion, this qualitative application of the TASM framework for the A-CDM case 
study managed to detect weaknesses that have not been accounted for in the concept design, 
thereby demonstrating a more generic use of TASM in system design and operations 
analysis. However, the analysis should not stop here. This qualitative systemic TASM 
analysis only highlighted a deficiency in the A-CDM concept, the solution to which may be 
investigated through mathematical and statistical modelling. Nevertheless, the TASM 
should be used to inform data collection for this modelling, including: 
• scheduled and actual flight information at an airport; 
• arrival and departure punctuality; 
• spatial distribution of flights across stands on the apron; 
• utilisation of aircraft stands; 
• GSA rosters; and 
• GSA utilisation. 
Based on a statistical analysis of historical data on scheduled and actual flight information, 
the GSPs should consider increasing available resources by a certain percent on specific 
hours, shifts, days, seasons. Future research should aim to quantify this benefit by means of 
cost-benefit analysis.   
7.4 Summary 
In contrast to the Safety-I models for the apron, which are capable of modelling only safety 
performance of a system, the TASM framework has a much wider application. Not only that 
it can be applied in retrospective and prospective safety modelling but it can be used as a 





system. In retrospective analysis the proposed functional model and taxonomy managed to 
identify systemic factors previously not found during the occurrence investigation. In 
prospective analysis, a new protocol for systemic and systematic hazard analysis in complex 
socio-technical systems (including the apron) was proposed. In system analysis the TASM 
functional model and its taxonomy identified design weaknesses. 
With its wide range of applications, TASM aims to overcome the existing preconception 
related to the perceived conflict between safety and efficiency, by bringing the various 
entities responsible for their fragmented managing into a single systemic apron system 





Chapter 8 TOWARDS QUANTIFICATION OF THE 
TASM FRAMEWORK 
Chapter 7 demonstrated the three possible applications of the TASM framework in 
qualitative retrospective, prospective and system analysis. Qualitative systemic safety 
analysis clearly provides a more holistic approach to safety modelling and by doing so offers 
new systemic insights to guide safety management (Leveson, 2004, Herrera and Woltjer, 
2010, Underwood and Waterson, 2013). Any quantification would greatly enhance this 
approach.  
Like other safety-critical industries, aviation is driven by the safety expectations set by 
national and international (i.e. CAA, ICAO) regulatory frameworks. These frameworks 
typically rely on setting targets such as an Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP) 
which “must be concrete, measurable, acceptable, reliable and relevant” (ICAO, 2013e, 4-12). 
Furthermore, the targets are defined with the safety performance metrics that should allow 
for both qualitative and quantitative analysis (ICAO, 2013e). Data collection methods (i.e. 
safety reporting system, audits) are then designed with the objective of capturing these 
metrics. Consequently these data collection methods constrain the type of safety modelling 
that can be undertaken with the collected data. 
Systemic qualitative safety analysis offers a good overview and provides insights on the 
holistic safety issues within an organisation. However, for an active monitoring, 
prioritisation and management of these safety concerns quantitative models are more 
desirable. In the community of safety practitioners quantification has always played an 
important role in safety management (Hollnagel, 2012b). The focus of traditional simple and 
complex linear models in Safety-I was on the measurement of the numbers of ‘historical 
failures’ in retrospective and the ‘probability of failures’ in prospective safety analyses. In 
contrast, the ontology of Safety-II (see Section 5.1.2.3) is explained by the emergence arising 
from performance variability. Since the notion of performance variability is very different to 
the notion of ‘failure probability’, Hollnagel (2012b, p. 94) argues that performance variability 
should be “characterised verbally, that is, as a quality rather than a quantity”. While work 
towards quantification of FRAM is in progress (Slater, 2013, Kleef, 2014), no agreement has 






Therefore this chapter discusses in turn the opportunities and requirements for the 
quantification of the TASM functional model and its taxonomy in retrospective, prospective 
and system analysis in Sections 8.1 and 8.2, followed by the Chapter summary in Section 8.3. 
8.1 Consideration for TASM framework quantification in retrospective 
analysis 
The objective of this Section is to discuss the potential for the application of the TASM 
functional model and taxonomy in a novel retrospective safety trend analysis. Three 
considerations need to be made at this point. Firstly, the existing ground handling database 
needs to be discussed. Secondly, the data requirements for the TASM functional model and 
its taxonomy need to be assessed. Thirdly, a novel tool for safety trend analysis is presented. 
Finally, the gap between existing databases and the TASM framework requirements needs 
to be identified in order to inform future data collection processes. 
8.1.1 Review of ground handling safety databases 
Ground handling databases have already been introduced in Section 6.6.2.1. GSPs, airlines 
and airports have each developed internal data reporting systems on ground handling 
occurrences that feed into the corresponding databases. The type of data being collected 
varies across individual stakeholders as well as GSP base locations. Compounding this issue 
is the lack of a standardised terminology associated with the occurrence types, severity, 
reporting requirements (Section 5.2.3), which creates data quality issues (Wilke, 2013, Wilke 
et al., 2014). 
Towards addressing this gap, IATA developed the first dedicated database, IATA Ground 
Damage DataBase (GDDB), for ground damage occurrences from airlines, GSPs and airports 
that provide ground handling services (IATA, 2015b). Although it is a step in the right 
direction, this database has several imitations. As previously discussed, GSPs have 
developed internal safety reporting systems which pre-determine the data collected by a 
GSP internally. If a GSP agrees to participate in the IATA Global Aviation Data Management 
(GADM) GDDB, data collected through the GSP’s internal safety reporting systems will be 
extracted according to the data requirements of the IATA GDDB (IATA, 2015c) prior to 
being added to the GDDB pool of data from other GSPs. While the IATA GDDB initiative 
aims to standardise the diversity of GSP safety reporting systems, this database has a major 
constraint associated with the absence of standardised regulations that underpin internal 





the output from the IATA GDDB has to be taken with caution since it does not account for 
the differences in the quality of the outputs from the GSPs’ internal safety reporting systems. 
Future research is needed to assess the differences in the quality of different data sources 
and their impact on the GDDB identified trends. Finally, the IATA GDDB database collects 
only data in which ground damage involved an aircraft, simply reflecting the present 
aviation industry “aircraft-centric” approach to safety management on the apron. To 
overcome these limitations the researcher has made a case towards justifying the extension 
of the ICAO SMS requirements to ground handling (ICAO, 2015, Studic et al., 2015). 
In addition to the different internal GSPs’ safety reporting systems and the GDDB database, 
ground handling safety data is also collected within the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS). The ASRS database, although funded by the FAA, is operated by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as an independent third party with the 
objective of improving aviation safety (Skybrary, 2015). Occurrence and hazard reports are 
collected on a voluntary, confidential and non-punitive basis (ASRS, 2015b) by all aviation 
stakeholders (i.e. flight crew, ATCo, ground handlers third parties). The collected reports are 
analysed by the trained ASRS staff who are then responsible for issuing follow-up actions 
(i.e. Alert Messages, research topics). Due to the voluntary nature of the reporting system 
(i.e. self-reporting bias), the sample of reports in the ASRS database is “not statistically 
valid”(ASRS, 1994). Despite this limitation, the accessibility of this database makes it the 
predominantly data source used in the study of ground handling incidents, i.e. Chamberlin 
et al. (1995), Kanki and Brasil (2009), Kromphardt (2014). 
Summary of the existing databases is presented in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1 Ground handling databases 
Database Advantage Limitations 
Local safety reporting 





• Custom made reporting 
system specifically 
designed for each 
stakeholder 
• Different data being collected from 
the viewpoint of every stakeholder 
• Lack of standardisation 
• Mix of phenotypes and genotypes 
• Restricted access 
IATA GDDB  
(IATA, 2015c) 
• Database includes 
airport, airline and 
ground handling 
viewpoints 
• Focus on aircraft damage 
• Mix of phenotypes and genotypes 
• Data quality issues 
• Restricted access 
NASA ASRS  
(ASRS, 2015a) 
• Accessibility 
• Description of the 
contextual factors 
• Not specific to ground handling 
• Based only on voluntary reports 






Furthermore all described ground handling safety database are founded on the ontology of 
Safety-I that implies causality, linearity and bimodality with the focus on failures. Therefore 
none of them is completely suitable for the analysis based on the TASM framework. With 
consideration of this data quality limitation, the following Section explores the results that 
could potentially be gained from the retrospective analysis of existing databases using the 
TASM functional model and taxonomy. All three databases from Table 8-1 were considered. 
NASA ASRS has been rejected due to its statistical validity. IATA GDDB was rejected for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is simply aircraft-centric and thus does not provide the complete 
picture on other occurrences on the apron. Secondly, access to this database is restricted to 
GDDB participants (IATA, 2015c) and could not have been granted. Finally, the internal 
databases of GSPs, airports and airlines were considered. Due to the fact that airports and 
airlines mainly collect information related to aircraft safety (Wilke, 2013), a GSP’s databases 
were left as the only candidate for further consideration. Due to the nature of operations, the 
existing health and safety regulations (i.e. HSE in the UK, and OSHA in the USA) and the 
implied cost of safety occurrences, it is in the GSP’s interest to assure the safety of their 
employees, aircraft, equipment, reduce impact on the environment and minimise 
operational disruptions. Therefore to capture the complexity of apron operations and its 
implication on aircraft, facility, equipment, personal injury and operational disruptions data 
from a GSP was required. The following Section depicts the selection of an appropriate GSP. 
8.1.2 Data collection 
The data selection criteria defined for the safety trend analysis exercise corresponded to the 
criteria used in the previous phase of research (see Section 6.4). Therefore it was decided to 
carry out retrospective safety analysis on the ASIG occurrence data that was acquired for the 
five airports previously used for qualitative data modelling, the criteria for which were 
described in Section 6.4. The same airports were used to ensure the ability of comparing data 
obtained from qualitative TASM functional model and taxonomy with the information 
contained in the occurrence reports. Occurrence data was acquired for three calendar years 
from January 2011 to December 2013 to capture seasonal variations and allow for the 
identification of any trends in the data (Wilke, 2013). 
8.1.3 Database description and data pre-processing 
The chosen GSP provider, ASIG, has an internal data collection system for the reporting of 
any occurrence which resulted in (Structured communication, 2015b) a i) personal injury to 





spills. The reported data is stored in the Safety, Health, Environment, BAA (SHEBBA) 
database. Any occurrence has to be reported to the member(s) granted access to SHEBBA 
who enters the occurrence description into the database (Structured communication, 2015b). 
Company policy recommends that the occurrence to be entered into the database within one 
hour from its occurrence, though for practical purposes this timeframe is often extended 
(Structured communication, 2015b). From all the reported occurrences, a certain number of 
them will qualify for further investigation. This is determined subjectively by a regional HSE 
manager (or its equivalent) typically based on the actual or potential severity of the 
occurrence (Structured communication, 2015b). Criteria for determination of the severity 
(ASIG, 2014) were established based on the combination of OSHA/HSE requirements (i.e. 
reportable injuries often account for more severe) and the cost of an insurance claim (i.e. in 
excess of USD 40,000). Upon completion of the investigation, the investigator issues 
corrective actions, which are limited to the internal operations of the GSP. All the systemic 
issues are typically not addressed in an investigation. However, certain airports with a well 
developed underlying safety culture often bring the stakeholders together to openly discuss 
systemic issues that affect apron safety (Structured communication, 2013b).  
For the analysis period from January 2011 to December 2013 a total of 1281 occurrences were 
extracted from the SHEBBA database. However, not all reported occurrences were relevant 
for the scope of this research. Therefore all occurrences were reviewed and those that took 
place outside of the apron (i.e. manoeuvring area, baggage room, terminal building) were 
excluded from the dataset. This data pre-processing yielded 777 occurrences for further 
analysis (see Table 8-2). For confidentiality reasons, the five GSP bases (JFK, LAX, LHR, 
MCO and TPA) were de-identified and referred to as Base A, B, C, D and E in no particular 
order. The results are discussed in turn below. 
Table 8-2 Composition of the sample across the five bases 
 A B C D E Total 
Frequency 365 168 226 8 10 777 
Percent 47% 21.6% 29.1% 1% 1.3% 100% 
 
Every occurrence in the SHEBBA database contained the information about the: i) location 
(i.e. airport), ii) date and time, iii) free text occurrence description, iv) contributing factors 
and v) insurance claim associated with the occurrence. For the purpose of testing several 
hypotheses related to the research additional data was acquired from ASIG. These include 
the: i) monthly count of operations, ii) individual departure delays assigned to ASIG, and iii) 





To supplement the ASIG data in testing one of the hypotheses, U.S. airport delay data was 
required. The data was obtained from the FAA Aviation System Performance Metrics 
(ASPM) database, which contains punctuality data from a sample of the domestic U.S. 
airlines. The data sample covers over 80% of the total scheduled flights (EUROCONTROL, 
2012a) from 30 airlines (FAA, 2015a) and 77 U.S. airports (FAA, 2015b). All the airlines are 
required to report Out Off On In (OOOI) times, which refer to the times aircraft has departed 
the gate, took off from the runway on departure, landed on the runway, and arrived into the 
gate on arrival respectively (FAA, 2015c).  
8.1.4 Data analysis 
Consistent with the assumption taken of TASM framework development, this Section also 
adopts the Safety-II paradigm. As previously discussed in Section 6.2.1.1, occurrences 
emerge from the combinations of the functions’ upstream/downstream couplings, internal 
and external variability (Hollnagel, 2012b). For intractable systems, such as apron 
operations, it is often difficult to assume that the entire set of conditions associated with a 
particular occurrence can be identified following its emergence. This can be for several 
reasons. Firstly, some of the conditions can only be inferred but not identified “due to 
transient phenomena, combinations of conditions, or conditions that only existed at a particular point 
in time and space” (Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 131). Secondly, an organisation’s data reporting 
system determines the type of information that is being collected. Thirdly, reported 
conditions may be affected by different types of bias (Johnson, 2003), summarised in Section 
7.1.3. Consequently, while acknowledging that the full set of conditions associated with 
reported occurrences is unavailable for retrospective analysis within the assumptions of the 
Safety-II framework, this Section performs a pilot study on the available data. Results of this 
analysis will demonstrate i) the potential of using a Safety-II approach in a retrospective 
safety trend analysis, and ii) indicate the data missing from the existent data reporting 
systems. 
The analysis is carried out in four Sections. The first Section characterises the quality of the 
data used in the analysis. Section two describes the process of extraction and coding of 
existing and new variables from the original occurrence reports. A transformed dataset is 
used in the third Section as a basis for the preliminary descriptive analysis. Following the 
identification of trends, data mining is applied to the dataset to detect and validate the 
patterns in the occurrences in Section four. A novel visualisation framework that could be 





Section concludes by providing a summary of findings and recommendation about data 
collection strategy that would allow for the future quantification of the TASM framework. 
8.1.4.1 Data quality consideration 
Safety risk management and safety assurance within an organisation is underpinned by the 
data collected through its safety reporting system. The quality of this data drives the 
identification of safety priorities, decision-making associated with mitigation strategies and 
their effectiveness (ICAO, 2013e). Therefore for safety management to be effective, data 
quality must be accounted for. 
The following criteria for assessment of data quality have been identified in the literature 
(Brackstone, 1999, Dupuy, 2012, ICAO, 2013e): i) accessibility, ii) accuracy, iii) completeness, 
iv) consistency, v) credentials, vi) interpretability, vii) relevance, viii) timeliness, and ix) 
security. Descriptions of these factors are summarised in Table 8-3 and their relevance to the 
research scope of this thesis are discussed further. 
Table 8-3 Data quality criteria description (Dupuy, 2012, ICAO, 2013e) 
Data quality criteria Description 
Accessibility Data is easily accessed and analysed by its users. 
Accuracy Data correctly reflects the variables it is supposed to measure. 
Completeness All data values are completed for the required variable. 
Consistency Data values are coherent and correspond to data variables. 
Credentials Data source warrants for information quality. 
Interpretability Data is clear, objective and unbiased. 
Relevance Data is suitable for a particular application. 
Timeliness Data is reported and analysed timely. 
Security Data is protected against unauthorised interference. 
Accessibility to the required data was granted though subject to a Non Disclosure Agreement 
(NDA). While safety-related data were obtained with ease, it was much more difficult to 
access other performance related data (i.e. punctuality, turnover rates). This only 
highlighted the limited interoperability between different departments within the GSP.  
Data variables in the GSP’s database were defined and structured differently to the research 
requirements. This meant that the original database needed to be transformed into the 
required format. Transformed variables were classified according to Dupuy (2012) as either 
explicit, implicit or inferred variables. Explicit variables in the final database have an exact 
match pre-existing in the original database. Implicit variables in the final database required 
the exact data extraction from the original database. Whereas inferred variables in the final 





causal factors from the original database to match the final taxonomy). Qualitative 
description of variables is presented in Section 8.1.4.2.  
Accuracy, consistency, timeliness and security of the data are a function of the data reporting 
procedures and their enforcement. Data accuracy in the GSP’s reporting procedures, 
previously described in Section 8.1.3, is enhanced by the data analysts processing. Therefore 
no furthers accuracy checks were deemed necessary. Well-defined and structured data 
reporting system (i.e. pre-defined variables with categories selected through drop-down 
lists) ensures a high level of consistency. Consequently all acquired variables describing 
occurrences were of the same format. The level of detail was however dependant of the 
severity of the occurrence. This was accounted for in the completeness check, explained 
below. Data timeliness is assured by the data reporting procedures (described in Section 
8.1.3) and is not challenged further in this research. Security of the data is embedded into the 
data reporting system restricting database access and editing (i.e. a base manager can only 
edit data for the base he is in charge with). 
While the established data reporting system assures reporting accurate, consistent, timely and 
secure data, credibility of the data is subject to the general safety culture within an 
organisation. Due to the good safety culture assessment, described in Section 6.4, the 
credentials of the safety data were not challenged further. 
The completeness criteria of the data values were met for all the variables directly obtained 
from the GSP’s database. However, since the data reporting system requirements differ from 
the requirements established in this research (see Section 8.1.4.2), a significant amount of 
values needed to be extracted from the occurrence reports to populate the newly defined 
variables. Therefore, completeness of the dataset defined in this research was calculated 
according to Dupuy (2012) as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 100 − 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 8.1 
Appendix XII summarises the results of the completeness for all variables defined in Section 
8.1.4.2. Low completeness for the variables describing the TASM functions (Functions 1, 2, 3 
and 4) indicates the focus of the SHEBBA reporting system to be on only the immediate 
variability of the functions, thus failing to consider systemic the nature of the occurrences on 
the apron. Low completeness scores for factors affecting the TASM functions variability 
(variable Variability 1, 2, 3 and 4) demonstrate the focus on phenotypes instead of genotypes 





8.1.4.2) contributes to the low completeness, thereby limiting the use of this variable for the 
assessment of a true cost of occurrence on the apron. 
The extent of interpretability of data within the context of newly defined variables needed to 
be tested. Within the research context this data quality criteria was assessed through inter-
rater agreement. Hence for every one of the implicit and inferred variables (defined in 
Section 8.1.4.2) the agreement rate between two qualified raters was computed, thus 
increasing research reliability and validity. One Airport Safety Expert at a doctoral level was 
asked to independently rate a sample of 30 occurrences. The rate of agreement between the 
finding of the researcher and the independent rater was computed using the Cohen’s Kappa 
(κ) coefficient (previously introduced in Section 6.7.3) and percent agreement. Where due to 
the small and skewed data sample Cohen’s Kappa (κ) coefficient could not have been 
computed, inter-rater agreement was evaluated using the percent agreement. According to 
Robson (2002), percentage agreement (𝑝!) is calculated as: 
 𝑝! = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠×100 8.2 
The results of the interpretability checks (presented in Appendix XIII) indicate that the 
coding of variables was reliable and consistent according to both criteria (Robson, 2002, 
Fleiss et al., 2013): i) for Cohen’s Kappa (κ> .60), and ii) percentage agreement (𝑝!> 0.80). 
Within the context of this research, only relevant data were requested from the GSP and 
therefore the relevance data quality criterion does not apply.  
Based on the evaluation of the all nine outlined criteria, the derived database was 
characterised to be satisfactory for all criteria apart from a very limited completeness. 
Therefore caution needs to be made when interpreting the results of the descriptive statistics 
and safety trend analysis described in Sections 8.1.4.3 and 8.1.4.4 respectively. 
8.1.4.2 Data coding 
Following the process of data collection and pre-processing, the occurrences were analysed 
with the objective of extracting variables relevant for the TASM functional model and 
taxonomy. The following explicit, implicit or inferred variables were extracted from the 
ASIG occurrence reports: 





• implicit: occurrence location, injury/damage type; 
• inferred: functions, variability, event type, total claims. 
All variables are described first, before the process of variable coding is illustrated as an 
example. 
The variable base refers to the IATA three letter airport code. The dataset included 
occurrences from five airports: JFK, LAX, LHR, MCO, and TPA which were selected from a 
drop-down list. Following the extraction process, the bases were de-identified and further 
referred to as bases A, B, C, D and E in no particular order. 
The variables date and time refer to the calendar date (in the format DD/MM/YY) and local 
time at each airport (in the format HH/MM) when the occurrence happened. 
The variables aviation claims and injury claims refer the cost of an occurrence expressed as the 
payments (in the USD) the insurance company paid out to the GSP (i.e. ASIG), as insured 
party, following an occurrence (Investopedia, 2015). Insurance claims are subject to an 
insurance policy, which implies that they do not account for all the injuries/damages that 
may result from an occurrence. For instance, unwanted outcomes in which (Structured 
Communication, 2015a): i) the GSE damage occurred internally, ii) the claim is not pursued 
by the third party29, iii) an internal agreement between the GSP and the third party is 
reached without pursuing the claim, are not covered by the insurance policy. Consequently, 
the variable total claims calculated as a sum of aviation claims (which include aircraft and 
other property damage) and injury claims, underestimates the total cost of an occurrence in a 
major way. Nevertheless, in the absence of other measures the total claims variable is used 
to assess the severity of each occurrence. Future research should focus on the development 
of a more holistic and objective measure of occurrence severity on the apron. 
The variable occurrence location could have been described by one of the following:  i) aircraft 
model (for occurrences that took place within an aircraft), ii) stand (for occurrences that took 
place on a stand – including the exterior of the aircraft), iii) road (for occurrences that took 
place on a road within the apron), iv) inter-stand clearway (for occurrences that took place on 
inter-stand clearway) or v) other spatial location on the apron where the occurrence took 
place. 
                                                      
29 Herein the term ‘third party’ refers to any stakeholder (i.e. other GSP, airline, airport, passenger) 





Functions and variability variables correspond to their definitions in the TASM framework 
(Section Appendix VI and Appendix VIII). From every occurrence narrative, up to four 
functions and factors that affect variability were extracted. 
The variable event type refers to the top event preceding an unwanted outcome (Hudson, 
2001). Classification of event types was derived from a Template analysis (King, 1998). 
Firstly, an initial template of event types was created based on the existing categories found 
in the literature (Boeing, 2004, Balk, 2008, ACI, 2009, Ma and Rankin, 2012, UK CAA, 2013). 
In the second phase of the analysis, the initial template was further modified, refined and 
amended based on the occurrence data. The final template of events types, defined for the 
purpose of this research, consists of 20 categories: 
• Contact: 
o Between two aircraft 
o Between aircraft and GSE 
o Between aircraft and a load unit 
o Between aircraft and person 
o Between GSE and other property (GSE, infrastructure or FOD) 
o Between GSE and load units 
o Between GSE and person 
o Between a person and a load unit 
o Between two persons 
• Found damage where the unwanted outcome was found upon inspection of an aircraft 
or GSE; 
• Manual handling where an unwanted outcome occurred during the manual handling 
functions 
• Slip/trip/fall occurrences where an unwanted outcome was caused by a slip, trip or a 
fall of any person on the apron surface; 
• Equipment/load unit fall/loss where an unwanted outcome resulted from a drop or 
loss of a load unit; 
• Equipment malfunction where an unwanted outcome resulted from an equipment 
malfunction during a function execution due to wear and tear; 
• Aircraft/equipment operated out of tolerance where an unwanted outcome resulted 
from the operation of the equipment outside its design intent; 






• Hazardous substance exposure /contact where an unwanted outcome resulted from 
exposure or contact with a hazardous substance (i.e. needles); 
• Spill refers to occurrences in which an unwanted outcome resulted from a release of a 
substance (i.e. fuel, de/anti-icing fluid); 
• Fire/smoke refers to occurrences where the unwanted outcome resulted from a fire or 
smoke. 
Due to coupling between the top events, every occurrence was explained with up to two 
event types. For instance, a contact could have occurred between GSE and other property (GSE, 
infrastructure or FOD), followed by a fuel spill. 
The variable unwanted outcome type refers to the type(s) of unwanted outcome(s) measured 
in terms of i) personal injury, ii) aircraft damage, iii) GSE damage, iv) infrastructural 
damage, v) load unit damage, vi) environmental impact, and vii) operational disruptions 
(i.e. flight delay or cancellations). Every occurrence can be explained with multiple 
unwanted outcomes. 
Table 8-4 under a) provides the extracts from the SHEBBA database, de-identified for 
confidentiality reasons. This is followed by the data coding according to the variables 
previously described in this Section under Table 8-4 b). 
As illustrated in Table 8-4 under b), categories function, event type and variability are rank 
response variables. Such variables allow for the coding of multiple responses while 
assigning a weight to every responses (Cohen et al., 2011). Therefore each occurrence 
narrative was first read to identify all response(s), implied or inferred to in the narrative 
description for every variable. In case more than one response for a variable was identified, 
they had to be ranked pairwise against each other. The responses within one variable 
(function, event type and variability) were subjectively given a higher rank based on the 
interpretation of the occurrence narratives.  
Additionally, it has to be pointed out that the coding process unveiled many blank data cells 
(see Appendix XII), which can be attributed to the different requirements of the SHEBBA 
reporting system and the nature of the multiple response variables. For instance, the 
occurrence from in Table 8-4 under b) has 17 data blank responses. Some of blank cells 
implied that the particular variable was not applicable or specified for the particular 
occurrence. For example, the location of the occurrence was defined as stand 302 at Terminal 
3, making the other variables depicting the location of the occurrence inapplicable (i.e. road, 
aircraft, other). Similarly, the narrative infers to the variation in the Offload/onload the aircraft 





Table 8-4 Data coding example 
a) Occurrence extract from the SHEBBA database 




Root Cause Name 
Airport A 22/07/11 11:00 GSA was pulling a Airline A AKE/ULD onto a 
trailer and said he felt a slight pain in his 
shoulder as the morning has gone on he said he 
now getting sharp pains when shoulder is cold 
when it warms up he said it was fine. Injured 
has now supplied a medical certificate signing 
him off from work for 3 weeks 




Ergonomics Heavy Lift 
Repetitive Activity 
Did not Coordinate or 
Ask for Assistance 
Ergonomics Heavy Lift 
Repetitive Activity 

































































































 GSA was pulling a Airline A 
AKE/ULD onto a trailer and 
said he felt a slight pain in his 
shoulder as the morning has 
gone on he said he now 
getting sharp pains when 
shoulder is cold when it 
warms up he said it was fine. 
Injured has now supplied a 
medical certificate signing 














































s    
 
                                                      
30 Load Unit (LU) 
31 Environmental impact (Env.) 
32 Operational disruption (Ops. Dis.) 
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any other function in the TASM model it is assumed that no other function 
experiences variability at the time of/leading to  the  occurrence.  These  responses 
were coded as not specified. However, where the occurrence inferred to a variable 
response but the information about a unique response was incomplete, unavailable 
for the variable – the label undetermined was inserted in the corresponding data cell. 
Both categories of data fields (not specified and undetermined) were treated as missing 
fields and used in the calculation of the completeness check (see Section 8.1.4.1). 
8.1.4.3      Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics was undertaken on the variables,  described in Section 8.1.4.2, 
derived from the original occurrence reports across five airports. 
The analysis begins by comparing the distribution of the number of occurrences as a 
function of a year and month (see Figure 8-1). A similar trend can be observed for the 
major bases A, B and C. Significantly different results can be observed for bases D 
and E. This can however be explained by the small data sample: i) a total of eight 
occurrences for airport D and ii) a total of ten occurrences for the observed period of 
three years. 
Figure 8-1 Occurrence distribution per year and month 
The following segment of the analysis, normalises the data with the total number of 
operations for each base by calculating the occurrence rate per 1, 000 GSP operations. It 
has to be highlighted that this occurrence rate is calculated relative to  the  total 
number of ground services operations handled by different departments at the GSP. 







responsible for fuelling and the second for other ground handling services. If both 
departments had serviced a particular flight, this would have been counted as two 
operations. In contrast, if only one of the departments was servicing a  particular 
aircraft, this would have been counted as one operation. In addition, this metric 
accounts for all occurrence types and is not restricted to only aircraft damages only. 
Due to different denominator − aircraft departures, used in the literature (Lacagnina, 
2007, Balk, 2008) to calculate occurrence rates, it is not possible to compare existing 
rates with the finding in Figure 8-2. 
 
While the information about the number of operations was unavailable for Base C, 
Figure 8-2 indicates that Base A experiences occurrence rates by one order of 
magnitude higher than the other bases. While no conclusive evidence can be found 
to explain higher occurrence rate at Base A, possible explanations may be ascertained 
from the observations and the interviews (see Section 6.5). The operations at Base A 
were restricted to only one highly congested terminal. The  size  and  layout  of  the 
apron at that particular terminal were raised as an issue in several interviews. For 
instance, due to the size of the stands aircraft are towed-in at. This can be used to 















Figure 8-2 GSP occurrence rates 
The reports were subsequently analysed for the trends in the time of the day an 
occurrence took place. Every 24h day period was divided into two categories: i) day 
(ranging from 6 am to 6 pm), ii) night (before 6 am and after  6  pm).  Figure  8-3 
indicates that there are more occurrences during daytime, which is likely to be 
proportional to the difference in the number of operations and the hourly duration 










Figure 8-3 GSP occurrences per day/night 
The location of the occurrences was analysed in the following Section of the analysis. 
A distinction between five location categories was established: i) aircraft interior 
(passenger cabin and baggage/cargo/mail compartments), ii) stand, iii) interstand 
clearway, iv) road, and v) other (i.e. taxiway, parking area). As illustrated in Figure 
8-4, the highest portion of the occurrences takes place on the stand. Bases A and C 
experience a higher percentage of occurrences that take place inside the aircraft. This 
can be explained with the fact that these two bases carry  out  a  large  number  of 
aircraft cabin  servicing  operations. Similar to  the  Figure  8-1  and  Figure  8-3  above, 
interpretations for bases D and E are based on a small occurrence numbers. 
 
 
Figure 8-4 GSP occurrences per location 
Out of the total number of 777 occurrences, 329 were associated with actual aircraft 
operations. Out of the 329, information about the aircraft model could be extracted 
for only 175 occurrences. The summary of occurrences per aircraft type and base is 






sustained some form of damage. However, only for 164 occurrences could the 
information about the aircraft type have been extracted (see Figure 8-5 under b)). 
 
  
a) Aircraft exposure b) Aircraft damage 
Figure 8-5 GSP occurrences per aircraft model 
These frequencies of occurrences were mapped to the interview transcripts (see 
Section 6.6) to verify whether the GSAs’ remarks associated with a particular aircraft 
model can be mapped with the frequencies shown above. A summary of the aircraft 
models identified as negatively impacting performances is presented  in  Table  8-5 
along with i) name of the base, and ii) the frequencies of a particular model being 
mentioned during the course of the interview process. For the bases A, B and C there 
is a degree of overlap between the aircraft models identified to negatively impact the 
performance variability of the GSAs and the frequency  of  these  particular  aircraft 
types that sustained damage following an occurrence. However, due to the absence 
of the normalisation data for aircraft types it is not possible to statistically test this 
hypothesis with the available data. 
 
















































A     1 1  4 1    7 
B     1  1  1  1 1 5 
C             0 
D 1 1 1          3 
E    1      1  1 3 






The following segment of the analysis explores the distribution of occurrences across 
stands at the selected airports. Out of the total number of occurrences 480 (62%) took 
place on a stand. Figure 8-6 illustrates the top ten stands for each base with respect to 
frequencies of occurrence at each base. Due to the small number of occurrences bases 
D and E were not plotted. 
 
In addition to the findings from the occurrence reports, stand design has been 
identified as a factor that affects the variability of operations on the apron. Therefore, 
the frequencies from the occurrences were mapped to the statements in the interview 
transcripts (see Section 6.6) where a particular stand has been identified to negatively 
impact safety. In the majority of the statements stand layout has been identified as a 
generic factor that affects its performance variability e.g. “At T1 the stands are 
extremely small. They are much bigger at other terminals like T4” (Personal 
Communication, 2013h). At airport A, more specific statements were obtained with 
respect to the negative impact of stand design on GSAs’ performances i.e. “Gate 7. It 
is the way it is angled. 4 can also be tricky. 2 can be tricky. The plane is angled and then these 
guys need to come at an angle”(Personal Communication, 2013g).  From  Figure  8-6, 
stands 7, 4 and 2 were found in the top 9 stands in terms of the frequency of 
occurrences taking place on them. Regrettably, due to unavailability of normalisation 
data for stand utilisation, no statistical inference can be made at this stage to test the 
statistical significance of stand design on occurrence emergence. Therefore, future 
research should explore this hypothesis further. 
 
 
Figure 8-6 GSP occurrences per airport stand 
As previously explained in Section 8.1.4.2, TASM  functions  that  experienced 






complete multiple response set frequency analysis results can be found in Appendix 
XIV, whereas Figure 8-7 illustrates the top 10 TASM functions that experienced the 
highest variability across the five  bases  during  the  observation  period.  These 
functions have experienced the highest variability across all five bases with a slight 
variation in the rank of each function as summarised in the Appendix XV. 
 
Similar to the functions, factors affecting the internal and external variability of 
functions were also coded as a multiple response variable. Due to the focus on 
phenotypes, very sparse information about the genotypes representing internal and 
external variability of functions could be extracted from the occurrence reports. 
Approximately 90% of the possible values coded for variability were not populated. 
The complete multiple response set frequency analysis results can be found in 
Appendix XVI. For the factors extracted from the occurrence reports the top  ten 
internal and external variability factors, with the highest  frequency  across  the  five 
bases during the observation period, are summarized in Figure 8-8. In contrast to the 
functions where the top 10 functions are common across all  five  bases,  dominant 











Figure 8-8 Top ten factors affecting internal and external variability of TASM functions 
Combinations  of  the  variability  of  the  TASM   functions’  outputs  coupled  with 
internal and external variability of the functions themselves can be associated with 
certain  types  of  events  (the  list  of  which  has  been  discussed  in  Section  8.1.4.2). 
Results of the frequency analysis of the top ten events types is presented in Figure 
8-9 whereas details for other functions can be found in Appendix XVIII. The list of 
top ten event types in terms of frequency of occurrence is fairly consistent across all 
bases (see Appendix XIX). 
 
 








Figure 8-10 Distribution of unwanted outcomes 
Furthermore, the frequencies of unwanted outcomes resulting from the event types 
are analysed next. As previously discussed in Section 3.5.3, the research presented in 
this thesis considers not only i) aircraft damage but also ii) personal injuries, iii) 
infrastructural damage, iv) equipment damage, v) load  unit damage, vi) load 
damage, vii) environmental impact, and viii) disruptions. Therefore, from every 
occurrence report one or more types of the unwanted outcomes (multiple response 
variable) was extracted and analysed for their frequencies. Considering all seven 
categories of unwanted outcomes, in over 70% of the occurrences at least one 
category that occurred was identified (see Figure 8-10). However, the observed five 
bases experience different types of damage as illustrated in Appendix XX. 
 
Finally, a frequency analysis is carried out to assess the distribution of cost for 
different event types. The results are summarised in Table 8-6. 
 
During the interview process at base B, salaries and employee turnover rate were 
identified as safety drivers. For instance  one  of  the  respondents  stated  that  as  the 
GSP “started paying our employees the living wage ordinance amount and my turnover rate 
has gone down”(Personal Communication,  2013f).  The  management  at  the  base 







To test these anecdotal claims, empirical data on turnover rates33, number of 
occurrence and associated insurance claims was collected for the base B. Figure 8-11, 
clearly indicates that the safety at the base dramatically  improved  following  the 
salary increase on the July 1st  2013. However, a decreasing safety trend existed prior 
to the salary increment. While the information about the income was unavailable, the 
association between turnover rate and safety occurrences and their cost is  tested 
further. 
 
Table 8-6 Distribution of insurance claim cost per event type 
 
 
Multiple response Event Type 




































Aircraft engine blast/ingestion 
Contact  (aircraft-GSE) 
Contact  (aircraft-aircraft) 
Contact  (aircraft-GSA) 
Contact (GSA-GSA) 
Contact  (GSE-Other) 
Contact (GSE-GSA) 
Contact  (LU-aircraft) 
Contact (LU-GSA) 
Contact (LU-GSE)  
Found damage 






Equipment/load unit fall/loss 
Equipment  malfunction 
Aircraft/equipment  operated 
out of tolerance 
2 527 527 100 954 604 
56 1460 17462 0 276612 45075 
1 0 0 0 0 . 
9 0 1743 0 13992 4607 
6 0 10116 0 60696 24779 
231 0 2286 0 88000 8439 
17 925 548703 0 9249990 2242304 
15 1242 2941 0 22685 5806 
19 612 11588 0 96152 25590 
15 968 1190 0 3907 1183 
198 0 3301 0 431454 32073 
19 0 547 0 6434 1479 
85 342 9435 0 415000 47084 
45 343 7514 0 75838 19678 
9 302 2532 0 17863 5807 
10 0 311 0 3000 945 
36 239 3153 0 70256 11647 
21 0 2196 0 17863 4402 
16 188 5026 0 65279 16226 











33 Turnover rate refers to “the proportion of employees who leave an organisation over a set period 
expressed as a percentage of total workforce numbers”(CIPD, 2015). 
34  Responses in which the occurrence report did not allow for a specific event type to be 





Figure 8-11 Distribution of turnover rates at base B 
Additional data aggregated at a monthly level on turnover rates, number of 
occurrences and the associated insurance claims was collected for the remaining 
observed bases. The data was available only for the past two years and only for the 
four bases (A, B, D and E). The data could not have been obtained for the base C. 
Statistical analysis was undertaken to test for associations between these variables 
across the four bases. 
Data was first tested for normality in a graphical manner (i.e. visual inspection of the 
histograms) and subsequently numerically assessed (including Skewness, Kurtosis 
and Shapiro-Wilk test) according to Cramer (1998) to conclude the data significantly 
deviated from a normal distribution. Consequently, associations between the 
variables (number of occurrences, total insurance claims and turnover rate) were 
tested with Spearman’s non-parametric test. The results indicate a statistically 
significant but weak??, positive correlations (??) between i) the turnover rates and the 
number of occurrences (?? ? ????? ? ? ????, and ii) the turnover rates and insurance 
claims (?? ? ????? ? ? ????. Therefore the results of the statistical analysis support the 
anecdotal claims about the relationship between the turnover rates and safety 
performance within an organisation. Future research will conduct a survey to 
explore the means of increasing the stability of the workforce. In addition, a cost-
               
?? According to the Dancy and Reidy (2004) criteria, Spearman’s correlation coefficient (???  is 







benefit analysis will be performed to assess the impact of a salary increase against 
the savings in insurance claims. 
The impact of “current focus on on-time-departures” (Balk and Bossenbroek, 2010) on 
safety in ground handling remains unknown. During the observations and 
interviews (discussed in Section 6.5) it was found that employees underperform 
when faced with time or peer pressure. For instance, one of the experienced trainers 
stated “what I found is that when they are under pressure, they don't do really well. They 
make a lot of mistakes” (Personal Communication, 2013i). To test this hypothesis delays 
assigned to the GSP and total airport delays were used to approximate the impact of 
time pressure on GSP operations. Out of five GSP bases studied in this research, base 
B was selected for its size, complexity and distribution of its operations across the 
airport terminals. In this exploratory analysis 2012 data on: i) safety occurrences of 
the GSP at base B, ii) GSP delays assigned to the fuelling department36 of the GSP at 
base B, and iii) airport gate arrival and departure delay from the ASPM database for 
2012, was used. Before associations between these three variables were tested, data 
was first tested for normality. After demonstrating that the data significantly varies 
from the normal distribution according to Cramer (1998), the Spearman’s non-
parametric test was applied.  
The results indicate no statistically significant correlations (𝑟!) between i) the daily 
sum of delay minutes assigned to the GSP and the number of occurrences that took 
place within the GSP on the particular day (𝑟! = .000, 𝑝 > .05), and ii) the daily 
average airport delay on arrival (𝑟! = .056, 𝑝 > .05) and departure (𝑟! = .033, 𝑝 > .05) 
with the number of occurrences within the GSP on the particular day. While no 
statistically significant result could be found, the hypothesis on the negative impact 
of time pressure (approximated through delays) cannot be dismissed. A possible 
explanation of such findings lies in the high level of data granularity (i.e. average 
daily data) and the small data sample (i.e. occurrences only within one GSP). Future 
research will attempt to address these data limitations and expand the scope of 
analysis to multiple GSPs before making the conclusive statement on the impact of 
time pressure on ground handling safety.  
This Section concludes with a summary of the high-level findings drawn from the 
descriptive statistics: 
                                                      





• The number of reported occurrence reports does not seem to vary across the 
observation period neither on a yearly nor monthly basis; 
• GSP occurrence rate are fairly constant across the observed period although they 
vary across the five bases; 
• Approximately two thirds of occurrences take place during daytime. However, 
without information about the number of operations it cannot be concluded 
whether the time of the day can be associated with the number of occurrences; 
• The highest portion of the occurrences takes place on the stand; 
• Frequencies of occurrence vary as a function of aircraft types. However, due to 
the absence of the normalisation data for aircraft types it cannot be concluded 
whether differences in aircraft types can be associated with the number of 
occurrences; 
• The distribution of occurrences varies spatially across stands however without 
normalisation data about stand utilisation it is impossible to conclude whether 
stand design contributes to occurrence emergence; 
• All five bases have experienced the same trend in terms of TASM functions with 
the highest variability. They include i) driving, ii) assuring safety and quality of the 
turnaround, and iii) Offload/onload the aircraft. 
• Information about the factors that induce internal and external variability to 
TASM function was sparse and the factors significantly varied between the 
bases;  
• In terms of event types, all five bases experience a similar trend in terms of the 
top types of events (occurrences): i) contact (GSP-other), ii) found damage, and 
iii) manual handling; 
• Unwanted outcome frequencies and the cost of insurance claims resulting from 
occurrences vary across the five bases; 
• Turnover rates are associated with the safety performance in the GSP; 
• No statistically significant evidence was found about the associations between 
time pressure and safety in ground handling. 
8.1.4.4 TASM application in safety trends analysis 
Currently, FRAM has only been applied to the retrospective safety analysis of a 
single occurrence (Macchi et al., 2009, Herrera and Woltjer, 2010, De Carvalho, 2011, 
Studic, 2014). However, the application of FRAM to retrospective safety trend 






framework for a tool that would extend the applicability of FRAM in safety trend 
retrospective analysis. Although the  proposed  framework  is  applicable  to  any 
complex socio-technical system, a case study based on the  TASM  framework  for 
apron operations and the data described in Section 8.1.2 is presented in this Section. 
 
In selecting the appropriate method for trend analysis for the TASM, it is necessary 
to consider the theoretical foundations upon which FRAM is based upon. The 
concept of emergence in FRAM has its origins in the Event-Structure Theory of the 
American sociologist Floyd Henry Allport (Hollnagel, 2012b). Allport was the first to 
offer an alternative view to the linear cause-effect thinking in the form of patterns of 
events, as cited by Hollnagel (2012b, p. 15) from Allport (1954): 
 
“Patterns seem to flow not from linear trains of causes and effects, but somehow 
from patterns already existing. Structures come  from  structure;  and  in  many 
cases the structures themselves, as wholes, seem to operate not sequentially but in 
a contemporaneous and concurrent fashion.” 
 
 
Figure 8-12 Transient nature of occurrences (source: EUROCONTROL (2013c, p. 19)) 
This understanding of (behavioural) pattern  emergence  within  the  FRAM  context 
was used to explain how occurrences emerge through “transient  phenomena” 
(Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 131) illustrated in Figure 8-12. When mapped with the TASM 
framework, each ball in Figure 8-12 represents a TASM  function,  the  outcomes  of 
which are affected by i) its internal mechanisms (i.e. cognition a GSA), ii) 4D 
trajectories of all other balls (i.e. outcomes of all other functions in the TASM 
framework), and iii) types of surface these balls are moving on (i.e. external 
conditions). These correspond to the previously described concepts of internal 
variability, upstream/downstream coupling, and external variability, respectively. 
Therefore, every occurrence scenario can be explained by a pattern of the values for 
all three concepts. With longitudinal observations of these scenarios over  time  it 
would be possible to identify patterns of occurrence emergence. This assumption on the 








selected for the retrospective safety trend analysis framework outlined in the 
following section. 
8.1.4.4.1 TASM pattern discovery method 
Moving away from linear models and causality, the objective of Safety-II is not to 
create cause-effect mechanisms that lead to an occurrence but instead to identify the 
patterns of functions and their variability, which can be associated with emergence 
of an occurrence.  
Cluster Analysis, as one of the data mining techniques, enables pattern discovery 
based on the similarity between responses from multiple variables within the dataset 
(Field, 2000). This technique has been widely applied in profiling across a diversity 
of disciplines including medicine (van't Veer et al., 2002), market analysis (Okazaki, 
2006), manufacturing (Chang and Tsai, 2014), road transport (Depaire et al., 2008) but 
and has also been applied in the aviation domain (Burghouwt and Hakfoort, 2001). 
Therefore Cluster Analysis was deemed appropriate for modelling patterns of 
occurrence scenarios in the TASM framework.  
Although different clustering algorithms are available, in this initial analysis 
TwoStep Cluster Analysis, available in the IBM SPSS Statistics Version 22 software 
was deemed appropriate for this analysis. Further considerations had to be given as 
to which type of Cluster Analysis to conduct depending of the data characteristics. 
Given the mixed categorical and continuous nature of variables, TwoStep Cluster 
Analysis was the only application in SPSS capable of cluster analysis based on such 
data (Norusis, 2011). Additionally this application assumes the data to be 
“independent, continuous variables that have a normal distribution, and categorical variables 
that have a multinomial distribution”(Norusis, 2011, p. 394). Nevertheless, even if these 
assumptions are not met, “the algorithm is thought to behave reasonably well” (Norusis, 
2011, p. 394). Having considered all these assumptions, the algorithm was 
characterised as appropriate for the analysis. The following text summarises the 
procedure methodology of the TwoStep Cluster Analysis algorithm. For a more 
detailed review of the method and its application in air passenger market 
segmentation please refer to Teichert et al. (2008) and Ivanov (2011). 
As a basis for creating clusters, the algorithm measures the distance between the 
variables derived from a statistical model (Chiu et al., 2001). The model assumes that 





distributed with means 𝜇!" and variances 𝜎!", whereas the categorical variables 𝑎! 
within cluster 𝑖 independent, multinomial distributed with probabilities 𝜋!"#, where (𝑗𝑙) the index for the 𝑙-th category 𝑙 = 1,2,… ,𝑚!  of variable 𝑎! 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑞 . The 
log-likelihood measure of distance is used due to its capability to handle mixed type 
variables. The log-likelihood distance between two clusters 𝑖 and 𝑠 is defined as: 
 𝑑 𝑖𝑠 = 𝜉! + 𝜉! + 𝜉(!,!) 8.3 
where: 




!!! log 𝜋!"#  8.4 




!!! log 𝜋!"#  8.5 




!!! log 𝜋 !,! !"  8.6 
Here, 𝜉! explains the variance within cluster 𝑣 𝑣 = 𝑖, 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑠 , and measures two 
aspects. Firstly, the variance of the continuous variables 𝑥! within cluster 𝑣, 
expressed as −𝑛!( !!!!!! log   𝜎!"! + 𝜎!! . Secondly, the variance for the categorical 
variables, expressed as – 𝑛! 𝜋!"#!!!!!!!!! log 𝜋!"# . Following the calculation of 
within cluster dispersion, clusters with the smallest distance 𝑑 𝑖, 𝑠  are merged in 
each step. The loglikelihood function for the step with 𝑘 clusters is computed as: 
 𝑙! = 𝜉!!!!!  8.7 
Following the calculation of log-likelihood distance between all possible pairs of 
cases, pairs with closer distances are clustered in two steps. Firstly, through a 
sequential distance comparison approach, a set of pre-clusters with common 
characteristics is constructed to maximize a log-likelihood function (Okazaki, 2006). 
Due to the sequential nature of pre-clustering, the order of cases in the dataset may 
affect the results of the cluster analysis. Therefore it is recommended to organise the 





step, a hierarchical clustering algorithm is applied on the pre-clusters thereby 
creating a hierarchical tree-structure, with the root cluster containing all the 
observations down to the clusters with a single observation (Chiu et al., 2001). 
The number of clusters can be automatically determined in two phases. In the first 
phase, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
are computed: 
 𝐴𝐼𝐶! = −2𝑙! + 2𝑟! 8.8 
 𝐵𝐼𝐶! = −2𝑙! + 𝑟!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛 8.9 
where 𝑟!    is the number of independent parameters. According to Chiu et al. (2001), 
both 𝐵𝐼𝐶! and 𝐴𝐼𝐶! provide a good initial estimate of the maximum number of 
clusters, however due to model overfitting BIC tends to offer solutions with a higher 
number of clusters when compared to the AIC solution.  
In the second phase the ratio change 𝑅(𝑘) in distance for 𝑘 clusters is calculated, as 
(Chiu et al., 2001): 
 𝑅 𝑘 = 𝑑!!!/𝑑! 8.10 
where 𝑑!!! is the distance if 𝑘 clusters are merged to 𝑘 − 1 cluster. The distance 𝑑! is 
defined similarly. The number of clusters is obtained for the solution where a big 
jump of the ratio change occurs. The ratio change is computed as: 
 𝑅 𝑘! /𝑅 𝑘!  8.11 
where 𝑅(𝑘)(𝑘 = 1,2,… , 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥; 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝), for the two 
largest values of 𝑅(𝑘). If the ratio change is larger than the current threshold value 
set at 1.15, the number of clusters is set equal to 𝑘!, otherwise the number of clusters 
is set equal to the solution with max  (𝑘!, 𝑘!). 
Finally, objects in the clusters are assigned deterministically to the closest cluster 





8.1.4.4.2 TASM pattern discovery results, evaluation and validity 
Following the description of the TwoStep Cluster Analysis algorithm, a set of nine 
variables, defined in Section 8.1.4.2, were used to form the clusters. The categorical 
variables included were: 
• function – a multiple-response variable described by up to four responses. 
Each response was recorded as a new variable thereby describing variability 
of functions for every occurrence by a maximum of four distinct values; 
• event type (occurrence) – a multiple-response variable described by up to two 
responses. Each response was recorded as a new variable thereby describing 
the variability of event types for every occurrence by a maximum of two 
distinct values; 
• variability – a multiple-response variable described by up to four responses. 
However, due to sparse information on variability (i.e. only 3.6% responses 
for the third and 0.64% for the fourth response could be extracted from the 
total number of recorded occurrences) responses three and four were 
excluded from the analysis. The Cluster Analysis proceeded by only 
including the first two responses for variability. Consequently, each response 
was recorded as a new variable, thereby describing variability for every 
occurrence by a maximum of two distinct values. 
Due to the nature of multiple-response variables, a large number of cells across the 
dataset did not contain a (categorical) value. Since SPSS would have excluded all the 
occurrences (i.e. cases) where the response was missing37, a dummy value was 
created to overcome this ‘limitation’. For instance, let us consider an occurrence, 
which was explained by variability in only two functions (out of possible four). The 
first two responses for Functions 1 and 2 were coded according to the TASM 
functional model categorisation (see Appendix VIII), whereas the responses 
Functions 3 and 4 where inapplicable for the particular occurrence and were therefore 
coded with value “DUMMY” representing “not applicable for this case”. This is merely 
an elegant practical solution which adds a “not applicable” value to the multiple-
response variables, thus allowing the inclusion of these variables in the analysis, as 
well as clustering of all the cases regardless of the number of responses, be it 1, 2, 3 or 
                                                      
37 In the dataset empty cells did not refer to unavailability of responses but instead to the 





4. Potential similarity and discrimination between occurrences with a different 
number of responses is also preserved. 
The only continuous variable included in the cluster analysis was the total claims. 
This variable could have been converted into a categorical variable by creating 
predetermined groups based on the amount of insurance claims (i.e. low, medium, 
high). Instead, it was decided to maintain the variable as continuous allowing the 
algorithm to create clusters by considering all the described nine variables together. 
To account for the sequential nature of the TwoStep Cluster Analysis in SPSS, the 
observations were firstly randomised. Variables were then entered in SPSS, before 
the algorithm described in Section 8.1.4.4.1 was applied to the dataset. The outputs 
from the analysis are discussed in turn below. 
Based on the Akaike Information Criterion, the first output offers information about 
the generated number of clusters and their quality. In this case study four clusters 
were obtained (see Model Summary in Figure 8-13). The quality (goodness) of these 
clusters is estimated using the silhouette 𝑠 𝑖  measure. Introduced by Rousseeuw 
(1987) silhouette characterises the quality of a cluster by comparing for each case 𝑖 
the average distance from that case to all other cases within the same cluster with an 
average distance from that case to all other cases within all the other clusters 
(Rousseeuw, 1987): 
 𝑠 𝑖 = 1 − 𝑎 𝑖𝑏 𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓  𝑎 𝑖 < 𝑏(𝑖)0                            , 𝑖𝑓  𝑎 𝑖 = 𝑏(𝑖)𝑎 𝑖𝑏 𝑖 − 1, 𝑖𝑓  𝑎 𝑖 > 𝑏(𝑖)  
8.12 
Where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are clusters and 𝑎 𝑖  average distance of 𝑖  to all other objects of 𝐴, 
and 𝑏 𝑖  average distance of 𝑖  to all other objects of 𝐵. While 𝑠 𝑖  measures the 
goodness of fit of a particular case within the same cluster, silhouette width for all 
the cases within the same cluster is measures as an average for all the cases within 
the cluster. Furthermore, for the all the cases in the dataset Kaufman and Rousseeuw 
(1986) Silhouette Coefficient (𝑆𝑐) calculates the average silhouette value which is 
used in SPSS as a measure of cohesion and separation. The following criteria by 






𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 0.71 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 ≤ 1, 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒   ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛   𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 0.70 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0.51, 𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒   ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛   
𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 0.26 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0.5, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒   𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0.25 , 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒   ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛   𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 
 
8.13 
According to the outlined criteria (Equation 8.13), the value of 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 = 0.3 in Figure 8-13 
can be interpreted as fair. Considering the nature of the dataset containing multiple- 
response variables and  numerous empty cells (coded as a dummy values), for the 
sake of the exploratory nature of this research the figure is deemed adequate. 
However, to assure a more robust analysis, a data collection method designed 
















Figure 8-13 Cluster number and quality 
While silhouette can be used as a measure of internal cluster solution validity 
(Rousseeuw, 1987), further testing is required for  its  stability  (Verma,  2012). 
According to Hennig (2007, p. 2) for a cluster solution to be stable “a meaningful valid 
cluster shouldn't disappear easily if the dataset is changed in a non-essential way.” Due to 
the relatively small number of observations when compared to the number of 
variables and associated values, it was not deemed appropriate to test cluster 
stability on a subset of observations. In the absence of an additional dataset, the 
reproducibility of the cluster solution was tested on the existing dataset by changing 
the order of observations (Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). Five runs were carried out with 
randomised order of cases. Table 8-7 shows solid stability in terms of clusters’ 
structure and size in terms of importance of each variable in defining every cluster as 
well as the distribution of cases into clusters. For three out of four clusters, main 
descriptors are identical in each of five runs. Fourth cluster has one common 







somewhat less stable cluster, compared to the other three38. As cluster sizes are also 
stable across four runs, it is a clear sign of overall robust clustering structure.  
Whilst acknowledging the fair cluster quality, the interpretation of the proposed 
cluster solution is discussed further. The distribution of cases across the four clusters 
is presented in Figure 8-14. Similarity between cluster the size is considered to be a 
characteristic of “a good solution” (Norusis, 2011). 
Table 8-7 Cluster solution stability 
 






















 ET1(MH) - 38.3% F1(OAC) - 50.0% 
V1(TC) - 29.6% 
 
Size: 206 
ET1(MH) - 39.4% 
F1(OAC) - 50.8% 
V1(TC) - 30.6% 
 
Size: 193 
ET1(MH) - 40.3% 
F1(OAC) - 50.3% 
V1(TC) - 31.9% 
 
Size: 191 
ET1(MH) - 44.8% 
F1(OAC) – 44.8% 
V1(TC) - 35.0% 
 
Size: 163 
ET1(MH) - 50.7% 
F1(OAC) - 64.3% 







 ET1(CGO) -93.4% 























 ET1(FD) – 97.9% 
F1(AS) – 78.4% 
 
Size: 194 
ET1(FD) – 97.5% 
F1(AS) – 76.2% 
 
Size: 202 
ET1(FD) – 94.3% 
F1(AS) – 73.7% 
 
Size: 209 
ET1(FD) – 95.2% 
F1(AS) – 74.4% 
 
Size: 207 
ET1(FD) – 97.5% 







 ET1(CA) – 26.0% 
F1(PG) – 26.5% 
 
Size: 181 
ET1(CA) – 27.8% 
F1(OG) – 29.0% 
 
Size: 176 
ET1(CA) – 27.3% 
F1(PG) – 29.5% 
 
Size: 176 
ET1(CA) – 30.9% 
F1(OG) – 29.1% 
 
Size: 175  
ET1(CA) – 31.6% 




ET1 – Event Type 1 
ET1 – Event Type 1 
F1 – Function 1 
V1 – Variability 1 
MH – Manual handling 
OAC – Offload/onload the aircraft 
TC – Technological characteristics 
CGO – Contact (GSE – other) 
DG – Drive GSE 
FD – Found damage 
AS – Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
CA – Contact (Aircraft – GSE) 
PG – Position GSE 
OG – Operate GSE 
 
 
                                                      
38 Solution with three clusters gave slightly higher AIC and the same Sc, but the stability of 








Figure 8-14 Cluster size 
For each cluster, the SPSS output summarises the characteristics in terms of the 
importance of each variable in predicting every cluster. Figure 8-15 displays the 
composition of each cluster. The clusters are presented in descending order 
according to their size. Colour coding is used to denote the importance of the pattern 
of variables and corresponding values in every cluster. The darker the colour the 
greater the importance of the particular variable value on forming a cluster. For 
instance, Cluster 3 is the largest cluster in this clustering scheme, representing 26.5% 
of all cases within the dataset. Furthermore, every cluster can be described by a 
certain combination of values for each of the nine input variables. In the case of 
Cluster 3, five of the nine variables are dummy variables which can be explained by a 
large number of empty cells belonging to the multiple response variables function, 
event type and variability. Out of the remaining values for the variables: 
• 38.3% of all observations for the first event type variable are manual handing; 
• 50% of all observations for the first function variable are offload/onload the aircraft; 
• 29.6% of all observations for the first variability variable are technological 
characteristics; and finally 
• the mean value of total claims variable for Custer 3 is 6,322.56  USD. 
In summary, this cluster can be interpreted as one occurrence emergence pattern. In line 
with the theoretical framework of FRAM, every pattern describes the variability in i) 
functions, ii) internal and external variability, and iii) the cost arising from unwanted 
outcome resulting from iv) an event type. In the case of Cluster 3, the pattern can be 
interpreted as variability in the Offload/onload the aircraft function coupled with the 
variability in the Technological characteristics (i.e. aircraft, GSE or load unit) present 
during the Manual handling event types that on average costs in excess of 6,300 USD. 







Figure 8-15 Variable predictor importance 
Despite the fair 𝑆𝑐 value, the identified clusters provided a fairly good representation 
of pattern results consistent with the descriptive statistics outputs carried out in 
Section 8.1.4.3. In addition to the internal validity and stability testing, the results for 
all four clusters were also validated by a Senior Director, Security and HS&E of a 
major GSP. The following Section discusses about the implications of the outlined 
framework for retrospective safety trend analysis. 
8.1.4.4.3 Discussion about the requirements for a tool based on the TASM 
pattern discovery  
As previously discussed in Section 5.2.2, the existing approaches to safety 
management are based on a target in which a set of pre-defined lagging and/or 
leading safety indicators are benchmarked against the set target. In the spirit of 
Safety-I, managers tend to focus their resources on managing severe negative 






These targeted piecemeal safety improvement solutions are often made in isolation 
from the functioning of the remainder of the system. This approach however cannot 
be justified in managing a complex tightly coupled socio-technical system such as an 
airport apron. As a solution, a more systemic occurrence trend analysis framework in 
line with the Safety-II school of thought was proposed in Section 8.1.4.4. 
Instead of relying on identifying ‘the root cause’ of an occurrence, whilst assuming 
cause-effect relationship between system components, the proposed framework 
offers a solution that searches for patterns in the dataset. Based on the combinations 
of diverse genotypes and phenotypes of occurrences, such patterns emerge. Each 
pattern represents a frequent occurrence scenario based on the data input.  
Furthermore, although the proposed framework is based on the Safety-II thinking, it 
can easily be integrated with a widely accepted Safety-I methodology such as Bow 
Tie. The Bow Tie method establishes a link between safety events (c.f. phenotypes or 
genotypes), hazardous/top events (c.f. occurrences) and the potential outcome (c.f. 
unwanted outcomes) of an occurrence as illustrated in Figure 8-16. 
 
Figure 8-16 Bow Tie diagram (source Skybrary (2013)) 
The bow Tie method is widely accepted across safety-critical industries due to its 
simplicity and plausible graphical illustration. However it has three major limitations 
inherent to the majority of Safety-I methods: i) linearity, ii) focus on phenotypes, and 





Figure 8-17 Modified Bow Tie model 
To overcome these limitations, a solution is proposed in this Section. Several 
adaptations were made to the original Bow Tie model. Firstly, the left hand side of 
the diagram is amended by replacing its linear model with a systemic model (i.e. 
based on the FRAM). Secondly, the hazardous event and the right hand side of the 
diagram is expanded to account for not only failures but also successes and normal 
everyday operations (c.f. Section 5.1.1.1) thus making the model more compatible 
with Safety-II. Thirdly, in a complex tightly coupled system occurrences produce a 
knock-on reactionary effect on system functioning thus increasing system variability. 
To account for this a loop between the right and the left side of the Bow Tie was 
established. The amended version of the Bow Ties model is illustrated in Figure 8-17. 
This modified Bow Tie has inspired the approach to the identification of occurrence 
emergence patterns outlined in Section 8.1.4.4.2. Additionally, since visualisation 
represents a desirable characteristic of safety modelling, the outputs from the 
TwoStep Cluster Analysis are mapped with the TASM framework.  
For each pattern (cluster), the variability of every function was illustrated with a 
shade of colour. The shade was determined on the basis of the value of the 
importance of each variable and the corresponding value within the cluster as 
illustrated in Figure 8-18. The missing fields were excluded from this illustration and 
the colour coding was done relative only to the populated fields. 
Additionally, for each pattern a list of factors that contributed to variability can be 
identified. For manageability, an arbitrary decision could be made to identify only 
the top five factors that contributed to the variability as illustrated in Figure 8-18 in 
the bottom left hand corner. Similarly for each pattern, a cost associated with it can 
also be displayed as illustrated in bottom right hand corner of Figure 8-18. 
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Future research will conduct a feasibility study for the development of a 
retrospective safety trend analysis tool based on this conceptual framework. 
However, some initial thoughts are discussed further.  
The automated TASM tool would complement the existing performance-based safety 
analysis approaches with a systemic profiling of the emergence of occurrences/ 
unwanted outcomes. The tool would offer several benefits: 
• enabling analysts to run queries through large datasets with nearly 
instantaneous results; 
• the simple visual results would enhance communication between employees at 
all organisational levels thus contributing to safety assurance and promotion; 
• reduction in the number of required safety analysts in an organisation; 
• contribute to the change in safety thinking from a linear root-cause to a systemic 
analysis; 
• automated results would improve data quality. 
Nevertheless such a tool would also have inherited some limitations, the largest 
being the input into the tool. Since the proposed automated tool would be 
underlined with the systemic TASM framework, the data collection system would 
need to correspond to the model’s requirements. The mismatch within the data 
collection strategy and the TASM framework was clearly demonstrated in Section 
8.1.4.4.2, where due to the large number of unpopulated fields over 50% of each 
cluster contained dummy variables making the results very generic and failing to 
exploit the systemic nature of the TASM framework to the full extent. This led to the 
need to define the data requirements necessary for an efficient and effective use of 
the existing TASM framework and is also applicable for the future research on its 
automation.  
Firstly, the data reporting system would need to be structured in a such a way that it 
is not only based on the reporting of unwanted outcomes (i.e. occurrences) but also 
that it captures normal operations and extraordinary performances. The application 
scope of the model and taxonomy could then also be extended from managing safety 
to also managing punctuality, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
Secondly, the data reporting system should expand in its scope from reporting only 
the immediate causes to more systemic factors that contributed to the system 
variability for each occurrence. The TASM functional model and taxonomy offer a 






1.? Maintain airport infrastructure 
2.? Maintain and test aircraft 
3.? Maintain and test GSE 
4.? Develop procedural guidance 
5.? Weather monitoring 
6.? Provide and update flight information 
7.? Provide training to GSP employees 
8.? Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
9.? Assess requirements for ground handling services 
10.? Dispatch GSAs and GSEs 
11.?Manage turnaround 
12.? Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
13.? Assign gate/stand 
14.?Move aircraft into/from the gate/stand 
15.? Guide aircraft into/from the gate/stand 
16.? Secure/release the aircraft 
17.? Communicate and coordinate task execution 
18.? Drive GSE 
19.? Position GSE 
20.? Guide GSE 
21.? Secure/release GSE 
22.? Open/close aircraft doors 
23.? Establish/remove interface with the aircraft 
24.? Operate aircraft systems 
25.? Operate GSE 
26.? Disembark/embark the aircraft 
27.?Manage load and control 
28.? Offload/onload the aircraft 
29.? Prepare and sort load units 
30.? Service aircraft cabin 
31.?Walk across the apron 












require assessing the impact of all functions and their variability in every occurrence report. 
To achieve this, a change in the occurrence reporting procedure would be required. At each 
base only a qualified person would enter the reports ensuring quality in the database. All 
personnel in this position would need to be trained to perform this function. 
Finally, a good safety culture within an organisation is the prerequisite for this automated 
tool to succeed. The employees need to feel a sense of participation within the organisation. 
Given the existing working conditions in the ground-handling sector, the industry still has a 
considerable way to go before this can be achieved. As a way towards achieving this goal 
the GSPs may need to consider deploying a new safety assurance approach the aim of which 
would not be to test compliance to the procedures but on the contrary understand everyday 
operation. Bridging this gap between “work as imagined” and “work as done” is expected 
(Hollnagel, 2012b) to improve safety, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
8.2 TASM quantification in prospective and system analysis 
The long tradition of using probabilistic risk assessment has proven to be much less reliable 
and accurate in estimating risk in modern complex socio-technical systems (Leveson and 
Diaz-Herrera, 1995, Rae et al., 2012). This fact has been confirmed many times following 
aviation accidents and even recently in the B787 Li battery fire incident, when the risk of fire 
has been significantly underestimated (Matthew and Jad, 2013, Hollnagel, 2014c, Leveson, 
2015). The question of whether quantification is actually necessary is being debated by the 
leading systemic safety thinkers including Hollnagel (2012b) and Leveson (2015), who agree 
that probabilistic risk assessment can be misleading in some cases. 
Considerations about quantification of the TASM framework are summarised in the 
following. The TASM is based on the FRAM theoretical framework that qualitatively models 
variability in human, organisational and technological functions. All of three types of 
function experience and respond to performance variability in different ways. In addition, 
expanding the scope of the analysis from only studying/modelling system failures to 
normal operations significantly increases the difficulty in determining the range of scenarios 
(patterns) of resonance. The data would need to be able to capture all the patterns of 
conditions necessary for an operation (i.e. a function or a set of functions) within a system to 
succeed. In the absence of this data the protocol, heavily dependant on SME input, for 
systemic hazard analysis described in Section 6.2.1.5 was proposed. In its current version the 
protocol uses discrete values to describe the outcomes of every function. By doing so, 
couplings between functions’ outputs are created. Future research is needed to explore the 





Additional work will be undertaken to explore the application on Fuzzy Logic. 
Alternatively, work is underway within Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to 
reduce the effort of analysis through development of ‘Formal Tools to Support STPA’ 
(Leveson, 2013, Thomas, 2013). Certain aspects of these tools could then be transferred into 
the proposed application based on FRAM, including the TASM framework. 
8.3 Summary 
Building upon the three qualitative case studies based on the TASM framework in the 
previous Chapter, this Chapter conducts an exploratory analysis examining the possibilities 
for its quantification. 
The data selection criteria defined for this quantitative part of the analysis corresponded to 
the criteria used in the previous qualitative phase of research. A total of 777 occurrences 
were analysed in the period from January 2011 to December 2013. Data quality assessment 
of the analysed data identified a mismatch in the occurrence reporting system in this 
research and the TASM framework. Therefore the results of descriptive statistics only 
identified the immediate variability of the functions and phenotypes, thus failing to consider 
the systemic nature of the occurrences on the apron.  
Furthermore, a conceptual framework for a tool that extends the applicability of FRAM in 
safety trend retrospective analysis based on Cluster Analysis methodology was developed 
offering a quick, simple, cost-effective analysis of large datasets. Since the concept was 
demonstrated on the available data not suited for TASM modelling, requirements for the 
future data collection were presented. Additionally the proposed conceptual framework 






Chapter 9 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter starts by presenting the main findings of the research on the systemic safety 
risk management framework for apron operations in Section 9.1, with reference to the 
research objectives set in Section 1.2. Sections 9.2 and 9.3 propose a set of recommendations 
for the improvement of safety and suggestions for further research, respectively. 
9.1 Main findings of the thesis 
The aim of this research, previously introduced in Section 1.2 was to: 
Develop a novel generic framework for a robust, systemic, systematic, retrospective, 
prospective and system design analysis, which improves safety management and 
efficiency in apron operations. 
To achieve this aim five objectives were defined in Section 1.2. The findings are discussed in 
turn for each objective in the following sections. 
9.1.1 Model the evolution in the ATM concept of operations  
Based on a systematic review of the ATM ConOps drivers, functions, and technologies since 
the beginning of powered flight, it was found that the ATM system changed very little 
functionally and that the evolutionary change was instead associated with the 
implementations of ATM functions rather than the variability in functions themselves. The 
developed functionally invariant high-level model of the ATM system was applied on a case 
study of SESAR ConOps Step 2. The transferability of the model was further validated by its 
incorporation into the inter-modal ATM model of 2070 (Chapter 2).  
The second aspect of this objective considered the impact of the evolution of the ATM 
ConOps on the boundary of the ATM system. In contrast to the common understanding of 
the ATM system structure, it was demonstrated for the first time that with the transition to 
the en-route-to-en-route concept in the new ATM ConOps the apron should become a part 
of ATM in SESAR. Furthermore, the apron was identified as the new safety-critical area of 
the future ATM system, with aircraft accident rates five times higher than those caused by 
ATM. Following a critical review of existing concepts and research programmes, it was 





9.1.2 Specify the apron system architecture  
As a precondition for the Total Apron Safety Management (TASM) framework development 
a detailed understanding of the i) physical architecture, ii) ground handling services 
(operations), iii) participating stakeholders, and iv) the technology used on the apron was 
developed in Chapter 4. This was achieved by integrating the literature on apron safety and 
20 days of field work that included 15 observations, 43 interviews, and numerous structured 
and unstructured communications with the SMEs. The apron system architecture was used 
to inform the selection of an appropriate safety risk modelling approach to TASM. 
9.1.3 Review the literature on the safety modelling paradigms 
A comprehensive review of the phenomenology, aetiology and ontology of the two safety 
science paradigms was presented to identify the best theoretical match between the apron 
system characteristics and the required approach for its safety risk management in the 
TASM framework (Chapter 5). It was found that only systemic safety analysis methods 
could account for the apron system complexity in terms of the difficulty of managing and 
controlling it (Chapter 6).  
After opting for the systemic safety methods in TASM development, a critical review of the 
FRAM and STAMP methods was presented. FRAM was selected for application in the 
TASM framework due to the graphical description it offers, which is desirable in safety 
modelling. Additionally, due to the exploratory nature of this research, FRAM was selected 
as favourable since it has not previously been applied in the apron safety domain. 
Furthermore, certain limitations associated with the FRAM method were addressed. Firstly, 
a novel protocol was developed for hazard analysis in complex socio-technical systems by 
integrating the best practices of FRAM and STPA. Secondly, a detailed methodology, for the 
derivation of the FRAM model, from the data collection phase to the model validation, was 
developed. Thirdly, a detailed taxonomy of factors that affect human and organisational 
performance variability on the apron was developed (Chapter 6). 
9.1.4 Develop a framework for a retrospective, prospective and system design 
analysis of apron operation 
The framework for a retrospective, prospective and system design analysis of apron 
operation was developed. This was achieved by development of a detailed methodology, 





Analysis (GMTA) and expert judgement, for the derivation of the TASM framework, from 
the data collection phase to the validation. Although the methodology was developed for 
the TASM application, it can be transferred to any socio-technical system (Chapter 6). 
The outputs of the framework include a functional model, the taxonomy of factors that affect 
the variability of the functions in the model and the storyline (Chapter 6). The functional 
model depicted everyday operations on the apron in terms of the functions carried out and 
the couplings, which exists between them. To complement the TASM functional model, the 
most exhaustive list of factors (440 at the lowest level) that affect human and organisational 
performance variability on the apron yet seen in the literature was developed, based on: i) 
observations across five airports worldwide, ii) interviews with 43 respondents working for 
the GSP, airlines and airports, and iii) a review of factors from 24 methods. Finally, storyline 
was developed to provide a summary of typical variability during operations on the apron. 
9.1.5 Demonstrate the application of the developed process retrospective, 
prospective and system design analysis of apron operation 
In contrast to the Safety-I models for the apron, which are capable of modelling only the 
safety performance of a system, the TASM framework has a much wider application. Not 
only can it be applied in retrospective and prospective safety modelling but it can also be 
used as a tool for a more generic design, change or performance management analysis of the 
apron system. In retrospective analysis the proposed functional model and taxonomy 
identified systemic factors previously not found during the occurrence investigation. In 
prospective analysis, a new protocol for systematic hazard analysis in complex socio-
technical systems (including the apron) was proposed. In system analysis the TASM 
functional model and its taxonomy identified design weaknesses. 
Finally, a novel conceptual framework for safety trend analysis tool based on the TASM 
functional model and taxonomy was developed. The proposed framework offers an 
alternative approach to quantification when compared to existing approaches based on 
longitudinal frequency analysis. In contrast, underpinned by the theoretical foundation of 
FRAM and based on pattern emergence, the new framework for the first time proposes a 
safety trend analysis methodology based on the pattern discovery principles. The output of 
this conceptual framework offers a graphical, quick, simple and cost-effective approach to 
the analysis of large datasets. Without numerical values, patterns in the data are identified 






In addition to the numerous applications of the TASM framework already described and 
implemented in this research, the insights gained through the data collection process (see 
6.5) can be used to identify safety improvements as summarised below. 
• Develop national and international safety regulatory frameworks for Ground Handling 
Services (GHS). This would help increase standardisation and improve safety by 
reducing variability in the level of safety maturity between Ground Service Providers 
(GSPs) worldwide. 
• Update the Ground Service Equipment (GSE) fleets. The age and state of repair of GSE 
were found to negatively impact operations on the apron. To address this, it is proposed 
to set an age or utilisation limit for the GSE equipment operating on the apron. 
• Increase the uniformity in GSE fleets. GSPs are frequently undergo restructuring due to 
acquisition, losses or mergers resulting in a high degree of diversity in GSE fleet which 
in turn increases variability in the Ground Service Agent (GSA) training, GSE 
operations and maintenance. Standardisation of GSE fleets, apart from bringing safety 
improvement, could potentially improve operational efficiency and reduce the costs of 
maintenance and training. 
• Improve aircraft design. Aircraft design has been identified as a factor that may 
influence performance both positively and negatively. Therefore it is recommended that 
aircraft manufacturers work more closely together with the ground handling and 
airport communities to bridge the gap between design and operational requirements. 
• Improve aircraft maintenance. Deficiencies associated with the aircraft loading and 
fuelling system have been found to negatively impact GSA performances. As previously 
discussed in Section 7.1.3 a regulatory initiative is required to enforce the management 
of aircraft hazards that do not directly affect the safety of flight but create hazardous 
working conditions for the GSAs.  
• Improve apron design. A large amount of variability in stand signage and markings 
exists even within the same airport. Certain designs are more favourable in terms of 
safety. Therefore, the optimal solution(s) should be found and enforced through 
regulations in addition to the existing recommendations by ACI (2007). Furthermore, 
certain characteristics of stands, particularly the size, position of fuel pits and the 
insufficient amount of the staging areas, were also identified to negatively influence 
GSA performance and should be improved in collaboration with airport authorities. 
• Improve communication. Communication issues were found to negatively impact GSP 





apron, as detailed in Section 6.8. Communication between an airline and GSP operations 
can be improved by introducing A-CDM and enforcing standard 
phraseology/signology between the flight crews and the GSA (IATA, 2008b). 
Communication within a GSP can be improved by equipping more employees with the 
means for communication (i.e. radios) and by developing a standardised 
phraseology/signology to aid the communication and coordination between GSAs on 
the apron.  
• Improve working conditions for GSAs. Unfavourable working conditions in terms of 
salaries, insurances and CRM have also were found to negatively impact safety 
performance through an increase in the GSA turnover rate, with the consequent low 
average level of experience and overall low job satisfaction. Preliminary findings in 
Section 8.1.4.3 indicated that an improvement in working conditions may contribute to a 
higher degree of stability in the workforce and safety improvements. As a way of 
addressing this concern, a ‘level playing field’ between GSPs in terms of GSA selection 
and training, working conditions, quality of the equipment and GSE maintenance 
requirements should be created. 
• Standardise airline procedures. The diversity of procedures defined by the airlines was 
found to be unnecessary and to negatively impact safety, efficiency and cost-
effectiveness (i.e. increases training costs). Therefore, standardisation and local 
enforcement of procedures could contribute to the safety and efficiency improvements 
for all stakeholders. 
• Develop a Crew Resource Management programme for GSAs. Excessively long 
working hours (i.e. 16-18 shifts) negatively impact GSA performance and should be 
closely monitored and controlled. This can only be achieved by strengthening the 
existing Work Time Regulations (i.e. EU Directive 2003/88/EC) and developing a GSP 
crew resource management (CRM) programme. 
• Reduce the dispersion of GSP operations across multiple terminals. The dispersion of 
GSP operations across multiple terminals was found to negatively affect both safety and 
efficiency when faced with disruptions in flight schedules, particularly at larger 
airports. To improve this, bidding for contracts for aircraft servicing should be at the 
level of a terminal instead of the level of an airline. 
• Mandate the position of a ‘handling agent’ or ‘turnaround coordinator’. This was found to 
induce a great level of variability affecting safety and efficiency of the process. 
Therefore, in addition to the HSE (2000) recommendation to have an individual in this 





• Increase the threshold in the GSA selection process. Psychological and physiological 
characteristics can affect the safety and efficiency of apron operations. Therefore a set of 
minimum requirements should be outlined for different positions within GSPs. 
• Develop a GSP representative body. All aviation stakeholders have a representative 
body that lobbies for their rights e.g. ACI for airports, IATA for airlines. Therefore a 
similar organisation should be founded for GSPs to increase their presence in the 
aviation community. 
9.3 Future research 
The research presented in this thesis has just opened the ‘Pandora’s box’ of apron safety 
leading to a series of research questions to be explored in future research as outlined below. 
The described TASM framework is in an experimental phase. However, in the future this 
framework can be converted into a dedicated tool for apron performance modelling. While 
in retrospective analysis the already publically available FMV software is suitable for the 
TASM analysis, future developments should translate the hazard analysis protocol in 
Section 6.2.1.5 into a tool capable of visualising the impact of different scenarios on the 
propagation of both positive and negative variability within the system, for use in 
prospective and system analysis. The concept of colour coding of the output proposed in 
Section 8.1.4.4.3 for trend analysis could also be applied in this future tool. 
While the TASM functional model and taxonomy focused on human and organisational 
functions, technological factors were not developed further within this thesis. However its 
importance should not be neglected and future research, mainly focusing on GSE design 
and maintenance, should develop this aspect further. 
While the case study on A-CDM in Section 7.3 carried out a qualitative analysis of the 
relationship between A-CDM and CRM within GSPs, future research should statistically test 
the hypothesis on the potential benefits of adjusting CRM to actual traffic information by 
means of cost-benefit analysis.  
Future research is needed to assess the levels of safety maturity worldwide. This 
information could then be used to adjust the results obtained from the GDDB in order to 
improve the quality and accuracy of the GDDB outputs. 
Finally, further research is also required to improve the FRAM. More specifically, while 





the functions, it does not allow the modelling of the dependencies between individual 
variability in the system. Therefore, future research should consider the development of 
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Appendix I – An application of the functionally invariant model of the 
ATM system on a case study of the SESAR Step 2  
Communication 
Communications in ATM is an enabling service, providing the means by which 
stakeholders’ requirements for the interchange of information are met. Communications in 
the ATM system comprises of ground/ground (G/G), air/ground (A/G) and air/air (A/A) 
voice and data communications (EUROCONTROL, 2006b). 
In the ATM system ConOps Step 2, the trend in aeronautical communications will be 
towards digital networking (i.e. SYSCO39, CPDLC40), the greater use of data rather than 
voice, automatic message handling and data compression to improve bandwidth utilisation. 
In the longer term, increasing use of datalink will mean that voice traffic is reduced for 
routine ATC communications, though it will remain the primary mechanism for emergency 
and critical safety related exchanges (EUROCONTROL, 2006b). 
Navigation 
As the navigation techniques move towards GNSS as the prime means of positioning, a 
transition from ground-based infrastructure for all phases of flight to GNSS is necessary. 
Rationalisation of navigation infrastructure will be completed by 2025 (EUROCONTROL, 
2008b). 
In the en-route airspace, due to the shift from today’s fixed ATS route structure to 4D 
trajectories, aircraft will be flying using basic area navigation (B-RNAV or RNAV 5). Since 
terminal airspace (TMA) requires better navigation capability, the aircraft will be required to 
fly with even higher navigation capabilities (P-RNAV or RNAV1). 
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At the airport level there will be a trend of gradual replacing of ILS approaches with 
approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV41) based on augmented GNSS 
(EUROCONTROL, 2013b). 
Finally, navigation capabilities of both aircraft and vehicles for the movement on the airport 
surface are supported by moving maps (EUROCONTROL, 2010h). 
Surveillance 
In Step 2, surveillance in the en-route and TMA airspace is operated through a combination 
of (EUROCONTROL, 2008a, 2014b):  
• PSR that will continue to be used to track targets not equipped with a transponder in 
en-route airspace and to detects aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface (i.e. 
Surface Movement Radar (SMR)); 
• SSR that will be replaced with SSR Mode S (Elementary or Enhanced) Surveillance 
that enables downlink of specific airborne parameters from the cockpit, such as 
identification, navigation position, speed, and other data from the aircraft. This 
capability has facilitated development of new surveillance technologies: 
Multilateration and ADS-B; 
• Multilateration (MLAT) that will be widely implemented in the terminal areas and 
airport surfaces; 
• ADS-B Out and ADS-C that can provide ground-based surveillance services to areas 
of airspace where it had previously proven uneconomic to provide radar surveillance 
or may be used to augment existing surveillance infrastructure (EUROCONTROL, 
2008a). In addition, ground service vehicles at airports will be equipped with ADS-B 
Out which will enable ATCOs to identify them even during periods of low visibility; 
• information derived from moving maps, indicating the status of the runway, 
showing restricted and unauthorised areas, that will support the movements of 
aircraft and vehicle on the airports surface. 
To ensure these surveillance requirements the Single European Sky Surveillance 
Performance and Interoperability Implementing Rule (SPI IR) mandates surveillance on-
board the aircraft to be compliant with Mode S Enhanced Surveillance and ADS-B out. The 
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mandate dates are January 2015 for forward fit and December 2017 for retrofit aircraft 
(European Commission, 2011a). 
Information Management 
The inefficiencies in the current ATM system operations, based on numerous sources of 
information that are exchanged point-to-point, will be overcome in the ATM Step 2 ConOps. 
All information including trajectories, surveillance data, aeronautical information of all 
types, meteorological data etc. will no longer be exchanged in the message format but will 
instead be published/used when and where needed. Real time information exchange will 
improve ATM planning, collaborative decision making processes and tactical operations. 
This is going to be achieved via implementation of the: 
• Collaborative Network Operations Plan (NOP), which will provide dynamic and 
efficient interfaces to support the network planning process (EUROCONTROL, 
2014d); 
• Digital NOTAM concept that will provide NOTAM in digital format suitable for 
digital processing (EUROCONTROL, 2010c); 
• uplink and loading of aeronautical or MET data for use by relevant onboard system 
of service (SJU, 2014a); 
• a specified weather data captured by airborne aircraft and downlinked to the 
meteorological service in support of forecasting, significant weather reporting and 
data collection (SJU, 2014e); 
• a European IP based data transport network deployed for ground/ground 
communications. This network is the main element of the communication 
infrastructure supporting all the Ground/Ground and Air/Ground communications. 
This network will interconnect the ATM Stakeholders (ANSP, Airport, Airspace 
Users, Network Manager42) through gateways, (SJU, 2014d); 
• ground-ground data SWIM services for Network Operations Planning, Airport 
exchange and Airline Operations Centre (SJU, 2014g, 2014h, 2014i); 
• Common Flight Object - a complex data structure that contains full information 
about all parameters concerning a flight and which is made available to all systems 
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(airborne and ground via the federative sharing network) that process information 
about the flight and keep it updated throughout the flight lifecycle (SJU, 2014f). 
Airspace Organisation and Management 
The process of airspace design for the ConOps 2025 and beyond is explained in detail in the 
Advanced Airspace Scheme Concept Document (EUROCONTROL, 2004). The starting point 
includes the analysis of main traffic flows and their orientation. Based on this, ATS routes 
will be designed according to the users’ preferred routes and the inclusion of direct route 
segments, whilst meeting the requirements of the military (EUROCONTROL, 2011b, 
EUROCONTROL, 2011c). However, although the route structures will be designed – they 
will only be used in the traffic situation of high complexity. The rest of the time, the aircraft 
will be flying in the Free Route Airspace (FRA).  
The next step in the airspace design process will include the creation of sector families - 
areas containing specific air traffic flows and conflict areas, which will consist of strongly 
interdependent sectors (probably between 3 to 8 ATC Sectors). Every sector family will be 
divided into elementary sectors – with the minimum operational elementary volume, which 
will then be combined to satisfy the operational requirements (traffic demand, traffic 
pattern, staff) and airspace availability (EUROCONTROL, 2004). And finally sector families 
will be grouped into family groups – the grouping of the sector families into a larger block 
of airspace based on operational benefits.  
Dedicated airspace management tools will be available for timely prediction on upcoming 
congestions as well as alternative proposals for dynamic airspace adaptation and trajectories 
optimisation taking into account network needs and updates coming from the sequencing 
tools (SJU, 2014c). 
The airspace will be managed at the European level and will require civil-civil, civil-military 
and military-military cooperation to maximise the Network capacity. By enabling the 
possibility of creation of ad-hoc structure delineation at short notice, more flexibility will be 
given to GA and Military flights to select the preferred route trajectories. Changes in the 
airspace status will be uplinked to the pilot and shared with all other concerned airspace 






In the ATM ConOps Step 2, the Airspace organisation and management and the Network 
management functions will be interdependent, making it hard to draw a distinction between 
them. 
At the planning level, the National High Level Airspace Policy Body (HLAPB) within the 
Airspace organisation and management function will formulate the national Airspace 
Management policy and carry out the necessary strategic planning work, taking into account 
the requirements of national and international airspace users. In parallel, the Network 
management (NM) will start up with its own strategic plan taking into consideration the 
data available at the time. In case of imbalance between demand and capacity, the Airspace 
organisation and management and Network management functions will negotiate the 
solution. 
As more and more flight data becomes available, the closely coordinated process between 
the NM, the Airspace Management Cell43 (AMC) and the Flow Management Position (FMP) 
will start. The collaborative decision making process between the NM, AMC, FMP/ACC, 
Aerodrome Reporting Office (ARO) and Aircraft Operators (AOs) on the day before the day 
of operation. The whole process starts when the ACCs/FMPs, in coordination with the NM 
assess the expected traffic forecast for the particular day. These two parties then together 
identify and highlight capacity shortfalls, and agree on the traffic flow adjustment 
requirements that will be requested on the particular day of operations. These requirements 
are then sent to the AMC who collects, collates and analyses all airspace requests and 
resolves conflicts through negotiation and coordination with neighbouring AMCs. As a 
result, a draft of the Airspace User Plan (AUP) is published, which is then forwarded to the 
NM. The NM then: a) evaluates the impact on the network of the ‘draft’ airspace allocation in 
close coordination with FMPs and AMCs concerned, b) identifies optimal scenarios and c) 
forwards proposals to the relevant AMCs. The relevant AMCs then consider the 
advice/alternatives proposed by NM and create the AUP, which is then sent to the NM. 
Based on the all AUPs, the NM creates a Conditional Route Availability Message (CRAM), 
which is then sent to AOs, ACCs/FMPs, relevant AMCs and relevant AROs. Any changes 
identified through the process of collaborative decision making are communicated either 
directly to the AMC or to the NM, who then notify the AMC. Based on these changes, the 
AMC produces the Draft Updated User Plan 1 (UUP1) and sends it back to the NM for 
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consideration of the network effect and coordination with Airspace Users, if required. As a 
result of this CDM process, the AMC publishes the UUP1 and sends it to the NM who then 
disseminates the information to the AOs (EUROCONTROL, 2010f). 
On the day of operation, the procedure described in the paragraph above for the production 
of the UUP1 is used again for the creation of UUP2. This though is not the only update on 
the day of operation. If required, the AMC may publish one or more UUP-like messages for 
the period of validity of the current AUP, for transmission to the FMPs, ACCs, the NM and 
adjacent AMCs. A minimum of one hour is allowed between the release of those UUP-like 
messages and the commencement of any additional airspace structures made available by 
such messages (EUROCONTROL, 2010f). 
Apart from close Airspace management/Network management coordination, the number of 
scenarios to be used in the process of air traffic flow and capacity management (ATFCM) 
will be increased through a catalogue of predefined scenarios. For the purpose of supporting 
ATFCM scenario management, a number of NM tools44 have been developed. Also, aircraft 
operators will have developed new systems that will assist them in filing the flight plan and 
in re-routing according to airspace availability and the ATFM situation, through 
collaboration with NM, ANSPs and airports. And lastly, new slot swapping techniques are 
going to be developed to reduce slot wastage. 
Trajectory Management 
The Trajectory management function in the ATM Step 2 ConOps is described on three levels: 
Airport management, Approach/Terminal Control Area (TMA) management and En-route 
management operational improvement. 
Probably the biggest operational improvement in airport management will be the 
introduction of the concept of Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM). A-CDM 
aims at improving Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) at airports by 
reducing delays, improving the predictability of events and optimising the utilisation of 
resources through better information sharing and decision making between stakeholders 
(ACI et al., 2012).  This concept is further elaborated in Section 3.3.1.  
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Airport management will be improved even further by better synchronisation of arriving 
and departing traffic. This will be achieved through Departure Management (DMAN), 
Arrival Management (AMAN) and Surface Management (SMAN) integration supplemented 
by accurate prediction of Runway Occupancy Time (ROT) information (SJU, 2013). In 
addition, to optimise busy TMA, the DMAN and AMAN horizons will be expanded to 
synchronise operations of multiple airports within the TMA. DMAN and AMAN concepts 
are revisited in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively. 
Another important feature of the Airport management function is runway usage 
management, given its scarce capacity. It has been proven that saving just one second on 
every movement could result in one slot gained every two hours, so it is in the interests of 
all parties to ensure that vital seconds are not lost (EUROCONTROL, 2003b). By 2025 the 
following will be in place to reduce ROT:  
• estimation of ROT based on the aircraft parameters;  
• Wake Vortex separations based on Dynamic Aircraft Characteristics; 
• building of additional Rapid Exit Taxiways (RET), and 
• interlacing take-offs and landing.  
In the field of Approach/TMA management, the biggest change will be the introduction of 
Advanced Continuous Climb Departure (ACCD) and Advanced Continuous Descent 
Approach (ACDA). These new procedures will be made feasible in the highly dense areas 
by provision of new controller tools and 3D trajectory management. 
The main operational improvements in TMA and en-route management are developed as a 
part of the First Air Traffic Control (ATC) Support Tools Implementation (FASTI) 
Programme. These include: System Supported Coordination (SYSCO), MONitoring Aids 
(MONA) and Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD). SYSCO and MONA are enablers of 
the MTCD. The MTCD concept, as a main component of the safety assurance process in Step 
2, is explained further in the next subsection. SYSCO is developed to replace the telephone 
communication with OLDI (On-Line Data Exchange) computer-to-computer message 
exchange. Initially SYSCO will link adjacent sectors in the same but not between 
neighbouring Air Traffic Services Units (ATSUs). 
Safety Assurance 
The function of Safety assurance is performed in parallel with the function of Trajectory 





management function is used in this Section to explain the function of Safety assurance. 
Firstly, the safety assurance function is described at the airport level through Surface 
management, followed with the consideration of the safety assurance function in the 
Approach/TMA area and En-route through Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) and 
Ground based safety nets. 
In the Step 2 ConOps, safe airport surface operations in all weather conditions will be 
achieved through the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS). Enabled by improvements in the surveillance function, A-SMGCS supports airport 
stakeholders’ (ATCOs, flight crews and vehicle drivers) operations in navigation, conflict 
detection and resolution − thereby improving airport surface safety and efficiency 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010b, 2010g, 2010h). A-SMGCS is revisited in Section 3.3.4 for purpose 
of research focus justification. 
En-route conflict detection will be enhanced through implementation of Conflict Detection 
and Resolution Tools (i.e. Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD), Short Term Conflict 
Alert (STCA), Area Proximity Warning (APW), Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW), 
Approach Path Monitor (APM)) tools, which will enable trajectory-based operations and 
flexible routing via conflict free trajectories. Although the tool will assist ATCOs in the 
identification of potential conflicts with a look-ahead time of up to 15 minutes, the ultimate 
responsibility for conflict resolution will remain with the ATCO (EUROCONTROL, 1999).  
Security Management 
The purpose of aviation security is to provide a protection to passengers and cargo against 
danger, damage, loss and crime. After the events of 9/11, many measures were put in place 
to enhance aviation security. Until now, security threats have mostly been physical in nature 
(e.g. terrorists and bombs) and it has been possible to control them at the airport level. Thus 
aviation security has been an equivalent to airport security. 
With increased information sharing, the security threats are not only going to be limited to 
physical but will expand to information management threats. Availability of information in 
the ATM system could induce new threats when used by unauthorised people. That is why 
security issues are going to be of a major concern in the design of the new information 
management system. 
In terms of security, in Step 2, the protection of the SWIM will be addressed through SWIM 





identity management (local and federated) to provide authentication and authorisation. 
Also includes use of public key cryptography (PKI).  
Environmental Management 
Aviation CO2 emissions accounted for 4% of the EU2745 total in 2007 and while this appears 
relatively small, aviation CO2 emissions have increased by 138% between 1990 and 2007 
(Molloy, 2011). This is the reason why the European Commission has put pressure on the 
aviation sector to reduce its environmental footprint. 
With the goal of reducing the environmental impact of aviation, ATM ConOps in Step 2 
envisages following measures: 
• Reduction of fuel consumptions, gaseous emissions and noise impact on habitants 
living in the surrounding through the implementation of ACDA, ACCD and SMAN 
concepts; 
• Reduction of fuel consumption through implementation of FRA and 4D trajectories; 
• Reduction of water pollution by collecting de-icing fluids that are spread out over the 
wing and tail surfaces of the aircraft during the process of de-icing at stands; 
• Monitoring of environmental performance by introducing noise monitoring, flight 
tracking and air quality monitoring systems. 
                                                      





Appendix II – Open-ended questions used in semi-structured interviews 
Introduction 
Hi! My name is Milena Studic. I am a researcher from Imperial College London. I have a 
background in ATM so I am trying to transfer a new safety and productivity improvement 
technique from ATM into the apron operations. The objective of my study is to explore and 
identify possibilities for improvement in apron operations. 
Demographics 
Could you tell me a little bit about yourself 
Age 
Experience 
• Which job position are you working on? 
• For which positions on the apron have you been trained? 
• How much time did you spend working at each job position? 
• Have you worked for another GSP? 
• What are your career prospects? 
Permission for recording 
Would it be possible for me to take notes/records of our discussion? All the information 
gathered through the research will be de-identified and used for research purposes only. I 
can also offer you a copy of the transcription of the interview to check before I use it in my 
research. 
Before we start, do you have any questions for me? 
Interview questions 
I am interested in understanding your everyday ‘routines’ or activities you typically do 
during your working hours. 
Could you explain me in your own words how do you do your job? 
*Following their job description I will extract the functions they do and then probe them to 






* Some examples of probes: 
Input: “Why are you starting that function?” 
Output: “What is the output of the function? 
Control: “What is it that regulates your job?” 
Resource: “How were you trained for the job?” 
Precondition: ...  
Time: “What if you are under time pressure?” 
 
* Investigate variability of the output of each function: 
Timing: too early, too late, omission 
Force/distance/directions: too weak, too strong, to short, too long 
Wrong object: the output is a neighbouring or similar or unrelated object 
Sequence: omission, jumping, repetition, reversal, wrong part 
Possibilities for improvements 
If you could do anything to make operations on the apron safer and more efficient, with no 
budget limits or time constraints, would you do something? 
What would it be? 






Appendix III – Description of functions and their outputs used in 
Grounded Theory application 
As previously explained in Section 6.6.1.2, the application of Grounded Theory derived: 
• 3146 axial codes – defined as a FRAM function in the TASM functional model, and 
• 4146 open codes – defined as Outputs of FRAM functions (axial codes) in the TASM 
functional model. 
1. Maintain airport infrastructure 
This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of airport apron 
infrastructure by the airport authorities. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of 
this function should be that the ‘Airport infrastructure is maintained’, i.e.: 
“… we have another division which is facility maintenance group. They are the ones 
doing the fixes… and then they fix it and then they come back to sign off on that basically 
saying that it is fixed correctly”. 
2. Maintain and test aircraft 
This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of aircraft and their 
regular testing by aircraft operator engineers before every flight. For an optimal turnaround 
process, the Output of this function should be that the ‘Aircraft is maintained and tested’, 
however this might not necessarily be always the case, i.e.:  
“…The a/c has an inherit fuel leaking problem into the auxiliary tanks but as he is 
fuelling it, he cannot see the gauge.” 
3. Maintain and test GSE 
This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of GSE and their regular 
testing by GSP engineers (or the GSA) at the beginning of each shift (or working day). For an 
optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should be that the ‘GSE is 
maintained and tested’, i.e.: 
                                                      
46 Initially during the process of qualitative data analysis (Section 6.6.1) only the first 30 axial and 40 
open codes were found whereas after the process of validity checks (Section 6.7.4) an additional 31st 






“… the vehicles need to be checked every day. We have our own in-house mechanics who 
check the vehicles every day before they are being used. That's just a standard”. 
4. Develop procedural guidance 
This function refers to the process of developing procedures at i) the airport operator, ii) 
aircraft operator, and iii) GSP level based on iv) the international (i.e. ICAO), regional (i.e. 
EASA) or national (i.e. UK CAA) regulatory bodies’ regulations, v) specialised association 
(i.e. IATA, Association of European Airlines) guidance and recommendations, and vi) 
manufacturer (i.e. aircraft, GSE manufacturers) manuals and recommendations. Due to the 
manageability of the model, only procedures i), ii) and iii) are modelled. Therefore this 
function has only three Outputs: a) ‘Airport procedures’, b) ‘Airline procedures’, and c) ‘GSP 
procedures’, i.e. see Table Appendix III - 1:  




“… The BAA are responsible for designing the safe routes. Each airport will have their own 
version of OSI (Operating Safety Instructions). At Gatwick they are called Information 
Directives Instructions, they would comply to airport by laws and then they would be having 
pieces taken from CAA, IATA etc.” 
Airline 
procedures 
“… BA have their own operating procedures. No driving under the wings. You are only 
allowed to go around the back of the a/c if you are servicing that a/c.” 
GSP 
procedures 
“… For those airlines who do not tell us specifically when to remove the chocks, we remove the 
chocks once all the equipment is off the a/c.” 
 
5. Weather monitoring 
This function refers to the process of gathering information about the current and prospect 
meteorological conditions. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function 
should be that the ‘Current and prospect weather conditions’ are correctly assessed, i.e.: 
“… We track the weather 5 days in advance but we also look up to a month and week in 
advance. Some airlines use the meteorological office and they give them a bronze, amber 
and red alert. If they get amber, they go anti-ice automatically. But that is normally 
airlines that do their own anti-icing. They would use this MET warning as a guide rather 
than looking through the window... we would look every different type of weather, we 





operational control here at the airport (they can give you a specific characteristics of the 
weather). It is quite accurate.” 
6. Provide and update flight information 
This function refers to the process of provision of accurate current and prospect information 
to direct stakeholders at the apron (c.f. Section 4.3.1). For an optimal turnaround process, the 
Output of this function should provide a reliable, accurate and timely ‘Flight information’, 
i.e.: 
“… It says, "Arrival 10:55, arriving to gate 121, it has 99 passengers, 127 bags”. 
7. Provide training to GSP employees 
This function refers to the process of training provision to GSP employees. For an optimal 
turnaround process, the Output of this function should assure that the ‘GSP employees are 
trained’, i.e.: 
“… I have an employee that has been training for the jet bridge. Then I would take the 
employee to operate the jet bridge. If I feel comfortable that he/she does it correctly then I 
sign off. If I need to do too much correction, I do not sign off and give them more 
practice.” 
8. Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
This function refers to the process of assuring the GSP has enough resources to perform 
ground handling services on a daily basis. For an optimal turnaround process, this function 
should have the following four Outputs: a) ‘Optimal rosters’, b) ‘Optimal number of qualified 
GSA for each task’, c) ‘Optimal number of required GSE for each task’, and d) ‘Optimal quantity of 
replenishing supplies’ (these include fuel, de/anti-icing fluid, and cleaning supplies), i.e. see 
Table Appendix III - 2: 
Table Appendix III - 2: Outputs from the function Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Output Example 
Optimal rosters “… I was working from 5am to 9pm, 5 days per week. Almost 5 person working 5 
days double time, 3 persons working 4 days double time, 6 person working 2 days over 
time and the rest of the persons they worked 1 day overtime because some people don't 
like overtime. With the people they've hired now, they've cut overtime.” 
Optimal number of 
qualified GSA for 
each task 
“… The supervisor is making sure all the manpower is correct, (we have the right 
equipment) and are watching our employees for manpower. No one stays for overtime 





Optimal number of 
required GSE for 
each task 
“… the supervisor at the gate gathers that information and then he/she tells the 
agents: “you give me 3 dollies, you give me 2 carts, you go and get a can loader”. That 
happens about 30mins before the plane arrives at the gate.” 
Optimal quantity of 
replenishing 
supplies 
“… We have a de-icing coordinator who is responsible for ordering fluid in, making 
sure we don't run out of fluid.” 
 
9. Assess requirements for ground handling services 
This function refers to the process of identifying the requirements for the services that need 
to be performed on the aircraft during the turnaround process. For an optimal turnaround 
process, the Output of this function should accurately ‘Define services that need to be 
performed’, e.g.: 
“… Usually, to stay on the safe side, the pilots usually request Type I and IV. It has 
happened that on a sunny day when it stopped snowing and you still have snow on the 
plane but they still request both Type I and IV. Pilots usually stay on the safe side. So no, 
I have never seen that they make a wrong judgement.” 
10. Dispatch GSAs and GSEs 
This function refers to the process of dispatching GSAs and GSEs for the turnaround. For an 
optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure an appropriate and 
timely ‘GSA and GSE assignment’ as a function of available resources in the shift, i.e.: 
“… That is why they say the number of bags. So for example for 127 bags we will need 3 
carts but we always bring 4, so extra. Depending on the size it can be between 50-60 
bags… we always bring extra so that we are prepared.” 
11. Manage turnaround 
This function refers to the process of managing (orchestrating) the turnaround process 
typically performed by a turnaround coordinator (TCO), dispatcher, GSP manager, GSP 
supervisor, and GSP lead. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function 
should ensure that the ‘Turnaround process managed and coordinated’, i.e.: 
“… If you want a ground handler to handle your whole operation, then you have a TCO 
now the duty performed by the TCO can be different for different ground handling 
companies. There is a need to standardise this position on the ramp. The problem is if you 





difficult since there is no legislation saying 'this person is in total charge of the flight'. 
They pass it down. The HSE have tried to get a turnaround plan in HSG209.” 
12. Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
This function refers to the turnaround process safety and quality assurance. For an optimal 
turnaround process, this function should have the following six Outputs: a) ‘Apron is 
inspected’, b) ‘Aircraft is inspected’, c) ‘GSE is inspected’, d) ‘Load Units are inspected’, e) 
‘Procedures are enforced’, and f) ‘Records are kept’, i.e. see Table Appendix III - 3: 




“… a walk all the agents must perform, before the airplane comes in. It is a safety walk to 
make sure that there is no debris. This is done only around the gate before the plane is 
coming in. Also, when the plane leaves” 
Aircraft is 
inspected 
“… The supervisor or the lead conducts the walkaround, a/c inspection checks. They focus 
especially on the areas that are very vulnerable that could have been hit during offloading 
and loading, which is around the cargo door.” 
GSE is 
inspected 
“… Before they get into their vehicle they would do a 360 degrees walkaround of the vehicle. 
You would look up and down, basically check whether everything on the vehicle is stowed 
properly and that everything is disconnected (bonding cables, hoses from the aircraft etc.).” 
Load Units are 
inspected 
“… do a visual inspection of the palette before it goes to the a/c, check for the height, make 
sure nothing is leaning, nothing is overhanging where it is outside of the base of the palette 
cookie sheet where it could strike the a/c.” 
Procedures are 
enforced 
“… If we spot someone not complying, we talk to them and correct them. The second or third 
time, we take disciplinary actions (detention). But first we have to correct, ask them if they 
know what the procedures are.” 
Records are 
kept 
“…we take a picture before we offload anything and then we take another picture once we've 
done loading and we keep it for a few days. In case that at next station they mention 
something was damaged here, we have proof that either the a/c arrive that way to LAX or 







13. Assign gate/stand 
This function refers to the process of gate/stand assignment performed by the apron 
management. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure 
that an appropriate ‘Gate/stand is assigned’ timely, i.e.: 
“… We assign a gate basically. We say “this gate is yours from this to this time”. And 
then not only this gate but also this ticket counter in the terminal and this pier for the 
baggage carousels. And we assign all these different assets to them.” 
14. Move aircraft into/from the gate/stand 
This function refers to the process of operating the aircraft (if it is on its own power) or the 
pushback tug (if the aircraft is being towed in/pushed back) into/from the gate/stand. For 
an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure the ‘Aircraft has 
arrived to/departed from the gate/stand’, which is assigned to it timely and has parked correctly 
without resulting in any unwanted outcome (c.f. Section 3.5.3). 
“… So you need to push very slowly at an angle that you just know is not going to hit. 
Even if you mess up, you can stop. You don't need to slam on the brakes. You just stop 
and redo everything.” 
15. Guide aircraft into/from the gate/stand 
This function refers to the process of providing guidance to the aircraft (if it is on its own 
power) or the pushback tug (if the aircraft is being towed in/pushed back) into/from the 
gate/stand. This function can be performed by the human operators (i.e. aircraft marshallers 
and wingwalkers) or the technology (i.e. VDGS). For an optimal turnaround process, the 
Output of this function should ensure that the ‘Aircraft is guided into/from the stand’ reliably, 
precisely and accurately, i.e.: 
“…Right now we do tow-in on a one gate where the VDGS is not there and will be back 
tomorrow. On all the other gates we have been powering in. That is just the Bradley West 
gate. But other than that, there is a lot of gate where we power-in to that we don't have 
VDGS but we just use marshallers instead.” 
16. Secure/release the aircraft 
This function refers to the process of securing/releasing the aircraft from movement 
following its arrival into/departure from the gate/stand. The function involves 
pressing/releasing the aircraft brake by the flight crew, and placing aircraft chocks and 
cones by the GSAs. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should 





“… As soon as the aircraft blocks in, comes to a complete stop, and then we get the 
thumbs up that the engines are off and the employees would begin putting chocks and 
cones on the a/c.” 
17. Communicate and coordinate task execution 
This function refers to the process of communication and coordination that occurs before, 
during, and following the execution of all the remaining functions during the turnaround. 
For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘Task 
execution is coordinated’ timely, reliably, accurately, precisely and completely, i.e.: 
“… mechanics gets this info from the captain who gets it from the tower. The captain asks 
for pushback clearance. Once the tower grants it, the captain communicates it to the 
mechanic and he tells it to me. No matter what, I cannot move before I get that signal, 
even if the brakes are off. Whatever he says to me is what I do cause he is telling me the 
information from the pilot. Some people have made the mistake when they have seen the 
light go off and tried to move when the captain is not ready. This is the problem that you 
have these two signals which may be contradicting.” 
18. Drive GSE 
This function refers to the process of driving and parking GSE on the apron surface outside 
the inner Circle of Safety47 (IATA, 2008b) illustrated in Figure Appendix III - 1 in green. For an 
optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘GSE reached 
its destination’, i.e.: 
 “… Because from T6 to remote, that is 15mins drive. So if you miss a bag you have to go 
all the way back. Because this is an international flight, you don't wanna miss a bag on 
an international flight. Sometimes bags fall out of carts.” 
                                                      
47 Circle of Safety refers to a fictive safety zone from the aircraft perimeter where “motorised equipment 
must make a full stop as a brake check” (IATA, 2008b, section 9.32) before approaching the aircraft. This 
zone is defined by two concentric circles, the perimeters of which may vary as a function of GSPs and 
the metric system. For instance, inner and outer circles extend 2 and 5 meters around the aircraft 
respectively according to the Australasian Aviation Ground Safety Council (AAGSC) definition 
(AAGSC, 2012). In contrast, according to ASIG’s definition (ASIG, 2013) inner circle extends 10 feet 






Figure Appendix III - 1: Circle of Safety sticker (source: AAGSC (2012, p. 4)) 
19. Position GSE 
This function refers to the process of driving and positioning GSE on the apron surface 
within the inner Circle of Safety, explained above. GSE are to be driven at a walking speed 
due to the proximity of aircraft and high level of congestion in this area during turnaround. 
For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘GSE 
in position’, i.e.: 
“… On the ground of the bridge there are two floor guardrails. And it is key that those 
guardrails are positioned correctly and properly aligned to the width of the cargo door. 
Cause if you don't align it correctly, it would allow a palette to go at an angle and strike 
the a/c.” 
20. Guide GSE 
This function refers to the process of guiding GSE on the apron surface within the inner 
Circle of Safety to assure clear line of sight when positioning GSE. For an optimal turnaround 
process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘GSE is being guided into position’, 
i.e.: 
“… You know, whenever you are guiding in a person, you have to be right in front of him 
and you have to be able to see both of his hands (right and left). This means go more to the 
right and this go more to the left. This means stop. Sometimes you can't see him because 





and you do go and then you move to the other side but you still can't see this hand so you 
gotta be looking and stepping on the gas and brake.” 
21. Secure/release GSE 
This function refers to the process of securing/releasing the GSE from movement and 
assuring safety on the apron surface. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this 
function should ensure that the ‘GSE is secured/released’. Depending on the GSE type, Secure 
GSE function may require selecting the neutral gear, applying a hand brake, securing the 
load units, choking the vehicle, extending the stabiliser and lifting the handrail. Similarly, 
reverse tasks may be required for releasing GSE, i.e.: 
“… The manufacturer doesn't require for the majority of them (cargo loaders) that the 
stabilisers are down cause they have another parking brake system. So there is a parking 
brake on them that is different from the vehicles just to switch like an electric parking 
brake. But to be on the safe side, we actually lower the stabilisers.” 
22. Open/close aircraft doors 
This function refers to the process of opening/closing of any door (i.e. passenger, cargo, fuel 
panel, lavatory panel) on the aircraft. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this 
function should ensure that the ‘Aircraft doors are opened/closed’ according to the doors’ 
design specifications, i.e.: 
“… you can put a ladder on the side on an Airbus and open the door. Open the clutch 
and then use the control to open the door. But on most of Boeing aircraft, you need to put 
the ladder in front of the door to release the clutch. The clutch should be a little closer so 
that you can access it from the side. Therefore the process is much lengthier than it would 
have been if you didn't need to move the ladders.” 
23. Establish/remove the interface with the aircraft 
This function refers to the process of establishing/removing the physical interface between 
GSE and the aircraft. These include connecting the a) fuel, lavatory, and water hose, b) 
bonding cable, c) ground power, d) air conditioning, and e) pushback tug. For an optimal 
turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘Interface with the 
aircraft is established/removed’ according to the design specifications, i.e.: 
“…There is a button there to disconnect, there has to be the parking brake and neutral at 






24. Operate aircraft systems 
This function refers to the process of operating aircraft systems by the flight crew, GSAs or 
the mechanics. These include operating a) fuel panels, b) loading panels, c) door panels, d) 
lavatory, e) water panels, and f) aircraft brake system. For an optimal turnaround process, 
the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘Aircraft system is operated ’ according to 
the design specifications, i.e.: 
“… one person would control the main deck controls (on B747 so everything is 
motorised) - the panel that brings the cargo on and off and then the second person inside 
the aircraft would just lower the locks or put the locks up and secure them when they are 
loaded”. 
25. Operate GSE 
This function refers to all the processes of operating GSE by the GSAs, excluding the 
positioning which has been described as a separate function Position GSE. For an optimal 
turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘GSE is operated’ 
according to the design specifications, i.e.: 
“… They would get the reading of the fuel on board, they would set the gages on the a/c 
to what was required, do the calculation and then they would start with the fuelling 
process. In parallel they would monitor various gages on the vehicle to make sure that 
everything is doing what it should be doing. And then when they've got the required 
amount, they would stop and look, check that the hose is up and that would be it.” 
26. Disembark/embark the aircraft 
This function refers to the process of disembarking/embarking of passengers, flight and 
cabin crew, GSAs and other people (i.e. from the airport, aircraft or GSP operations) during 
the turnaround. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should 
ensure that the ‘Aircraft is disembarked/embarked ’ without resulting in any unwanted outcome 
(c.f. Section 3.5.3), i.e.: 
“… That involves getting down onto the apron. They have doors on the jetbridge and go 
downstairs. You should be security checked when you use the stairs. Some airports do 
and some don't… you then go back to the cockpit.” 
27. Manage load and control 
This function refers to the process of managing of aircraft’s load and control by the GSP’s 
loading/offloading team according to the load plan (i.e. Load-sheet) provided by the airline 





this function should ensure that the ‘Aircraft (off) loaded according to the loading instruction’ 
assuming they were correct, i.e.: 
“… We follow the offloading and loading sequence when the aircraft comes in. We 
typically offload the rear lower decks first and then we'll move to the main deck. When it 
is complete, we'll offload the front so we always have weight towards the front of the 
aircraft and avoid the aircraft tipping over. And during the loading, we would load the 
front lower deck first, and we'll load the main deck and move as much weight as possible 
towards the nose of the aircraft.” 
28. Offload/onload the aircraft 
This function refers to the process of positioning and releasing/securing and transferring 
load units (i.e. bags, pallets, containers, catering) from the aircraft to the GSE and vice versa 
by the GSAs. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure 
that the ‘Load Units are offloaded/onloaded ’ without resulting in any unwanted outcome (c.f. 
Section 3.5.3), i.e.: 
“… We have 2 people on the ground that help push the cargo off the loader onto a dolly. 
And then the others would help on the main deck on the ground pushing the cargo off the 
loader onto the dollies and offloading the bulk compartment, which is where the loose 
boxes are at.” 
29. Prepare and sort load units 
This function refers to the process of preparing and sorting the Load Units for 
offloading/loading from/to the aircraft. It includes the processes of a) loading containers 
with bags, b) loading bags into carts, c) building pallets, and d) sorting the containers before 
loading/after offloading according to the load-sheet/designation. For an optimal 
turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘Load units are 
prepared and sorted on dollies/carts’ without resulting in any unwanted outcome (c.f. Section 
3.5.3), i.e.: 
“… Some flights are manual and others you have scanners. All bags should have a 
barcode sticker but on manual ones we will take on the paper to make the count. On other 






30. Service aircraft cabin 
This function refers to the process of cleaning, catering48 and performing security checks49 in 
the aircraft cabin. For an optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should 
ensure that the ‘Aircraft cabin is serviced’ without resulting in any unwanted outcome (c.f. 
Section 3.5.3), i.e.: 
“… Cleaning the bathrooms, a chemical is used to kill the bacteria. And then dispose the 
trash, put a new bag in a trash can. Then make sure that it has paper towels, toilet paper 
and napkins. Then we go to the kitchen… Then with the seats we clean the pouch that is 
right in front of the passenger. They usually leave trash and regulated garbage there. And 
we get that out wearing gloves. One of the things we tell the people to open to see the 
pouch cause it could be needles in there. They have to have a magazine, the instructions 
and the vomit bag.” 
31. Walk across the apron50 
This function refers to the movements of all people (i.e. GSA, flight crew, airport employees, 
security, passengers) on the apron in between the execution of all other functions. For an 
optimal turnaround process, the Output of this function should ensure that the ‘People 
reached its destination’ without resulting in any unwanted outcome (c.f. Section 3.5.3). 
“…So the supervisor needs to walk from one gate to another…” 
   
                                                      
48 It should be noted that the data collection process did not account for catering services due to 
unavailability of resources. However, this restriction did not affect the development of the TASM 
functional model since the services performed by the catering services largely overlap with the other 
ground services in terms of the functions: Drive GSE, Position GSE, Guide GSE, Secure/release GSE, 
Open/close aircraft doors, Operate GSE, Offload/load the aircraft, and Service aircraft cabin. In 
addition, GSE driven by the catering is similar to the GSE used for cabin cleaning, allowing 
transferability of derived function and factors that affect safety in ground handling. 
49 Since the TASM focuses on safety modelling of normal everyday operations, security issues were 
not considered within the scope of this thesis. However, safety issues emerging from the security 
checks, when performed by the qualified GSP teams, were accounted for. 
50 This function was not initially found during the process of qualitative data analysis (Section 6.6.1) 





Appendix IV – Description of factors that affect function variability used in 
Grounded Theory application 
As previously explained in Section 6.6.1.2, the application of Grounded Theory derived: 
• 12 axial codes – defined higher-order factors that affect variability of FRAM function in 
the TASM functional model, and 
• 47 open codes – lower-order factors that affect variability of FRAM function in the 
TASM functional model. 
1. Ambient conditions 
This factor refers to conditions that were present in the environment (ambient) during the 
execution of the functions on the apron. Four subcategories of ‘Ambient conditions’ emerged 
during the process of open coding: 
a) ‘Season’ refers to the high season, low season, spring, summer, autumn or winter, i.e.: 
“(Disruptions) It happens a lot, normally in summer time or winter or spring when it 
gets hectic. But mostly summer time”. 
b) ‘Weather conditions’ refer to the air temperature, humidity, precipitations (i.e. rain, snow, 
ice, hail), winds, storms (i.e. thunderstorm, hurricane) and visibility, i.e.: 
“… You also have to remember weather conditions. We are at the beach, there has been 
situations when you are right in front of a plane and you cannot see nor hear it.” 
c) ‘Time of day’ refers to the periods of daylight, night-time, dusk or dawn, i.e.: 
“… (Can you compare a night shift with a day shift?) I wouldn't say any difference, 
probably just the light. You have to be more cautious. Like I said, during daytime you can 
hit your head when placing the chocks, at nights is harder to see because it is less visible, 
less light so you just gotta be more cautious and careful about your surroundings.” 
d) ‘Noise levels’ refers to the noise from the people, equipment or the aircraft that may 
affect execution of the functions on the apron, i.e.: 







2. Traffic characteristics 
This factor refers to characteristics of both air and ground traffic during the execution of the 
functions on the apron. Five subcategories of ‘Traffic characteristics’ emerged during the 
process of open coding: 
a) ‘Number of flights’ refers to the total number of flights (operations) both scheduled and 
unscheduled at an airport as well as their distribution across different airlines that need 
servicing by GSPs within a predetermined timeframe, i.e.: 
“… you are looking at between 30-35 departures. So if you have someone like a cleaning 
company, it is not like Delta terminal when you have 5-6 departures within 1 hour. Over 
here the planes sit for 2-3 hours so you have time.” 
b) ‘Flight characteristics’ refer to the airline type (passenger or cargo), range (short-, 
medium- or long-haul flight), business model (hub-and-spoke or point-to-point 
operations), market segment (traditional, low-cost or charter). The outlined 
characteristic impact the duration of the turnaround process which is considered as an 
additional Flight characteristic, i.e: 
“… Most of the airlines, we do at LHR, because they are foreign operators coming in and 
they don't use LHR as their hub, they ask us to de-ice in the morning.” 
c) ‘Coactivity’ refers to the constraints related to joint activities of airport, airline and GSP 
employees and their equipment on a single or two neighbouring stands/gates occupied 
by aircraft that is/are being serviced, i.e.: 
“… All the baggage services and catering most of the time goes on the other side of the 
aircraft. We will not know if the engineers are putting oxygen on board the aircraft. They 
should come and tell us but sometimes they don't and then you just end up noticing them 
pulling up. In that case we would approach them and explain that fuelling is in progress. 
Lot of people are not aware of the other people around and therefore they just cut to chase 
with their own jobs.” 
d) ‘Congestion’ refers to the number of airport, airline and GSP employees and their 
equipment on the apron surface, i.e.: 
“…When we work the aircraft, we place the K loader here and the beltloader here. There 





e) ‘Distribution of to be serviced aircraft across the airport’ refers to the distribution of aircraft 
across the airport that need to be serviced by GSP employees within a predetermined 
timeframe, i.e.: 
“… It is much easier when the operations take place within one terminal but can 
potentially get complicated with the ground handling company is servicing the whole 
airport.” 
3. Technological characteristics 
This factor refers to characteristics of technology that supports execution of the functions on 
the apron. Five subcategories of ‘Technological characteristics’ emerged during the process of 
open coding: 
a) Apron technology characteristics’ refer to the stationary technology that supports ground 
handling services mainly during fuelling (i.e. emergency cut off valve) and aircraft 
positioning (i.e. VDGS), i.e.: 
“… VDGS are good on straight lines but for complex stands marshallers are better.” 
b) ‘Aircraft characteristics’ refer to the aircraft type, size, age, and related hazards, i.e.: 
“… This is a pitot tube and depending on the type of aircraft they are set right the 
captain's and co-pilot's window. Especially on the MD80 you have to be very careful and 
watch. They snap off very easily when you catch them. And the MD80 series is very 
badly designed in that sense.” 
c) ‘GSE characteristics’ refer to the GSE type, size, age, weight and related hazards, i.e.: 
“… use all FMC Tempests because they are the more modern then the Premiers which are 
like old school trucks. Tempests are a lot easier to control, they don't shift as much as the 
Premiers and it is only due to the way the booms are constructed… the bucket so there is 
a lot more stability and it won't move as much in high winds. Premiers are a lot easier to 
manoeuvre - there is less buttons on them. The Tempest has a lot more buttons on them 
and that is why only the most experienced senior operators use them.” 
d) ‘Load Unit characteristics’ refer the load unit type, weight, size and condition, i.e.: 
“… A lot of time, you load cargo containers and they don't fit over the cargo locks or 
whatever. A lot of these pallets over years have been beaten up so they won't fit in the 





e) ‘PPE characteristics’ refer to the type of protection PPE offers: eyes, head and neck, ears, 
hand and arms, feet and legs or the whole body, i.e.: 
“…One of the key things are that they wear the correct PPE which is the face mask, a set 
of overalls, lavatory gloves.” 
4. Airport characteristics 
This factor refers to characteristics of the airport at which functions take place. Six 
subcategories of ‘Airport characteristics’ emerged during the process of open coding: 
a) ‘Airport location’ refers to the impact of geographical location and regional differences of 
an airport on the functions being performed on the apron, i.e.: 
“… The most we get here is a 3-day event. We don't get more than that. However in 
Scandinavian countries you can get a longer event. So if you get snow for a week that is a 
serious strain on resources.” 
b) ‘Surface design’ refers to the impact of the variability in the physical architecture of an 
airport in terms of the size, orientations and gradient of stands, inter-stand clearance 
zones, hydrant system design, blast protection, roadway design, equipment staging 
areas and de-icing facilities on the functions being performed on the apron, i.e.: 
“… we didn't leave a whole lot of room for catering or for any other GSP. There is 
nowhere for them to stage dollies and carts. So we have put the staging area at the 
location, which is at the long distance. But that's the challenge. Since we've built new 
gates, there is no room for GSE there. At LAX our biggest problem is space - we are really 
constrained. We cannot expand anymore, we cannot take any more land. It is a challenge 
for everything, not only for the gates but also runway separation, taxiway separation, 
everything is reduced here. The FAA know about it but they don't know what to do about 
it.” 
c) ‘Surface conditions’ refers to the cleanliness of the apron in terms of contamination and 
FOD, i.e.: 
“… Everybody airside has to collect FOD. And if you see and cannot collect it, 
because of the location, then you need to report it to the airport.” 
d) ‘Marking, signage and lighting’ refers to the availability, adequacy and standardisation of 
apron marking, signage and lighting, i.e.: 
“… Double white markings are the ones that separate the apron to the aircraft stand from 





you have a black and white checker lines the taxiway crossing. To get across the taxiway, 
you drive across this area as long as it is safe to do so. And there is always a stop sign to 
tell you to stop before you go across. These are called uncontrolled crossings and you 
don't need ATC permission to cross. Stand clearway markings is the roadway between 
two stands. Interstand clearway - if we are waiting for an aircraft on one stand but there 
is nowhere safe to park within the parking area, then you can sit and wait in the 
interstand clearway.” 
e) ‘Apron control’ refers to the availability and technology used in the apron control 
function (i.e. ‘Assign stand/gate’) but also the delegation of responsibility between the 
airport, airline and ATC when it comes to apron control, i.e.: 
“… We have a letter of agreement with them where they agreed to control traffic in 
specific aliways, not all of them. So it depends if there is a dominant carrier (airline) who 
has the facility and capability of controlling that aliway. On the south side we have 
American ramp tower, Delta ramp tower and United ramp tower. So really the south side 
is controlled by the airlines and the north side is controlled by the Tower. And the other 
thing that is interesting, after hours (after midnight or so) those ramp towers close and 
then they revert back to the Tower. Except from Delta that stays open. So that would be 
C9 aliway that continues to be controlled by Delta 24h.” 
f) ‘Requirement of airside compliance’ refers to the airside policies related to safety. They 
include requirements for the employees (i.e. background checks), GSE (i.e. age limit) 
and operations on the apron, i.e.: 
“… Zero tolerance for drugs and alcohol. We do urine samples when they have their 
medicals. Driving permit is valid for 5 years. As a driving medical they do drug and 
alcohol tests and then if we suspect for any reason that anyone is under influence of drugs 
or alcohol or if anybody has had a driving accident then automatic blood analysis will be 
done. But we also have random tests.” 
5. Aircraft operator characteristics 
This factor refers to impact of airline characteristics on the functions that take place on the 
apron. Three subcategories of ‘Aircraft operator characteristics’ emerged during the process of 
open coding: 






“… Then we would tender for the prices and then they would audit us against the other 
companies to see which has the best procedures, environmental impact.” 
b) ‘Service Level Agreement (SLA)’ refers to the agreement about ground handling services 
provision according to the specified standards between the GSP and the airline, i.e.: 
“… You know, UPS are very strict with procedures. And we handle UPS contract here. 
On a B767 here, we put about 10 agents including the supervisor. UPS has so many 
procedures but they are willing to pay for it. On a B767, they put 30 people. I mean they 
have a few things that are different from other cargo operations that require a little bit 
more. But you could probably do the operations the way they want with 17 people. But 
they have so many added procedures that other carriers don't and are willing to pay for it. 
And there are just a lot of different procedures, which makes it very different from our 
other operations. But they are willing to pay for it while other companies want a lot but 
are not willing to pay.” 
c) ‘Safety oversight’ refers to the monitoring and verifying GSP’s compliance with the 
established rules and agreements (i.e. SLA), i.e.:  
“…Last year we had 7-8 audits in total. You would normally have a week notice. They 
are fulfilling their own audit trail. Their boss would ask that from them even though it is 
in some cases just ticking the boxes. But it is a safety-critical job so we need to accept it.” 
6. GSP characteristics 
This factor refers to impact of GSP corporate characteristics on the functions that take place 
on the apron. Five subcategories of ‘GSP characteristics’ emerged during the process of open 
coding: 
a) ‘Corporate change’ refers to the GSP restructuring due to acquisition, losses or mergers, 
i.e.: 
“… too many company they buy ASIG. The other company was BBA. Before was 
Signature, before Signature was Range Aerospace. Before that was the other company I 
forgot the name. Different managers - different people.” 
b) ‘Resource management’ in contrast with the function ‘Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing 
supplies’ (see Appendix III under 8) which addresses the management of resources in the 
front line day to day, ‘Resource management’ factor refers to the corporate management 
of resources. It includes selection, staffing, working conditions (i.e. salary, insurance), 
management of job satisfaction and turnover rates, and GSE acquisition (i.e. type, 





“…people not having situational awareness and not following proper procedures is 
because the turnover rate. We paid our employees the bare minimum.” 
c) ‘Safety management’ refers to safety management characteristics of a GSP based on the 
four components of the ICAO (2013e) SMS Manual: policies, safety risk management, 
safety assurance and safety promotion, i.e.: 
“…when I first arrived here to LA - the culture was horrible. We averaged about almost 
22% recordable injury rate. That is basically 3 a day, almost 7 a month. And year after 
year, now we are down at 3.2. That is basically maybe one every 2 months.” 
d) ‘Procedural factors’ in contrast to the function ‘Develop procedural guidance’ which focuses 
more on the fact that procedures and policies are in place, the ‘Procedural factors’ relate 
to the actual adequacy, clarity, complexity, effectiveness, efficiency and standardisation 
of procedures, i.e.: 
“… We are allowed to use any person available in the area for help, it doesn't matter 
which company it is. But the point it, if there is an accident, whose fault it is... 
Interesting! That is not specified within the company. Those are the grey areas. Different 
managers would give you different answers.” 
e) ‘Training factors’. In contrast to the function ‘Provide training to GSP employees’ which 
focuses more on the fact that training is in place, the ‘Training factors’ relate to the type 
(initial, computer-based, on the job or refresher training), quality and duration of the 
training process, i.e.: 
“… A lot of cross-training is involved. Our cabin service agents go out on the ramp and 
grasp the wheel chairs and the strollers and bring them up. That's usually ramper's job. 
So we have a lot of blurred lines, especially if you train cabin service and ramp. When we 
train people for cabin service, for example, the bulk of their training is certifying them to 
be able to do ramp as well. If we need them to get down and get the wheel chairs, they 
have to have Ramp Safety Type thing that the passenger service agent might not. And 
our fullers are all certified to be rampers too in an emergency.” 
7. GSP operations 
This factor refers to impact of characteristics of GSP operations at an airport on the execution 
of the functions that take place on the apron on a daily basis. Six subcategories of ‘GSP 
operations’ emerged during the process of open coding: 
a) ‘Base characteristics’ refer to the size of a GSP base, number and size of different units 





“… I used to work at Delta on T3 and the space was much, much bigger. You had 
everybody there, the ramp controller, the catering, in-flight service, rep of the pilots, reps 
of the ramp, passenger service, cleaners, maintenance - everyone in one room. It was a big 
operation. In order that the operations go smoothly, you need all departments to get first 
hand information.” 
b) ‘Expectations’ refer to the corporate or base expectations related to performance 
requirements and safe behaviour during the execution of functions on the apron, i.e.: 
“… It is very important; you have the lives of so many passengers on your hands. So we 
tell operators to take as much time as they need, that it is not a race and that they make 
sure aircraft is clean before it goes. Be 100% positive that the aircraft is clean”. 
c) ‘Teamwork’ refers to the team relations that exist with a GSP, between two or more GSPs 
and between the GSP and the airline at an airport, i.e.: 
“… If we are at the location that there is no jet bridge, we need to get the truck stairs. If 
ours is not operable, we will call the other company to borrow a pair of stairs. They would 
do the same for us. We are not afraid to speak to each other “Can I use your airstart”, 'As 
long as you bring it back, it is ok”. 
d) ‘Communication’. In contrast to the function ‘Communicate and coordinate task execution’ 
which focuses on communication process during the turnaround, the ‘Communication’ 
factor relates to the means of communication: i) verbal direct in person or by 
phone/radio or indirect communication via a middle person, ii) visual communication 
through hand signals, eye contact, uniforms, system indication, or iii) written 
communication through pen and paper or electronic media such as email or a 
computerised system, i.e.: 
“… but in the truck and we cannot hear it sometimes. And it happens, there are 
situations when we finish fuelling and disconnect but then the operations require more 
fuel. The coordinator will find out about that on the radio. But we won't, so we 
disconnect and leave. So the coordinator finds us and then we have to come back and do it 
all over again. We don't mind but the time is running. It would be much better if we had 
a radio.” 
e) ‘Time pressure’ refers to stress airport, airline and GSP employees face due to internal 
(i.e. self-imposed) or external (i.e. peer) pressure to complete a task within a 





time departures. In addition, time pressure may increase as a result of a disruption in 
flight schedules, caused by both early arrivals and delays51 i.e.: 
“… you needed to turnaround in 45mins and there is lot of pressure. You need to be on 
top of everybody. There is a process that you need to follow and if the process breaks you 
are falling 5min. You always need to make sure that every step follows the next step so 
that you can perform the 45min turn. Otherwise, if catering doesn't get there on time - 
that's it!” 
f) ‘Peer pressure’ refers to the influence the peers (i.e. airline representative, flight crew, 
engineers, lead, supervisor, other GSA) may have on an individual (i.e. GSA) before, 
during or following a task execution, i.e.: 
“…A lot of it comes to do that we are in the day and age when we are asked to do more 
with less. We are in the business of making money but we also need to keep people safe. It 
is same with airlines, GSPs etc. And that is when our employees feel the pressure. (Who 
is putting pressure on the employees?) It is at all levels from the bottom up. I think 
everybody feels it." 
8. Physiological factors 
This factor refers to impact of physiological characteristics of GSA on the execution of the 
functions that take place on the apron on a daily basis. Three subcategories of ‘Physiological 
factors’ emerged during the process of open coding: 
a) ‘Personal characteristics’ refer to the age, gender, height, weight, strength, hearing, 
sight, hunger/thirst and fitness for duty (i.e. illness), i.e.: 
“… Here we have two categories of people: one of them really young which is 18 to 30, 
and half of fullers are 50 or above. Young people react much quicker than the older ones. 
Old people cannot react this quickly, which puts pressure on them. This cannot be safe if 
you force them. Give them time to adjust. For young guys this is not a problem. This is 
not affecting their body but the driving skill. So the are rushing. They can get a ticket for 
that.” 
b) ‘Workload’ refers to the physical or mental demand (high and low) that is put on an 
individual (i.e. GSA) during the execution of task on the apron, i.e.: 
                                                      






“… you know with cargo and bags, they are heavy and can strain you throughout the 
day. Day by day, week-by-week, it can put a toll on your body.” 
c) ‘Fatigue’ refers to the impact of tiredness experienced by an individual (i.e. GSA) during 
the execution of task on the apron. Fatigue can be attributed to circadian rhythm52, shift 
characteristics, days off and the commute to work, i.e.: 
“… Well you don't ever wanna get someone work over 16h. We try not to let them work 
more than 12h. Cause it starts being double time so you need to start paying more. Due 
to fatigue we don't let anybody work over 12h.” 
9. Psychological factors 
This factor refers to impact of psychological characteristics of GSA on the execution of the 
functions that take place on the apron on a daily basis. Five subcategories of ‘Psychological 
factors’ emerged during the process of open coding: 
a) ‘Personality’ refers to individual’s (i.e. GSA) character traits such as job commitment, 
ability to work in a team, resilience, creativity, morale, fearlessness, i.e.:  
“… I think we have never been in a situation where we said that we just can't do it. So 
we just keep trying or get additional resources or the airline would come with 
maintenance and try to find a way to figure it out. Maybe find a way to manually lower 
the motorised wheels to allow it to free the palette and enable it to be pushed on and off.” 
b) ‘Cognition’ refers to individual’s (i.e. GSA) mental capabilities in terms of perception (i.e. 
visual, auditory, spatial, temporal, motional), decision-making and memory, i.e.: 
“…So we had to use our best judgement and we kind of misjudged a little bit. We 
misjudge it initially and we were out to far.” 
c) ‘Knowledge’ refers to individual’s (i.e. GSA) knowledge of airport and airline 
procedures, aircraft and GSE operations, phraseology and computing skills, i.e.: 
“… In breaking the fuel load, sometimes they mess it up. That's why I keep telling them if 
they don't know how to do it to ask the pilot or the mechanic. We do that manually.” 
d) ‘Experience’ refers to the level of individual’s (i.e. GSA) proficiency in execution of a 
function, i.e.: 
                                                      
52  Circadian rhythm also known as the “internal body clock”, is an internal mechanism that keeps the 





“…You don't know 100% where you are. But that is also something, which comes with 
judgement and experience, you know doing something repetitively. You kind of get a feel 
for the way jet bridge is. You can kind of tell, all right I've gone so far.” 
e) ‘Risk awareness’ refers to the individual’s (i.e. GSA) awareness of and risks behaviour 
(i.e. isolated or routine) behaviour towards risks on the apron and the behaviours, i.e.: 
“… Precaution yeah. Danger yeah but you gotta be careful. You don't want to get there 
and get yourself hurt. Safety is our No1. We are also precautious - we do not rush.” 
10. Drugs and alcohol 
This factor refers to the impact of drugs and alcohol on physiological and psychological state 
of employees (i.e. GSA), i.e.: 
“… The problem is for early shifts that start at 6am, the alcohol is still there from 2am. 
We had instances where security gates to come to the airside has picked up somebody that 
smells of alcohol and they have the right to stop you and call your manager.” 
11. GSP competition 
This factor refers to the impact of competition between GSP on the execution of the 
functions that take place on the apron on a daily basis, i.e.: 
“… That is all fine if we all work for the same company but if it is another company. Let 
say Gate Gourmet is catering the vehicle and we want to put a cleaning high-lift on. They 
have the catering high-lift that is on the door that we are supposed to use for cleaning but 
the TCO is Dnata (they are doing Check-in and turnaround of the plane). So the Dnata 
guy should go to the catering guy and tell him to off you come because they should be on. 
But he is going to argue about the authority ASIG, Dnata and Gate Gourmet. In theory 
everything should be standardised but due to disruptions the knock on creates problems. 
When the airlines used to handle it was different, there was a coordinator who everybody 
knew since you all worked for the same airline.” 
12. Global factors 
This factor refers to the circumstance at a national, regional or worldwide level that 
influence execution of functions on the apron. Three subcategories of ‘Global factors’ emerged 
during the process of open coding: 





“… I don't want to say that it is economical situation cause we are already little stable in the 
economy. So there are opportunities now. Couple of years ago, probably because they cannot get 
anything better, they kept this job. But right now, I think they are liking the company.” 
b) ‘Unions’ refer to the power of the trade union to protect and improve working 
conditions of the GSAs, i.e.: 
“… If for some reason they need to ask question about it, they need to contact the Union. 
They bring the representatives, their Union members. If there is something major, they 
have meetings. But if it is a minor thing, we deal with them here.” 
c) ‘Regulations’ refer to national, regional or worldwide regulations and standards related 
to the operations on the apron, i.e.: 
“… The Directive is a good thing but is a curse sometimes as well (laugh). Because people 
have the option to sign out from it. It is an EU Directive which we have implemented in 
the UK. There is a daily limit of work, daily limit of rest, weekly limit of rest, but you can 
deviate if you do compensatory rest and as soon as you start doing shift work then it 
starts being more complicated. So if the law says you have to have 11h rest between shifts, 
what if you do the morning shift and then you go back and do an afternoon shift… It is 
the employer's responsibility to assess risk and the employer approves risk. The operator 





Appendix V – Mapping between the reviewed taxonomies and the final taxonomy on the TASM variability 
Original taxonomy Changes in the final taxonomy (see Appendix VI and Appendix VII) when compared to the original taxonomies Factors deleted Factors modified Factors added 
REDA 
(Boeing, 2004) 
• Factors that correspond to phenotypes 
related to the: maintenance of GSE, 
operations of GSE, following the 
procedures and guidances, planning, 
prioritization, delegation and 
supervision tasks; 
• Factors that are unclear: Instructor’s 
empathy. 
• Negative connotations of the taxonomy were 
neutralized, i.e. information Not 
understandable was relabelled with 
Information clarity;  
• Some of the factors were restructured. For 
instance category Physical health was 
relabelled as Fitness for duty and divided into 
– Height, Strength, Weight and Well being. 
• Some higher-order factors in the 
original taxonomy was developed in 
more depth in the final taxonomy, i.e. 
Shift characteristics are further divided 
into 9 sub-categories;  
• Other higher-order factors cannot be 
found in the original taxonomy, i.e. 
Personality, Risk awareness, Season, Flight 








• Factors that were too generic or 
negative, i.e. Communication failure; 
• Factors that correspond to phenotypes, 
i.e. Horseplay/mischief; 
• Factors that correspond to TASM 
functions, i.e. Poor discipline that 
correspond to the function Assure safety 
and quality of the turnaround. 
• Negative connotations of the taxonomy were 
neutralized, i.e. Failure to see was relabelled 
as Visual perception;  
• Some factors are re-labelled, i.e. Poor 
judgment/complacency was relabelled as 
Decision-making 
• Higher-order factors that could not be 
found in the original taxonomy were 
added, i.e. Physiological factors, Traffic 
characteristics; 
• Lower-order factors that could not be 
found in the original taxonomy, i.e. 
Temperature, Humidity, Rain, Snow/Ice, 





• Factors that are unclear, i.e. Other 
personnel, Not regular work area. Not 
regular work crew; 
• Factors that correspond to phenotypes, 
i.e. Work practices (non compliance); 
• Factors that correspond to TASM 
functions, i.e. aircraft or GSE Staged in 
the wrong place; 
• Negative connotations of the taxonomy were 
neutralized, i.e. Lack of teamwork with Team 
structure, communication and coordination; 
• Certain factors were relabelled, i.e. Lack of 
assertiveness was relabeled as Decision-making 
(No decision/plan) 
• Some higher-order factors were 
populated with lower-order factors, i.e. 
category Workload was populated with 
Physical workload (Task precision, Task 
speed, Task motion, Task duration) and 
Mental workload (Information, Task 
execution, Internal pressure); 
• Some higher-level categories did not 
exist in the original taxonomy, i.e. 
Means of communication. 
NTSB’ study 
(NTSB, 2004) 
• Factors related to phenotypes and 
functions from the TASM model have 
• Factor Human error in the original taxonomy 
is too generic and high-level. Since the final 
• The factors from the original taxonomy 





been deleted from the original 
taxonomy, i.e. Failure to follow established 
procedures, Substandard equipment 
maintenance, Poor inadequate training. 
taxonomy does not recognize the concept of 
human error, this factor has been captured 
but through a much higher level of detail by 
accounting for all the factors that affect 
human variability on the apron. 
taxonomy develops the existing factors 
to a higher granularity, i.e. Ramp 
congestion is broken down into 6 sub-
categories; 
• In addition other higher-level factors 
were added in the final taxonomy, i.e. 




• Only factors Airspace structure and ATC 
equipment/navigation facility were 
deleted from the original taxonomy 
since they do not apply to apron 
operations. 
• In addition, factor Logbook entry was 
excluded from the final taxonomy as it 
corresponds to a TASM function (Assure 
safety and quality of the turnaround). 
• The labels for majority of the factors in the 
original taxonomy were slightly modified to 
make the final taxonomy categories more 
specific, i.e. Aircraft was relabelled with 
Aircraft characteristics. 
• The factors from the original taxonomy 
are very high-level therefore the final 
taxonomy develops the existing factors 
to a higher granularity, i.e. the 
equivalent of Equipment/tooling – GSE 
characteristics in the final taxonomy is 
broken down into 18 sub-categories; 
• In addition other higher-level factors 
were added in the final taxonomy, i.e. 
Traffic characteristics. 
NASA’s study 
(Chamberlin et al., 
1995) 
• Factors Improper guidance, taxi or parking 
instruction, Improper positioning of ground 
equipment and Procedural issues were 
excluded from the original taxonomy 
because they have been defined as 
functions in the TASM model. 
• Due to the context in which communication 
issues were discussed in the study, factor 
Communication in the original taxonomy was 
relabelled as Means of communication in the 
final taxonomy. 
• The factors from the original taxonomy 
are very high-level therefore the final 
taxonomy develops the existing factors 
to a higher granularity, i.e. the 
equivalent of Communication – Means of 
communications in the final taxonomy is 
broken down into 37 lowest-level 
factors; 
• In addition other higher-level factors 
were added in the final taxonomy, i.e. 
Resource acquisition and management. 
Wilke’s taxonomy 
(Wilke et al., 2012, 
Wilke, 2013) 
• Factors that describe phenotypes in the 
original taxonomy (i.e. Aircraft technical 
failure) were excluded from the final 
taxonomy since they are already 
captured with TASM functions; 
• Factors related to the manoeuvring are 
were excluded from the original 
taxonomy since they do not correspond 
to the scope of the final taxonomy, i.e. 
ATC. 
• Due to the different organisation of the 
original taxonomy, some factors have been 
relabelled in the final taxonomy, i.e. Pressure 
by other crewmembers as Peer pressure (Pressure 
imposed by other ramp personnel). 
• While many higher-level factors 
overlap between the original and final 
taxonomy, the subcategories are 
significantly different. The original 
taxonomy lists the phenotypes whereas 
the final taxonomy lists the genotypes 
instead. 
• In addition, new higher order 
categories were added in the final 





Apron characteristics, Organisational 
climate and structure. 
SLIM 
(Embrey, 1983) 
• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
• While all categories can be found in both 
original and final taxonomies, due to 
different context, level of granularity and 
organisation some categories were relabelled 
in the final taxonomy, i.e. Available time was 
relabelled as Pressure to maintain on-time 
departures. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Traffic characteristics, 




• Some factors were excluded from the 
original taxonomy since they were 
considered to be activities and as such 
captured with the TASM functions, i.e. 
Vigilance, Feedback HMI. 
• Some factors in the original taxonomy were 
relabelled in the final taxonomy, i.e. 
Perceptual requirements were relabelled as 
Perception. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 




• Some factors were excluded from the 
original taxonomy since they were 
considered to be activities and as such 
captured with the TASM functions, i.e. 
Checking, Unclear allocation and 
responsibility. 
• Some factors were re-clustered and 
relabelled, i.e. Technique learning and 
Operator inexperience in the original 
taxonomy were relabelled with Experience in 
the final taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. GSE characteristics, 
External GSP factors. 
ATHEANA 
Cooper et al. (1996) 
• None • Some factors were relabelled in the final 
taxonomy, i.e. Ergonomics, HMI, 
Instrumentation were relabelled as 
Characteristics of aircraft or GSE. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 




• Some factors were excluded from the 
original taxonomy since they were 
considered to be activities and as such 
captured with the TASM functions, i.e. 
• Some factors were relabelled in the final 
taxonomy, i.e. Quality of information and 
interface were relabelled as Information 
(Quality). 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 





Training/Competence. • In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 




• None • Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Number of 
simultaneous goals in the original taxonomy 
was relabelled with Number of flights in the 
final taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduced to reflect 
apron operations, i.e. Cognition, 
Personality. 
TRACEr-Rail 
Rail Safety and 
Standards Board 
(2004) 
• Some factors were excluded from the 
original taxonomy since they were 
considered to be activities and as such 
captured with the TASM functions, i.e. 
Poor/Delayed/Incomplete feedback. 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Ability to 
detect and perceive in the original taxonomy 
was relabelled with Perception in the final 
taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 





• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Pilot-
controller communication in the original 
taxonomy was relabelled with Means of 
communication in the final taxonomy. 
• While this taxonomy offers a high-
level of granularity, it is ATM specific. 
Therefore existing higher-level factors 
were populated factors that specific to 
the apron environment; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Safety management. 
HERMES 
Cacciabue (2004) 
• Some factors, i.e. Roster/shift planning in 
the original taxonomy were excluded 
since they have already been considered 
as activities and as such captured with 
the TASM functions. 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. 
Technological interfaces in the original 
taxonomy was relabelled with Technological 
characteristics in the final taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Resource acquisition and 
management. 
SPAR-H 
Gertman et al. 
• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Available 
time in the original taxonomy was relabelled 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 





(2004) considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
with Pressure to maintain on-time departures in 
the final taxonomy. 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Traffic characteristics. 
HEPI 
Khan et al. (2006) 
• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
• While all categories can be found in both 
original and final taxonomies, due to 
different context, level of granularity and 
organisation some categories were relabelled 
in the final taxonomy, i.e. Distraction was 
relabelled as Workplace distraction. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Resource acquisition and 
management. 
HFACS-RR 
Reinach and Viale 
(2006) 
 
• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
• While all categories can be found in both 
original and final taxonomies, due to 
different context, level of granularity and 
organisation some categories were relabelled 
in the final taxonomy, i.e. Distraction was 
relabelled as Workplace distraction. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Aircraft Operator (AO) 
characteristics. 
HERA 
Hallbert et al. 
(2007) 
• Factor Training in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Ergonomics 
and HMI in the original taxonomy was 
relabelled with Technological characteristics in 
the final taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Safety management. 
CARA 
Gibson and Kirwan 
(2008) 
• Some factors were excluded from the 
original taxonomy since they were 
considered to be activities and as such 
captured with the TASM functions, i.e. 
Vigilance, Checking. 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Cognitive 
overload in the original taxonomy was 
relabelled with Workload (Mental) in the final 
taxonomy. 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. Means of communication. 
HFs in Railways 
Hammerl and 
Vanderhaegen 
• Factor Roster planning provided by 
organisation in the original taxonomy 
was excluded since it has already been 
• Some factors were relabelled, i.e. Safety 
awareness in the original taxonomy was 
relabelled with Risk awareness in the final 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 





(2009) considered as an activity and as such 
captured with the TASM functions. 
taxonomy. factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 
operations, i.e. External GSP factors. 
RARA 
Rail Safety and 
Standards Board 
(2012) 
• Factor Technique learning in the original 
taxonomy was excluded since it has 
already been considered as an activity 
and as such captured with the TASM 
functions. 
• Negative connotations of the taxonomy were 
neutralized, i.e. information Operator 
inexperience was relabelled with Experience;  
• While all categories can be found in both 
original and final taxonomies, due to 
different context, level of granularity and 
organisation some categories were relabelled 
in the final taxonomy, i.e. Task complexity 
was relabelled as Task execution (Complexity). 
• Due to high-level of abstraction of the 
original taxonomy, existing clusters 
were populated with lower-order 
factors in the final taxonomy; 
• In addition some new higher-order 
factors were introduces to reflect apron 





Appendix VI – The description for the first four levels of the final 
taxonomy of variability 
Variability of human functions 
According to Hollnagel (2012b, p. 65) human functions are those “carried out by humans, 
either as individuals (individual performance) or in small, informal (social) groups (collective 
performance).” Variability of these functions can be either internal (endogenous) or external 
(exogenous). 
Internal variability 
Internal variability of human functions can be caused by: Physiological, Psychological factors, 
and Drugs and alcohol.  
Physiological factors refer to i) Personal characteristics (i.e. age, gender, fitness for duty), ii) 
Workload defined as Physical (due to physical demand of the task) or Mental (attributed to the 
mental demand of the task), and iii) Fatigue associated with circadian rhythm, commute to 
works, shift characteristics or days off. 
Psychological factors refer to i) Personality traits (i.e. commitment, creativity, leadership 
ability), ii) Cognition associated with perception, decision-making and memory, iii) 
Knowledge/skills required to carry out a function, iii) Experience, iv) Risk awareness. 
Drugs and alcohol refers to the use of psychoactive substances, which may impair the 
execution of the human functions. Since these factors can affect both Physiological and 
Psychological factors, they have been clustered as a separate category. 
External variability 
External variability of human functions can be caused by: Ambient conditions, Traffic 
characteristics, Technological characteristics, Apron characteristics, Apron control, Communication 
and Social environment.  
Ambient conditions refer to the following conditions during the execution of human 
functions – i) Weather conditions, ii) Noise levels, iii) Vibrations, iv) Season, v) Time of day, vi) 





Traffic characteristics refer to traffic numbers and their distribution during the execution of 
human functions – i) Number of flight, ii) Time between flights served by a GSA/E, iii) 
Distribution of aircraft that need servicing across the airport, iv) Flight characteristics (i.e. 
aircraft operator characteristics, duration of turnaround), v) Coactivity (on one or 
neighbouring stands), vi) Congestion in different areas on the apron, vii) Emergency services. 
Technological characteristics refer to i) Aircraft characteristics, ii) GSE characteristics, iii) Load 
unit characteristics, and iv) PPE characteristics. Technology related to the airport infrastructure 
is explained under Apron characteristics. 
Apron characteristics refer to i) Airport location, ii) Surface design (i.e. apron or terminal 
building design), iii) Surface conditions, iv) Lighting, and v) Marking/signage. 
Apron control refers to the Availability, Responsibility for and Technology present to perform 
the apron control. 
Communication mainly refers to the Means of communication (i.e. verbal, visual, written) 
between all direct stakeholders on the apron and Other factors which may affect these 
communication means. 
Social environment refers to the factors from the social environment that affect the 
operator(s) performing a human function – i) Team characteristics, ii) Peer pressure (i.e. 
pressure by the supervisor or the flight crew), iii) Time pressure (i.e. for on-time departure, or 
induced by delays or early arrivals), iv) Workplace distractions (i.e. interruption during 
execution of a function), v) Norms and expectation imposed onto the operator(s) by the direct 
stakeholders present on the apron during the execution of a human function.. 
Variability of organisational functions 
According to Hollnagel (2012b, p. 66) organisational functions are those “carried out by a 
group or groups of people, sometimes very large groups, where the activities are explicitly organised.” 
Variability of these functions can be either internal (endogenous) or external (exogenous). 
Internal variability 
Internal variability of organisational functions can be caused by: Resources/acquisition 






Resources management refers to management of i) Human resources that includes GSP 
employee selection, training methods, staffing, salary, insurance, job satisfaction and 
turnover rate, ii) GSE/facility resources related to acquisition and management of the 
equipment (i.e. type, condition and quantity of units), and iii) GSP budget. 
Organisational structure refers to the characteristics of GSP’s i) Chain of command, ii) 
Delegation of authority, iii) Communication within GSP and other GSPs, airports and airlines at 
the organisational level, and iv) Base characteristics in terms of the size of the base and 
different business units within the base, as well as the operational tempo of the base. 
Organisational climate refers to the i) Norms and rules, ii) Values and beliefs, iii) Team relations, 
and iv) Safety culture within a GSP. 
Safety management refers to the four cornerstones of an SMS within a GSP i) Policies (i.e. 
hiring and firing, overtime, safety policies, maintenance policies), ii) Safety risk management 
(i.e. individual or joint), iii) Safety assurance (i.e. inspections and audits) and iv) Safety 
promotion (i.e. initiatives within the GSP and other direct stakeholders). 
External variability 
External variability of organisational functions can be caused by: Global factors, External GSP 
factors, Airline characteristics, Airport characteristics, and Competing GSP factors. 
Global factors refer to the impact of i) Global economy, ii) Forces of nature, iii) Regulations and 
iv) Legislations on the operations of all direct stakeholders on the apron. 
External GSP factors refer to the impact of i) Commercial pressure, ii) Financial pressure, iii) 
Corporate change/restructuring, iv) Customer expectations, and v) Union actions on GSP 
operations. 
Airline characteristics refer to the i) GSP selection criteria, ii) Service Level Agreement (SLA), iii) 
Organisational culture within the airline, iv) Safety oversight of apron operations, v) Aircraft 
maintenance policies, and vi) Airline budget. 
Airport characteristics refer to the i) Requirements for airside compliance for GSE and 






Competing GSP factors refers to the characteristics of competing GSP providers regarding i) 







Appendix VII – The complete list of 440 factors of the final taxonomy of 
variability 
Factors affecting variability of the TASM functional model  
• 1 Human function  
o 11 Internal variability  
! 111 Physiological  
! 1111 Personal characteristics  
! 11111 Age  
! 11112 Gender  
! 11113 Hearing  
! 11114 Sight  
! 11115 Hunger/thirst  
! 11116 Fitness for duty  
! 111161Height  
! 111162 Weight  
! 111163 Strength  
! 111164 Well being  
! 1112 Workload  
! 11121 Physical  
! 111211Task speed  
! 111212 Task duration  
! 111213 Task precision  
! 111214 Task motion  
! 1112141 Requires twisting  
! 1112142 Requires 
kneeling/bending/stooping  
! 1112143 Requires forceful exertions  
! 1112144 Requires walking backwards  
! 11122 Mental  
! 111221 Information  
! 1112211 Availability  
! 1112212 Quantity  
! 1112213 Clarity  
! 1112214 Accuracy  
! 1112215 Quality  
! 111222 Task execution  
! 1112221Familiarity  
! 11122211New task  
! 11122212 Task change  
! 11122213 Different from other 
similar tasks  
! 1112222 Frequency  
! 11122221 High  
! 11122222 Low  
! 1112223 Complexity  
! 111223 Internal pressure  
! 1112231 Financial pressure  
! 1112232 Personal stress  
! 11122321 Personal event (e.g. family 
problem, car accident)  
! 11122322 Emotional stress  
! 1113 Fatigue  
! 11131 Circadian rhythm  
! 11132 Commute to work  





! 111331 1st half of shift  
! 111332 1st shift after extended absence  
! 111333 Last half of shift  
! 111334 Shift/day swap  
! 111335 Second/third job  
! 111336 Overtime  
! 111337 Work hours  
! 111338 Work breaks  
! 111339 Split shifts  
! 11134 Days off  
! 112 Psychological  
! 1121 Personality  
! 11211 Committed  
! 11212 Ability to work in a team  
! 11213 Resilient  
! 11214 Creative  
! 11215 Morale  
! 11216 Leadership ability  
! 11217 Courageous  
! 11218 Anxious  
! 1122 Cognition  
! 11221 Perception  
! 112211 Visual  
! 1122111 Visual information available, correct 
and correctly interpreted  
! 1122112 Visual information not available  
! 1122113 Visual information incorrect  
! 1122114 Visual information correct but 
misinterpreted  
! 1122115 Visual information correct but 
missed  
! 112212 Auditory  
! 1122121 Auditory information available, 
correct and correctly interpreted  
! 1122122 Auditory information not available  
! 1122123 Auditory information incorrect  
! 1122124 Auditory information correct but 
misinterpreted  
! 1122125 Auditory information correct but 
missed  
! 112213 Spatial  
! 1122131 Unfamiliarity  
! 11221311 Apron layout  
! 112213111 Unfamiliarity of 
recent changes  
! 11221312 Construction works  
! 11221313 Work practices  
! 11221314 Procedures  
! 1122132 Disorientation  
! 1122133 Confusion  
! 1122134 Diagrams/Carts  
! 11221341 Not using/missing  
! 11221342 Inaccurate/out of date  
! 1122135 'Sign blindness' caused by a 
multitude of signs  
! 1122136 Surrounding traffic  
! 1122137 Surrounding employees  





! 1122139 Surrounding infrastructure  
! 11221310 Driving gear  
! 11221311 GSE turn radius  
! 11221312 Hand brake  
! 112214 Temporal  
! 112215 Velocity  
! 11222 Decision-making  
! 112221 Correct decision/plan  
! 1122211 On time  
! 1122212 Too late  
! 112222 Incorrect decision/plan  
! 112223 No decision/plan  
! 11223 Memory  
! 112231 Forgotten  
! 112232 Incomplete recall  
! 112233 Incorrect recall  
! 112234 Complete and correct recall  
! 1124 Knowledge/skills  
! 11241 Task knowledge  
! 11242 Instructor's knowledge and experience  
! 11243 Airline process knowledge  
! 11244 Ground service process knowledge  
! 11245 Aircraft system knowledge  
! 11246 Aircraft configuration knowledge  
! 11247 Airport process knowledge  
! 11248 Airport configuration knowledge  
! 11249 Communication skills  
! 112491 English language proficiency  
! 112492 Use of phraseology  
! 112493 Use of hand signals  
! 112410 Computing skills  
! 1125 Experience  
! 11251 Too much  
! 11252 Too little  
! 1126 Risk awareness  
! 11261 Full awareness of risks and hazards  
! 11262 Isolated risk behaviour  
! 112621 A mismatch between perceived and real risk  
! 112622 Desire to cut corners to save time and energy  
! 112623 Belief that the rule/procedure no longer 
apply  
! 112624 Balance of safety and efficiency  
! 11263 Routine risk behaviour  
! 112631 A mismatch between perceived and real risk  
! 112632 Desire to cut corners to save time and energy  
! 112633 Belief that the rule/procedure no longer 
apply  
! 112634 Balance of safety and efficiency  
! 11264 Lack of awareness of risks and hazards  
! 11265 Malicious behaviour  
! 113 Drugs and alcohol  
o 12 External variability  
! 121 Ambient conditions  
! 1211 Weather conditions  
! 12111 Temperature  
! 121111 Cold  





! 12112 Humidity  
! 12113 Rain  
! 12114 Snow/Ice  
! 12115 Tornado/Hurricane  
! 12116 Thunderstorm  
! 12117 Visibility  
! 12118 Hail  
! 12119 Wind  
! 121110 Sand storm  
! 1212 Noise levels  
! 12121 People  
! 12122 Equipment  
! 12123 Aircraft  
! 1213 Vibrations  
! 1214 Season  
! 12141 High season  
! 12142 Low season  
! 12143 Spring  
! 12144 Summer  
! 12145 Autumn  
! 12156 Winter  
! 1215 Time of day  
! 12151 Day  
! 12152 Night  
! 12153 Dusk/dawn  
! 1216 Day of the week  
! 122 Traffic characteristics  
! 1221 Number of flights  
! 12211 Scheduled  
! 12212 Unscheduled  
! 1222 Time between flights served by a GSE  
! 1223 Distribution of aircraft that need servicing across the airport  
! 1224 Flight characteristics  
! 12241 Aircraft operator characteristics  
! 122411 Passenger  
! 1224111 Traditional  
! 1224112 Low-cost  
! 122412 Cargo  
! 12242 Range  
! 122421 International  
! 122422 Domestic  
! 12243 Handling airport  
! 122431 Hub  
! 122432 Non-hub  
! 12244 Duration of the turnaround  
! 1225 Coactivity  
! 12251 Neighbouring gates/stands  
! 12252 Neighbouring tasks  
! 1226 Congestion  
! 12261 Movement restrictions  
! 122611 Jet blast  
! 122612 Multiple pushbacks  
! 12262 Congestion on the aircraft clearance zones  
! 12263 Congestion on the equipment parking positions  
! 12264 Congestion on the road  
! 12265 Congestion on the apron interstrand walkway  





! 1227 Emergency services  
! 12271 Medical  
! 12272 Fire/explosion  
! 12273 Security  
! 12274 Technical  
! 123 Technological characteristics  
! 1231 Aircraft characteristics  
! 12311 Model  
! 123111 Steps  
! 123112 Antenna  
! 123113 Aircraft systems  
! 123114 Colour  
! 12312 Size  
! 12313 Age  
! 12314 Aircraft-related condition  
! 123141 Hard surfaces, steps, handrails  
! 123142 Biohazardous materials  
! 123143 Toxic substances  
! 123144 Power sources  
! 123145 Ventilation  
! 123146 Sharp objects  
! 123147 Slippery surface  
! 123148 Cupboard doors  
! 123149 Narrow space  
! 1231410 Dangerous goods  
! 1231411 Hot surfaces  
! 1232 Ground Service Equipment (GSE) characteristics  
! 12321 Model  
! 12322 Size  
! 12323 Age  
! 12324 Weight  
! 12325 Automation  
! 12326 GSE-related condition  
! 123261 Hard surfaces, steps, handrails  
! 123262 Biohazardous materials  
! 123263 Toxic substances  
! 123264 Power sources  
! 123265 Ventilation  
! 123266 Sharp objects  
! 123267 Slippery surface  
! 123268 GSE doors  
! 123269 Narrow space  
! 1232610 Dangerous goods  
! 1232611 Hot surfaces  
! 1232612 Uneven surfaces  
! 1232613 Lights  
! 1233 Load unit characteristics  
! 12331 Type  
! 123311 Bag  
! 123312 Pallet  
! 123313 Container  
! 12332 Weight  
! 12333 Size  
! 12334 Load unit-related condition  
! 123341 Strap snapping  
! 12342 Load unit stuck  





! 12341 Eyes  
! 123411 Safety spectacles  
! 123412 Goggles  
! 123413 Face screen  
! 123414 Faceshields  
! 12342 Head and neck  
! 123421 Safety helmets  
! 123422 Bump caps  
! 12343 Ears  
! 123431 Earplugs  
! 123432 Earmuffs  
! 12344 Hands and arms  
! 123441 Gloves  
! 12345 Feet and legs  
! 123451 Safety shoes  
! 123452 Safety boots  
! 12346 Whole body  
! 123461 Overalls  
! 123462 Aprons  
! 124 Apron characteristics  
! 1241 Airport location  
! 12411 Familiarity  
! 12412 Unfamiliarity  
! 1242 Surface design  
! 12421 Apron design  
! 124211 Stand size  
! 124212 Stand orientation  
! 124213 Gradient  
! 1242131 Incline  
! 1242132 Level  
! 1242133 Decline  
! 124214 Obstacle clearance  
! 124215 Hydrant system design  
! 1242151 Number of fuel pits  
! 1242152 Position/distribution of fuel pits  
! 124216 Blast protection  
! 124217 Walkway/Roadway design  
! 124218 Interstand clearance  
! 124219 Parking space  
! 1242120 Equipment staging areas  
! 1242121 Stand location  
! 12421211 Ground handling  
! 12421212 De/anti-icing  
! 12422 Building/facility design  
! 1243 Surface conditions  
! 12431 Cleanliness  
! 124311 Contamination  
! 1243111 Slippery surface  
! 1243112 Presence of hazardous/toxic 
substances  
! 124312 FOD  
! 1243121 Equipment operating on the airfield  
! 1243122 Construction debris  
! 1243123 Wildlife/wildlife remains  
! 1243124 Personal belongings of passengers 
and employees  





! 12431251 Tire  
! 12431252 Engine  
! 1243126 From GSE  
! 12431261 Fuel pit marker  
! 12431262 Chocks  
! 12431263 Wheel  
! 12431264 Dolly caster  
! 1243127 Environmental e.g. gravel, sand, 
stones  
! 1243128 Other parts/debris on apron  
! 12431281 Baggage tags  
! 12431282 Plastics (e.g. 
bags)/packing materials  
! 12431283 Garbage  
! 12431284 Glass  
! 12431285 Ground coupling pit 
marker  
! 12432 State of repair  
! 124321 Surface  
! 1243211 Bumps  
! 1243212 Potholes  
! 124322 Hydrant system  
! 12433 Work in progress  
! 1244 Lighting  
! 12441 Available and fully operable  
! 12442 Inadequate/confusing  
! 124421 Lighting is not adequate for nightime 
operations  
! 124422 Colour coding is confusing  
! 124423 Creating glare or dazzle for GSAs  
! 124424 Creating glare or dazzle for pilots  
! 124425 Creating glare or dazzle for ground control  
! 12443 Not provided  
! 12444 Inoperable  
! 1245 Marking/Signage  
! 12451 Available and adequate  
! 12452 Inadequate  
! 124521 For a particular type of aircraft  
! 124522 For GSE parking  
! 124523 For night time operations  
! 124524 Former changes in markings/signage  
! 124525 Poor condition (lines erased, signage not 
readable anymore)  
! 124526 Ambiguous  
! 12453 Not standardised  
! 124531 Format  
! 124532 Message they convey  
! 124533 Position  
! 12454 Not provided  
! 125 Apron control  
! 1251 Availability  
! 1252 Responsibility  
! 1253 Technology  
! 126 Communication  
! 1261 Means of communication  
! 12611 Within a Ground Service Provider (GSP)  





! 1261111 Direct communication  
! 12611111 In person  
! 12611112 Radio  
! 12611113 Telephone  
! 1261112 Indirect communication  
! 12611121 In person  
! 126112 Visual  
! 1261121 Hand signals  
! 1261122 Eye contact  
! 1261123 Uniforms  
! 126113 Written  
! 1261131 Pen and paper  
! 12611311 Paper sheets  
! 1261132 Electronic  
! 12611321 Computerised system  
! 12611322 Email  
! 12612 Between a Ground Service Agent (GSA) and the Flight 
Crew  
! 126121 Verbal  
! 1261211 Direct communication  
! 12612111 In person  
! 12612112 Intercom  
! 1261212 Indirect communication  
! 12612121 Via Turnaround Manager  
! 12512122 Via Aircraft Operator (AO) 
representative  
! 12612123 Via Aircraft Operator (AO) 
operations  
! 126122 Visual  
! 1261221 Hand signals  
! 1261222 Eye contact  
! 1261223 Uniforms  
! 1261224 Aircraft systems  
! 12613 Between a Ground Service Provider (GSP) and the 
Aircraft Operator (AO) operations  
! 126131 Verbal  
! 1261311 Direct communication  
! 12613111 In person  
! 12613112 Telephone  
! 1261312 Indirect communication  
! 12613121 Via Ground Service 
Provider (GSP) supervisor  
! 126132 Written  
! 1261321 Pen and paper  
! 1261322 Electronic  
! 12613221 Computerised system  
! 12613222 Email  
! 12613226 ACARS  
! 126133 Visual  
! 1261331 Uniforms  
! 12614 Between Ground Service Providers (GSPs)  
! 126141 Verbal  
! 1261411 Direct communication  
! 12614111 Physical  
! 12614112 Telephone  
! 1261412 Indirect communication  





! 12614122 Via Aircraft Operator (AO) 
representative  
! 12614123 Via Aircraft Operator (AO) 
operations  
! 126142 Visual  
! 1261421 Hand signals  
! 1261422 Eye contact  
! 1261423 Uniforms  
! 126143 Written  
! 1261431 Pen and paper  
! 1261432 Electronic  
! 12614321 Email  
! 12615 Non-existence of a communication link  
! 1262 Other factors that affect communication  
! 12621 Frequency  
! 126211 Setting  
! 126212 Congestion  
! 12622 Contact information availability  
! 12623 Distance between communication actors  
! 127 Social environment  
! 1271 Team characteristics  
! 12711 Team size  
! 12712 Team structure, communication and coordination  
! 127121 Inter-Ground Service Provider (GSP)  
! 127122 Intra-Ground Service Provider (GSP)  
! 127123 Ground Service Provider (GSP) - Aircraft 
Operator (AO)  
! 1272 Peer pressure  
! 12721 Pressure imposed by the supervisor  
! 12722 Pressure imposed by other ramp personnel  
! 12723 Pressure imposed by flight crew  
! 12724 Pressure imposed by the airline representative  
! 12725 Pressure imposed by the ground engineer  
! 1273 Time pressure  
! 12731 Pressure to maintain on-time departures  
! 12732 Disruptions  
! 127321 Delays  
! 1273211 Passenger and Baggage  
! 1273212 Cargo and Mail  
! 1273213 Aircraft and Ramp Handling  
! 1273214 Technical and Aircraft Equipment  
! 1273215 Damage to Aircraft & 
EDP/Automated Equipment Failure  
! 1273216 Flight Operations and Crewing  
! 1273217 Air Traffic Flow Management 
Restrictions  
! 1273218 Airport and governmental 
authorities  
! 1273219 Reactionary  
! 12732110 Miscellaneous  
! 12732111 Others  
! 127322 Early arrivals  
! 1274 Workplace distraction  
! 12741 Interruption during task performance  
! 12742 Misplaced concentration  
! 1275 Norms and expectations  





• 2 Organisational function  
o 21 Internal variability  
! 211 Resources management  
! 2111 Human resources  
! 21111 Selection  
! 21112 Training methods  
! 211121 Initial training  
! 211122 Computer based training  
! 211123 On-the-job training  
! 21113 Staffing  
! 21114 Salary  
! 21115 Insurance  
! 21116 Job satisfaction  
! 21117 Turnover rate  
! 2112 GSE/facility resources  
! 21121 Type  
! 21122 Condition  
! 21123 Quantity  
! 2113 GSP budget  
! 212 Organisational structure  
! 2121 Chain of command  
! 2122 Delegation of authority  
! 2123 Communication  
! 21231 Within the GSP  
! 21232 Between different GSPs  
! 21233 With the airport  
! 21234 With the airline/flight crew  
! 2125 Base characteristics  
! 21251 Size of the base  
! 21252 Size of the unit  
! 21253 Operational tempo  
! 213 Organisational climate  
! 2131 Norms and rules  
! 2132 Values and beliefs  
! 2133 Team relations  
! 2134 Safety culture  
! 214 Safety Management  
! 2141 Policies  
! 21411 Hiring and firing  
! 21412 Promotion/Retention  
! 21413 Sick leaves  
! 21414 Overtime  
! 21415 Safety policies  
! 214151 Formal accountability for actions  
! 214152 Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  
! 214153 Drugs and alcohol  
! 214154 Accident investigations  
! 21416 Maintenance policies  
! 21417 Procedural factors  
! 214171 Adequate  
! 214172 Not understandable/Complex  
! 214173 Ambiguous/Confusing  
! 2141731 Conflict between immediate and 
long term objectives  
! 2141732 Conflict of motives about job 
performance  





! 214175 Too much/Conflicting information  
! 214176 Incomplete  
! 214177 Update process is to long/complicated  
! 214178 Inefficient  
! 214179 Information not used  
! 2141710  Ineffective  
! 2141711 Unavailable/Inaccessible 
! 2141712 Lack of standardisation  
! 2142 Safety Risk Management  
! 21421 Individual  
! 21422 Joint  
! 2143 Safety Assurance  
! 21431 Inspections  
! 21432 Audits  
! 2144 Safety Promotion  
! 21441 Within a GSP  
! 214411 Reward initiatives  
! 21442 With all stakeholders  
o 22 External variability  
! 221 Global factors  
! 2211 Global economy  
! 2212 Forces of nature  
! 2213 Regulations  
! 2214 Legislations  
! 222 External GSP factors  
! 2221 Commercial pressure  
! 2222 Financial pressure  
! 2223 Corporate change/restructuring  
! 2224 Customer expectations  
! 2225 Union action  
! 223 Airline characteristics  
! 2231 GSP selection criteria  
! 2232 Service Level Agreement (SLA)  
! 22321 Required number of Ground Service Agents (GSAs)  
! 22322 Type of service  
! 22323 Training requirements  
! 22324 Procedures  
! 223241 Use of a guide person  
! 223242 GSE positioning  
! 223243 Maximum number of dollies  
! 223244 Stand markings  
! 223245 Passenger boarding during fuelling  
! 223246 Chocks and cones  
! 22325 Waivers  
! 22326 Number of Ground Service Providers (GSP) that 
jointly serve an aircraft  
! 2233 Organisational culture  
! 2234 Safety oversight  
! 2235 Aircraft maintenance policies  
! 2236 Airline budget  
! 224 Airport characteristics  
! 2241 Requirement of airside compliance  
! 22411 Employees  
! 224111 Background security checks  
! 22412 GSE  
! 2242 Safety oversight  





! 2244 Airport budget  
! 225 Competing GSP factors  
! 2251 Resources management  
! 2252 Organisational structure  
! 2253 Organisational culture  
! 22531 Norms and rules  
! 22532 Values and beliefs  
! 22533 Team relations  
! 22534 Safety culture  
! 2254 Safety management  
! 22541 Safety policies  
! 22542 Safety risk management  
! 22543 Safety assurance  







Appendix VIII – The final TASM functional model 
Name of function Assess requirements for ground services 
Description This function refers to the process of identifying the requirements for 
the services that need to be performed on the aircraft during the 
turnaround process. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Define services that need to be performed 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control Airline procedures 
Flight information 
A/c is maintained and tested 
Current and prospect weather conditions assessment 
Time  
 
Name of function Develop procedural guidance 
Description This function refers to the process of developing procedures at 
i) the airport operator, ii) aircraft operator, and iii) GSP level. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  












Name of function Communicate and coordinate task execution 
Description This function refers to the process of communication and coordination 
that occurs before, during, and following the execution of all the 
remaining functions during the turnaround. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Define services that need to be performed 
Interface with the a/c established 
A/c is secured 
A/c has arrived to the gate/stand 
GSE is being guided into position 
A/c door opened 
GSE is operated 
A/c is disembarked 
Aircraft cabin is serviced 
Turnaround process managed and coordinated 
Load Units are offloaded 
Output Task execution coordinated 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control Flight information 
GSP employees are trained 
Time  
 
Name of function Provide and update flight information 
Description This function refers to the process of provision of accurate current 
and prospect information to direct stakeholders at the apron. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 










Name of function Maintain and test a/c 
Description This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of 
aircraft and their regular testing by aircraft operator engineers 
before every flight. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input A/c is inspected 
Output A/c is maintained and tested 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control Airline procedures 
Time  
 
Name of function Dispatch GSAs and GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of dispatching GSAs and 
GSEs for the turnaround. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output GSA and GSE assignment 
Precondition  
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Optimal number of required GSE for each task 
Optimal quantity of replenishing supplies 







Name of function Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Description This function refers to the process of assuring the GSP has enough 
resources to perform ground handling services on a daily basis. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Flight information 
Output Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Optimal number of required GSE for each task 
Optimal rosters 







GSA and GSE assignment 
Current and prospect weather conditions assessment 
GSE is maintained and tested 
Time  
 
Name of function Drive GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of driving and parking GSE on the 
apron surface outside the inner Circle of Safety. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input GSA and GSE assignment 
Output GSE reached its destination 
Precondition GSE is inspected 
Records are kept 
GSP employees are trained 
Load units are prepared and sorted on dollies/carts 
Resource Optimal number of required GSE for each task 
Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control Flight information 
Airport procedures 
Procedures are enforced 







Name of function Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
Description This function refers to the turnaround process safety and quality 
assurance. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output GSE is inspected 
Records are kept 
Procedures are enforced 
Apron is inspected 
A/c is inspected 





Name of function Guide GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of guiding GSE on the apron 
surface within the inner Circle of Safety to assure clear line of sight 
when positioning GSE. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output GSE is being guided into position 
Precondition GSE reached its destination 
Apron is inspected 
A/c is secured 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 







Name of function Provide training to GSP employees 
Description This function refers to the process of training provision to GSP 
employees. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output GSP employees are trained 
Precondition  
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 





Name of function Position GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of driving and positioning GSE 
on the apron surface within the inner Circle of Safety. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input GSE is being guided into position 
Output GSE in position 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 







Name of function Maintain and test GSE 
Description This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of 
GSE and their regular testing by GSP engineers (or the GSA) at the 
beginning of each shift (or working day). 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input GSE is maintained and tested 
GSE is inspected 
Output GSE is maintained and tested 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control GSE is operated 
Load units are prepared and sorted on dollies/carts 




Name of function Secure GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of securing the GSE from 
movement and assuring safety on the apron surface. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output GSE is secured 
Precondition GSE in position 
Resource  







Name of function Move the a/c in the gate/stand 
Description This function refers to the process of operating the aircraft (if it is on 
its own power) or the pushback tug (if the aircraft is being towed 
in/pushed back) into the gate/stand. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input A/c is guided into the stand 
Output A/c has arrived to the gate/stand 
Precondition Interface with the a/c established 
Resource Airport infrastructure is maitained 
Gate/stand is assigned 
Control A/c is maintained and tested 
GSE is maintained and tested 
Time  
 
Name of function Maintain airport infrastructure 
Description This function refers to the process that goes into the maintenance of 
airport apron infrastructure by the airport authorities. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Apron is inspected 
Output Airport infrastructure is maitained 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 
Airport procedures 








Name of function Secure the a/c 
Description This function refers to the process of securing the aircraft 
from movement following its arrival into the gate/stand. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output A/c is secured 
Precondition A/c has arrived to the gate/stand 
Optimal number of required GSE for each task 
Resource  




Name of function Esatblish inteface with the a/c 
Description This function refers to the process of establishing the physical interface 
between GSE and the aircraft. These include connecting the a) fuel, 
lavatory, and water hose, b) bonding cable, c) ground power, d) air 
conditioning, and e) pushback tug. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output Interface with the a/c established 
Precondition A/c is secured 
A/c is inspected 
GSE is secured 
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 
GSE is being guided into position 







Name of function Open a/c doors 
Description This function refers to the process of opening of any door (i.e. 
passenger, cargo, fuel panel, lavatory panel) on the aircraft. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output A/c door opened 
Precondition A/c is secured 
A/c is inspected 
Interface with the a/c established 
GSE is secured 
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 




Name of function Disembark the aircraft 
Description This function refers to the process of disembarking of passengers, 
flight and cabin crew, GSAs and other people (i.e. from the airport, 
aircraft or GSP operations) during the turnaround. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output A/c is disembarked 
Precondition Interface with the a/c established 
A/c door opened 
GSE is secured 
A/c is secured 
Resource  







Name of function Operate GSE 
Description This function refers to all the processes of operating GSE by the GSAs, 
excluding the positioning which has been described as a separate 
function Position GSE. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Flight information 
Output GSE is operated 
Precondition Interface with the a/c established 
A/c is secured 
GSE is secured 
Resource Optimal quantity of replenishing supplies 
Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control GSE is maintained and tested 
A/c system operated 
Current and prospect weather conditions assessment 
GSE is inspected 








Name of function Operate a/c systems 
Description This function refers to the process of operating aircraft systems by the 
flight crew, GSAs or the mechanics. These include operating a) fuel 
panels, b) loading panels, c) door panels, d) lavatory, e) water panels, 
and f) aircraft brake system. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Interface with the a/c established 
Output A/c system operated 
Precondition A/c door opened 
A/c is secured 
GSE is secured 
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 




Name of function Guide a/c in the gate 
Description This function refers to the process of providing guidance to the aircraft 
(if it is on its own power) or the pushback tug (if the aircraft is being 
towed in/pushed back) into the gate/stand. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output A/c is guided into the stand 
Precondition Apron is inspected 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 







Name of function Manage turnaround 
Description This function refers to the process of managing (orchestrating) the 
turnaround process typically performed by a turnaround coordinator 
(TCO), dispatcher, GSP manager, GSP supervisor, and GSP lead. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output Turnaround process managed and coordinated 
Precondition  
Resource GSA and GSE assignment 




Name of function Prepare and sort load units 
Description This function refers to the process of preparing and sorting the Load 
Units for offloading from the aircraft. It includes the processes of a) 
loading containers with bags, b) loading bags into carts, c) building 
pallets, and d) sorting the containers after offloading according to the 
designation. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output Load units are prepared and sorted on dollies/carts 
Precondition GSE is inspected 
Load Units are offloaded 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 







Name of function Manage load and control 
Description This function refers to the process of managing of aircraft’s load 
and control by the GSP’s offloading team according to the load plan 
(i.e. Load-sheet) provided by the airline dispatcher and agreed by 
the flight crew. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output A/c off-loaded according to the loading instruction 
Precondition  
Resource  
Control GSP employees are trained 
Time  
 
Name of function Offload the a/c 
Description This function refers to the process of positioning and releasing and 
transferring load units (i.e. bags, pallets, containers, catering) from 
the aircraft to the GSE by the GSAs. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output Load Units are offloaded 
Precondition GSE is secured 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control A/c off-loaded according to the loading instruction 
A/c system operated 







Name of function Service a/c cabin 
Description This function refers to the process of cleaning, catering and 
performing security checks in the aircraft cabin. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 
Output Aircraft cabin is serviced 
Precondition Interface with the a/c established 
A/c door opened 
Resource Optimal quantity of replenishing supplies 
Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control GSP employees are trained 
Time  
 
Name of function Assign gate/stand 
Description This function refers to the process of gate/stand assignment 
performed by the apron management. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Flight information 










Name of function Weather monitoring 
Description This function refers to the process of gathering information about the 
current and prospect meteorological conditions. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  






Name of function Walk across the apron50 
Description This function refers to the movements of all people (i.e. GSA, flight 
crew, airport employees, security, passengers) on the apron in 
between the execution of all other functions. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 











Appendix IX – Inter-rater reliability for open and axial codes 
Results from the Cohen’s Kappa tests for axial and open codes are summarised in Table 
Appendix IX - 1 and Table Appendix IX - 2 respectively. 
Table Appendix IX - 1: Cohen’s Kappa for axial codes 
 Cohen's Kappa 
Axial Code Rater 1 Rater 2 
All 42 axial codes 0.85 0.87 
 
Table Appendix IX - 2: Cohen’s Kappa for open codes 
Cluster Function 
vs Factor 
Axial Code Open Code Cohen's Kappa 
Rater 1 Rater 2 
A Function Maintain airport infrastructure Airport infrastructure is maintained 0.77 0.79 
Maintain and test aircraft Aircraft is maintained and tested 
Maintain and test GSE GSE is maintained and tested 
B Function Develop procedural guidance Airport procedures 0.89 0.89 
Airline procedures 
GSP procedures 
C Function Weather monitoring Current and prospect weather 
conditions 
0.89 0.94 
Provide and update flight information Flight information 
Provide training to GSP employees GSP employees are trained 
D Function Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing 
supplies 
Optimal rosters 0.91 0.90 
Optimal number of qualified GSA for 
each task 
Optimal number of required GSE for 
each task 
Optimal quantity of replenishing 
supplies 
E Function Assess requirements for ground 
handling services 
Define services that need to be 
performed 
0.95 0.90 
Dispatch GSAs and GSE GSA and GSE assignment 
Manage turnaround Turnaround process managed and 
coordinated 
F Function Assure safety and quality of the 
turnaround 
Apron is inspected 0.96 0.87 
Aircraft is inspected 
GSE is inspected 
Load Units are inspected 
Procedures are enforced 
Records are kept 
G Function Assign gate/stand Gate/stand is assigned 0.95 0.90 






Guide aircraft into/from the gate/stand Aircraft is guided into the stand 
H Function Secure/release the aircraft Aircraft is secured/released 0.84 0.83 
Communicate and coordinate task 
execution 
Task execution is coordinated 
Drive GSE GSE reached its destination 
I Function Position GSE GSE in position 0.89 0.88 
Guide GSE GSE is being guided into position 
Secure/release GSE GSE is secured/released 
J Function Open/close aircraft doors Aircraft doors are opened/closed 0.90 0.84 
Establish/remove the interface with the 
aircraft 
Interface with the aircraft is 
established/removed 
Operate aircraft systems Aircraft system is operated 
K Function Operate GSE GSE is operated 0.92 0.94 
Disembark/embark the aircraft Aircraft is disembarked/embarked 
Manage load and control Aircraft loaded according to the 
loading instruction 
L Function Offload/onload the aircraft Load Units are offloaded/onloaded 1.00 0.94 
Prepare and sort load units Load units are prepared and sorted on 
dollies/carts 
Service aircraft cabin Aircraft cabin is serviced 
M Factor Ambient conditions Season 0.92 1.00 
Weather conditions 
Time of day 
Noise levels 




Distribution of to be serviced aircraft 
across the airport 
O Factor Technological characteristics Apron technology characteristics 0.93 0.95 
Aircraft characteristics 
GSE characteristics 
Load Unit characteristics 
PPE characteristics 
P Factor Airport characteristics Airport location 0.91 0.86 
Surface design 
Surface conditions 
Marking, signage and lighting 
Apron control 
Requirement of airside compliance 
Q Factor Aircraft operator characteristics GSP selection criteria 0.92 0.91 

















T Factor Physiological factors Personal characteristics 0.76 0.77 
Workload 
Fatigue 





V Factor Drugs and alcohol Drugs and alcohol 0.95 0.95 
GSP competition GSP competition 








Appendix X – TASM framework application in retrospective analysis 
 
Name of function Position a load unit 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Load unit is in the correct position 
Precondition GSP employees are trained 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control Procedures are enforced 
Aircraft loaded according to the loading instruction 
Aircraft loading system exists/is operable 
Load units are maintained 
Aircraft is approved for manual handling 
Time  
 
Name of function Secure/stack load units 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Load unit is secured/stacked 
Precondition Load unit is secured/stacked 
Aircraft locks are maintained 
Load units are maintained 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control GSP employees are trained 








Name of function Manage load and control 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Aircraft loaded according to the loading instruction 
Precondition GSP employees are trained 
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Control Procedures are enforced 
Time  
 
Name of function Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Procedures are enforced 






Name of function Maintain and test aircraft 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Aircraft loading system exists/is operable 











Name of function Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  






Name of function Provide training to GSP employees 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  






Name of function Approve aircraft for manual handling 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Aircraft is approved for manual handling 
Precondition  
Resource  









Name of function Develop procedural guidance 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  




Control International/national recommendations and standards 
Time  
 
Name of function Develop international/national recommendations and standards 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  






Name of function Maintain and test GSE 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  













Load the aircraft 
Description  
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Aircraft is inspected 
Output  
Precondition Load unit is in the correct position 














Communicate and coordinate task execution 
Description This function refers to the process of communication and 
coordination that occurs before, during, and following the 
execution of all the remaining functions during the turnaround. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Task execution coordinated 
Precondition  
Resource  







Provide and update flight information 
Description This function refers to the process of provision of accurate 
current and prospect information to direct stakeholders at the 
apron. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Task execution coordinated 





















Dispatch GSAs and GSE 
Description This function refers to the process of dispatching GSAs 
and GSEs for the turnaround. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input Flight information 
Output  
Precondition  
Resource Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Optimal number of required GSE for each task 
Optimal quantity of replenishing supplies 







Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 
Description This function refers to the process of assuring the GSP has 
enough resources to perform ground handling services on a 
daily basis. 
Aspect Description of aspect 
Input  
Output Optimal number of qualified GSA for each task 
Optimal number of required GSE for each task 












Appendix XII – Completeness assessment of variables in the 
SHEBBA database 
Table Appendix XII - 1 summarises the results of the completeness assessment for 
the 17 variables extracted from the SHEBBA database. 





Occurrence location 100.00% 
Function 
 Function 1 97.30% 
Function 2 37.60% 
Function 3 8.20% 
Function 4 0.60% 
Variability 
 Variability 1 37.32% 
Variability 2 13.77% 
Variability 3 3.60% 
Variability 4 0.64% 
Event type 
 Event type 1 99.70% 
Event type 2 5.00% 
Claims 
 Aviation claims 29.21% 
Injury claims 20.08% 







Appendix XIII – Interpretability assessement for the implicit and 
inferred variables extracted from the SHEBBA database 
Results from the Cohen’s Kappa and percentage agreement tests for the implicit and 
inferred variables are summarised in Table Appendix XIII - 1. 
Table Appendix XIII - 1: Data interpretability results 
Variable Cohen’s Kappa Percentage agreement 
Occurrence location 0.80 0.87 
Unwanted outcome 
  Injury 0.66 0.83 
Aircraft 0.89 0.97 
GSE 0.75 0.87 
Infrastructure 0.65 0.97 
Load 0.74 0.93 
Load unit 1.00 1.00 
Environment N/A 0.97 
Disruption N/A 0.97 
Function 
  Function 1 N/A 0.83 
Function 2 N/A 0.7753 
Function 3 N/A 0.93 
Function 4 N/A 1.00 
Event type 
  Event type 1 N/A 0.87 
Event type 2 N/A 0.97 
Variability 
  Variability 1 N/A 0.80 
Variability 2 N/A 0.93 
Variability 3 N/A 0.93 
Variability 4 N/A 1.00 
 
  
                                                      
53 The value of percentage agreement although below the .80 threshold is assessed as 









Percent of Cases N Percent 
Multiple_Fa Assign gate/stand 1 0.0% 0.1% 
Assure safety and quality of the 
turnaround 191 6.1% 24.6% 
Communicate and coordinate 
task execution 49 1.6% 6.3% 
Develop procedural guidance 11 0.4% 1.4% 
Disembark/embark the a/c 15 0.5% 1.9% 
Dispatch GSAs and GSE 3 0.1% 0.4% 
Drive GSE 215 6.9% 27.7% 
Establish/remove interface with 
the a/c 24 0.8% 3.1% 
Guide a/c into/from the 
gate/stand 1 0.0% 0.1% 
Guide GSE 14 0.5% 1.8% 
Offload/onload the aircraft 132 4.2% 17.0% 
Maintain airport infrastructure 16 0.5% 2.1% 
Maintain and test a/c 20 0.6% 2.6% 
Maintain and test GSE 75 2.4% 9.7% 
Manage GSA, GSE and 
replenishing supplies 10 0.3% 1.3% 
Manage load and control 2 0.1% 0.3% 
Manage turnaround 1 0.0% 0.1% 
Move the a/c in/out of the 
gate/stand 6 0.2% 0.8% 
Open/close a/c doors 7 0.2% 0.9% 
Operate a/c systems 17 0.5% 2.2% 
Operate GSE 100 3.2% 12.9% 
Position GSE 97 3.1% 12.5% 
Prepare and sort load units 15 0.5% 1.9% 
Provide training to GSP 
employees 4 0.1% 0.5% 
Secure/release GSE 47 1.5% 6.0% 
Secure/release the a/c 7 0.2% 0.9% 
Walk across the apron 13 0.4% 1.7% 
Undetermined54 21 0.7% 2.7% 
Service aircraft cabin 24 0.8% 3.1% 
DUMMY55 1970 63.4% 253.5% 
Total 3108 100.0% 400.0% 
a. Group 
                                                      
54 Responses in which the occurrence report did not allow for a specific TASM function to be 
extracted, the function variability was coded as Undetermined. 
55 Dummy variable was introduced to denote when one or more of the multiple responses did 





Appendix XV – Multiple response frequency analysis results for the functions variable per base 
TASM function 
Base Total 













Assign gate/stand 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Assure safety and quality of the turnaround 156 0.427 24 0.143 11 0.049 0 0 0 0 191 
Communicate and coordinate task execution 20 0.055 9 0.054 16 0.071 3 0.375 1 0.1 49 
Develop procedural guidance 1 0.003 2 0.012 8 0.035 0 0 0 0 11 
Disembark/embark the a/c 5 0.014 1 0.006 8 0.035 1 0.125 0 0 15 
Dispatch GSAs and GSE 1 0.003 2 0.012 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Drive GSE 57 0.156 67 0.399 84 0.372 3 0.375 4 0.4 215 
Establish/remove interface with the a/c 17 0.047 2 0.012 3 0.013 1 0.125 1 0.1 24 
Guide a/c into/from the gate/stand 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Guide GSE 5 0.014 4 0.024 5 0.022 0 0 0 0 14 
Offload/onload the aircraft 70 0.192 22 0.131 39 0.173 0 0 1 0.1 132 
Maintain airport infrastructure 9 0.025 1 0.006 6 0.027 0 0 0 0 16 
Maintain and test a/c 10 0.027 2 0.012 8 0.035 0 0 0 0 20 
Maintain and test GSE 20 0.055 28 0.167 24 0.106 2 0.25 1 0.1 75 
Manage GSA, GSE and replenishing supplies 7 0.019 0 0 3 0.013 0 0 0 0 10 
Manage load and control 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Manage turnaround 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Move the a/c in/out of the gate/stand 3 0.008 3 0.018 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 





Operate a/c systems 7 0.019 5 0.03 5 0.022 0 0 0 0 17 
Operate GSE 34 0.093 37 0.22 26 0.115 1 0.125 2 0.2 100 
Position GSE 31 0.085 25 0.149 37 0.164 3 0.375 1 0.1 97 
Prepare and sort load units 11 0.03 2 0.012 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 15 
Provide training to GSP employees 2 0.005 2 0.012 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Secure/release GSE 17 0.047 10 0.06 20 0.088 0 0 0 0 47 
Secure/release the a/c 5 0.014 1 0.006 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 7 
Walk across the apron 6 0.016 3 0.018 4 0.018 0 0 0 0 13 
Undetermined56 7 0.019 6 0.036 5 0.022 1 0.125 2 0.2 21 
Service aircraft cabin 6 0.016 0 0 18 0.08 0 0 0 0 24 












                                                      
56 Responses in which the occurrence report did not allow for a specific TASM function to be extracted, the function variability was coded as Undetermined. 





Appendix XVI – Multiple response frequency analysis results for the 
variability variable 
Variability Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
 113 1 0.0% 0.1% 
N.p.58 410 13.5% 52.8% 
Und.59 2268 74.5% 291.9% 
1113 1 0.0% 0.1% 
1126 18 0.6% 2.3% 
1211 8 0.3% 1.0% 
1226 3 0.1% 0.4% 
1273 8 0.3% 1.0% 
1274 9 0.3% 1.2% 
2253 1 0.0% 0.1% 
11112 2 0.1% 0.3% 
11116 2 0.1% 0.3% 
11121 45 1.5% 5.8% 
11122 18 0.6% 2.3% 
11133 2 0.1% 0.3% 
11214 1 0.0% 0.1% 
11218 1 0.0% 0.1% 
11221 55 1.8% 7.1% 
11222 2 0.1% 0.3% 
11223 5 0.2% 0.6% 
11252 1 0.0% 0.1% 
11263 2 0.1% 0.3% 
11264 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12113 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12114 1 0.0% 0.1% 
                                                      
58 Not populated (N.p.) refers to field in 
which information about variability was 
not populated. 
59 Responses in which the occurrence 
report did not allow for a specific 
variability factor to be extracted, the 
variability was coded as Und. 
12116 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12117 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12119 7 0.2% 0.9% 
12252 11 0.4% 1.4% 
12262 7 0.2% 0.9% 
12263 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12264 3 0.1% 0.4% 
12265 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12266 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12311 6 0.2% 0.8% 
12314 35 1.1% 4.5% 
12315 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12321 5 0.2% 0.6% 
12322 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12323 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12325 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12326 14 0.5% 1.8% 
12331 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12332 16 0.5% 2.1% 
12333 1 0.0% 0.1% 
12334 7 0.2% 0.9% 
12341 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12342 4 0.1% 0.5% 
12344 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12345 2 0.1% 0.3% 
12421 25 0.8% 3.2% 
12431 19 0.6% 2.4% 






Appendix XVII – Multiple response frequency analysis results for the 








































































113 0 0 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
N.p.
60 265 0.726 88 0.524 48 0.212 6 0.75 3 0.3 410 
Und.
61 1058 2.899 522 3.107 636 2.814 23 2.875 29 2.9 2268 
1113 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1126 15 0.041 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.3 18 
1211 5 0.014 2 0.012 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 8 
1226 2 0.005 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1273 0 0 2 0.012 5 0.022 1 0.125 0 0 8 
1274 1 0.003 1 0.006 7 0.031 0 0 0 0 9 
2253 0 0 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
11112 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
11116 1 0.003 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
11121 9 0.025 2 0.012 31 0.137 1 0.125 2 0.2 45 
11122 11 0.03 0 0 7 0.031 0 0 0 0 18 
11133 0 0 1 0.006 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 2 
11214 0 0 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
11218 0 0 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
11221 8 0.022 15 0.089 32 0.142 0 0 0 0 55 
11222 1 0.003 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 2 
11223 1 0.003 0 0 4 0.018 0 0 0 0 5 
11252 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
11263 0 0 0 0 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 2 
11264 0 0 0 0 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 2 
12113 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
12114 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12116 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
                                                      
60 Not populated (N.p.) refers to field in which information about variability was not 
populated. 
61 Responses in which the occurrence report did not allow for a specific variability factor to be 





12117 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12119 4 0.011 1 0.006 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 7 
12252 2 0.005 1 0.006 8 0.035 0 0 0 0 11 
12262 3 0.008 0 0 4 0.018 0 0 0 0 7 
12263 1 0.003 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 2 
12264 1 0.003 0 0 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 3 
12265 0 0 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 1 
12266 1 0.003 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 2 
12311 4 0.011 0 0 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 6 
12314 6 0.016 1 0.006 28 0.124 0 0 0 0 35 
12315 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12321 1 0.003 3 0.018 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 5 
12322 0 0 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 1 
12323 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12325 0 0 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 1 
12326 4 0.011 1 0.006 9 0.04 0 0 0 0 14 
12331 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12332 10 0.027 2 0.012 4 0.018 0 0 0 0 16 
12333 0 0 1 0.006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12334 1 0.003 0 0 6 0.027 0 0 0 0 7 
12341 0 0 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 1 0.1 2 
12342 2 0.005 0 0 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 4 
12344 1 0.003 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 2 
12345 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
12421 6 0.016 7 0.042 12 0.053 0 0 0 0 25 
















Appendix XVIII – Multiple response frequency analysis results for 
the event type variable 
 
Responses 
Percent of Cases N Percent 
a Aircraft engine blast/ingestion 2 0.2% 0.3% 
Contact (aircraft-GSE) 56 6.9% 7.2% 
Contact (aircraft-aircraft) 1 0.1% 0.1% 
Contact (aircraft-GSA) 9 1.1% 1.2% 
Contact (GSA-GSA) 6 0.7% 0.8% 
Contact (GSE-Other) 231 28.3% 29.7% 
Contact (GSE-GSA) 17 2.1% 2.2% 
Contact (LU-aircraft) 15 1.8% 1.9% 
Contact (LU-GSA) 19 2.3% 2.4% 
Contact (LU-GSE) 15 1.8% 1.9% 
Found damage 198 24.3% 25.5% 
Hazardous substance exposure /contact 19 2.3% 2.4% 
Manual handling 89 10.9% 11.5% 
Slip/trip/fall 45 5.5% 5.8% 
Spill 9 1.1% 1.2% 
Fire/smoke 10 1.2% 1.3% 
Equipment/load unit fall/loss 36 4.4% 4.6% 
Equipment malfunction 21 2.6% 2.7% 
Aircraft/equipment operated out of tolerance 16 2.0% 2.1% 
Undetermined62 2 0.2% 0.3% 
Total 816 100.0% 105.0% 
a. Group 
                                                      
62 Responses in which the occurrence report did not allow for a specific event type to be 


























Aircraft engine blast/ingestion 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Contact (aircraft-GSE) 26 0.071 12 0.071 18 0.08 0 0 0 0 56 
Contact (aircraft-aircraft) 1 0.003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Contact (aircraft-GSA) 3 0.008 0 0 5 0.022 0 0 1 0.1 9 
Contact (GSA-GSA) 1 0.003 0 0 5 0.022 0 0 0 0 6 
Contact (GSE-Other) 63 0.173 62 0.369 97 0.429 4 0.5 5 0.5 231 
Contact (GSE-GSA) 7 0.019 5 0.03 5 0.022 0 0 0 0 17 
Contact (LU-aircraft) 11 0.03 1 0.006 3 0.013 0 0 0 0 15 
Contact (LU-GSA) 5 0.014 9 0.054 5 0.022 0 0 0 0 19 
Contact (LU-GSE) 9 0.025 5 0.03 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 15 
Found damage 152 0.416 26 0.155 19 0.084 1 0.125 0 0 198 
Hazardous substance 
exposure /contact 9 0.025 1 0.006 9 0.04 0 0 0 0 19 
Manual handling 33 0.09 20 0.119 30 0.133 2 0.25 4 0.4 89 
Slip/trip/fall 22 0.06 4 0.024 19 0.084 0 0 0 0 45 
Spill 2 0.005 4 0.024 0 0 3 0.375 0 0 9 





Equipment/load unit fall/loss 21 0.058 13 0.077 2 0.009 0 0 0 0 36 
Equipment malfunction 6 0.016 9 0.054 6 0.027 0 0 0 0 21 
Aircraft/equipment operated out 
of tolerance 3 0.008 9 0.054 3 0.013 1 0.125 0 0 16 













                                                      










damage GSE damage 
Infrastructural 





Base A Count 0 182 42 11 2 24 0 11 256 
% within base 0.0% 71.1% 16.4% 4.3% 0.8% 9.4% 0.0% 4.3%  
B Count 2 19 84 3 3 10 5 5 116 
% within base 1.7% 16.4% 72.4% 2.6% 2.6% 8.6% 4.3% 4.3%  
C Count 84 12 72 4 1 0 1 3 170 
% within base 49.4% 7.1% 42.4% 2.4% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 1.8%  
D Count 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 3 
% within base 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3%  
E Count 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
% within base 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Total Count 86 213 203 18 6 34 7 20 548 
Percentages and totals are based on respondents. 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1. 
 
